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Preface 
Leadership in Space 
Section 203 (a) (3) of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 
requires of NASA that, "The Administration, in order to carry out the purpose of 
this Act, shall provide for the widest practicable and appropriate dissemination 
of information concerning its activities and the results thereof." This clause 
provides the legal basis for d l  of NASA's public outreach activities, among 
which are included the many speeches given by the administrator and other 
senior officials in the course of representing the agency. While public speaking 
does not come naturally to me, it is an important part of my duties; and from 
the outset of my tenure, I determined to abide by several tenets I thought to be 
important when representing NASA in public forums. 
First, I thought that each speech should be unique. I wanted each new 
speech to have something "fresh" for listeners, some new food for thought. 
While there would of course be common themes I wanted to emphasize, I would 
try to do so in different ways at each venue in which I spoke. Second, each 
speech would be "mine" by the time I gave it-my own thoughts in my own 
"voice." I was willing, indeed eager, to accept thematic ideas, drafts or editing 
suggestions from any source. But I didn't intend to use a "speechwriter" in the 
conventional sense. By the time a speech was ready to be delivered, I would 
have reworked it so thoroughly that I would be at least a co-author in the 
fullest sense. I would never simply read a speech prepared by others, even if the 
alternative was to deliver an extemporaneous address on the spot, as sometimes 
happened. And finally, while each speech was to be unique, I wanted to leave 
behind my thoughts on certain themes of particular interest to me and whose 
treatment would be the topic of more than one address. 
The most important theme ,for me has been that of identifying and 
elucidating an intellectual rationale for human space exploration. I believe 
that it is time for the proponents of human spaceflight to cease the attempt to 
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justify it on the basis of its contributions to science. While human spaceflight 
does offer options and venues for scientific discovery that are not easily 
provided by robotic spacecraft, this is merely a collateral benefit of human 
presence in space. 
Human space exploration is not fundamentally about enabling science, 
important as that is. It is about expanding the range of human action, experience 
and influence. It is about developing options for succeeding generations to 
exploit the resources of the solar system for the benefit of mankind. I believe 
that this is an endeavor whose intrinsic merit stands on par with that of 
scientific discovery in its value to the human race. Yet when I joined NASA in 
the year following President George W. Bush's announcement of the Vision 
for Space Exploration, comments such as "exploration without science is 
tourism" were being bandied about in the media. Such comments convey the 
disdainful judgment that human exploration exists, if it is allowed to exist at 
all, on the sufferance of the scientific community and is to be ranked in terms 
of its value to that community. Even the International Space Station, the most 
incredibly stunning engineering achievement in human history, was justified 
in terms of the arcane science it would enable instead of its truly fundamental 
role as a toehold on a new frontier, a place to begin to learn how to live and 
work in space. 
I sought to offer through my public addresses a more complete rationale for 
human presence in space. In various speeches I tried to illustrate the connections 
between a vigorous program of human space exploration and important societal 
interests including national security; the value of leadership and partnership in 
great enterprises; the effect on our industrial base and economic competitiveness 
of learning how to do very hard things; the spread of values and culture among 
the worlds of the future; the long-term survival of the human species; and, yes, 
enhanced possibilities for scientific discovery. Part 1 of this collection offers a 
collection of speeches addressing various aspects of that broad theme. 
Because the exploration and development of the space frontier is a 
strategic issue for the United States, NASA touches important segments of 
society on many levels. Learning how to live and work in space or sending our 
machines there on our behalf has profoundly influenced and in some cases 
redefined the practice of commerce, science, engineering and management 
in our nation and the world. Part 2 includes speeches on various aspects of 
such influence. In particular, I am persuaded that we owe the modern practice 
of system engineering and its allied discipline, systems management, to the 
driving force of the early civil and military space programs. I believe these 
disciplines are crucial to our success in a competitive global society yet are 
widely misunderstood; and so I have included in this section some material 
outlining my views on what system engineering is and is not. 
We are at a cusp of opportunity for the U.S. civil space program. Apollo, 
and with it the outward focus of our efforts in space, was ended almost before 
the policy makers of that era had time to consider or debate the implications of 
what was being done and not done. Spotlighted by the searching examination of 
the Columbia Accident Investigation Board was the glaring assessment that the 
U.S. space program had moved forward for more than three decades without a 
guiding vision. For a brief moment, and for the first time in decades, this was 
broadly seen to be the fundamental flaw in national space policy that some of 
us have always seen (and lamented) but were powerless to alter. But out of that 
tragedy came a new guiding vision, one that I believe is perfectly aligned with 
this nation's proper interests in space. 
Now, at this cusp, we who want this new vision carried forward 
must recognize that it is not yet cemented firmly in place. Outward, 
destination-focused exploration is not yet the paradigm for "what NASA does." 
For decades, the public image of NASA has been that of flying the space shuttle 
to orbit, carrying out activities little understood and less regarded by most of 
those who must support them. As it retreated into history, Apollo assumed 
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mythological proportions, becoming simultaneously NASA's apotheosis and 
a measure of what had been lost. 'The actual doing of Apollo seemed, in early 
2005, to be impossibly beyond us. Even now, very few in our space industry 
yet believe that we can really, truly, actually, not only re-create but go beyond 
the achievements of the Apollo years. 
But I know that we can. And Part 3 is devoted to my assessment, in 
rather specific terms, of why I believe that is so, how we can do it and how what 
we are doing fits into the context of what we have done before. ?he civil space 
strategy that has been laid out is practically achievable and affordable, if barely 
so, with the budgets we can expect to receive. I hope that you will conclude 
after reading the material in this section that this is indeed so. 
So, finally, in the work presented here I have tried to provide a thoughtful 
rationale for what we are doing in space, why we are doing it and how we intend 
to bring it about. If we can agree, as a community of those who believe that our 
future lies in mastering the space frontier, then I hope you will also agree with 
me that now it is a future we can seize. 
Part 1. 
Exploration and Our Future 
Leadership in Space 
Michael D. Griffin 
Administrator 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
California Space Authority 
December 2, 2005 
I'm here today to talk about national and world leadership in space- 
what it means to me, and what I think it takes to achieve and maintain it. 
Most will agree that it is important for the United States to be a 
leader among the nations of the world, and that such leadership has many 
dimensions. Economic, cultural, diplomatic, moral and educational leadership 
are certainly major components of world leadership. Moreover, we clearly still 
live in a time when any wealthy and prominent nation must have the ability to 
defend itself and its allies. But true leadership also involves defining, and then 
pursuing, the frontiers that expand mankind's reach. It means occupying the 
cutting edge of science and technology. It means establishing world technical 
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standards-as we have done in the computing and aviation industries-not 
through coercion but because we have developed a capability that others wish 
to use. It also means having the ability and determination to take the lead in 
building coalitions and partnerships to do those things that fulfill the dreams 
of mankind. And those dreams have always included the desire to see what lies 
beyond the known world. 
To journey beyond the known world today, we must leave Earth entirely. 
That is the long-held dream that has actively engaged our country and others 
for nearly 50 years, since our first primitive steps in the exploration of space 
became possible. And I firmly believe that in the 21st century taking shape as 
we speak, a vital part of world leadership will be leadership in the exploration 
and development of the space frontier. 
For many years, our country has been rightly recognized as the world 
leader in the exploration and use of space, and in developing and deploying 
the technologies that make space leadership possible. Our determination to 
be first on the moon and preeminent in other space activities resulted in some 
of the iconic moments of the 20th century, and helped to solidify American 
leadership in the generation after World War 11. 
But, as they say, that was then and this is now. We cannot rest on, nor 
be satisfied with, past accomplishments. The true space age, in which humans 
will explore the worlds beyond our own, is just getting underway. Leadership 
in establishing a human presence in the solar system will, in my judgment, be a 
key factor in defining world leadership on Earth for generations to come. 
Throughout history, the great civilizations have always extended the 
frontiers of their times. Indeed, this is almost a tautology; we define as 
"great" only those civilizations which did explore and expand their frontiers, 
thereby ultimately influencing world culture. And when, inevitably, some 
societies retreated from the frontiers they had pioneered, their greatness 
subsided as well. 
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Today, other nations besides our own aspire to leadership on the space 
frontier. These nations are making progress, and they will undoubtedly utilize 
their advancements in space to influence world affairs. Their activities will 
earn them the respect, which is both sincere and automatic, that is accorded 
to nations and societies engaged in pioneering activities. These things are not 
in doubt, and so the question before us is this: when other nations reach the 
moon, or Mars, or the worlds beyond, will they be standing with the United 
States, or will we be watching their exploits on television? The president has 
given us his answer. America will lead. In 2004, the president said, "We have 
undertaken space travel because the desire to explore and understand is part 
of our character. And that quest has brought tangible benefits that improve 
our lives in countless ways." He also said our Vision for Space Exploration is 
a "journey, not a race." These words are unambiguous. They chart a course for 
action that is unmistakable. It is imperative that this commitment transcend 
any given administration and any given Congress. 
Today, as other countries renew their commitment to space, America has 
the opportunity, and I would argue the obligation to maintain our leadership 
role in space exploration. As we watch other countries commit to developing 
new exploration systems and technologies to expand into space, we too must 
remain committed to new advancements, lest we fall behind. In that regard, it 
may be significant to note that of today's major spacefaring powers, only Russia 
and China have spacecraft--Soyuz and Shenhzou-that are capable of returning 
crews from a trip to the moon. 
Through the Vision for Space Exploration however, this country has a 
renewed commitment to maintain our leadership and restore the capabilities 
we set aside many years ago. The vote by three successive Congresses to 
support the Vision for Space Exploration outlined by President Bush in 2004 
offers wonderful evidence of national determination to regain lost ground in 
space. But beyond those very important congressional votes, there are some 
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very serious challenges that we must face as a nation. We must think carefully 
about what the world of tomorrow will look like if the United States is not the 
preeminent spacefaring nation. And if we don't like that picture, if we truly 
want the United States to be the world leader in space now and in the future, 
there are a number of critical things we simply must decide to do. The Vision 
gives us the opportunity to take on the leading role in the exploration of space, 
not just for this century, but for centuries to come. But we have to seize that 
opportunity and make it a reality. 
The first essential step is that American leadership in the exploration 
and development of the space frontier must be an explicit national goal. There 
must be continued and sustained bipartisan cooperation and agreement on 
the importance and necessity of American leadership in space, just as we are 
determined to be leaders in other areas such as defense, education and scientific 
research. There need not, indeed there must not, be partisan debates over whether 
to have a vibrant space program or not. And we must get beyond revisiting this 
determination each year or after an accident, or after a technical problem. 
In addition to needing national agreement on the importance ofAmerican 
leadership in space, we need to make this a commitment from generation to 
generation. Space exploration by its very nature requires the planning and 
implementation of missions and projects over decades, not years. Decades 
of commitment were required to build up our network of transcontinental 
railroads and highways, as well as our systems for maritime and aeronautical 
commerce. It will not be quicker or easier to build our highways to space, and 
the commitment to do it must be clear and sustaining. 
To ensure the success of the space program across a wide spectrum of 
political thought and down the generations, it is essential to have simple but 
compelling The space cominunity has an obligation to communicate to 
the country our plans to ensure America's leadership in space exploration. The 
President's Vision for Space Exploration has established goals that people can 
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understand and support-moving our space exploration activities beyond low 
Earth orbit, and returning to the moon as a stepping-stone to Mars and other 
destinations beyond, such as the near-Earth asteroids. 
Broad support for these goals is certainly there. A recent Gallup poll 
indicated that, with funding levels at or below one percent of the federal budget, 
three-quarters of Americans are supportive of our plans to return to the moon 
and voyage to Mars. This is amazingly strong support for any government 
initiative, and I believe it provides a firm foundation upon which to build in 
the years ahead. The first step might be to explain that we're actually spending 
less than 0.7 percent of the federal budget! 
Still another key requirement for long-term leadership in space is the 
ability to build and maintain a strong international coalition of spacefaring 
nations. A critical component of this ability will always be our credibility in 
making agreements and honoring them. In any partnership, the most critical 
commitments fall upon the senior partner. Since that, of course, is the role 
we wish to play, we must be thoughtful, deliberate and sure about any 
commitments we make. But once made, we need to keep them. I think we can 
all agree that one of the best results of the International Space Station program 
is the cooperation it has fostered among the participating nations. A prime goal 
of the President's Vision for Space Exploration is to continue and expand this 
cooperation as we plan for human lunar return. 
These are some of the key things we need to do if we Americans are 
indeed serious about being a leader on the space frontier. As we lift our eyes to 
the future, I see a space program that will bring hope, opportunity and tangible 
benefits as we renew our commitment to lead in these endeavors. While we 
cannot predict today at what pace others will venture beyond Earth orbit and 
establish the first outposts on distant worlds I earnestly believe those nations 
that are the most adept at reading the lessons of history will be taking the lead. 
Leadership in Space 
I have mused often upon these lessons, looking for the patterns that can 
provide guidance for our own time. Indeed, if we were alive 500 years ago, or 
thereabouts, and a candlelight conference were held in Lisbon by the Portuguese 
Oceans Authority, no doubt we would be listening to such giants of exploration 
as Vasco da Gama and Pedro Alvares Cabral (the explorer who claimed Brazil 
for Portugal) explain how their activities would bring about Portugal's rise to 
global influence. 
Perhaps all of us would be speaking Portuguese today had not first 
Spain, and then later England, made a greater commitment to the discovery, 
exploration and settlement of new territories. 
As an example of how the choices that nations make matter, not only 
for themselves, but also for the future of humanity, let us consider the case of 
John Cabot. Cabot, whose true name was Giovanni Caboto, was an Italian 
who sailed for the English government and private merchants after Spain and 
Portugal expressed no interest in his ideas on finding a westward passage to 
Asia. While exploring the coastal regions of North America in Newfoundland, 
he established the basis for England's claim to North America and was the first 
to bring our language to the shores where we now live. 
There are more recent examples of similar pivotal crossroads in our history. 
While American ingenuity, in the form of those quintessentially American 
inventors, Wilbur and Orville Wright, did lead the way into the era of powered 
flight, we tend to forget that we squandered our initial leadership in aviation. 
And so, 90 years ago, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, NASA's 
major predecessor, was founded precisely because our nation's leaders feared 
the European nations already had a significant advantage in the development 
of strategically important aviation systems and technologies, just one decade 
into the age of flight. This was in fact true, and as a consequence, the air war of 
World War I was fought with European airplanes. 
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But because we made a strong commitment at that time to this emerging 
field, the influence of American air power and aviation technology can, today, 
be seen in everything from the fact that we live in a world not dominated by 
fascism or communism, to the fact that when you fly anywhere in the world, 
say from Bangalore to Bangkok, the International Civil Aviation Organization 
dictates that pilots and air traffic controllers speak English. This is a lesson that 
cannot be learned too thoroughly: if we become complacent, other nations can 
and will surpass our achievements. 
As we look forward to the events that will define the 21st century, as 
viewed by the historians of yet future centuries, there is no doubt that the 
expansion of human civilization into space will be among the great achievements 
of this era. We have the opportunity, and I would say the obligation, to lead 
this enterprise, to explore worlds beyond our own and to help shape the destiny 
of this world for centuries to come. 
I am convinced that leadership in the world of the 21st century and 
beyond will go to the nation that seeks to fulfill the dreams of mankind. We 
know what motivates those dreams. Exploring new territory when it becomes 
~ossible to do so has defined human striving ever since our remote ancestors 
migrated out of the east African plains. The human imperative to explore new 
territories, and to exploit the resources of these territories, will surely be satisfied 
by others if not by us. What the United States gains from a robust, focused 
program of human and robotic space exploration is the opportunity to define 
the course along which this human imperative will carry us. 
The Vision for Space Exploration affords the United States nothing 
less than the opportunity to take the lead, not only in this century but in the 
centuries to follow, in advancing those interests of our nation that are very 
much in harmony with the interests of people throughout the world. Space will 
be explored and exploited by humans. The question is: which humans and from 
where, and what language will they speak? It is my goal that Americans will be 
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always among them. If this is the future we wish to see, we have a lot of work 
to do to sustain the Vision which takes us there. To me, the choice could not 
be more compelling. 
Part 1. Exploration and Our Future 
Space Exploration: Real Reasons and Acceptable Reasons 
Michael D. Griffin 
Administrator 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Quasar Award Dinner 
Bay Area Houston Economic Partnership 
January 19,2007 
We have a very interesting conundrum at NASA, and we have been 
spending a lot of time lately thinking about it. In national polling, NASA as 
an American institution enjoys a hugely positive approval rating, broadly in 
the range of 65 to 75 percent, an amazing result for a government agency. But 
when you ask people why, they are not really sure, or at least cannot express it 
clearly. When you ask people what we do beyond the broad category of "space," 
again they aren't quite sure. And if you ask them what we're planning to do, 
they're even less sure. But they know that they love NASA. So NASA has what 
in the marketing discipline would be called "very strong brand loyalty," even 
though people are not familiar in detail with what we do or why they like it. 
I have been trying to understand why this is so, because it is important 
to our agency's future. If we don't have public support that is both strong and 
specific, the things we want to do and believe to be important will not survive. 
There are many competing priorities for public funding, and there always will 
be. So it really is important for us to communicate to the public how we're 
spending the 15 cents per day that the average American contributes to NASA, 
because there are other places where that money can go. 
I've reached the point where I am completely convinced that if NASA 
were to disappear tomorrow, if the American space program were to disappear 
tomorrow, if we never put up another Hubble, if we never put another human 
being in space, people would be profoundly distraught. Americans would feel 
less than themselves. They would feel that our best days are behind us. They 
Leadership in Space 
would feel that we have lost something, something that matters. And yet they 
would not know why. 
This is an interesting conclusion, and so I've thought about it a good bit; 
and I've come believe that the reason is that we in the space business don't talk 
about it in the right way. 
If you ask why we're going back to the moon and, later, beyond, you 
can get a variety of answers. The president quite correctly said that we do it for 
purposes of scientific discovery, economic benefit and national security. I've 
given speeches on each of those topics, and I think these reasons can be clearly 
shown to be true. And Presidential Science Advisor Jack Marburger has said 
that questions about space exploration come down to whether or not we want 
to bring the solar system within mankind's sphere of economic influence. I 
think that is extraordinarily well put. 
These reasons have in common the fact that they can be discussed 
within the circles of public policy making. They can be debated on their 
merits, on logical principles. They can be justified. They are what I am going 
to call tonight "Acceptable Reasons." You can attach whatever importance 
you want to any of those factors, and some citizens will weight some factors 
more and some will weight them less, but most of us would agree that they 
are, indeed, relevant factors. 
But who talks like that? Who talks about doing something for purposes 
of scientific or economic gain or national security other than in policy circles? If 
anybody asked Lindberg why he crossed the Atlantic-and many did-he never 
indicated that he personally flew the Atlantic to win the Orteig prize. His backers 
might have done it in part for that, but Lindberg did it for other reasons. 
If you ask Burt Rutan why 'he designed and built Voyager and why Dick 
Rutan and Jeanna Yeager flew it around the world, it wasn't for any money 
involved; it was because it was one of the last unconquered feats in aviation. If 
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you ask Burt and his backer Paul Allen why they developed a vehicle to win the 
X-Prize, it wasn't for the money. They spent twice as much as they made. 
I think we all know why people do some of these things. They are 
well-captured in many famous phrases. When Sir George Mallory was asked 
why he wanted to climb Mount Everest, he said, "Because it is there." He didn't 
say that it was for economic gain. 
We know these reasons, and tonight I will call them "Real Reasons." Real 
Reasons are intuitive and compelling to all of us, but they're not immediately 
logical. They're exactly the opposite of "Acceptable Reasons," which are 
eminently logical but neither intuitive nor emotionally compelling. The Real 
Reasons we do things like exploring space involve competitiveness, curiosity 
and monument building. So let's talk about them. 
First, most of us want to be, both as individuals and as societies, the first, 
the best and the most, in at least some activity. We want to stand out. This 
kind of behavior is rooted in our genes. We are today the survivors of people 
who wanted to outperform others. Without question, that can be carried to 
an unhealthy degree; we've all seen more wars than we like. But because this 
trait can be taken too far doesn't mean that we can do without it completely. 
Competitiveness is rooted in the genes of successful people. 
As to curiosity, who among us does not know the wonder, mystery, 
awe and magic of seeing something-even on television-never seen before, 
an experience brought back to us by a robotic space mission? And how much 
grander when one of our own, a representative of other human beings, is 
there to see it for herself? Who doesn't know that feeling? The urge to know 
what's over the next hill is one of the most common feelings we share, 
whatever our backgrounds. 
We like to do what I'll call "monument building." We want to leave 
something behind for the next generation, or the generations after that, to show 
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them that we were here, to show them what we did with our time here. This 
is the impulse behind cathedrals and pyramids and many, many other things. 
We could have done a lot of different things to honor George Washington. 
But what was done was that, in the early 1800s, people started to work on a 
550-foot high obelisk to honor him. 
But it is not only George Washington whom the monument honors; 
it says hlly as much about the people who built it. And that's okay. It is my 
observation that when we do things for Real Reasons as opposed to Acceptable 
Reasons, we produce our highest achievements. The people who do things for 
Real Reasons, and who know it, are also the ones who are the most successhl 
by the standards embodied in Acceptable Reasons. 
All of you in the space business know this, whether you realize it or not, 
because none of us is in this business for the money to be made. But I believe 
we see it most obviously in our society and in sports. In my own sport, golf, 
certain people have, over the decades, risen to the very top of the game and 
stayed there. People like Bobby Jones, Ben Hogan, Jack Nicklaus or, today, 
Tiger Woods. In other sports, people like Wayne Gretzky or Michael Jordan 
come to mind. 
What do these people have in common and what is the lesson for the 
rest of us? The lesson is that they became legends because they wanted to be the 
very best at what they do. They wanted to leave something behind them, lasting 
records in their sport. And they wanted to do it because the challenge was there. 
Who thinks that any of them played, or kept playing, for the money? 
I think that tells us something. When you do things for Real Reasons 
instead of Acceptable Reasons, you have a chance to obtain Real Success. 
And so we have a conundrum. The cultural ethos in America today requires 
us to have Acceptable Reasons for what we do. We must have reasons that 
pass analytical muster, that offer a favorable costlbenefit ratio and that can be 
logically defended. We tend to dismiss out of hand reasons that are emotional, or 
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are value-driven in ways that we can't capture on a spreadsheet. But, Acceptable 
Reasons alone don't take us where we really want to go. 
In my view, the space business, more than most other endeavors, suffers 
from the fact that the most important, the best and the most basic reasons 
for doing it are Real Reasons and not Acceptable Reasons. The Acceptable 
Reasons-economic benefit, scientific discovery and national security-are, in 
fact, completely correct. But they comprise a derived rationale and are not the 
truly compelling reasons. And again, who talks like that, about anything that 
really matters to them? 
Why in today's culture do we focus so much on requiring Acceptable 
Reasons? Only a couple of generations ago, it was not so much this way. 
One observation I would make is that, in the shaping of policy, the kinds 
of things I've cited as Real Reasons are "right-brain" things; they're intuitive, 
subjective and difficult to quantify. And they are running around loose in a 
left-brain world! All of us here tonight got where we are by being analytical 
and objective and very left-brain oriented. Spaceflight cannot be successfully 
accomplished without these traits. And so I think we tend not to pay appropriate 
respect to the deeper parts of human nature that are intuitive and qualitative. 
This one-sided focus isn't always to our benefit. In a very important sense, we're 
not the right people to make the arguments as to why we should be encouraged 
to do what we do! 
Some of you must have read Norman Mailer's book from 1970, entitled 
"Of a Fire on the Moon." Mailer was a unique and controversial novelist. I 
think of him, in the sense that I was just talking about, as quite possibly the 
ultimate right-brain kind of guy. And he wrote about Apollo in a very, very 
interesting book, but from a perspective I've not seen another writer choose. He 
didn't write about the engineering of it, the operational aspects, the astronauts 
who flew the missions or anything like that. He wrote about what people were 
feeling, the power and majesty of the event and the nature of the people who 
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would engage in such a thing. It's a compelling story, but it is not like any other 
book about the space program that you will read. That's the kind of person, the 
kind of work, that we need to exemplify the Real Reasons for what we do. 
Real Reasons are not amenable to costlbenefit analysis. I'm reminded 
of the famous quote "A cynic is a man who knows the price of everything and 
the value of nothing," by the character Lord Darlington in Oscar Wilde's play 
"Lady Windermere's Fan." It's one of my favorites. Well, in today's America, 
it's smart; it's popular; it's clever to be a cynic. And a certain amount of it is 
appropriate; a healthy skepticism of bold claims is necessary. But too much 
skepticism causes us to deny a part of what we are. 
Real Reasons are old fashioned. How many of us grew up reading "Tom 
Swift," "Jack Armstrong" or "All American Boy"? Or other similar books 
stories? Not great literature, for sure, but they exemplified many of the values 
I think we like to see in people: inventiveness, competitiveness, boldness and 
a sense of good feeling about what it was to be an American, in very simplistic 
ways, ways which hit close to home. 
To read those books was to understand, even as a child, that achievement 
is to be valued and is not something to be set aside. So, how do we talk about 
our achievers today? Other than in the field of sports, we talk about today's 
achievers as "geeks" and "workaholics." People are advised to lead "balanced 
lives." I don't know about you, but I haven't led a balanced life. But people 
who want to accomplish something are not balanced. And they are geeks 
and workaholics. I think we owe our country to people who were like that. I 
don't know that one could say that folks like George Washington and Thomas 
Jefferson led balanced lives. Any rational costlbenefit analysis would tell you 
to stay out of a quarrel with the mother country and let other people deal 
with it! Who today would talk about pledging "their lives, their fortunes and 
their sacred honor" to a cause? Today we are uncomfortable with such value 
discussions, and I think it's a shame. 
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Now, I talked earlier about building monuments, and I mentioned 
the cathedrals and the pyramids. Cathedral builders knew what I am talking 
about tonight. They knew the awe and the mystery of their God. They built 
monuments to him, and also to themselves, just as the Washington Monument 
speaks to the people who built it as well as to the person for whom it was 
built. But they wanted to build the best cathedrals, and if you study cathedral 
building from a civil engineering perspective, you can see the evolution of that 
discipline; and you will be impressed. You should be. 
Within the space business, Kennedy is probably best remembered for his 
"Man, Moon, Decade" speech (which, by the way, is also a classic of program 
management). And it's a great speech. But the Kennedy quote about space that 
I love more than anything in the world because it evokes exactly the things 
I'm talking about here tonight, was the one he gave from this lecture at Rice 
University in September of 1962 when he said, "We choose to go to the moon, 
and to do the other things, not because they are easy, but because they are 
hard." I'll say it again: "not because they are easy, but because they are hard." 
?he cathedral builders knew that reason. They were doing something 
that required a far greater percentage of their gross domestic product than we 
will ever put into the space business, and they knew it was hard. We know it 
too. We look back across 600 or 800 years of time and we are still awed by what 
they did. What is it that Americans make sure to see when they go to Europe? 
Who goes to Europe and does not, at some point, see the cathedrals? We are 
still awed across the centuries by what they accomplished. 
To me, the irony is that when we do hard things for the right reasons-for 
the Real Reasons-we end up actually satisfying all the of the Acceptable 
Reasons. And we can see that, too, in the cathedrals, if we look for it. 
What did the cathedral builders get? They didn't just build cathedrals and 
then stop there. They began to develop civil engineering, the core discipline for 
any society if it wishes to have anything more than thatched huts. They learned 
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how to build high walls and have them stand up straight. They learned how to 
put a roof across a long span. They learned which materials would work and 
which ones would not. And by finding the limits on how high walls could be, 
how broad roof spans could be and what materials wouldn't work, they created 
the incentive to solve those problems; so that they could build things beyond 
cathedrals; so that they could, fundamentally, build Western civilization. 
They gained societal advantages that were probably even more important 
than learning how to build walls and roofs. They learned to embrace deferred 
gratification, not just on an individual level where it is a crucial element of 
maturity, but on a societal level where it is equally vital. The people who started 
the cathedrals didn't live to finish them; such projects required decades. The 
society as a whole had to be dedicated to the completion of those projects. To 
be able to do that for cathedrals was to be able to do it in other areas as well. 
We owe Western civilization as we know it today to that kind of thinking: the 
ability to have a constant purpose across years and decades. 
The medieval builders formed guilds, establishing professional trades 
beyond that of agriculture. Now, agriculture is at the root of human technology. 
Nothing good happens to human beings without getting beyond the hunter- 
gatherer stage, and agriculture is that first step. But the second step is to be 
able to build physical works that didn't previously exist. The organization and 
systemization of that in Western society today began in medieval Europe, with 
the cathedral builders. They learned how to organize large projects, a key to 
modern society. And, probably most important of all, the cathedrals had to be, 
for decades at a time, the focus of civic accomplishment and energy. A society, 
a nation, a civilization, needs such foci. 
It is my contention that the products of our space program are today's 
cathedrals. The space program addresses the Real Reasons why humans do 
things. It satisfies the desire to compete, but in a safe and productive manner 
rather than in a harmful manner. It speaks abundantly to our sense of human 
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curiosity, of wonder and awe at the unknown. Who doesn't look at a picture 
of the Crab Nebula, synthesized from visible-light Hubble photographs and 
Chandra X-ray images, and say "Oh my God?" Who can look at that and not 
experience a sense of wonder? 
Who can watch people assembling the greatest engineering project in 
the history of mankind-the International Space Station-and not wonder 
at the ability of people to conceive and to execute that project? And it also 
addresses our sense of monument building, of leaving something behind for 
future generations. Not for nothing, 3 1 years after its opening, is the National 
Air and Space Museum still the most heavily visited museum in Washington, 
D.C. And what do people come to see? They come to see early airplanes and 
Apollo spacecraft. 
Of course the space program also addresses the Acceptable Reasons I've 
mentioned. In the end, this is imperative. Societies will not succeed in the 
long run if they place their resources and their efforts in enterprises that, for 
whatever reason, don't provide concrete value to that society. 
But my point earlier is that if things are done for the Real Reasons that 
motivate humans, they also serve the Acceptable Reasons. In that sense, in the 
practical sense, space really is about spin-offs, as many have argued. But it's not 
about spin-offs like Teflon, Tang and Velcro as the public is so often told-and 
which in fact did not come from the space program. And it's not about spin-offs 
in the form of better heart monitors or cheaper prices for liquid oxygen for 
hospitals. Yes, you get those things and many more; and they are real benefits. 
But that's not the right level on which to view the matter. The real spin-offs are 
at a higher level. We need to look at a broader landscape. 
What is the economic value to a society of upgrading the precision to 
which the entire industrial base of that society works? Anyone who wants to put 
together space artifacts, who wants to bid on a competition for space artifacts, 
who wants to be a subcontractor or supplier or who even wants to supply nuts, 
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bolts and screws to the space industry, must work to a higher level of precision 
than human beings had to do before the space industry came along. And that 
fact absolutely resonates throughout our entire industrial base. What is the 
value of that? I can't calculate it, but I know it's there. 
What is the scientific value of discovering the origins of our universe? Or  
of discovering that literally 95 percent of the universe consists of dark energy 
or dark matter, terms for things that we as yet know nothing about? But they 
make up 95 percent of our universe. Is it even conceivable that one day we 
won't learn to harness them? As cavemen learned to harness fire, as people two 
centuries ago learned to harness electricity, we will learn to harness these new 
things. It was just a few years ago that we discovered them, and we would not 
have done so without the space program. What is the value of knowledge like 
that? I cannot begin to guess. A thousand years from now there will be human 
beings who don't have to guess; they will know; and they will know we gave 
this to them. 
Let's think for a moment about national security. What is the value to 
the United States of being involved in enterprises that lift up human hearts 
everywhere when we do them? What is the value to the United States of being 
engaged in such projects, doing the kinds of things that other people want to 
do with us, as partners? What is the value to the United States of being a leader 
in such efforts, in projects in which every nation capable of doing so wants to 
take part? I would submit that the highest possible form of national security, 
well above having better guns and bombs than everyone else, well above being 
so strong that no one wants to fight with us, is the security which comes from 
being a nation which does the kinds of things that make others want to work 
with us to do them. What security could we ever ask that would be better than 
that, and would give more of it to us, than the space program? 
What do you have to do? How do you have to behave, to do space 
projects? You have to value hard work. You have to live by excellence, or die 
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from the lack of it. You have to understand and practice both leadership and 
followership; and both are important. You have to build partnerships; leaders 
need partners and allies, as well as followers. You have to be willing to defer 
gratification, to spend years doing what we do, and then stand back and see if 
it works. We learn how to leave a legacy, because we work on things that not 
all of us will live to see-and we know it. And we learn about accepting the 
challenge of the unknown, where we might fail, and to do so not without fear 
or apprehension, but to master it, to control it and to go anyway. 
These are lessons that we all need to learn, and they are lessons the space 
business teaches us. And I would submit that our country is a better place for 
those who have learned those lessons. 
These are the values that the space program brings. This is why it must 
be supported. And this is why, although we don't acknowledge it, we don't 
admit it and most of us don't understand it. This is why if we didn't have a 
space program, we Americans would feel less than ourselves. We can never 
allow that to happen. 
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Why Explore Space? 
Michael Griffin 
Administrator 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Op-ed posted on  www.ndsa.gov on  January 18, 2007, and distributed 
nationwide on  the McClatchy/Tribune Wire Service for publication in 
local and regional news publications. 
As NASA resumes flights of the space shuttle to finish building the 
International Space Station, many are questioning whether the project-the most 
complex construction feat ever undertaken-is worth the risk and expense. 
I have been asked, and asked myself, this question many times during my 
career, particularly when the United States lacked a plan to go beyond the space 
station to other destinations in the solar system. 
The issue was addressed eloquently in the report of the Columbia 
Accident Investigation Board, which examined the 2003 loss of the shuttle and 
its crew. That report pointed out that for the foreseeable future, space travel 
is going to be expensive, difficult and dangerous. But for the United States, it 
is strategic. It is part of what makes us a great nation. And the report declared 
that if we are going to send humans into space, the goals ought to be worthy 
of the cost, the risk and the difficulty. A human spaceflight program with no 
plan to send people anywhere beyond the orbiting space station certainly did 
not meet that standard. 
President Bush responded to the Columbia report. The administration 
looked at where we had been in space and concluded that we needed to 
do more, to go further. The result was the Vision for Space Exploration, 
announced nearly 3 years ago, which commits the United States to using the 
shuttle to complete the space station, then retiring the shuttle and building a 
new generation of spacecraft to venture out into the solar system. Congress has 
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ratified that position with an overwhelming bipartisan majority, making the 
Vision for Space Exploration the law of the land. 
Today, NASA is moving forward with a new focus for the manned space 
program: to go out beyond Earth orbit for purposes of human exploration and 
scientific discovery. And the space station is now a stepping stone on the way, 
rather than being the end of the line. 
On the space station, we will learn how to live and work in space. We will 
learn how to build hardware that can survive and function for the years required 
to make the round-trip voyage from Earth to Mars. 
If humans are indeed going to go to Mars, if we're going to go beyond, 
we have to learn how to live on other planetary surfaces, to use what we find 
there and bend it to our will, just as the Pilgrims did when they came to what is 
now New England-where half of them died during that first frigid winter in 
1620. There was a reason their celebration was called "Thanksgiving." 
The Pilgrims were only a few thousand miles from home, and they were 
accomplished farmers and artisans. And yet, when they came to an unfamiliar 
land, they didn't know how to survive in its harsh environment. They didn't 
know what food would grow and what wouldn't. They didn't know what they 
could eat and what they couldn't. 
The Pilgrims had to learn to survive in a strange new place across a vast 
ocean. If we are to become a spacefaring nation, the next generation of explorers 
is going to have to learn how to survive in other forbidding, faraway places across 
the vastness of space. The moon is a crucially important stepping stone along 
that path-an alien world, yet one that is only a three-day journey from Earth. 
Using the space station and building an outpost on the moon to prepare 
for the trip to Mars are critical milestones in America's quest to become a truly 
spacefaring nation. I think that we should want that. I want that. I want it for 
the American people, for my grandchildren, for my great-grandchildren. 
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Throughout history, the great nations have been the ones at the forefront 
of the frontiers of their time. Britain became great in the 17th century through 
its exploration and mastery of the seas. America's greatness in the 20th century 
stemmed largely from its mastery of the air. For the next generations, the 
frontier will be space. 
Other countries will explore the cosmos, whether the United States does 
or not. And those will be Earth's great nations in the years and centuries to 
come. I believe America should look to its future and consider what that future 
will look like if we choose not to be a spacefaring nation. 
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Space Exploration: Filling Up the Canvas 
Michael D. Griffin 
Administrator 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NASA Langley Colloquium Series 
Sigma Public Lecture Series 
October 24,2006 
Thank you for inviting me to speak at this colloquium; I am truly 
honored. This lecture series dates back to 1971, with the inaugural address by 
Wernher von Braun. Many other luminaries from our industry have followed 
him, so I have big shoes to fill. I started my career in the aerospace business 
in that same year. Maybe there is a young person in this audience who will be 
giving the 70th anniversary lecture on the then-future of space exploration, 
35 years from now. 
This area of our country, Virginia, has given birth to many great leaders and 
explorers, whose ideas for our nation's future speak to us across the generations 
as we carry out the great task before us in space exploration. No event in our 
history more aptly conveys those ideas and lessons than does the Lewis and 
Clark expedition, which concluded exactly 200 years ago. When discussing 
this great expedition, led by Virginians Meriwether Lewis and William Clark, 
fellow Virginian Thomas Jefferson wrote, "The work we are now doing is, I 
trust, done for posterity in such a way that they need not repeat it. We shall 
delineate with correctness the great arteries of this country. Those who come 
after us will fill up the canvas we began." 
Today, we are endeavoring to "fill up the canvas" of our solar system 
in such a way that our work is done for posterity as well. When President 
Bush laid out the canvas for NASA with the Vision for Space Exploration in 
2004, he evoked the Lewis and ~ l & k  expedition, saying: "Two centuries ago, 
Meriwether Lewis and William Clark left St. Louis to explore the new lands 
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acquired in the Louisiana Purchase. They made that journey in the spirit of 
discovery, to learn the potential of vast new territory, and to chart a way for 
others to follow. America has ventured forth into space for the same reasons. 
We have undertaken space travel because the desire to explore and understand 
is part of our character." 
When President Bush set this new course for America's space program, 
the White House issued a supporting document explaining why. Quoting from 
that policy, "The fundamental goal of this vision is to advance U.S. scientific, 
economic and security interests through a robust space exploration program." 
I believe that this is exactly right, and that the benefits to be derived in these 
respects from such a program were exactly the same ones that Jefferson expected 
to derive from the Louisiana Purchase and from the expedition he sent out to 
begin its assessment. 
Security in Jefferson's time meant establishing the primacy of the 
infant United States across the breadth of the North American continent, in 
an era when numerous competitors for this primacy existed. Today's nation, 
stretching "from sea to shining sea," was the vision of farseeing men like our 
third president, but few others. 
The Lewis and Clark expedition paved the way for future adventures by 
the new nation in what eventually became the American West. Indeed, would 
it even have become the "American" West without the staggering success of 
this first great westward trek? At the time of their expedition, Spain, France, 
England and Russia had interests and a presence in what is today the Western 
United States. This is a message that speaks to us today, across two centuries of 
time, as we contemplate the future of humans in the solar system. 
In our time, while we certainly recognize that the United States will 
be only one nation among many on the space frontier, we have learned that 
"security" can involve much broader concerns than competition among 
nation-states. The Chairman of the NASA Advisory Council, Harrison Schmitt, 
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geologist, Apollo 17 astronaut, and former United States Senator and Stephen 
Hawking, cosmologist and Lucasian professor of mathematics at the University 
of Cambridge, have both pointed out this fundamental truth: The history of 
life on Earth is the history of extinction events. There is evidence, now, for 
some five major extinction events in the history of the planet. The last of these 
occurred approximately 65 million years ago, at the end of the Cretaceous 
Period, when the dinosaurs that dominated Earth for over 160 million years 
suffered a catastrophic extinction over a relatively short period. It is believed 
that this event was induced by an asteroid of some 6-1 5 kilometers in diameter 
which struck Earth in the Gulf of Mexico, triggering tsunamis, tectonic shifts 
and radically changing Earth's atmosphere. 
The brief history of humans is next to nothing compared to the history of 
other life on Earth, and even less so compared to the age of our solar system or of 
the universe. Our species hasn't been around long enough to have experienced 
a cataclysmic extinction event. But they will occur again, whether we are ready 
for them or not. So, in the end, human expansion into our solar system is 
fundamentally about the survival of the species, about ensuring better odds 
for our survival through the promulgation of our species. There is no more 
fundamental measure of "security." 
But security is not the only reason to explore. History shows clearly 
that there is an economic benefit to be derived from exploring new territories. 
Jefferson understood this. When he proposed the Lewis and Clark expedition 
in a secret message to the Congress, he said: "While other civilized nations 
have encountered great expense to enlarge the boundaries of knowledge by 
undertaking voyages of discovery, and for other literary purposes, in various 
parts and directions, our nation seems to owe to the same object, as well as to 
its own interests, to explore this, the only line of easy communication across 
the continent, and so directly traversing our own part of it. The interests of 
commerce place the principal object within the constitutional powers and care 
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of Congress, and that it should incidentally advance the geographical knowledge 
of our own continent, cannot be but an additional gratification." 
Likewise, the Vision for Space Exploration recognizes the economic 
benefits to be derived from space exploration. As the President's Science Advisor 
Jack Marburger stqted in a speech earlier this year, "Questions about the vision 
boil down to whether we want to incorporate the solar system in our economic 
sphere, or not. Our national policy, declared by President Bush and endorsed by 
Congress last December in the NASA Authorization Act, affirmatively answers 
that question: The fundamental goal of this Vision is to advance U.S. scientific, 
security and economic interests through a robust space exploration program." 
In this vein, the U.S. segment of the International Space Station has 
been designated a national laboratory, open for commercial manufacturing 
and advances in materials sciences due to its unique microgravity environment. 
To that end, I commend the Langley Research Center's material scientists 
for recently retrieving 200 specimens from the Materials International Space 
Station Experiment (MISSE) "suitcase" with the space shuttle. Working with 
the Naval Research Laboratory and others, these experiments may lead to more 
advanced solar arrays, and help researchers make materials and coatings that last 
longer on Earth. 
On the moon, there are resources to be mined, including hydrogen, 
oxygen and maybe one day helium-3, which could be of special benefit in 
establishing a permanent lunar presence. An armada of satellites from the 
United States, India, China and Japan is set to map the moon's geography and 
resources over the next several years in anticipation of future human exploration 
and, potentially, lunar settlements. Of particular interest are the moon's polar 
regions, where some locations enjoy near-permanent sunlight while others, only 
a few kilometers apart, are permanently shadowed. The former are obviously 
of tremendous benefit in establishing a lunar base, because of the ability to 
generate nearly continuous solar power. And in the shadowed regions, it is 
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possible that water ice deposited by comet impact might be found preserved 
from evaporation by the sun's heat. If such ice exists, it would be a boon for a 
future lunar base, enabling the occupants to "live off the land" more easily than 
carrying all provisions with them from Earth. 
But this rosy prospect is, at present, still conjecture. While there is 
some evidence to support it, there remains considerable debate among lunar 
scientists as to whether such conditions truly exist at the poles, and, if so, 
how much ice is there. We won't know until we conduct a better survey. 'This 
debate among lunar scientists is not unlike the debate about the unknown 
geography of our own North American continent at the time of the Lewis 
and Clark expedition. 
'The next robotic lunar missions will test our assumptions and challenge 
our beliefs. But one assumption that I know will be justified is that the moon, 
the near-Earth asteroids and the rest of the solar system contain the resources 
that will take mankind to the next level of civilization and prosperity. I don't 
know when it will occur or who will do it, but it will happen. I hope that it will 
be soon, and that we will be the agents of this great endeavor. 
Jefferson was the most scientifically literate president our nation has had, 
and he fully understood that his bold expedition would, almost automatically, 
open a new realm of scientific discovery. Jefferson's instructions to Meriwether 
Lewis in June of 1803 read like a NASA requirements document today: 
". . . explore the Missouri river, and such principal stream of it as by its course 
and communication with the waters of the Pacific Ocean whether the Columbia, 
Oregon, Colorado or any other river may offer the most direct and practicable 
water communication across this continent for the purposes of commerce." 
Jefferson's additional requirements for the Lewis and Clark mission: "Mou will 
take careful observations of latitude and longitude at all remarkable points on the 
river. . . . Other objects ofworthy notice will be the soil and face of the [territory] 
its growth and vegetable productions, . . . the animals of the [territory], . . . 
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the mineral productions of every kind; but more particularly metals: limestone, 
pit-coal and salt-petre; salines and mineral waters . . . volcanic appearances and 
climate." This was advanced scientific inquiry for that day. 
For NASA, exploration is about the expansion of human and robotic 
activity beyond Earth. ?his sets the stage for scientific opportunities which 
we are just now beginning to consider. Soon, we will begin to add to our 
civilization's body of knowledge concerning the real estate values in cislunar 
space, and we will conduct scientific experiments along the way, much in the 
fashion that Meriwether Lewis and William Clark gathered specimens, made 
careful observations in their journals and drew detailed maps of the American 
West 200 years ago. 
Jefferson's plans were comprehensive, yet flexible. The hoped-for water 
route to the Pacific did not, in fact, exist. Yet, because the expedition did not 
have a single overriding goal, it was an enormous success. This should also be our 
strategy when making plans to explore the moon and Mars. We should expect to 
be surprised, and we should adjust our exploration plans as we learn more about 
the lay of the land before us, its resources and environmental conditions. 
If we are able to live and work on the moon, we will not only use its 
resources for our survival and economic benefit. We will think ofways to exploit 
its unique vantage point and environment to further our scientific goals. Back 
in 1990, the National Academy of Sciences studied the suitability for using 
the moon as a stable platform, without an atmosphere and having predictable 
heating and lighting, for astronomical observatories, especially interferometers. 
Going into the next decadal study for astronomy and astrophysics, the Academy 
should consider how we can better leverage the exploration architecture to 
further scientific pursuits "and other literary purposes" as Jefferson would say, 
so that we can plan our expeditions appropriately. 
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So, what is our approach to achieving the goals of which I have 
spoken here? 
Our nation's Vision for Space Exploration honors our previous 
commitment to the space station and at the same time commits us to bold new 
journeys to the moon, Mars and eventually the rest of the solar system, to learn 
the potential of this vast new territory and chart a way for others to follow. 
With our Russian, European, Japanese and Canadian partners, the United 
States is completing the assembly of the space station. We will then retire the 
space shuttle in 2010. Meanwhile, we are beginning to build new space ships 
and rockets to carry astronauts and, one day, future settlers outward from low 
Earth orbit. 
'The scientists and engineers of Langley Research Center are integral 
to turning this vision into reality. Experts in structures, materials and other 
disciplines in the aerospace sciences, along with the NASA Engineering and 
Safety Center (NESC) that is hosted at Langley, helped return the space shuttle 
to flight after the Columbia accident. 'Their work has been instrumental in 
understanding the physics behind foam loss on the external tank, and its effects 
on the shuttle thermal protection system. Langley engineers worked on the 
computational fluid dynamics (CFD) analysis to support the removal of the 
shuttle External Tank Protuberance Air Load (PAL) ramps. All of this was 
absolutely crucial to the future of our agency; absolutely nothing good can 
happen at NASA unless we can fly the shuttle with confidence that we have 
fixed the problems that brought down Columbia. 
Looking to the future, the NESC organized a "smart buyer" team 
across the agency earlier this year to conduct an "in house" design of our 
Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle, so that managers and engineers could 
better evaluate industry designs and sharpen the systems engineering and 
integration skills needed to manage this major undertaking. And a project 
team hosted at Langley is managing the Orion Launch Abort System, which 
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we hope to test beginning in 2008. Others are working on the Orion landing 
system vertical drop tests with the half-scale crew module. And yet others 
have conducted wind tunnel tests of the Ares 1 Crew Launch Vehicle to 
characterize the launch vehicle stack. 
This stuff is rocket science! As an engineer myself, I fully appreciate the 
challenges before us, and frankly, we should all recognize that the development 
of the arts and sciences of spaceflight is quite simply the most technically 
challenging thing our nation, or any nation, does. Meriwether Lewis' perspective 
on the challenges ahead of him on July 4, 1805 speaks to many of us in NASA 
today: "We all believe that we are now about to enter on the most perilous and 
difficult part of our voyage, yet I see no one repining; all appear ready to meet 
those difficulties which wait us with resolution and becoming fortitude." 
We must also recognize the dangers involved. Virginian David Brown, 
no less an explorer than any on the Lewis and Clark expedition, died with his 
fellow crewmates on Space Shuttle Cobmbia. A graduate of William and Mary 
and Eastern Virginia Medical School, David once said that even in the case of 
a possible catastrophe for his upcoming mission, "The program will go on. It 
must go on." 
Thomas Jefferson was equally cognizant of the perils awaiting the Lewis 
and Clark expedition. In his letter of instructions to Meriwether Lewis, Jefferson 
wrote: "As it is impossible for us to foresee in what manner you will be received 
by the native people, whether with hospitality or hostility, so it is impossible to 
prescribe the exact degree of perseverance with which you are to pursue your 
journey. We value too much the lives of our citizens to offer them to probable 
destruction. . . . To your own discretion therefore must be left the degree of 
danger you risk, and the point at which you should decline to continue, only 
saying we wish you to err on the side of your safety, and to bring back your 
party safe even if it be with less information that you will have acquired to that 
point." For the record, Lewis and Clark succeeded admirably in this matter, 
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while still achieving the larger goals of their venture. Only one man was lost 
on the expedition, from what was believed to have been a burst appendix, an 
ailment which could not have been treated in that era in any case. 
Some days our journey into space must appear altogether boring to the 
casual observers, the pundits or the "chattering class," as they're sometimes 
called in Washington, who are not steeped in the trials and tribulations of 
great challenges. The critics will never appreciate the hard but tedious work, 
and the sheer joy, that goes with the successful accomplishment of every space 
shuttle flight, or a record-breaking hypersonic flight like that of the X-43A, 
or the development of a new satellite capability, like the Cloud-Aerosol Lidar 
and Infrared Pathfinder Satellite Observation (CALIPSO) lidar instrument 
managed at the Langley Research Center. 
This also is not new. The daily entries in the Lewis and Clark journals 
are sometimes filled with "nothing to report" as well, as the men of the Corps 
of Discovery and their female Indian interpreter Sacagawea endured the 
daily rains in Oregon. However, historians have noted the three words in 
Meriwether Lewis's journal that are often-repeated, and are the most important 
in understanding the character of those making such a journey: "We proceeded 
on." Lewis repeats this phrase in his journal on many days, after attacks by native 
Indians and grizzly bears, after seeing great bison stampedes, after capturing a 
prairie dog, after backbreaking portages with their canoes and after gazing upon 
the daunting mountain ranges which they had to traverse to reach the West 
Coast ofAmerica. Indeed, "we proceeded on" evokes the sense of determination 
that David Brown expressed about our basic human need to explore. 
The Vision for Space Exploration carries on the tradition of exploration 
embodied by two Virginians of whom we have spoken tonight, Meriwether 
Lewis and William Clark, 200 years ago. They carried out their mission for 
very similar reasons that we carry out our mission today-national security, 
economic gain and scientific discovery. While space exploration is certainly 
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fraught with difficulty and peril, we can at the same time both appreciate those 
risks and yet believe that for the same reasons as existed 200 years ago, this is 
truly the most rewarding endeavor our nation will pursue in the 21st century. 
When Lewis and Clark and other members of the Corps of Discovery 
returned and, subsequently, were feted for their accomplishments in Washington, 
one senator remarked that they appeared "as if they had returned from the 
moon." How apt. The Lewis and Clark expedition embodied the pioneering 
spirit which is characteristic of our nation, the spirit which led us forward to the 
Apollo 1 1 lunar landing by Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin. Lewis and Clark 
made "one giant leap for mankind," right along with Armstrong and Aldrin. 
New leaps will soon follow. 
The next steps in returning to the moon and moving onward to Mars, 
the near-Earth asteroids and beyond are crucial in deciding the course of 
future space exploration. We must understand that these steps are incremental, 
cumulative, and incredibly powerful in their ultimate effect. As President Bush 
pointed out when announcing the Vision for Space Exploration, "We will make 
steady progress-one mission, one voyage, one landing at a time." Further, we 
must understand that there is no turning back. In the words of David Brown: 
"It must go on." 
Allow me to end with the thoughts of Meriwether Lewis on the day he 
turned 32 years old. Lewis was on one of the greatest journeys of his time, of 
any time, yet he did not realize its significance while he was doing it. Instead, 
he was consumed with the great mission before him. Jefferson once opined that 
Lewis suffered from a certain melancholy when it came to his work. Meriwether 
Lewis wrote the following passage of enlightenment in his journal on August 
18, 1805: "This day I completed my thirty first year, and conceived that I 
had in all human probability now existed about half the period which I am to 
remain in this Sublunary world. I reflected that I had as yet done but little, very 
little, indeed, to further the happiness of the human race, or to advance the 
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information of the succeeding generation. I viewed with regret the many hours 
I have spent in indolence, and now sorely feel the want of that information 
which those hours would have given me had they been judiciously expended. 
But since they are past and cannot be recalled, I dash from me the gloomy 
thought, and resolved in future, to redouble my exertions and at least endeavor 
to promote those two primary objects of human existence, by giving them the 
aid of that portion of talents which nature and fortune have bestowed on me: or 
in future, to live for mankind, as I have heretofore lived for myself." 
So, in conclusion, I really do hope that there is a young person in the 
audience today who, many years from now, will continue the tradition of this 
lecture series by telling us how she helped to fill up the canvas, breaking the 
confines of this "sublunary" world. 
Thank you. 
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Continuing the Voyage: The Spirit of Endeavour 
Michael D. Griffin 
Administrator 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
United States of America 
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The Royal Society of the United Kingdom 
December 1,2006 
I am truly honored to have been invited to speak before this august group. 
The Royal Society has a long and distinguished history of supporting explorers 
and scientists; indeed, for centuries the Royal Society was the embodiment of 
science in western civilization. Yesterday, I had the honor of making a very 
special presentation of the Society's prestigious Copley Medal to Professor 
Stephen Hawking of Cambridge University. This medal, the world's oldest 
award for scientific achievement, flew on board Space Shuttle Discovery on 
the STS-121 mission last summer, part of the personal effects of British-born 
astronaut Piers Sellers, as a gesture in honor of Professor Hawking. 
I hope that next week Space Shuttle Discovery will roar back into space 
with the STS-116 mission to continue the assembly of the International Space 
Station.' When it does fly, another British-born astronaut, Cambridge graduate 
Nick Patrick, will be aboard. The upcoming shuttle missions to finish the space 
station are among the most difficult and complex ever undertaken. On  this 
mission alone, the crew will add another segment to the space station truss, 
the backbone of the configuration. ?hey will re-configure the electrical power 
system to incorporate and use the new solar arrays brought up on the last flight, 
and they will fill and activate the ammonia cooling system for two of the truss 
segments. The exploration and development of the space frontier is, truly, the 
most technically challenging endeavor of our generation and many to follow. 
' STS-116 launched on December 9,2006 and returned after a successful mission on December 22,2006. 
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But in carrying it forward, we are building on the heroic exploits of our forbears 
in their own missions of human exploration and scientific discovery. 
I have no greater personal hero than former British Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill, a man whose distinguished paternal ancestors served 
Britain for centuries, yet who was born of an American mother. Throughout 
my life I have admired Churchill's famed incisive wit, his stunning oratorical 
skills, his steadfastness in support of that in which he believed, and above all 
the unbreakable rock of his courage. During the darkest days of World War 11, 
as he sought to bolster his countrymen and those everywhere who fought for 
freedom, Churchill exclaimed, "We have not journeyed all this way across the 
centuries, across the oceans, across the mountains, across the prairies, because 
we are made of sugar candy!" 
Nor will we journey into space, and make the solar system our own, 
by being made of sugar candy. The United Kingdom is a truly great nation, 
a nation whose people and culture have spread across the globe, and whose 
language has become the world's most common second language, due in no 
small measure to the support of Royal Society for its nation's explorers over the 
centuries. As we consider the migration of human beings out into space, first 
to the moon and Mars and then eventually beyond, I think it is interesting to 
look back and consider the migration of the human species and its languages 
and cultures to all of the continents of this planet. Our forebears have left us a 
history filled with lessons for the future. Some of these lessons are in evidence 
in my own land. America's origins do not begin on a specific date, nor do 
they involve any one particular group of people. Many of us in America are 
the descendants of pioneers from Spain, Portugal, Holland, Scotland, England, 
Ireland, France, Germany, Italy and many other countries, who emigrated 
over many generations and settled in what became the United States, in search 
of new riches, new freedoms and new beginnings. The several peoples of the 
British Isles were not even the first of these many groups, but they were in 
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the end the boldest and most persistent. And so, over many generations, the 
primary language of the United States came to be English, and our dominant 
cultural traditions are derived from Great Britain. Thus, while we Americans 
are quite a mixed bag, in many respects we are your cultural, political and 
quite often genetic descendents. One of my own great-grandfathers emigrated 
from Scotland, another was Irish, a great-grandmother was a Hobbs, and my 
surname indicates the presence of a Welshman somewhere on the family tree! 
So my hope is that the English language will not only remain in common usage 
around the world, but it will spread throughout the solar system over the course 
of the next century as modern-day explorers like NASA astronauts Piers Sellers, 
Nick Patrick and others carry their British heritage with them into space. That 
is truly a lasting legacy for a great people. 
Now, I am not a historian, but I am mindful of the lessons of history 
and how we can apply them to the challenges that NASA faces today in space 
exploration and scientific discovery. The Royal Society was one of the primary 
benefactors to many great maritime explorers of the 17th and 18th centuries. 
Today, in many respects, NASA is carrying on the same tradition of combining 
exploration and scientific discovery that the Royal Society initiated centuries 
earlier. Indeed, NASA is so beholden to the Royal Society and its traditions that 
two space shuttles, Discovery and Endeavour, were named in honor of sailing 
ships used by Captain James Cook, one of Britain's, and history's, greatest 
explorers. And when astronauts Dave Scott and Jim Irwin voyaged to the 
mountains of the moon on the Apollo 15 mission, their command ship was 
also named Endeavour. 
So in drafting my speech for today, I thought it might be insightful to 
consider the connection between certain lessons from Captain Cook's initial 
South Pacific voyage on His Majesty's Bark Endeavour, to the work NASA is 
carrying out today in exploring the planets, moons, asteroids and comets of the 
solar system. Cook's first expedition to the South Pacific in 1768 was funded 
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jointly by the Royal Society and the British Admiralty. The primary purpose of 
the voyage was to obtain astronomical observations of the transit of the planet 
Venus, as seen from Earth, across the disk of the sun on Saturday, June 3, 
1769. ?he secondary intent of the voyage was to search the South Pacific for 
signs of a southern continent, Terra Australis, which had been conjectured to 
exist by members of the Society. He was only 39 at the time and, from my 
present vantage point, clearly far too young to be entrusted with such major 
responsibilities. What in heaven's name were his superiors thinking? 
If I were speaking to the Royal Astronomical Society, everyone present 
would understand why the Royal Society was interested in having Captain 
Cook and a team of scientists observe the 1769 transit of Venus, and I could 
save a few words. But for tonight, we should probably note that prior to the 
invention of radar and, later, the capability to send spacecraft to other planets, 
it was extremely difficult to determine the actual size of the solar system. But, 
using a method first proposed by Sir Edmund Halley, himself an early and 
renowned member of the Royal Society, it is possible to use observations of a 
Venus transit to calculate the distance from Earth to the sun, the "astronomical 
unit," or A.U., and with that to determine the scale of the solar system. 
Venus transits are one of the rarest predictable celestial events, typically 
lasting for only a few hours at a time. Between the 12th and 39th centuries they 
occur in a 243-year cycle, with appearances in pairs 8.5 years apart, separated 
by gaps of over a century. The most recent Venus transit occurred in 2004; the 
next one will be in 2012; and after that, we will need to wait until 21 17 for 
another. I observed the 2004 event personally. And it may not be too much 
to hope for that I will see the 2012 transit, but I expect I shall miss the one 
after that. 
The practical difficulties of making such observations were substantial in 
the 18th century. It is necessary to measure, quite accurately, the entry and exit 
times at which Venus crosses the limb of the sun, as seen from widely separated 
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points on Earth. So, to begin, it was necessary to meet the fundamental challenge 
of merely traveling to various distant points on the globe, including the South 
Seas. This was an enormously difficult prospect in its day. Considered objectively, 
one must say that it was fully as difficult, dangerous and time consuming for 
Cook and Endeavour to reach the South Pacific as it will be for the first voyagers 
to reach Mars. Indeed, my personal opinion is that it was far more so, given 
the technology of those times. I believe that this is an important perspective for 
those who believe, somehow, that the exploration of space is uniquely difficult 
in comparison with the exploration of Earth by Europeans. And so this is the 
first lesson. Are we to quail before multiyear voyages to uncertain destinations, 
when our ancestors did not? 
Among the many challenges of long sea voyages in the 18th century 
was, first, the basic task of determining one's location! Accurate and consistent 
timekeeping at widely separated points, equivalent to knowing one's longitude, 
was still a major challenge in 1769, and nearly impossible to do while aboard 
ship. Today, we take for granted Global Positioning System (GPS) navigators 
that receive precise timing signals from satellites with atomic clocks in orbit 
around Earth. Back in 1769, Captain Cook did not even have the benefit of an 
accurate chronometer. It was not until his second voyage to the South Pacific 
a few years later that Cook carried with him the K1, a copy of Harrison's 
H4, the clock that won him the famed Longitude Prize in 1773. Indeed, 
modern-day navigators and timekeepers, using GPS, are forever indebted to 
John Harrison and his famous clocks, some of which can be seen today at the 
Greenwich Observatory. 
Captain Cook learned the value of accurate navigation and precise timing 
in the late 18th century; and the ability to carry out the primary purpose of his 
voyage was only barely possible with the technologies available to his expedition 
at that time. He didn't even have a good map; indeed, his job was in part to help 
make them. Modern-day explorers and scientists also know the value of a good 
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map and accurate GPS measurements. Data from NASA's LANDSAT satellites 
provides the backdrop for maps provided by Google Earth and others. We 
will need a similar navigation infrastructure on the moon for future explorers 
and scientists. Scheduled for launch in 2008, NASA's Lunar Reconnaissance 
Orbiter, with its laser altimeter and other instruments, will provide an accurate 
global map of the moon for future explorers. We're still formulating our plans 
for providing communication and navigation for future explorers on the moon, 
but I can foresee NASA collaborating with other spacefaring nations like the 
United Kingdom in providing such infrastructure. 
Such collaborations again have a long and honorable history. In another 
interesting parallel to space exploration today, the effort to observe the 1769 
transit of Venus was an early example of international scientific collaboration. 
Cook's expedition to the South Seas and his sighting of the Venus transit from 
Tahiti was but one of many similar efforts, with scientists and explorers from 
Britain, Austria, France and other countries traveling to Siberia, Norway, 
Madagascar and the southern tip of Africa. Catherine the Great of Russia even 
invited astronomers to observe the transit of Venus from her observatory in 
Saint Petersburg. 
Similarly, and as of today, NASA has 58 ongoing space and Earth science 
missions, and over half of these missions have some form of international 
participation. Two-thirds of all NASA missions currently under development 
incorporate international partners. And of course, NASA's premier human 
spaceflight program, the development of the space station, is an effort involving 
some 15 nations. 
Like the collaboration for the Venus transit, NASA's partnerships in 
space exploration and scientific discovery take many forms, with various levels 
of contribution. For example, we are contributing two payloads to India's 
Chandrayaan-1 mission to the moon, planned to be launched in 2008. For the 
Cloud-Aerosol Lidar and Infrared Pathfinder Satellite Observation (CALIPSO) 
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mission launched earlier this year, NASA developed a LIDAR payload; the 
French Space Agency (CNES) integrated that payload to its satellite bus and 
NASA launched it. The British National Space Center provided a high-resolution 
atmospheric sounding payload to the Aura Earth science mission launched two 
years ago. In the next decade, the European Space Agency will launch the James 
Webb Space Telescope aboard an Ariane V rocket. 
One of the more unusual aspects of Cook's first expedition is that few 
members of the crew of Endeavour contracted scurvy, a disease now known to 
result from a lack of Vitamin C. By the mid-1700s, it was widely known that a 
poor diet caused scurvy, but what specifically caused it was not known. Captain 
Cook led by example and motivated his sailors into eating Vitamin C-rich (but 
not very tasty) sauerkraut by being the first to eat it during his meals. 
While today's space station crewmembers don't get scurvy, they face 
other medical issues. For example, muscle and bone density loss due to a 
lack of tension on the human body in zero-G is well known. While there is a 
significant degree of variability between station crewmembers in the amount 
of bone loss, the average density lost in the spine and hip areas is about one 
percent per month. This rate of bone loss for astronauts is 10 times worse than 
for those who suffer from osteoporosis here on Earth. 'Thus, like sailors of 
the 18th century, our astronauts on the space station or in future missions to 
Mars face significant medical hazards in the form of bone fractures and kidney 
stones that could jeopardize their health and their mission. The equivalent of 
sauerkraut for modern-day astronauts is the unpleasant but necessary nutrition 
and exercise regimen to create muscle tension and mitigate bone loss. But these 
are stopgaps, incomplete and unsatisfactory at best. Whatever therapy is finally 
developed to control bone loss in astronauts will have application to sufferers of 
osteoporosis everywhere. Astronauts already have conducted clinical trials for 
new osteoporosis drugs onboard the space station. We have much to learn, and 
in learning we will create knowledge that can help people everywhere. 
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For exploration beyond low Earth orbit, radiation is another hazard to 
be dealt with. (At this point, I will again quote Churchill, who famously said 
that the grammatical prohibition against ending a sentence with a preposition 
is "an inconvenience up with which I shall not put.") 'The Earth's atmosphere, 
and especially its magnetic field, shields us from nearly all of the effects of solar 
flares and galactic cosmic radiation, even to the extent of providing substantial 
protection for low-orbiting astronauts. Despite this shielding effect, periodic 
and highly intense solar storms wreak havoc with power grids on Earth and 
satellites in high orbit. On several occasions, space station astronauts have 
hunkered down in heavily shielded areas of the station when solar flares or 
coronal mass ejections were predicted to be heading toward Earth. And as we 
venture farther away from Earth, the need to protect them from this energetic 
particle radiation becomes more critical. For example, back in August 1972, 
between the Apollo 16 and 17 missions, a powerful solar flare occurred that 
would have seriously endangered our astronauts if they had been en route to 
the moon or on the lunar surface at that time. An even larger sequence of solar 
events occurred in the fall of 2003. We must provide our astronauts with both 
warning systems and effective safeguards. 
Looking through the eyes of multiple spacecraft over the past five decades, 
we have seen that in truth the planets of the solar system are embedded in 
the heliosphere, the exotic outer atmosphere of the sun, emanating from and 
shaped by its intense magnetic field. 'This heliosphere is analogous, in many 
ways, to the winds and currents of the Pacific Ocean that propelled Captain 
Cook's Endeavour, but which also endangered the vessel and crew during 
periodic storms. 'Thus, we must build our spaceships in ways that shield the 
astronauts and instruments inside; and we must provide timely warnings and 
predictions of "solar storms" just as we do now with weather forecasts here on 
Earth. Space weather monitoring and forecasts need to be extended beyond 
low Earth orbit to cislunar space and, eventually beyond, when we begin 
missions to Mars. 'This effort to safeguard planet Earth and our astronauts from 
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solar storms must be an international endeavor, just like information from an 
international network of weather satellites and forecast centers today is shared 
around the world. We will benefit all mankind in the process by planning 
our heliophysics missions together. Earlier this month, NASA launched the 
Solar Terrestrial Relations Observatory (STEREO) mission, consisting of two 
satellites intended to provide 3-D images of the effects of coronal mass ejections 
and other solar activity on Earth's magnetosphere. 'The STEREO mission had 
several international partners, and will provide warnings that are useful around 
the world, but NASA cannot "go it alone." We must work together. 
Scientific discoveries are sometimes elusive, but we must persevere. 
As things turned out, despite the best efforts of Captain Cook and his men 
and the other international collaborators in measuring the Venus transit, the 
separate measurements taken by the various scientific expeditions onboard 
the Endeavour, at Point Venus in Tahiti and other places around the globe 
varied greatly, and were, inevitably, inconclusive. It turned out to be very 
difficult to determine the precise limb crossing times for Venus against the 
solar background. A now notorious observational surprise, the so-called "black 
drop effect," smears the image of Venus precisely as it becomes tangential to 
the solar limb. In the end, none of the observations of the 1769 transit, whether 
from Cook's team or others, were very good. The astronomical unit would not 
be accurately determined until the 1880s, when American Astronomer Simon 
Newcomb published a value of 149.6 million km, using data from the four 
prior Venus transits. 
'Thus, we must recognize that while the mysteries of the universe may not 
elude Stephen Hawking, these mysteries do frustrate the rest of us who are mere 
mortals. We must be resolute in our convictions, and despite setbacks, we must 
recognize that progress through human exploration and scientific discovery is a 
goal worthy of the costs and risks of the enterprise. Again to echo Churchill, we 
are not made of sugar candy. 
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But the disappointment encountered by Cook's expedition yields another 
lesson for space mission planners today. Cook's voyage was not judged, nor 
intended to be judged, solely on its ability to obtain accurate measurements of 
the transit of Venus. Indeed, Cook is today remembered above all else for his 
discovery, the first by European voyagers, of the previously unknown continent 
of Australia. Who today would label Cook's first South Pacific voyage a failure 
because the measurements of the Venus transit were inconclusive? We must 
remember this and similar experiences when our future space missions encounter 
difficulties. And we must plan them so that they are not hostage to a single piece 
of good fortune as a measure of their overall success. 
There is yet another lesson to be gained by looking back across the 
centuries at the voyages of Endeavour. Although Captain Cook no doubt 
considered his vessel to be the apotheosis of the shipbuilding arts as they 
were then known, we can see in retrospect that the Endeavour occupies but 
one point along a curve of ever increasing maritime capability, beginning for 
Europeans with the Viking longships and culminating in today's supertankers. 
We must realize that there will be a similar performance curve for space 
systems, and that we have not as yet advanced very far along it. We are at the 
dawn of the space age; metaphorically, we are sending out longships. We have 
a long, long way to go to get to supertankers. We must constantly question 
our assumptions as to how we build and operate our spacecraft and launch 
vehicles, because we have a lot yet left to learn. Each generation of ships must 
improve upon the last. For example, the space shuttle system, including the 
orbiter, solid rockets and external tank, requires almost 2 million labor-hours 
to prepare for launch. We have analyzed the processing labor required for other 
launch vehicles, both foreign and domestic, manned and unmanned. Using 
these other launch vehicle systems operating costs and labor-hours as a guide, 
I believe that NASA's next generation crew launch vehicle, the Ares I, should 
require an order of magnitude fewer labor hours to process than the space 
shuttle. The savings in launch vehicle operating costs can then be applied to 
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future systems and bolder missions. With the retirement of the space shuttle in 
2010, and development beginning for NASA's new Orion Crew Exploration 
Vehicle and Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle, we are beginning to lay the keel for 
the next generation of spaceships. Now is the time to question our operating 
assumptions and technical dogmas. 
Reflecting upon his journeys, Captain Cook once said, "I had ambition 
not only to go farther than any man had ever been before, but as far as it 
was possible for a man to go." While some people might ridicule such bold 
ambitions, I think that it reflects the determination innate in all of us to push 
the limits of our technological capabilities and human faculties. However, I 
will express a certain lament to those sympathetic and like-minded members of 
the Royal Society who are concerned, with me, that our broader society today 
often seems to suffer from a lack of imagination in grasping the importance of 
the challenge before us. 
One of the minor misfortunes of modern life in our major cities is that our 
night-time lighting has drowned out our view of the rich constellation of stars 
and planets in the night sky, and we find other idle pursuits, such as television, 
to occupy our time. Thus, we today do not look up nearly as often to marvel 
at the beauty and mystery of the night sky as did our ancestors, who imagined 
the stars to represent constellations of mythological beasts and legends, while 
the planets represented gods. I am happy that we have progressed beyond this. 
To me, the view of Hadley Rille from a camera mounted on the Apollo lunar 
rover is more exciting than imagining the moon to be the Huntress Diana. But, 
there is no question that we modern folk are less concerned with the heavens 
than were our ancestors. 
But if we do the right things, maybe we can alter this perspective. The 
British Royal Astronomical Society ,recently released a report advocating the 
expansion of British involvement in human space exploration. I hope that 
report receives sober consideration in the policy circles of the United Kingdom, 
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and I hope that I can count on you to be among the international partners who, 
with the United States, work to develop the first permanent lunar outpost in 
the next decade. 
Last month I made the decision, the culmination of 18 months of work 
by NASA engineers and scientists, that we could effectively and safely conduct a 
space shuttle servicing mission to the Hubble Space Telescope to extend the life 
and capabilities of this great observatory. I have been struck by the tremendously 
positive response this decision has received, by the way that people from all over 
the world have been awed and inspired by Hubble pictures revealing a few of 
the secrets of our universe. Hubble provides glimpses into the universe that are 
far, far beyond the scale of the astronomical unit, the objective for Cook's first 
voyage to the South Pacific. 
The view of our vast universe provided by Hubble uplifts us; it gives us a 
measure of hope. It was the same when the first man flew in space, and when the 
first man set foot upon the moon. We see a little of it each time a space shuttle 
crew returns from yet another mission in the sequence necessary to assemble 
the space station, quite possibly the greatest construction project in the history 
of mankind. We will see it again, at its peak, when the first astronaut places her 
boot on the surface of Mars. The human species was not crafted solely for safe 
places and prosaic times. We are, each of us, descended from people who left 
their homeland in search of what lay beyond. Today, what lies beyond is space. 
And so, quoting Professor Hawking: "To confine our attention to terrestrial 
matters would be to limit the human spirit." 
I believe with all my heart that, with the exploration of space, we have 
embarked upon the boldest human adventure yet conceived. We are limited only 
by our imagination, ambition, ingenuity, persistence and leadership. But, "We 
have not journeyed all this way across the centuries, across the oceans, across the 
mountains, across the prairies, because we are made of sugar candy!" 
Thank you. 
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Good evening. Thank you for inviting me to speak tonight. It is not 
often that an aerospace engineer is invited to speak to an economic forum. 
However, I took a business degree along with my engineering and physics 
coursework; and I appreciate the economic impact that space has on our 
society, especially practical applications like communications, navigation, 
weather and remote sensing satellites as well as the economic, national security 
and scientific benefits. And this says nothing of the less-quantifiable benefits 
of intellectual inspiration. 
Some of us gathered here tonight grew up during the Apollo era of the 
1960s, NASA's apotheosis. We watched science fiction movies and television 
shows that made us believe that we-all of us and not simply a few astronauts- 
could become space travelers. Arthur C. Clarke's and Stanley Kubrik's 
masterpieces of science fiction 2001: A Space Odyssey projected onto the screen 
of our collective human consciousness a future for us where, by now, hundreds 
of people would be living and working in space stations orbiting Earth, and 
outposts would exist on our moon. We would be journeying to other planets in 
our solar system, just as our European forbears came to America looking for new 
beginnings. This space age vision of our future proved illusory for our generation 
for two fundamental reasons: the limitations of our economic resources and the 
limitations of technology. Neil Armstrong's "giant leap for mankind was not a 
journey that could be sustained without a more concerted investment of time, 
resources and energy than followed his seminal achievement on July 20, 1969. 
Leadership in Space 
But I believe that there are economic and technological reasons why we 
can now begin to afford and sustain this Vision for Space Exploration in a 
fashion where we "go-as-we-pay," and why the nations of the world making 
such investments of time, resources and energy will find that the benefits far 
outweigh the costs and risks involved. We have the technology and economic 
wherewithal to incorporate the benefits of space into our sphere of influence-to 
exploit the vantage point of space and the space environment, and we have the 
natural resources of the moon, Mars and near-Earth asteroids. Space exploration 
is not simply this century's greatest adventure; it is an imperative that, if not 
pursued with some concerted effort, will have catastrophic consequences for 
our society. I realize this is a bold statement, so allow me to explain. 
O n  the day before he was assassinated in Dallas, President John F. 
Kennedy was in San Antonio, where he spoke about space exploration. He 
invoked Irish writer Frank O'Connor, who told the story of "how, as a boy, he 
and his friends would make their way across the countryside, and when they 
came to an orchard wall that seemed too high, and too doubtful to try, and too 
difficult to permit their voyage to continue, they took off their hats and tossed 
them over the wall-and then they had no choice but to follow them." The 
United States, the European Union, Russia, China, Japan, India and others 
have tossed our caps over the wall of space exploration. 
In that same speech, President Kennedy recited several technical advances 
from NASA's space program, explaining that "our effort in space is not, as some 
have suggested, a competitor for the natural resources that we need to develop 
Earth. It is a working partner and a co-producer of these resources." And he 
finished this speech with the recognition of the costs and risks involved with 
space exploration: "We will climb this wall with safety and with speed-and we 
shall then explore the wonders on the other side." 
Even an emotionless engineer can be moved by President Kennedy's 
poetic framing of the issues of space exploration, but since this is an economic 
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forum, let me now turn to the "dismal science." When President Kennedy spoke 
those words in 1963, the Gross Domestic Product of the United States was 
approximately $2.8 trillion in FY2000 dollars. In 2005, it was approximately 
$11 trillion in those same FY2000 dollars-four times larger. In 1963, the 
U.S. federal government spent approximately $600 billion, again in FY2000 
dollars, with NASA's allocation representing 2.3 percent of that amount. At 
the spending peak of the Apollo program, NASA represented 4.4 percent of 
the federal budget. Today, with a U.S. federal budget of almost $2.5 trillion, 
NASA's budget represents about 0.6 percent of that. 
Clearly our economy has grown, our society has changed, and our 
priorities for government spending have changed since 1963. Thus, in the 
latter half of the 1960s and early 1970s, our nation's leadership decided that we 
should not sustain such a high percentage of investment in the space program. 
In these years, the priorities of the U.S. federal budget changed to accommodate 
the escalating costs of the war in Vietnam, defense spending for the Cold War 
and Great Society programs. Today, the costs of the Global War on Terrorism, 
Hurricane Katrina recovery, Social Security and MedicareIMedicaid dominate 
our federal government spending The costs of our nation's entitlement 
programs alone are projected to double in the next 10 years, from more than 
$1 trillion per year today to more than $2 trillion per year, as baby boomers like 
me begin to retire. By comparison, NASA's budget of $16.2 billion for this year 
is somewhere in the realm of what engineers call rounding error, at 0.6 percent 
of all federal spending. 
Because of the magnitude of these changes over the last four decades, it 
is important to view our nation's investment in our civil space and aeronautics 
research program from this larger economic perspective, because some critics 
have questioned the value proposition of even the current investment in NASA. 
I believe that we must recognize that the development of space is a strategic 
capability for our nations, and that we must bring the solar system into our 
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economic sphere of influence. And equally, I believe that NASA must leverage 
the great economic engine of our nation and the world. 'Thus, the companies 
and countries that many ofyou represent can take advantage of the trails we plan 
to blaze as we explore space, just as we leverage the capabilities you create. 
As a U.S. federal agency, NASA expects only inflationary growth in our 
annual budget. 'Thus, we have adopted a "go-as-we-pay" approach for space 
exploration, science missions and aeronautics research. 'Thus, the primary 
pacing item for new ventures is our nation's ability to afford such capabilities. 
Over the next 3 years, our highest priority is to complete assembly of 
the International Space Station and honor our agreements to our Russian, 
European, Japanese and Canadian partners in this venture. It will not be easy. 
'The space station is the world's greatest engineering project, akin to such feats 
as the Great Wall of China, the pyramids of Egypt, the Panama and Suez canals 
or the sea walls of Venice. Friends of mine who worked on the Apollo program 
have conveyed to me their belief that the construction of the space station is 
just as tough a job. 
'There are many critics of this space station, just as there were critics of 
President Kennedy who called the Apollo program a "moondoggle." But I believe 
that the greatest achievement of the space station partnership is the partnership 
itself, and that's a tough thing to criticize. For over 6 years, astronauts and 
cosmonauts have been living and working together aboard the space station. 
For the United States, the station is a national laboratory in space, where we 
will conduct research to make future exploration to other planets in our solar 
system possible. I hope this partnership will reap even greater dividends as we 
explore space together over many future generations. 'The unifying vision that 
forged this partnership during the 1990s, prompted by the Gore-Chernomyrdin 
Commission, is what we endeavor to carry forward today. Our partnership has 
endured some hardships along the way, not least of which was the Cobmbia 
accident. I hope and believe that those hardships have built stronger bonds 
between us. 
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With the proper !goals in mind, I believe the benefits of space exploration 
far outweigh the risks. Among the most practical of these is our work with 
hurricane-monitoring satellites, aircraft and sensors that allow meteorologists 
to track such storms and predict their severity and impact. Many people 
today do not even realize that their weather forecasts rely on information 
from space assets. 
Broader misconceptions exist. NASA spinoff technologies were never 
Tang, Teflon or space pens. But while we actually can cite tens of thousands 
of legitimate technology spinoffs, including medical devices, fuel cells, batteries 
and even cordless tools, I would like to discuss a more seminal point. I want 
people to realize the key areas where NASA's space endeavors have created 
entirely new industrial capabilities that improve our fundamental way of life. 
For example, NASA is one of the major consumers of liquid hydrogen 
to fuel our space shuttle and other rocket engines. Liquid hydrogen is also 
used in the manufacturing of metals, !glass, electronics and even foods. When 
you hear the term "hydrogenated fats" applied to baked goods like pastries 
and bread, it means that liquid hydrogen was one of the ingredients. NASA 
is such a large consumer of liquid hydrogen that after Hurricane Katrina, we 
returned several hundred thousand gallons to the nation's reserve and delayed 
several space shuttle rocket engine tests to alleviate a national shortage when our 
nation's liquid hydrogen production facilities and supply lines were disrupted. 
Likewise, we are a major consumer of liquid oxygen. Our huge demand market 
for these propellants sparked fundamental improvements in the production 
and handling of these volatile substances. Today, the ready availability of liquid 
oxygen allows firefighters, emergency response teams and nursing homes to 
carry on their backs or in suitcases portable, hand-carried oxygen tanks. In the 
1960s, only select hospitals could supply oxygen in hazardous oxygen tents. 
I am sure that many of you would agree with me that the greatest 
revolution in our productivity and way of life has been the development of 
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the personal computer, Internet and various handheld communication devices. 
Thirty-five years ago, engineers like me used three pieces of wood and a piece 
of plastic that moved-the slide rule-to make calculations. 'Thirty years ago, 
1,000 transistors could fit on a silicon chip; today, it's 100 million. The cost 
of such chips has dropped by a factor of 100,000. Few people know that the 
development of the first microprocessors was born of a competition between 
Fairchild and Intel in the 1960s to build components small enough to fit in 
NASA spacecraft. This straightforward NASA technical requirement spawned 
a whole new industry that grew in ways few, except perhaps Gordon Moore, 
could predict. Necessity is the mother of invention, and I believe that we are at 
our most creative when we embark on bold ventures like the space program. 
So, with the economic growth and technology development we have seen 
since the 1960s, I believe that we are now entering a Renaissance period of 
space exploration where we can realize the vision that eluded us earlier. And 
as in the Renaissance, wealthy individuals will play a role in advancing the 
work of our architects, engineers and technicians. These will be entrepreneurs 
who have made their wealth in other endeavors-Jeff Bezos from Amazon, Bob 
Bigelow from Budget Suites, Richard Branson from Virgin and Elon Musk of 
Paypal fame are examples. These gentlemen and others have put their personal 
time, resources and energy behind the notion that many more people can have 
personal experience in space than do so today. It is one thing to view pictures 
of Earth from the vantage point of space, even on an IMAX screen, but it is 
another thing entirely to see it with one's own eyes. Many friends of mine have 
spoken of the epiphany they experienced from this. 
But let me be clear. NASA's job is not to sponsor space travel for private 
citizens. That is for private industry. My hope is the reverse; that when the 
public can purchase rides into space, NASA can leverage this capability. 
Likewise, I hope that one day NASA can leverage the expertise of companies 
not unlike FedEx or UPS today, to meet our cargo needs for the space station 
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and future lunar outposts. And one day, maybe, astronauts onboard our Orion 
crew exploration vehicle on their way to the moon and Mars can top off on 
liquid hydrogen from commercially available orbiting fuel stations. 
In the process of building these new space capabilities, these entrepreneurs, 
along with NASA and other companies, are hiring more aerospace engineers. I 
believe that a key measure of a society's economic growth is the extent to which 
we are educating a technically literate people who can build the infrastructure 
to advance that society. It is deeply troubling to me when education statistics 
for the United States indicate there are more bachelor's degrees in psychology 
being awarded than engineering degrees. I am sure that even the economics 
majors here can appreciate my concern! 
Again, NASA hopes to leverage, to the maximum extent possible, the 
capabilities that space entrepreneurs hope to create. A few years ago, when I 
was in the private sector working at In-Q-Tel, I helped k n d  a small software 
company seeking a better approach to visualizing satellite imagery. Over the 
years, that company grew into the backbone for Google Earth. Now, we hope 
to "spin-in" that capability to visualize imagery from other planets in our solar 
system, like the moon and Mars, using data from various NASA satellites and 
the Mars rovers. By invoking such commercial capabilities, NASA can leverage 
the funding of other investors to our mutual benefit. 
In conclusion, I would like to leave you with a final thought as to what 
might happen if we do not explore space, if we do not follow the cap we tossed 
over the wall in the 1960s. Last month in the journal Science, researchers 
examining the primordial material returned by NASA's Stardust space probe 
found that some of that material could not have come from the Kuiper Belt in 
the outer reaches of our solar system, but instead could only have come from 
our sun's core. Some of that material was even older than our own sun. 
The history of life on Earth is the history of extinction events, with 
evidence for some five major such events in the history of Earth. The last of 
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these occurred approximately 65 million years ago, when the dinosaurs that 
dominated Earth for over 160 million years suffered a catastrophic extinction. It 
is believed that this event was caused by a giant asteroid , which struck Earth in 
the Gulf of Mexico, triggering tsunamis, tectonic shifts and radically changing 
Earth's climate. 
The brief history of humans is next to nothing compared to the history of 
other life on Earth, and even less so compared to the age of our solar system or of 
the universe. Our species hasn't been around long enough to have experienced 
a cataclysmic extinction event. But they will occur, whether we are ready for 
them or not. 
In the end, space exploration is fundamentally about the survival of the 
species, about ensuring better odds for our survival through the promulgation 
of the human species. But as we do it, we will also ensure the prosperity of our 
species in the economic sense, in a thousand ways. Some of these we can foresee, 
and some we cannot. Who could claim that he or she would have envisioned 
the Boeing 777 after seeing the first Wright Flyer? And yet one followed the 
other in the blink of an historical eye. 
For this and many other economic and scientific reasons, we must explore 
what is on the other side of that wall, walk in the footprints of Neil Armstrong 
and make that next giant leap for mankind. 
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I often talk about very large-scale themes with regard to space exploration 
and our science and aeronautics program; and today, my thrust is going to be 
to try to link some of that up to your daily life. We often think in terms of 
spinoffs. I have never been unduly fond of that term, but I do think that there is 
a very strong link, the strongest possible link between doing the hardest things 
that human beings do, which is flying in space, and how it benefits the rest of 
our economy and, indeed, our whole way of life. We are gathered here to kick 
off this lecture series commemorating NASA's upcoming 50th birthday, but 
we are celebrating more than what NASA has done and the benefits that have 
followed. We are also, when we do this, celebrating who we are and who we can 
be as an American people. 
Fundamentally, NASA opens new frontiers and creates new opportunities, 
and because of that, we are a critical driver of innovation, but not in a way that 
just creates jobs. We create new markets and new possibilities for economic 
growth that didn't previously exist. We have taken at NASA to calling this the 
"space economy." It is an emerging economy, but a robust one even so, and it 
is an economy that is transforming lives here on Earth in ways that are not yet 
fully understood or appreciated. It is not an economy in space, or at least not 
yet, but space activities create products and markets that provide benefits right 
here on Earth, benefits that have arisen from our efforts to explore, understand 
and utilize the new medium. 
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In its last space report published in October 2006, the U.S. Space 
Foundation estimated the space economy at approximately $180 billion in 
2005'. Over 60 percent of that figure derived from commercial goods and 
services. That is a stunning statistic for an economy that arises fundamentally 
the world over out of government programs. ?his growing economy affects just 
about every aspect of how we live, work and play. Other emerging new markets 
are just around the corner. The space economy enables satellite communications, 
including radio and television and telemedicine, point-to-point GPS navigation, 
weather and climate monitoring and a host of space-based national security 
assets. It also includes the nascent space tourism industry and the development 
of space logistics services that will transform space transportation into a viable 
commercial enterprise. 
Fifty years ago, space was a far-off place. It was the stuff of science 
fiction. Today, it is pervasive in our lives, critical to a range of activities that 
create and provide value to human beings. It grew from NASA's roots in space 
exploration, and I would like to talk to you about that for just a few minutes. 
People all across our country, all across the world, find what we do exciting. 
They find it inspiring, and they find it so for many different reasons. Among 
them are the courage and competence of our astronauts, the dedication of the 
engineering teams that put them into space, the quest for knowledge that is 
realized by awe-inspiring pictures of distant galaxies or Martian craters from 
a robot perched on the rim, the challenge of the frontier, the final frontier, 
the frontier that begins anew on each planet and with each new discovery, the 
way we take on seemingly impossible tasks, tasks that challenge human skill 
and ingenuity to the utmost, like building a million-pound space station as a 
toehold on that final frontier. 
What we do at NASA is .quite simply larger than life. It is bolder than 
the boldest dreams, and we know it. So everyone knows and appreciates NASA, 
' The 2008 report, released in April, estimated that the space economy had grown to $25 1 billion in 2007. 
Part 1. Exploration a n d  Our  Future 
but to most people, what we do is literally out there. It is out of this world. The 
daily immediate connection between what we do and its impact on our lives is 
either unnoticed or taken for granted. In part, this is due to circumstances or, 
more properly, a change in circumstances because it wasn't always so. NASA 
was born and came of age during the cold war in an historical context that is 
difficult for many who were not there at the time to appreciate. It was a time 
when our very way of life was being called into question. 'The Soviet Union had 
declared that our democracy was too weak and too inefficient to compete with 
communism. After the successful launch of Sputnik, there were many people in 
our country and in the world who feared that they might be correct, and there 
were many others who were committed to proving them wrong. 
The moon race was more than exploration for its own sake, and it was a 
lot more than an exercise in national pride. It was considered a real-live test of 
the viability of an open society, a vindication of the very concept of freedom. 
The American people admired NASA's expertise, our daring do or can-do 
attitude. 'These were a reflection ofAmerica itself. People marveled at our ability 
to meet John F. Kennedy's challenge to land a man on the moon when we did 
it in just 8 years and 2 months, a feat that seems ever more wondrous the more 
distant we grow from it, but it was even more than that. The Soviet Union had 
shown that success on the frontier of space could, and did, translate into power 
and influence in the world. In the cold war, we were in a strategic competition 
for just such power and influence against a totalitarian regime whose core values 
were abhorrent to most Americans. 
So, when Americans watched the moon missions depart, our belief in 
freedom and in our way of life and our hopes for a better life for our children 
and their children were riding along with the astronauts. For a moment, we 
could leave our anxieties about the larger struggle of the cold war behind, and 
let our spirits soar into the skies. Nevertheless, we knew always in those years 
that we were locked into that struggle, that it was playing out most visibly 
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on the space frontier and that we were finally winning. Because of this, the 
connection between what we do at NASA and the daily lives of Americans at 
that time was immediate and intense. Even more, these events were inspiring to 
the world, not just to the United States. 
Friends of mine who have come here from other lands tell me directly 
that the world was cheering us on because of the sheer magnitude of the 
accomplishment that we attained. American self-confidence, our belief that we 
can do what we set out to do, drew admiration from around the world then as 
it does now. NASA, then as now, was the embodiment of that spirit. 
Today, we are in a very different world. The military and political 
competition has largely receded into the background. Today, we are primarily 
engaged in an economic competition around the world. We increasingly 
live in a global economy where rising wealth and living standards also mean 
ever-heightened levels of competition from places we never even considered. 
There are now more software engineers in Bangalore, India, than in Silicon 
Valley. Japan, Taiwan and South Korea together generate a fourth as many 
patents as does the U.S. every year, and their percentage is growing rapidly. 
The products of this innovation are all around in what has become a 
world marketplace. How many of you have a cell phone, a television or a car 
that was manufactured in the United States? These things are now a world 
commodity. I don't think I need to spend more time on these points. They are 
superbly treated in Tom Friedman's book, B e  World is Fht, and in the report, 
Rising Above the Gathering Storm, by my friend and colleague, Norm Augustine 
of the National Academy of Engineering. But I think the bottom line is that we 
all want our economy to continue to grow. We want to compete successfully. 
We want better lives for our children. But, economic growth and competitive 
success result primarily from the introduction of new goods and services or 
from finding more efficient ways to produce existing ones. 
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Economic growth is driven by technological innovation. Societies that 
foster it lead the pack, and others lag behind. But, if technological innovation 
drives competitiveness and growth, what drives innovation? There are many 
factors, but the exploration and exploitation of the space frontier is one of 
those. The money we spend, half a cent on the federal budget dollar, and the 
impact of what we do with it, doesn't happen out there. It happens here, and 
the result has been the space economy. So, if America is to remain a leader in 
the face of burgeoning global competition, we must continue to innovate, and 
we must continue to innovate in space. 
There is another factor driving innovation, also, and in my opinion, it 
is too often overlooked, or if it is seen, it is too often dismissed. Success in an 
economic competition depends upon image as well as substance. Companies 
the world over have a choice as to where to do deals and with whom to do them. 
The nation that appears to be at the top of the technical pyramid has taken a very 
large step toward being there in fact. Developing countries like China recognize 
the value of space activities as the driver of innovation, a source of national 
pride, and a membership in the most exclusive of clubs, that of spacefaring 
societies. It is no coincidence that we are seeing thousands of high-tech jobs 
starting up in China. 
NASA is uniquely positioned to drive the space economy with both 
substance and style because our mission requires us to push the technological 
envelope every single day, and to do it in the most publicly visible manner 
of any human enterprise. Our human and robotic ventures into the solar 
system, our attempts to fathom the mysteries of the universe require for their 
accomplishment a voyage of discovery beyond the limits of knowledge, and they 
are accomplished for all to see on a stage of breath-taking scope and grandeur. 
At once, we have an endeavor which places the highest possible demands 
on technical ingenuity, requires a calculated, but stunning, audacity for its 
success and returns a product with which all of the world is fascinated. Even 
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when we fail, and we do, we do so, in Teddy Roosevelt's words, "while daring 
greatly." 'That is why every year, the National Air and Space Museum is the 
world's most visited museum. 
At NASA, we explore the frontier, and in fact, we create that frontier. 
To do it, we have to answer a lot of questions that wouldn't even have been 
questions without that commitment to the unknown. 'The answers to those 
questions are answers that power our future here on Earth. Because our 
mission is flight in all its forms in space and in the air, we think and work 
and do our engineering and science at the extremes, and that is where the 
discoveries are made. 
In celebration of its own 25th anniversary, USA Today recently offered a 
list of the top 25 scientific breakthroughs that have occurred since its founding. 
Nine of those come from space, eight of them directly funded by NASA. We 
see the transformative effects of the space economy all around us through 
numerous technologies and life-saving capabilities. We see the space economy 
in lives saved when advanced breast cancer screening catches tumors in time 
for treatment using methodology developed from image extraction from the 
Hubble Space Telescope; or when a heart defibrillator restores the proper 
rhythm of a patient's heart; or when GPS, which was developed by the Air 
Force for military applications, helps guide a traveler to his or her destination. 
We see it when weather satellites warn us of coming hurricanes or when satellites 
provide information critical to understanding our environment and the effects 
of climate change. We see it when we us an ATM to pay for gas at the pump 
with an immediate electronic response via satellite. Technologies developed for 
exploring space are being used to increase crop yields and to search for good 
fisheries at sea. 
All of this is very nice, but 'sometimes a personal example carries I think 
more weight than the most comprehensive set of factual data. So let's consider 
the case of a woman, Sarah Moody, and her young nephew, Steve, who was 
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born with a very rare disorder. He had no sweat glands and he couldn't cool his 
body in the summer. He would overheat dangerously. After one too many close 
calls, Sarah thought to herself what many have thought and many have written: 
If we can put a man on the moon, why can't someone figure out a solution to 
this problem? So she called NASA and was put through to what is today our 
Innovative Partnerships Program. NASA scientists were able to adapt cooling 
technologies developed for the Apollo Lunar astronauts to develop a cooling 
vest for Steve. It worked. She started a foundation that has delivered 650-some 
vests to other people suffering similar disorders. Her foundation also turned 
to NASA for help with kids who had to live in dark rooms to avoid suffering 
tumors when exposed to ultraviolet light. NASA's contractors helped create 
suits that blocked the UV, allowing those kids to go outside. Sarah Moody died 
a few years ago, but her legacy lives on. 
Gary Thompson was an athletic 5(kyear-old man with a family history of 
heart disease. He was given a clean bill of health in a series of tests with several 
doctors a few years ago and then had a heart attack while running in a marathon. 
He survived and subsequently heard of a new ultrasound imaging technology 
derived from algorithms used to process images of Mars at NASA's JPL. He 
was diagnosed correctly using the new technology, something all the other tests 
had failed to do. He was so impressed that he started a company to take the 
applications to market. Medical Technologies International, Incorporated, now 
makes this new technology more widely available. It is in use in all 50 states. 
These examples only begin to tell the story. We can all be proud that 
they exist, but equally and in all fairness, we must recognize that we wouldn't 
create a space program in order to get these collateral benefits. But it is more 
than that. NASA and work in space generally are transformative. We don't just 
help develop technologies. We inspire whole new industries. We revolutionize 
existing ones, and we create whole new possibilities. In that vein, I often wonder 
if it might be possible to quantify the value to society of upgrading the standards 
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of precision to which the entire industrial base of that society operates. Any 
company bidding on space projects-military, or civilian or commercial-any 
company who wants to be a subcontractor or a supplier, any company that even 
wants to supply nuts, bolts and screws to the space industry must work to a 
higher level of precision than human beings have ever had to before. 
How do we value that asset? I don't know, but I am absolutely convinced 
that it is real, and that without the space industry, we wouldn't have it. In a 
related vein, another benefit to the space economy is the way that it inspires 
people to go into the technology sector. Our host today, Bob Stevens, was 
talking about exactly that experience of being a little boy watching a grainy 
black-and-white television set. Other people, Steve Jobs, Bill Gates and Burt 
Rutan tell similar stories. What is more important to realize is that a huge 
number of technology professionals in all fields first got hooked on space and 
then were inspired to pursue technical careers. 
'This is truly one of the best spinoffs we have, and the space exploration 
enterprise should receive due credit for it. At a time when we are concerned 
about declining enrollments in engineering and science and mathematics, this 
ought to be no small factor in our thinking. Space exploration inspires kids to 
study hard things, so that they can be part of it. Most of you know how the 
demands of spaceflight sparked the revolution in integrated circuitry. In the 
early years, our rockets couldn't compete with the throw weight of Russian 
rockets, and so in the United States, we embarked on a process to lighten the 
payload, and out of that, we got integrated circuits. But we didn't only get 
integrated circuits. We got all of the other technologies that make them possible. 
These capabilities now permeate our entire industrial base. 'The use of integrated 
circuits themselves is so ubiquitous in devices whose very existence would have 
been almost unimaginable only a few years ago that we no longer even notice 
it. Cell phones are given away as a competitive inducement to select one rate 
plan over another. Devices that can store gigabytes of information, a capability 
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once beyond price, are given away as keychain fobs in promotional advertising 
Built into your checkbook can be a calculator that Newton or Gaius would 
have given years of their career to have. For a few hundred dollars, you can buy 
a device that will allow you to navigate to any address in the country that can 
ever be found on a map. Who even notices anymore? 
Today, NASA is again among those at the forefront of computational 
development, as evidenced by recent demonstrations of the first computer 
chips that can work at 500 degrees centigrade in very hostile environments. Or 
consider a recent demonstration of a quantum computer chip, a device that 
operates at the limit of our understanding of the physical universe and makes use 
of the very strange and elusive properties of quantum mechanics, properties that 
even physicist friends of mine themselves refer to as "quantum weirdness." 
Quantum computing won't be just one more incremental improvement 
in present-day computing. It will revolutionize it. It is the kind of breakthrough 
you get when you set the bar possibly high, simply because the rigors of space 
exploration demand that it be so. To stimulate economic growth, to increase 
our international competitiveness, and to create better lives for our citizens, we 
must stimulate technological innovation. NASA's own programs accomplish 
this in one way, but as we have seen, the space economy today, at $180 billion 
around the world, is much bigger than NASA and is becoming more so. But 
NASA has another role to play, and that is as a catalyst for new ideas and new 
technology by setting extraordinary goals and then engaging the imagination 
and drive of entrepreneurs in the private sector. 
One such effort is our program to enable the creation of new low-cost 
commercial space launch capability using as an anchor market the logistics 
requirements for the International Space Station. The COTS program, short 
for Commercial Orbital Transportation Services, is intended to demonstrate 
capabilities to provide low-cost transportation to orbit for cargo and crew. If 
this experimental effort is successful, NASA will purchase commercial services 
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for delivery of cargo and crew to the station. We envision multiple flights per 
year beginning after shuttle retirement in 2010. To me, this is exactly analogous 
to the way that enlightened public policy spurred the aviation industry of the 
20th century. That system that took us in 100 years from cloth, sticks and string 
to a transportation system where you are more likely to die from being struck 
by lightning than in an air transport accident. It is a stunning achievement, and 
we need to do it in space. 
Fifty years into the space age, the greatest obstacle to the exploration 
and utilization of our solar system remains the very high cost of space 
transportation. No government effort has yet made a successful attack on 
the problem. But, when we do have it, we will find that commercially viable, 
low-cost space transportation will be as transformative to the economy as the 
transition from steam to diesel power or the achievement of powered flight 
that I spoke of a moment ago. It will open up possibilities that now appear 
impractical, if not outlandish. 
And this takes us to the Vision for Space Exploration, laid out by the 
president in 2004 and codified in the NASA Authorization Act of 2005. In 
the wake of the Columbia tragedy, it calls for NASA to extend human and 
robotic presence to the moon, Mars and beyond. As the President's Science 
Advisor, Dr. Jack Marburger stated in his March 2006 speech at a Goddard 
symposium, "As I see it, questions about the vision boil down to whether we 
want to incorporate the solar system into our economic sphere or not." Precisely 
so, perfectly said. 
Every aspect of human knowledge will be tested and advanced: physics, 
chemistry, biology and their practical applications in engineering, material 
science, medicine, computer science, robotics, artificial intelligence, power 
generation and storage and many other fields. I didn't even mention rocket 
science. This is a legacy that the crew of Columbia would be proud to know that 
we had carried forward. Reaching for the unknown, making our lives bigger 
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and our horizons broader, achieving things never before possible are the heart 
and soul of what we do at NASA. By pushing beyond the future, by setting 
for ourselves seemingly impossible challenges, we are transforming our lives 
for the better here on Earth, even as we explore new worlds in space; and if, as 
Shakespeare said, life is but a stage, then NASA takes the play to the grandest 
possible stage. In doing so, we create the space economy. At NASA, we are 
making the future happen, and we are doing it now. 
?hank you very much. 
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October 3,2006 
I spent last week in Beijing and Shanghai, touring various facilities and 
meeting some excellent scientists and engineers. It was my first visit to China, 
and I will again take a moment to thank my hosts for their warm hospitality 
- on that visit. It is important for the fraternity of spacefaring nations to discuss 
openly the issues that we each face. I look forward to more such dialogue with 
China's National Space Agency, and to continuing the dialogue with the heads 
of other agencies here at the International Astronautical Congress (IAC). Thus, 
my remarks today will be on the subject of "partnership" as we apply it to our 
endeavors in space. 
Space exploration, whether human or robotic, is still the grandest and 
most technically challenging expression of human imagination of which I can 
conceive. Thus, I believe it to be in our best interests in this unique human 
endeavor to work together on occasion, to ask each other as different countries 
and different cultures how we should go about solving the unique problems of 
this unique endeavor. The physics is the same for us all; the rocket equation 
does not change when expressed in a textbook of a different language. But I 
have found that while the problems and the physical constraints are the same 
for all, the vagaries of human creativity and ingenuity can yield many different 
solutions. So, it really is to our mutual benefit to understand how each of us 
develops the art and science of spaceflight. We all have much to learn. We can 
learn best by doing some things together. 
I have often said, but it bears repeating before this audience: I have no 
doubt that humans will continue to explore space, going to the moon and Mars 
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and far beyond. %us, the question of "whether" this will happen is not an 
interesting one to me; I know that it will. The interesting questions center around 
topics like "when," and "who," and "what," and "why." When will humans next 
return to the moon, or venture to Mars, or first explore the near-Earth asteroids? 
Who will first do each of these things, and many even bolder things beyond 
them? What languages will they speak, and what values will they hold? Why will 
they go; what gains will they expect to return to their parent societies? 
Such questions can be considered jingoistic if taken out of context, but 
that is not my intent at all. My intent in raising them is to ask how each of our 
cultures regards its role in exploring the space frontier. The American culture 
retains even now a certain frontier mindset, based on our history. We in America 
are the descendants of pioneers from Spain, Portugal, Holland, Great Britain, 
France, Germany, and many, many other countries who emigrated over many 
generations to settle in what became the United States. But the British were the 
boldest and most persistent of these early groups, and so the primary language 
of the United States came to be English. Canadians speak both English and 
French, while elsewhere in the Americas both Spanish and Portuguese are 
spoken. Now, these various languages not only convey the thoughts of their 
speakers in different ways, they also encourage and allow different thoughts. 
Language is, in part, a window into, and a map of, the culture of its users. 
And so, looking into the future of space exploration, I sometimes wonder what 
languages the explorers and eventual settlers of the moon and Mars will speak? 
Will my language be passed down over the generations to future lunar colonies? 
Or will another, bolder or more persistent culture surpass our efforts and put its 
own stamp on the predominant lunar society of the far future? 
Further, the laws of the United States, which represent the values of our 
people, are fundamentally based on English common law, Roman law and the 
Justinian code, yet have evolved to take into account modern philosophies 
and practicalities. Especially noteworthy is our core belief in the possession by 
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individuals of certain inalienable rights, including the right to own property. 
All of the countries represented here at the IAC are governed by the rule of 
law, but each of us has variations in our legal codes which reflect the values of 
our unique cultures. So, looking into the future of space exploration and space 
settlement, what values and laws will govern those explorers and settlers? 
These and others are fundamental questions which I will not attempt 
to answer here, because in the end I am not qualified to do so. I have never 
pretended to be either a linguist or a lawyer; I am merely an engineer. However, 
I consider such topics to be quite fascinating, and I hope that the community 
of spacefaring nations will carefully consider their import in the future. While 
we may disagree on certain points and priorities, it is important that we try to 
understand, and respect, each other's views. This is an essential ingredient of 
any successful partnership. 
It is no secret, and should be no surprise, that the United States has 
played, and seeks to play, a leadership role among the community of spacefaring 
nations. But we cannot simply presume such a role; it can only be earned. We 
must first be respected as a good partner before we can be regarded by you, the 
community of spacefaring nations, as a good leader. We at NASA have not 
always been the most reliable of international partners, and it has been one of 
my most important goals to improve that record. All who are here know that 
I have said on many occasions that the partnership behind the International 
Space Station provides its highest and longest lasting value, a value which we 
in the United States highly respect, as we work with our partners toward the 
completion of this enterprise. 
For many and various reasons, partnerships in space exploration have 
enormous benefits, but they are not easy to consummate. History demonstrates 
that countries and cultures will always have issues which divide and set them 
apart. We compete in the global marketplace of ideas, influence and intellectual 
property as well as in the more visible marketplace of economic goods and 
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services. It should be no surprise that there are sometimes disputes surrounding 
one or more of these issues. 
Competitiveness is healthy and usefbl for people, organizations and even 
nations, but the competitive spirit must be leavened with a healthy dose of 
collaboration, lest it be carried past the point of utility and into harm. So, 
while competing, we need also to be mindful of opportunities to work together, 
to create alliances for the common good of mankind. I believe that space 
exploration and scientific discovery are examples of endeavors which offer a 
distinctly unifying force for that common good. 
However, each of our countries also has unique national security 
concerns. Having spent a good portion of my career working for the U.S. 
Department of Defense, I am not ignorant of the military applications of space 
technologies, nor of the need to regulate the proliferation of certain capabilities, 
and missile technologies are prominent among these. The United States is 
firmly committed to ensuring that certain key technologies, which we possess 
and some others do not, not be used against us or our allies. That priority is 
higher for us than partnership in various space endeavors, and this fact must 
be understood and carefully considered by the parties involved in any putative 
collaboration. I recognize the bluntness of this assertion, but I believe that each 
of us, as spacefaring nations, must respect each other's national priorities, and 
must speak openly and honestly with each other if there are differences which 
hamper our ability to collaborate. 
Further, each of our countries has only so much money to expend on space 
endeavors, and this also limits our ability to partner on various projects. Even 
with an annual budget of $16.8 billion, NASA cannot afford everything that 
our own numerous constituencies would like us to do in exploration, science, 
and aeronautics research. That budget constitutes only 0.6 percent of the overall 
budget for our U.S. government, but in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, the 
greatest natural disaster in the history of the United States, and the expense of 
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the Global War on Terrorism, I still consider myself to be very lucky that our 
nation's leaders provide that much to NASA. But still, we must carefully choose 
those endeavors to which we commit with our fellow spacefaring nations. 
Much as we would wish otherwise, we cannot do everything we would like to 
do. In this context of limited resources, it is clear that partnerships work best 
when all partners have "skin in the game," each contributing resources toward 
a common goal that is greater than that which could be easily afforded by any 
single partner. We believe that such relationships work best when conducted 
on a "no exchange of funds" basis. I must admit that this view is not universally 
shared. On  many occasions since assuming my role as administrator I have been 
asked about opportunities for "partnership," when what is really being sought 
is American investment in the aerospace industries of other nations. I must be 
clear on this; "partnership" for us is not a synonym for "helping NASA to spend 
its money." 
The United States' Vision for Space Exploration honors our past 
commitments to the space station partnership, and calls on your interest and 
support in embarking upon new ventures. Last month, we restarted assembly 
of the station, after a hiatus of over 3 years due to the loss of Space Shuttle 
Cobmbia. On board the space station today, American Michael Lopez-Alegria 
(who was born in Spain but grew up in California), Russian Mikhail Tyurin 
and German Thomas Reiter are part of the greatest construction project in the 
history of humankind, rivaling the pyramids of Egypt, the Suez and Panama 
Canals, or the Great Wall of China. Who would have imagined after World 
War 11, my own father's generation, that such a team could be working and 
living in space today? 
Two weeks ago, I welcomed home the crew of Space Shuttle Athntis, 
which included Canadian astronaut Steve MacLean. Last week, Russian 
cosmonaut Pave1 Vinogradov, American astronaut Jeff Williams and 
Iranian-born spaceflight participant Anousheh Ansari returned home to Earth 
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on Soyzlz, landing in Kazakhstan. In December, I look forward to the next 
shuttle assembly mission to the space station, with Swedish astronaut Christer 
Fuglesang. Even at a cursory look at human spaceflight activities over just this 
past month shows that space exploration is a truly international endeavor, and 
a broader look shows just how true this has been, for a long time. 
'The shuttle program has, in 25 years of operation through STS- 
115, flown 708 astronaut-seats. (By that I mean that most individuals have 
flown more than once.) Eighty-three of these flight opportunities, or about 
12 percent of the total, have gone to 58 individual international astronauts 
from 14 countries. I don't know the statistics for Soyuz, but I do know that our 
Russian partners have flown a substantial number of non-Russian cosmonauts, 
going back for decades. This goes beyond the mere exchange of money or favors 
or other considerations. The largest spacefaring nations have quite simply made 
it a point to make human spaceflight a significant international activity. 
But that's not all. Last month, American engineers and scientists met in 
India to review progress in executing data-sharing agreements and delivering 
two instruments for India's Chandrayaan lunar mission. Since NASA cannot 
afford to do everything, and since so many missions are planned for the moon 
over the next few years, including China's Chang'E mission, lunar science data 
should be openly shared among the science community, just as we do with 
other planetary science data. 
Also last month, the Japanese Space Agency successfully launched the 
SOLAR-B satellite, a joint JAXA-NASA-UK-Europe heliophysics mission to 
study the sun's magnetic fields. Not only is NASA interested in the sun's effects 
on terrestrial telecommunications and power gids and potential impacts to 
the space station, we'll soon need timely and accurate warnings of impending 
solar storms for our astronauts in cislunar space. Later on, we'll need this same 
information on treks to Mars and near-Earth asteroids. 
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Later this month, I'll be sitting down with the NASA management team 
to go over the flight data from the past three shuttle missions to see if a servicing 
mission to the Hubble Space Telescope to extend the life and capabilities of this 
Great Observatory can be performed safely. People from all over the world are 
awed and inspired by Hubble pictures that reveal the secrets of our universe. 
From the first, Hubble has had an international complexion. After that mission 
is completed, the European Space Agency will launch the U.S.-built James 
Webb Space Telescope aboard an Ariane V. We're also collaborating with 
the German Aerospace Center on the SOFIA airborne observatory, and along 
with NASA's Kepler mission, ESA's Gaia mission will survey our galaxy for 
extra-solar planets. 
Next month, NASA Deputy Administrator Shana Dale will meet with 
her counterparts in Washington at an AASlAIAA seminar to define better our 
purposes in going to the moon, and to discuss what we'll do when we get there. 
This meeting is a follow-up to a highly successful NASA-hosted workshop last 
April. Since then, we have met regularly with other international space agencies 
to define a global strategy for space exploration. 
One aspect ofthis discussion is the need to set certain engineering technical 
standards to ensure compatibility and interoperability in our exploration 
architecture. Analogous to my previous comments about spoken languages 
for future space explorers, it is important that the engineering standards for 
NASA's architecture be specified with the international metric, or SI, standard 
as the base unit of measure, with English units only by exception when it makes 
sense for NASA to do so. Thus, we hope for a high degree of compatibility of 
interfaces and standards, as spacefaring nations explore the moon, Mars and 
near-Earth asteroids together. 
So, before I open up the dialogue to your questions, let me share with you 
the awe that veteran American astronaut Shannon Lucid conveyed to me last 
week as we toured China. Her'parents were American missionaries in the city of 
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Shanghai, and Shannon was born there during World War 11. Her family was 
interned in a concentration camp for the first year of her life, after which she 
and her parents were released as part of a personnel exchange. They returned to 
China after World War 11, and she attended kindergarten there. She has many 
memories from that time. She was amazed last week by the transformation of 
the city of Shanghai from what she remembered from the 1940s. Such changes 
are never objectively surprising, yet when we are confronted with them, as 
individuals we are indeed always surprised. 
Cities change; people change; nations change. Some nations that were 
American allies during World War I1 are not as close to us today, and some 
nations that were enemies in that era are now among our closest partners. Many 
have asked why I visited China last week on behalf of my country, when that 
nation is today not among those most closely linked to us. But China is a 
powerful and important nation, home to the oldest civilization we have in the 
world. The United States is newer and younger, but it is also a powerful and 
great nation. There is no possible purpose to be served by creating or advocating 
adversarial relations between the United States and China, or indeed between 
ourselves and any other nation. There have been sea changes in relationships 
between the United States, Germany and Japan, our adversaries in World 
War 11, and between the United States and Russia, our competitors during the 
Apollo era of the 1960s. There can be more such changes, and there will. The 
best possible goals for those who manage our nations' space agencies are to find 
ways to narrow the differences between us, so that the changes are good ones. 
We need to look toward those things we have in common, precisely because 
there are already an ample number of things to divide us. Perhaps this is not 
"breaking news" so much as it is a new perspective on the news. 
Thank you. 
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President Accoyer, distinguished members of the Parliamentary Group 
on Space and guests, thank you for the opportunity to address you today. I am 
honored to be with you and look forward to the opportunity to discuss bilateral 
cooperation with France as well as more general European space collaboration with 
NASA, and my perspective on the prospects for the future of space exploration. 
I firmly believe it is a future that will be full of opportunities for meanin@ 
collaboration, but that achieving it will take hard work and determination. With 
France assuming the Presidency of the European Union this year, and with a 
European Space Agency Ministerial in November to help define the European 
Space Agency's (ESA's) future direction, I am aware that I am speaking to you at 
a crucial time, when France is considering how best to exercise its leadership in 
space to benefit its citizens and the broader European community. 
As has been the case with the Centre National d'Edutes Spatiales 
(CNES), we have enjoyed excellent relations and have had the privilege of 
robust civil space cooperation with ESA, the German Aerospace Center (DLR) 
and the Italian Space Agency (ASI). As we proceed with space exploration we 
look forward to continuing to work with France, Germany, Italy, the European 
Space Agency and, indeed, with all of our European counterparts. 
Allow me to begin by highlighting a very important aspect of relations 
between France and the United States, which is simply that France has long 
been the United States' closest partner in space exploration, by many measures. 
For example, NASA has more active space cooperation agreements with France 
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than any other country. This is a relationship that goes back to the earliest days 
of spaceflight. In fact, I could note that NASA's first overseas representative was 
deployed to Paris in 1964. That is a position that we have filled continuously 
ever since, and our base of operations in Europe remains in France. In January 
2007, then-Minister for Higher Education and Research, Francois Goulard, 
and I signed a U.S.-France Umbrella Agreement for Cooperative Activities 
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes. In signing 
this agreement as the foundation for further space cooperation between our 
two nations, Minister Goulard and I underscored the vital role that a robust 
program in space exploration can play in sustaining our respective economic 
and national security interests, promoting innovation, and motivating pursuit 
of and excellence in mathematics, science, engineering and technology. I would 
like to thank the leadership of this Group, and of the National Assembly, for 
ensuring that this agreement was ratified. 
NASA's cooperation with France touches almost every aspect of our 
activities in aerospace. 
In aeronautics research, NASA is working closely with the French National 
Aerospace Research Center and others to develop a better understanding of 
the issues associated with aircraft in-flight icing. These research efforts will 
ultimately improve ice accretion modeling techniques and refine ice detection 
instrumentation and measurement systems. 
In space science, in addition to a long history of successful cooperative 
planetary missions including a robust program of Mars exploration, a variety 
of French institutions and scientists are important contributors to NASA's 
Gamma Ray Large Area Space Telescope (GUST)  mission. The G U S T  will, 
among other things, help us to study black holes and the source of gamma-ray 
bursts-the most powerful explosions in the universe-to probe dark matter 
and the early universe and to explore early star formation, pulsars, solar flares 
and the origins of cosmic rays. Cooperation in future space science missions 
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is also being considered in the study of dark energy. Closer to home, NASA 
is looking forward to the upcoming four-party Ocean Surface Topography 
Mission (OSTM), scheduled to launch next week. 'This mission, involving the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), NASA, CNES 
and Eumetsar will continue a long line of cooperative U.S.-French Earth 
science missions, beginning with TOPEWPoseidon and continuing with 
Jason-1 and CALIPSO. These successful cooperative missions have provided 
us with an improved understanding of ocean circulation; weather; climate 
variability and air quality; and they clearly demonstrated an effective model 
for transitioning research and development activities to practical applications 
on a day-to-day basis. 
'These few examples illustrate the significant benefits of our cooperative 
relationship, one that has produced benefits not only for France and the United 
States, but also for millions of people around the world. I have no doubt that 
such fruitful scientific collaboration will continue into the future. 
Another subject that may continue to be of particular interest to you is 
cooperation in human spaceflight. In this regard, I must note that NASA and 
the International Space Station partnership have come a long way since the 
tragic loss of Space Shuttle Columbia in February 2003. That accident forced 
the U.S. government to reconsider the strategic reasons for human spaceflight. 
As a result, the United States has committed to a long-term program of human 
and robotic exploration of space for a variety of purposes, purposes that I believe 
we share with Europe. 
When I look at the European Space Policy document released last May 
by ESA and the European Commission, and when I read the report by Senator 
Rev01 and Dr. Cabal published last February, or I review the remarks made 
by French President Nicolas Sarkozy on space policy given earlier this year in 
Kourou, I see that we have much in common. We both see space as a strategic 
environment that generates multiple advantages for our economy and our 
Leadership in Space 
people. We see it as a means of promoting peaceful international cooperation. 
We see that space exploration, in general, and human spaceflight, in particular, 
energize and encourage our minds as does no other enterprise. We see that it 
inspires our children to study math, science and engineering so that they can be 
a part of this great endeavor. As President Sarkozy noted, access to space is the 
hallmark of major industrial and technological powers. 
For these reasons, which you understand as well as anyone, the United 
States will never turn its back on this great endeavor. So, in the aftermath of the 
tragic Columbia accident, the United States committed to a new space policy. 
In my opinion, it is the best space policy we have ever enunciated. It builds 
upon our successes, pulls the components of our space efforts together into 
a more integrated whole and keeps faith with our long-standing partners like 
France. In the field of human spaceflight, we decided that it was time to replace 
the 1970s-vintage space shuttle with a new vehicle that will be capable of taking 
us beyond low Earth orbit, be safer and cheaper to operate and be flexible 
enough for our children and grandchildren to use when they head for Mars and 
other destinations. The Orion crew vehicle and Ares launch vehicles are being 
developed today with these goals for the future in mind. 
The first phase of this new exploration policy is to complete and operate 
the space station together with our international partners. I am thrilled with the 
excellent progress being made toward that objective. Beginning with the return 
to flight of Space Shuttle Discovery 3 years ago, the shuttle has conducted nine 
successful missions to the space station. While they have continued to become, 
technically and logistically, ever more complex, they have been executed 
brilliantly, thanks to the skill, dedication and hard work of the people involved. 
ESA Astronaut LCopold Eyharts, is one of those people. A credit to 
the ESA Astronaut Corps and the French Air Force, General Eyharts flew 
to the station on Space Shuttle Atlantis earlier this year, became part of the 
crew of Expedition 16 and returned to Earth on Space Shuttle Endeavor in 
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March. While on the station, he tested and operated the European Cohmbus 
Module, marking a significant milestone both for Europe and the partnership. 
?he culmination of many years of effort in Europe, Columbus gives Europe the 
capability to conduct onboard research in areas such as material science, fluid 
physics, life science and Earth observation. It is a major contribution 
to the station and demonstrates the maturity and sophistication of the 
European space enterprise. 
With respect to the recent launch of the Automated Transfer Vehicle 
(ATV) cargo vehicle earlier this year, let me re-emphasize what I said on April 3. 
Like many of my colleagues, I was happy to see that the first ATV was 
named after the French writer who was such an inspiration to so many 
of us in the space business. I am incredibly proud of our European partners 
for successfully docking the Jules Verne with the station. I applaud Europe's 
achievement. Only the United States and Russia have previously conducted 
automated dockings in space. In combination with the launch of the Cohmbus 
Module earlier this year, the success of the ATV marks the arrival of Europe as 
a full-fledged space power. Now that the ATV is operational, we hope Europe 
will utilize it to its fullest potential, providing NASA and the other international 
partners with cargo capabilities through existing arrangements. Commercial 
services, like the ones I am working to foster through NASA's Commercial 
Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) program, could follow. 
We await with anticipation the many deliveries by the ATV of 
critically needed cargo and equipment to the station. Further, the many 
technologies developed throughout Europe for this sophisticated vehicle 
offer the prospect of even greater European feats in the future, based on the 
use of this core vehicle. It would be a small step from today's Ariane 5 and 
Jules Verne to an independent European human spaceflight capability. 
In the meantime, the ATV is a tremendous asset for Europe in space, and we 
expect you will make the most of its capabilities for years to come. 
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The space station is on schedule to double its crew next year and 
to be completed in 2010. For those who have heard that the U.S. will 
soon abandon the station, let me be clear: we are committed to building 
and utilizing the space station well into the next decade. I n  fact, in the 
new U.S. space policy, the station is the primary focus of our near-term 
effort. Human research on  the space station will directly benefit our 
understanding of and preparation for future activities on  the moon and 
later voyages to Mars. Further, the U.S. Congress has designated the U.S. 
segment of the station as a national laboratory and directed NASA to develop a 
plan to "increase the utilization of the station by other federal entities and the 
private sector. . . . " Congress does not create or eliminate national laboratories 
lightly. %us, it is inconceivable to  me that the U.S. would abandon a 
perfectly functional space station because we have arrived an arbitrary 
date on the calendar. So while I cannot speak for a future U.S. administration 
or Congress, I do believe that the station will be around for a long time beyond 
2016, and the U.S. will remain part of it. 
As I noted earlier, present U.S. space exploration policy was born of the 
Columbia tragedy. One of the findings of the Columbia Accident Investigation 
Board was that "the loss of Columbia and her crew represents a turning point, 
calling for a renewed commitment regarding exploration." In the U.S., the plan 
for space exploration was put forth by President Bush in January 2004 and, 
after nearly 2 years of informed debate, was ratified with a remarkable level of 
bipartisan support with the passage of the NASA Authorization Act of 2005. 
Republicans and Democrats in the United States may disagree on many things, 
but they found common cause in the development of a coherent space policy. 
After embracing our international commitments to complete the station, 
the policy directs us to extend human and robotic presence throughout the 
solar system, first to the moon, and then on to other destinations, such as Mars. 
At this point, I should emphasize that as part of this remarkably straightforward 
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policy, we are also directed to seek opportunities for international collaboration 
in our activities. I will discuss this point in more detail later. 
But before I do that, let me take a moment to address a few of the concerns 
I've heard about the path the U.S. has chosen with regard to exploration. Some 
in France at the time of the president's announcement asked what France could 
gain from an American desire to return men to the moon. More recently, some 
in Europe have suggested that any consideration of missions to the moon is a 
distraction from the real goal of a human flight to Mars. Others have predicted 
that significant change to U.S. space policy will come with the presidential 
elections, so it is best to sit on the sidelines and wait to see what the next U.S. 
administration will do. I have several observations to make in connection with 
these points. 
First, U.S. civil space policy is specifically designed for the long term, 
designed to be implemented affordably and systematically across many changes 
of administration and Congress. In fact, those who are in favor of continuing 
human spaceflight, a substantial majority of U.S. policymakers, agree that we 
have little choice but to proceed on the path we are now following. While there 
will certainly be debate on the details of NASA's plans, in my view there will 
not be a significant change in our overall direction. There is a broad bipartisan 
consensus of support for today's U.S. civil space policy. 
Second, after nearly 30 years of service, the space shuttle will cease 
operations in 2010. The shuttle is an aging, fragile and increasingly expensive 
vehicle to operate. Production lines are in the process of shutting down. 
Suppliers are no longer are making certain critical parts. Vendors are moving 
on to other businesses. Meanwhile, our Orion spacecraft and Ares I launch 
vehicle will soon come on line. The major Orion and Ares I components were 
put under contract last year. An engineering model of the Orion vehicle has 
been built and will be used to test the launch escape system this September. The 
first Ares I test flight, Ares I-X, is scheduled for mid-2009. 
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Finally, I should note that although the "gap" between the shuttle and 
Orion will be painfully long, the shuttle will be replaced by vehicles with 
significantly higher reliability and flexibility. By the middle of the next decade, 
multinational crews will be traveling to and from the station-six at a time-in 
the Orion spacecraft. We are committed to the new path. 
That still leaves us the question of destinations for human exploration. 
I wholeheartedly agree with President Sarkozy that Mars offers us a great 
adventure, and I also agree with those who say that Mars is the ultimate 
destination for mankind in the 21st century. But I do not believe that Mars is 
the only interesting destination for mankind in the inner solar system, nor do I 
believe that it is reasonably within our immediate reach. As Professor Stephen 
Hawking said in his April lecture at the George Washington University, Earth's 
moon is an obvious first stop in human exploration, because of its proximity 
and the potential that water ice may exist in its polar craters. He also noted that 
Mars is the obvious next target after the moon. I agree with him completely. 
In the United States we had similar types of discussions in the early 
1960's, when we first engaged in the race to the moon with the Soviet Union. At 
that time there were numerous debates about the surest path to our destination, 
debates which could not be resolved with only the experience accumulated 
during Project Mercury. We had capabilities to demonstrate and technical skills 
to hone before we could go deeper into space. The Gemini Program helped 
us to develop the needed skills for the Apollo lunar missions, while remaining 
safely in our own "neighborhood," which at that time was low Earth orbit. 
Similarly, as we look toward Mars, continued work in Earth orbit 
followed by "field tests" on the moon are, in much the same way, on the path 
to a successful human expedition to Mars in the next few decades. During the 
development of U.S. space exploration policy, consideration was given to going 
directly to Mars. But when we looked at it carefully, we decided that we could 
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neither afford nor sustain the budget increases needed to ameliorate the risk of 
such a plan. 
Let me turn now to the subject of international cooperation in 
exploration. It is sometimes said that NASA was overly prescriptive of the roles 
of its partners in the early days of space station development. I think much 
might be said on either side of this claim and has. But whether or not it was so 
in the past, I determined that it would not be the case in the future. So, early in 
my tenure at NASA, I stated that we will not attempt to prescribe the manner 
of participation of any of our potential partners. We will work with others to 
define an exploration architecture suitable to all, and we will identify those 
portions of the task that we are willing and able to accomplish with the funding 
we can provide. We expect that others will do the same. 
In the years since, the exploration architecture is coming together nicely, 
with broad international support. NASA has welcomed ideas from our friends in 
France, elsewhere in Europe and from many other countries. We will continue 
to do so as we move forward. Just as with mid-20th century Antarctic research, 
some of the most creative approaches to 21st century lunar and Martian 
exploration will depend on international collaboration. France, through its 
space agency CNES, has added its voice to those of 13 other space agencies 
in a multilateral dialogue we collectively refer to as the Global Exploration 
Strategy. This effort has gone so far as to publish a framework document and 
establish a coordination mechanism, called the International Space Exploration 
Coordination Group. Exploring the moon, and eventually Mars, will be a 
challenging task, one that NASA has neither the resources nor the desire to do 
alone. And, as I mentioned earlier, U.S. policy and law explicitly calls on NASA 
to engage in international cooperation in pursuit of our goals. As European 
experts and political leaders have noted, a global exploration effort is a key to 
unlocking the door to our future. 
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One other curious comment that I have heard in international discussion 
about U.S. space policy is the suggestion that the United States is somehow 
unfairly excluding international partners from the development of Orion and 
Ares. I say "curious" because I note that Senator Rev01 and Deputy Cabal in 
their report last year stated that "autonomous and competitive launchers" are 
an absolute priority. President Sarkozy said earlier this year that independent 
access to space was essential. The "vital importance" of "independent, reliable 
. . . access to space . . . " is also enunciated in last May's European Space Policy 
statement. I fully agree, and moreover, such independent access to space is of no 
less importance to the United States. That is why we are proceeding with these 
developments as national projects, while at the same time hoping that other 
aspects of exploration will offer fruitful soil for international collaboration. 
Let me be clear: while we know that our national capabilities allow us 
to reach the moon again alone, we would not consider that to be a successful 
outcome. Measured against the standard of our own policy, it would be a 
failure. A group of nations pursuing common, coordinated goals will achieve so 
much more than a single country's mission or outpost. 
I am personally committed to the idea that this enterprise should be 
international in scope. It is obvious to me that we share a commitment to 
international cooperation of this sort. For example, ESA's Space Exploration 
Policy Advisory Group noted as far back as 2004 that "the cooperation 
objective among key actors should be based on heteronomy, partnership and 
networking." In our lunar ambitions, we couldn't agree more. We prefer a 
coordinated effort at the moon involving many national space programs over 
the alternative of exploring space alone. We are trying to behave in a manner 
which supports that claim. 
So NASA, guided by the U.S. policy, is pursuing a path of international 
cooperation in its space endeavors. It is a path that differs significantly from 
the Apollo era, and builds on the successes of prior shuttle missions and the 
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space station. We welcome, indeed we are asking for, European collaboration 
in human exploration. We welcome the development of independent European 
capabilities in space to provide redundant systems in the event of failure of 
any one partner's capabilities. Between and among us, we have seen enough 
such failures that we should know by now to plan for them. We think that this 
would be of benefit both collectively and individually, especially if we can link 
individual capabilities via common interfaces that will ultimately provide the 
robustness we need for future ventures beyond low Earth orbit. 
The foundation of NASA's cooperation with all of its partners is based on 
the principles of transparency, reciprocity and mutual benefit. Our relationships 
with our long-established partners in Europe and around the world have 
shown that only this foundation can provide a reliable basis for cooperation in 
spaceflight, and this foundation would be a necessary precondition for any new 
relationship with countries such as China. 
In November of this year, the ESA Ministerial will make programmatic 
decisions regarding Europe's plans in space for the next 3 years and impacting 
ESA's direction for a much longer time by setting the stage for the 201 1 
Ministerial. This period, between 2008 and 201 1, will be an important time 
for all of us. NASA will be working to enable early lunar exploration, following 
a stepping stone approach on the way to Mars and beyond. In Europe, these 
next years will be important for defining European objectives and putting in 
place the activities necessary to meet them. I hope that the decisions made at 
the 2008 Ministerial will hearken back to those of 1985, when the ESA Council 
agreed to pursue cooperation on the space station program. 
Regarding past decisions, we are pleased that European nations came 
together in 2001 and displayed their commitment to long-term robotic and 
human exploration with the initiation of the Aurora Program, which targets 
potential human presence on Mars in roughly the same timeframe as U.S. space 
exploration policy. We welcomed the generation of momentum in Europe 
88 Leadership in Space 
toward human and robotic space exploration in the European Commission's 
plan for implementing European Space Policy in 2003, and ESA's publication 
last year of objectives and interests in space exploration. In the future, I hope 
that you will maintain this momentum by encouraging the ESA Ministerial of 
2008 to commit to a program of synergy and common purpose, that will bring 
our programs closer together, and that will allow us to leverage our limited 
funds to mutual benefit. 
In summary, we thoroughly enjoy our productive relationship with 
France in space activities, both through bilateral and multilateral agreements 
with CNES and through French membership in ESA. We understand that 
there are many reasons to invest in the noble goal of space exploration, but 
that the same reasons will not have the same weight for all participants, and 
that other nations will embrace similar goals from different perspectives. In 
2004, Jacques Blamont wrote that in the world outside the U.S., the decision 
of any government to spend money for space programs is motivated by societal 
factors, and not only to "fulfill the public's sense of destiny" as some have said 
about the U.S. space program. I agree with Professor Blamont on this point. 
France will identify its own rationale for pursuing space exploration-one that 
meets its national goals and the needs of its unique society, just as we do. France 
will carry those ideas forward to its partners in Europe and beyond. But in the 
end, I believe that we share common purposes and goals, and that it makes 
sense to pursue these mutual interests together, as France and the U.S. have 
done in space for the last 50 years. I sincerely hope that this will be the case for 
decades to come. 
Not long ago, those of us in this business questioned whether we would 
ever again leave low Earth orbit. But now the question is not whether humans 
will extend their presence throughout the solar system. The questions are who 
will do it, how and when will it be done? I believe we have a firm handle 
on defining the "how" and the "when." As an engineer, I understand these 
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variables. What I cannot control is the "who." Europe's decision on whether or 
not to pursue an ambitious program in space exploration is, of course, a decision 
that only Europe can make. Europe certainly has the capability. I believe it has 
the ambition. And I believe the French people have the visionary leadership to 
influence the rest of Europe to choose a path of partnership with the United 
States that will benefit us all. 
I hope my words today have given you cause to consider this question and 
to join us and other spacefaring nations on what I believe will be the greatest of 
human adventures. 
Thank you. 
Leadership in Space 
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Today I want to discuss in a bit more detail a theme to which I have 
alluded in many talks, and that is the strategic importance of the civil space 
program to our nation. This is not a topic that receives a lot of attention. It is 
considered obvious to all that the space activities of our military forces and the 
intelligence community are "strategic." We talk about "strategic missiles" and 
"strategic reconnaissance," and the Russians make no bones about it with their 
"Strategic Rocket Forces." But civil space? Isn't that simply about scientific 
discovery, human exploration, or practical applications such as weather 
monitoring, navigation and communications? 
I think it's not "simple" at all, actually, so let's talk about it. 
Prominently featured in the Denver International Airport is a statue of a 
space-suited Apollo astronaut, the late Jack Swigert, a Denver native. A similar 
statue occupies a place of honor in the U.S. Capitol, one of the two allocated to 
each state to honor great men or women who represent the history and ideals of 
their home state. When people tour the Capitol, this is a statue at which they 
stop for a moment. Other exhibits represent our nation's past, and the present 
is captured by the view of our nation's current leaders hustling past, on their 
way to cast votes or attend hearings. But when tourists see this statue, they are 
arrested by the realization that they are glimpsing the future, not only that of 
our nation, but of the human species. 
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Jack Swigert grew up in Colorado, earned a mechanical engineering degree 
from Colorado University-Boulder, joined the Air Force and flew combat in 
Korea. He left the Air Force to earn a master's degree in aerospace engineering 
and became a test pilot for North American Aviation. He was selected for 
the astronaut corps in 1966, in the group that, somewhat tongue-in-cheek, 
Apollo 11 astronaut Michael Collins dubbed the "Original Nineteen." This 
group was selected at a time when it was thought that we would be conducting 
many more Apollo missions than regrettably turned out to be the case; several 
had to wait to fly for the first time on the space shuttle. 
In April 1970, Jack replaced command module prime pilot T. K. 
Mattingly when the latter was exposed to German measles and flew his only 
space mission, Apollo 13, with Jim Love11 and Fred Haise. Both the flight crew 
and the ground controllers demonstrated their bravery, perseverance, and quick 
thinking again and again as they struggled to survive and return to Earth. This is 
the kind of thing that has caused me to say that those of us in the space business 
must live by a creed of excellence, or die from the lack of it. 
The Apollo 13 mission was dramatized in a movie a few years ago. Jack 
Swigert was portrayed by actor Kevin Bacon. Unfortunately, in our culture 
today far more people recognize the actor than the man he portrayed, and 
far more people will flock to a movie depicting dramatized bravery than can 
recognize the real thing. 
Anyway, a few years after the Apollo 13 mission, Jack left NASA to 
become the staff director for the House Science & Technology Committee and 
then returned to Colorado and was elected to Congress in 1982. He died of 
cancer before he could take office, at 5 1 years of age. 
Now, Jack was not known as a perfect person; his time on the national 
stage was brief; and that little was suffused with professional disappointment and 
personal tragedy. So why did the people of Colorado choose him to represent 
them in the Capitol? Today, Colorado remains one of the most beautiful of the 
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states, which, a century and more ago, were on the western frontier. In many 
areas it is unchanged from that time, a land that in places can still be seen as the 
mountain men saw it. The American West is no longer a frontier, but the people 
who live here can still see it from where they stand. Certainly the people who 
sent U.S. Army Captain Zebulon Pike west to Colorado, where he discovered 
the peak to the west of town that bears his name, fully understood that the 
exploration and development of the western frontier was a strategic issue. And 
I believe that Westerners today, more than most, understand viscerally that our 
nation's next frontier lies 200 miles above our heads. 
So I think that the choice of a statue of Jack Swigert to represent Colorado 
in the halls of the U.S. Capitol was perfect. I believe it was because those making 
the choice understood the real reasons why we're in the space business. They 
understood that, for America, exploration is a matter of national strategy. 
So, out of respect for the people who recognized the strategic importance 
of opening the American frontier, or those who built some of the great feats 
of engineering we enjoy today, let us ask ourselves some fundamental, and 
disconcerting, questions: Do we really understand the importance of what it is 
that we choose to do, or not, in space? If our great-great grandparents accepted 
the challenge of expanding the frontier of their time, will our generation do 
less? And if so, why? 
NASA is a nearly unique government agency in the sense that it 
enjoys enormous name recognition and immensely positive public approval, 
consistently 65 to 75 percent as measured in professional surveys. This is a 
level of popularity that any public figure would envy, a level of "brand loyalty" 
about which most commercial product marketers could only dream. However, 
only about 50 percent of the people surveyed believe NASA to be relevant to 
their lives. So, in effect, the same people who resoundingly approve of NASA 
are not sure why. But when those being questioned are informed of even 
some of the more prosaic contributions of the space program to their daily 
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lives-things like the development of integrated circuits, medical monitoring 
equipment for hospital patients, navigation and weather satellites, materials 
used in joint replacement surgery-their assessment of our relevance shoots 
above 90 percent. Collaterally, the approval rating for space exploration jumps 
from 70 to 80 percent. 
So, clearly, the American people broadly approve of NASA even while 
admitting that they do not understand the relevance of the space program to 
their lives, and their approval increases further when we give them concrete 
reasons for it. To  me, this is an extraordinary result. How can it be? 
I have begun to believe that NASA's and the space program's place 
in the American consciousness lies not in our minds but in our hearts. The 
space program embodies in many ways what it means to be an American, the 
things we care about once we've dealt with the basics of earning a living and 
providing for our families. NASA's endeavors invoke feelings of national pride, 
what remains of American idealism and hope and innovation and daring, and 
respect for those qualities. And, yes, when they don't turn out well because we 
are human and therefore flawed, our endeavors also remind us of the need for 
determination, courage, resilience, toughness, and persistence and of respect 
for those qualities as well. Feeling for NASA involves a sense of our place in the 
world, of the need to pass on a legacy for our children and grandchildren, the 
hope that they will live in a better world, or maybe even on new worlds. Feeling 
for NASA involves the deep satisfaction of overcoming the most demanding 
technical challenges known to man. And, yes, feeling for NASA invokes the 
concrete benefits we obtain for our entire society when we tackle, and learn to 
overcome, those challenges. 
Tom Hanks, who starred in the movie Apollo 13, and told the story of 
Apollo in the TV mini-series From the Earth to the Moon, speaks eloquently 
of what NASA's missions to the moon meant for him and our nation during 
the tumultuous 1960s and early 1970s with the Vietnam War, the civil rights 
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movement and the assassinations of John and Robert Kennedy and Martin 
Luther King, Jr. In a simple, yet fundamentally insightful way, Hanks said of 
the Apollo program: "If we can do this, we can do anything." 
I believe this thought provides more of a justification for our space 
program than any rational, dollars-and-cents explanation I can ever hope to 
provide as to what NASA represents to the American public and those of us in 
the space business. The Apollo program became the standard by which future 
feats of engineering and the focus of national willpower would be measured. 
"If we can do this, we can do anything." 
However, a dark cloud passes over this bright thought. It has been a 
long time since we did "this." It has been over 35 years since man last set foot 
on the moon. Several of those who made that journey are no longer with us, 
and more will have passed before we return. While reading a recent story in 
B e  New York Times on the impending retirement of the space shuttle and 
its effect upon long-time space watchers in Florida, for whom the shuttle has 
become a fixture of daily life, the reporter noted that some young people today 
actually question whether we ever really achieved the goal of which President 
Kennedy spoke so eloquently: "landing a man on the moon and returning him 
safely to the Earth." One young waitress asked, "Do you think they really went 
to the moon?" This dark cloud calls into question our nation's willingness, 
maybe even our ability, to dare great things. It raises disturbing questions: Are 
America's best days behind us? Will our future be dimmer than our past? 
Human spaceflight has been accomplished only by the United States, 
Russia and most recently China. India has announced its intention to develop 
such capabilities. Having visited several space facilities in China and India 
this past year, and met their aerospace engineers, I must say that I am very 
impressed by the methodical, disciplined approach both countries have taken in 
developing their space industrial base and capabilities. The national economies 
of these countries exceed in scale the economy of the United States as it existed 
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in the early 1960s. 'Thus, if they wish to send their own astronauts into space, 
it is simply a matter of national will, of choosing to do so. Europe and Japan 
clearly have the economic and technical wherewithal to do so as well; for either 
of them, it is again simply a matter of making the strategic choice to do it. 
Today is the 46th anniversary of man's first foray into space. That man 
was a Russian, Yuri Gagarin. Today, a titanium statue of him rises 40 meters 
above a Moscow square. I will believe that we as a nation truly understand the 
importance of space to the future of our society when a similarly prominent 
statue is erected in honor of Alan Shepard, John Glenn or Neil Armstrong. 
President Kennedy was the first of our nation's leaders to recognize the 
importance of U.S. preeminence in space; indeed, it was an electoral issue in 
1960, the last time that this has been so. President Kennedy understood the 
strategic value of space power when he campaigned on the theme of the "missile 
gap" between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. While we now know that the 
actual gap was in favor of the United States, the misperception of that time is 
not the issue; my point is that it mattered. And when Kennedy saw the respect 
accorded the Soviet Union following Gagarin's flight, he understood as well the 
strategic value of human spaceflight, and the necessity that the United States 
be in its vanguard, saying "We go into space because whatever mankind must 
undertake, free men must fully share." 
And human spaceflight is a strategic capability for a nation. To me, 
Kennedy's appreciation of this matter was similar to the way in which President 
'Theodore Roosevelt recognized the importance of sea power around the turn 
of the last century as a means to increase the United States' economic, security, 
diplomatic and cultural influence in the world. 
Theodore Roosevelt was a mere 24 years old when his book on the War 
of 1812 was published in 1882.1'n it, he wrote that for a state as dependent on 
sea power as America, it was unthinkable that the nation "rely for defense upon 
a navy composed partly of antiquated hulks, and partly of new vessels rather 
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more worthless than the old." He went on to say that the United States was 
rising to world-power status, but it could do so only on the back of a powerful 
and efficient navy. 
As many who work in DOD space understand quite well, there is a 
direct analogy between many of the operating principles between sea and space 
power. Roosevelt's work was followed by the influential work of Alfred Thayer 
Mahan, jrhe Influence of Sea Power upon History, published in 1890, which 
became the bible for the development of sea power by the United States in 
the 20th century. Mahan also recognized that the United States was rising to 
world-power status, but could do so only with a powerful navy. According to 
Historian Paul Kennedy, Mahan "showed the intimate relationships among 
productive industry, flourishing seaborne commerce, strong national finances 
and enlightened national purpose." None of these themes has, by itself, any 
direct connection to U.S. preeminence on the high seas. But none was possible 
without it. 
Mahan's theoretical principles were one thing, but it took President 
Roosevelt "to turn the theory of Mahan's principles of sea power into effective 
practice, for the furtherance ofAmerican interests and values. No U.S. President 
did that better." Roosevelt turned Mahan's vision into reality. In an audacious 
move, President Roosevelt's bold dispatch of the Great White Fleet of 16 modern 
battleships on a 14-month cruise around the world sent a not-so-subtle message 
that the United States was an emerging world power capable of projecting its 
influence where necessary. Roosevelt's experience during the Spanish-American 
War, when a battleship required over 2 months to steam around Cape Horn 
from San Francisco to Cuba, prompted him to lead the negotiation for and 
development of the Panama Canal. The canal continues to be strategically 
important to our nation even today. 
Fifty years ago, first Sputnik and then Gagarin sent a similar, and not 
at all subtle, message about the wherewithal of the Soviet Union. President 
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Kennedy recognized that this message must be answered with a move even 
more audacious than that of Roosevelt's Great White Fleet. He recognized that 
the United States was behind the Soviet Union in human spaceflight, and he 
recognized its significance concerning the world's perception of leadership, 
saying: "Those who came before us made certain that this country rode the first 
waves of the industrial revolution, the first waves of modern invention, and the 
first wave of nuclear power, and this generation does not intend to founder in 
the backwash of the coming age of space. We mean to be a part of it-we mean 
to lead it. For the eyes of the world now look into space, to the moon and to 
the planets beyond, and we have vowed that we shall not see it governed by a 
hostile flag of conquest, but by a banner of freedom and peace. We have vowed 
that we shall not see space filled with weapons of mass destruction, but with 
instruments of knowledge and understanding. Yet the vows of this nation can 
only be fulfilled if we in this nation are first, and, therefore, we intend to be 
first. In short, our leadership in science and in industry, our hopes for peace and 
security, our obligations to ourselves as well as others, all require us to make this 
effort, to solve these mysteries, to solve them for the good of all men, and to 
become the world's leading spacefaring nation." 
With President Kennedy's focused goal of "man-moon-decade" in mind, 
our nation dared to do great things. Webb, Dryden, Searnans, Mueller, Gilruth, 
von Braun, Kraft, Low, Faget and many, many others were the great leaders of 
that time. They turned Kennedy's vision into reality and lifted our nation's 
spirits in the achievement. These men created a lasting legacy and were mentors 
to thousands of engineers who followed in their footsteps. 
Apollo helped create the system engineering discipline that spread 
throughout our nation's industrial base and found applications in other, diverse 
fields of the civil and DOD space business, aviation, automotive industry, health 
care, etc. Like Rickover's nuclear navy, Apollo moved the state-of-the-art forward 
throughout all of engineering. What is more strategic than that? The need for 
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precise manufacturing methods and engineering standards for human spaceflight 
systems created a requirement for industry to develop new manufacturing 
methods and operate to a higher, more precise standard of excellence. The 
operation of complex, integrated space systems required revolutionary thinking 
in their development and management. This revolution in our nation's systems 
engineering discipline was the real spin-off from Apollo, and our nation has 
benefited immensely from it in many direct and indirect ways. 
And while human spaceflight is clearly the most arresting activity any 
nation can undertake in space, the strategic impact of our efforts in space 
does not stop there. People seldom recall President Kennedy's breadth 
of vision, as he also challenged the nation to accelerate the development of 
communications and weather satellites for worldwide application. Because of 
that investment, we have a world that is much more connected and safer than 
otherwise. We have set standards that are followed around the world for the 
provision of weather data and the distribution of services. And we have greatly 
extended the goals established in the 1960s. We have two rovers, which have 
provided a continuous human telepresence on Mars since 2004. We conceived, 
designed and built the Hubble Space Telescope. We have carried out the first 
reconnaissance of the solar system, conducted the broadest and most intensive 
surveys of Earth's weather and climate and developed the first global navigation 
and communications systems. 
So, when we consider the strategic impact of the civil space program, 
we must ask, what is the value to the United States of pioneering, and leading, 
enterprises like this, which offer worldwide benefits and lift up human hearts 
everywhere when we do them? What is the value to the United States of being 
engaged in projects where we are doing the kinds of things that other nations 
want to do and including them as partners? I would submit that the highest 
possible form of national security, well above having better guns and bombs 
than everyone else, well above "speaking softly and carrying a big stick" as 
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President Roosevelt suggested, is the security which comes from being a nation 
which does the kinds of things that make other countries want to join with us 
to do them. If this is not "strategic," then what is? 
I have said many times that I believe that the most important aspect 
of the International Space Station is the tried and tested partnership that has 
been forged among the spacefaring nations of Canada, Europe, Japan, Russia 
and the United States. 'This partnership has endured tremendous hardships, 
especially with the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia, and stands by itself as a 
monumental international accomplishment. 'The space station partnership has 
collectively undertaken the largest task ever performed by the civilian agencies 
of the United States or our international partners; only military coalitions 
have undertaken larger tasks. With the space shuttle as our primary means 
for assembling the station, this endeavor rivals the Apollo program in cost 
and complexity. When completed, the station will be four times larger than 
the Russian Mir space station and five times larger than Skylab. It is truly one 
of the great engineering wonders of the world, akin to such feats as the Great 
Wall of China; the pyramids of Egypt; the Panama and Suez canals; or the sea 
walls of Venice. 
We can learn from our experience with the ISS and expand on its positive 
aspects as we move forward. My hope is that by maintaining our commitment 
to the station, our international partners will view NASA and the United States 
as good partners through thick and thin, good people with whom to team 
in future endeavors of space exploration and scientific discovery in exploring 
the moon, Mars and other worlds. We will also help to drive the creation of a 
new space industry in low Earth orbit and beyond in such a way that NASA 
becomes a reliable and supportive customer for that industry. 'This is the space 
analogy to Mahan's "flourishing seaborne commerce," and it will be a strategic 
matter for this century and beyond. 
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At this stage in the development of our plans for a return to the moon 
and a lunar outpost, it is important that we at NASA not prescribe roles and 
responsibilities for future international partnerships. Instead, we have defined 
a minimalist exploration architecture centered around the Orion and Ares 
crew- and heavy-lift launch vehicles as the first critical elements, with the 
hope that international and commercial partners will want to augment these 
capabilities with their own. 
We're already collaborating with other nations on a series of satellite 
missions to map the resources of the moon, which one day will be mined to help 
establish a permanent lunar outpost. More than half of NASA's armada of over 
50 robotic science missions involve some form of international participation, 
and almost two-thirds of our science missions on the drawing board today have 
an international component. One of the main reasons why these discussions 
for future collaboration in exploring the moon together have been so fruitful is 
that, despite many trials and tribulations, the United States has shown itself to 
be a good partner. We need to continue that. 
'Those who think strategically about geopolitical issues measure a nation's 
influence on world affairs through four fundamental metrics: economic 
influence such as the size of a nation's economy and the pattern of its trade 
relations; military influence such as the ability to deploy army, navy, air and 
space forces around the world; political influence through diplomacy between 
countries or in coalitions of nations; and cultural influence with regard to how 
a country projects its values through various arts, media and language. While 
some of these influences are easier to measure than others, I think we can see 
from this discussion that what we do in space contributes to all four of these 
measures of our nation's influence. What the United States chooses to do in 
space matters. 
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"If we can do this, we can do anything." 
We could also do nothing. It is a fairly simple choice, really. We could 
choose to do great things; we could simply sit back and watch; or we could 
choose to mock those who dare even to try. These are the questions I asked 
earlier: If our great-great grandparents accepted the challenge of expanding 
their frontier, will our generation do less? And if so, why? Are America's best 
days behind us? Will America's future be dimmer than its past? 
I have raised these questions, but it is those of you here who must answer 
them. They are not only strategic choices for our nation, they are also personal 
choices. All of us, and each of us, must consider the real reasons why we dare to 
explore this New Frontier. 
In conclusion, I would like to leave you with one final thought. Some 
people have asked me recently about the changes in leadership of Congress and 
how the next presidential election might change "the Vision." Those questioners 
are precisely the people who like to be armchair quarterbacks on space policy 
issues, when what we really need is to focus on the tasks before us and the pace 
of the work to be done, rather than fomenting discord and putting space policy 
in partisan, political terms. I would like to echo President Kennedy's advice 
on the day before he was assassinated, when he spoke in San Antonio, saying: 
"For more than 3 years I have spoken about the New Frontier. This is not a 
partisan term, and it is not the exclusive property of Republicans or Democrats. 
It refers, instead, to this nation's place in history, to the fact that we do stand 
on the edge of a great new era, filled with both crisis and opportunity, an era 
to be characterized by achievement and by challenge. It is an era which calls for 
action and for the best efforts of all those who would test the unknown." 
If we can do this, we can do anything. Let's try. 
Thank you. 
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We at NASA deal with the issues surrounding man-machine interfaces 
everyday, in flying the International Space Station, controlling over 50 Earth 
and space science missions in operation today, developing new flight control 
algorithms and avionics for future aircraft, or building the next generation of 
space vehicles to return Americans to the moon and, later, journeying even 
deeper into our solar system. To carry out our mission of space exploration, 
scientific discovery and aeronautics research, we must understand the conditions 
our machines will face and how they will behave under those conditions 
because mission success and, indeed, the lives of our astronauts depend upon 
our machines and the technical acumen of the scientists and engineers who 
develop and operate them. 
I thought it appropriate to speak tonight about the Hubble Space 
Telescope, one of the greatest machines NASA has ever built, and about our 
relationship with that machine and what it has taught us about our universe 
and, more importantly, ourselves. In October, astronauts on Space Shuttle 
Atkzntis will rendezvous with Hubble to repair and upgrade it for the fifth time 
in its nearly two decades of service. When they leave, it will be better than ever. 
It will be better than anyone ever imagined that it might be back when I was 
working on the project some 25 years ago. 
The story of this scientific alid engineering marvel is one of bold vision, 
imagination and audacious risk-taking, but also perseverance and ingenuity 
when, as sometimes happens, not all risks are successfully negotiated. It is a story 
104 Leadership in Space 
that transcends science, with Hubble images on display today in art museums or 
in homes where no scientist lives. But we all know that these images are far more 
than a just a bunch of pretty pictures. Hubble has observed the birth and death 
of stars not unlike our own solar system. It has shown the collision of the comet 
Shoemaker-Levy 9 with the planet Jupiter, not unlike the asteroid collision 
65 million years ago that wiped out the dinosaurs then roaming Earth. It has 
peered through a tiny knothole in the night sky, deep into the early universe, 
finding thousands of galaxies where our own human eyes would see only a patch 
of darkness. It has found the galaxies in our universe to be accelerating away from 
each other at a rate faster than any astrophysicist, including Edwin Hubble, ever 
predicted, allowing new insights into the birth and eventual fate of our universe, 
while raising new mysteries about dark matter and dark energy, constituents of 
a universe that, in all humility, astrophysicists must admit we barely understand 
today. Hubble has become a cultural icon while remaining an instrument of 
fundamental scientific discovery. It is unique in human history in its ability to 
occupy a place of prominence in both art museums and scientific journals. 
The birth of Hubble, with its launch in April 1990, would not have caused 
anyone to envision this outcome. Hubble's first images were unaccountably 
blurry, and analysis of its optical system revealed that a 2.3 micron error had 
been introduced in the grinding of its 2.4-meter primary mirror. The width of an 
average human hair is 80 microns, so the error was almost unimaginably small. 
But as this audience will understand, it is a huge error in terms of the optical 
wavelengths that a telescope must manipulate if it is to function. This mistake 
was devastating to the astronomical community. It was equally devastating to 
NASA's credibility. NASA was the brunt of jokes on late night talk shows, with 
the Hubble being compared to the Titanic, the Hindenberg, and the Edsel. 
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I have said that in the space business we live by a creed of excellence, or 
die without it. With Hubble, we faced a situation where this small error, left 
unchecked, called into question our ability to live by that creed. The jokes were 
cruel, leveling charges that NASA no longer had "The Right Stuff," in Tom 
Wolfe's elegant phrase. While such talk unfairly denigrates the many dedicated 
engineers, scientists and technicians who work late into the night to maintain 
the high standard of most of our endeavors, even the slightest error on such a 
highly visible project calls into question what happened and, above all else, who 
was to blame. 
Maybe this institute should study this peculiarly human trait-the 
predilection to "kick those who are down." For me, it always calls to mind 
President Theodore Roosevelt's great speech, "Citizenship in a Republic," with 
its famous excerpt about "the man in the arena." Few of those offering criticism 
of the Hubble mistake were capable of understanding its nature or origin, or 
indeed anything else of how Hubble was designed, or of the exacting tolerances 
to which it had to be built or of the tradeoffs that engineers face when deciding 
how to allocate scarce resources to multiple, competing concerns. As someone 
who has served on numerous failure boards, and has had to lead teams out 
of despair, I can only say that criticism from those who are both inept and 
uninvolved serves no useful function. It cannot even make us feel worse about 
ourselves than we already do, when we have failed. But it does seem to be 
a constant companion of bold endeavors, the dark side of human progress. 
A long career in the space business, with too many opportunities to observe this 
behavior, has caused me to come to the belief that there is, or at least should be, 
such a thing as earning the right to hold an opinion. 
But I digress. In the aftermath of the Hubble debacle, some Washington 
policymakers called for an end to NASA altogether. But we don't cast aside 
human frailty when we venture into space, and wiser heads understood 
that reaching for the unknown requires the fortitude to deal with adversity. 
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As President John F. Kennedy warned Congress and our nation in May, 1961, 
when-with 15 minutes of human spaceflight to our credit-he set forth the 
challenge to go to the moon, "If we are to go only halfway, or reduce our sights 
in the face of difficulty, in my judgment it would be better not to go at all." 
Thus, the Hubble scientists and engineers set their sights on fixing the 
telescope. The first step was to characterize precisely the observed error in the 
primary mirror, and then craft a corrective lens for the aberration. The crew 
of the first servicing mission to the Hubble trained intensively for one of the 
most complex shuttle missions ever undertaken, with five spacewalks and over 
a hundred specialized tools to correct the optics, while also installing new solar 
arrays, gyroscopes, and other electrical components. They also upgraded the 
telescope with a new wide field and planetary camera. 
You all know today that this first shuttle mission to service the Hubble, 
as well as the three which followed, were huge successes. The Hubble dazzles us 
with the splendor of our universe, but during those grim years between 1990 
and 1993, its awe-inspiring success was far from certain. If you didn't know the 
core strength of the NASA team when the chips are down, you might have bet 
against us. You would have lost. 
And that is why, to me, the most meanin@ lesson from the Hubble has 
more to do with our human nature than with any of the secrets of our universe. 
That is, in the face of adversity, we must resolve to persevere. To that end, I 
know, because I see it everyday, that NASA still has "The Right Stuff." 
Now, I must take a moment to acknowledge those who risked their lives 
to make the Hubble such a success. Every astronaut I know who has been on 
a Hubble mission has a special place in his or her heart for that machine. They 
believe it to be a part of something greater than themselves, that the risk of their 
lives is worth the promise of unlocking the secrets of our universe for future 
generations. As David Leckrone, Hubble program's senior scientist, once said: 
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We are privileged to be the first generation of homo sapiens to gain 
a clear and deep view of the visible universe. And what we see 'out 
there' is staggering in its beauty, awesome in its scale and shocking 
in the way it has upended our preconceived notions about how 
nature works. You don't have to be a scientist to grasp this. Any 
thinking person who has come in contact with Hubble images and 
Hubble discoveries seems to find exhilaration in the notion that 
our place in the grand scheme of things is now better defined than 
in all of prior human history. 
Dave is so right. And yet, his comment makes a great preface to an 
observation, which will probably set you back a bit. Science is not everything 
we do at NASA, nor should it be. And, while the advancement of science is of 
fundamental importance at NASA, and scientific discovery has a key role in 
human spaceflight, it is not the most compelling reason to do it. 
I would like to take some time to explain why I believe this to be so 
because numerous critics have called into question the cost and risk of journeys 
to the moon, Mars, and the near-Earth asteroids or the construction of the 
space station, which we are using as an engineering test bed to learn how to 
sustain such journeys. So let me try to provide some food for thought for you 
tonight. Some of you will disagree with me and thus spark a worthwhile debate. 
I never learn a thing by talking with people who agree with me. 
To me, NASA's manned missions to the Hubble are qualitatively different 
from our other human spaceflight endeavors. The difference is fundamental and 
important. And while our other efforts may not seem, today, to be as noble and 
worthwhile as servicing the Hubble, they are in the long run more important 
to the future of the human race. Allow me, if you will, to try to explain why I 
believe this to be so. 
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Surviving off-planet, in a different environment having different natural 
resources than those we have come to understand and take for granted, without 
the ability to drive to the nearest supermarket or doctor's office, is a qualitatively 
different experience than a brief foray into low Earth orbit. Not many will realize 
it, but NASA and our international partners have maintained a permanent 
human foothold in space onboard the space station since October 2000. 'The 
hard lessons of living and working in outer space 24171365 are much different 
than those of an intense, 2-week campaign to service a scientific instrument like 
the Hubble; to deploy a mission like Galileo to Jupiter or Cassini to Saturn; or to 
conduct other research, as has been done on many individual shuttle missions. 
So, when we begin our halting steps back to the moon in the next decade, 
or a journey to Mars in about 25 years, we will need to know what we must bring 
with us, but also how we might live off the land with the resources available 
to us when we arrive. And after we test the hypothesis that we can survive on 
other worlds, we then need to determine whether such outposts can become 
economically viable-meaning, is there anything to do there which is worth 
the investment to do it? Many today will assert, without benefit of proof, that 
the answer is categorically "yes," while others believe that the answer is "no." 
In my opinion, no one today can know the answer. 'The answer can be found 
only by experiment. In that sense, the purpose of today's human spaceflight 
program is to conduct such experiments, to explore and develop options, to 
unveil possibilities for future generations. 
'This experiment will be conducted in space over the course of the coming 
centuries by people from Earth. Only the language, culture and motives of the 
experimenters remain to be determined. I hope that this experiment will always 
find Americans, in company with our international partners, as first among 
equals on the frontiers of their time. 
'The experiment will be not dissimilar to those conducted by our 
ancestors far removed in space and time, when they left East Africa looking for 
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an easier existence elsewhere. It is not dissimilar to that conducted by our more 
immediate ancestors, just a few centuries ago, when they began to explore and 
settle what, to Europeans, was "the New World." In that context, I might 
note that it required the long-term investment of kingdoms, governments, 
commercial industry and private citizens for many generations before it 
could honestly be said that "the New World" provided a positive return on 
investment for society at large. 
And on a smaller scale, our experiment in space will not be dissimilar 
to that conducted by 'Thomas Jefferson, when he risked impeachment to 
consummate the Louisiana Purchase and then sought congressional financing 
for what became the Lewis and Clark Expedition 200 years ago. By the way, 
Lewis and Clark overran their budget, lost a considerable amount of their 
equipment, fell so far behind schedule that they were given up for dead and 
failed to achieve their primary goal-finding a suitable water route from the 
headwaters of the Missouri River to the Pacific Ocean. Does anyone here think 
their effort was wasted? 
Venturing into space is similarly an experiment, but one eminently 
worth conducting, for several reasons. First, I strongly believe that there will be 
near-term benefits to science, technology, economics and national security as 
we begin to incorporate the solar system into our sphere of influence, as Science 
Advisor Jack Marburger framed the issue a few years ago. 
We do not need to dwell upon the benefits to human society of scientific 
advances. We are on the verge of developing a new paradigm, a new view of 
how the universe is constructed. 'The last time-a century ago-that such 
an experience was forced upon us, it was accomplished through the work 
of Albert Einstein and his elucidation of relativity and quantum mechanics. 
Today these disciplines underpin much of modern technology, and form the 
backdrop of physics against which new ideas are interpreted. What will be the 
implications of forming new theories which embrace the experimental findings 
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that 96 percent of the mass-energy of the universe is comprised of dark energy 
and dark matter, things we don't yet even pretend to understand? 
Regarding technology, what is the benefit to a society which learns how 
to do what no one else has ever done? No human activity is more demanding, 
across a broader range of disciplines, than space exploration, nor is there any 
which produces greater returns from its mastery. Two generations and more 
ago, in what I consider to be the best speech he ever gave, President Kennedy 
said, "We choose to go to the moon in this decade and do the other things, not 
because they are easy, but because they are hard, because that goal will serve to 
organize and measure the best of our energies and skills. . . ." As a nation, we 
are still reaping the benefits of the Apollo investment, but they are coming to 
an end. America is no longer supreme in the world marketplace, not even in 
aerospace. It is time to move the goalposts, to define some new "hard things," to 
move outward again, for precisely the reasons Kennedy articulated so long ago. 
A vigorous civil space program offers collateral benefits to national 
security as well. When I have spoken of this in the past, it has usually elicited 
some surprise. But I think those who are surprised are taking too narrow a view 
of "national security." For the last century, the United States has been a world 
power, even if at times we did not aspire to or even recognize that fact. As such, 
we have assumed certain responsibilities for leadership on the world stage, and 
in that capacity it is inevitable that we have been, and will be again, called upon 
to make decisions and take actions that displease other nations and societies. 
We cannot possibly please everyone, and we cannot retire from world affairs. 
But it is equally true that we cannot prosper if every hand is against us. 
So if we must do hard things, it behooves us also to undertake activities which 
easily attract allies and partners, things which bind us to others in the world 
community. No activity has shown itself to be of greater inherent interest and 
excitement to others than has the exploration and development of the space 
frontier. And so I ask, concerning national security, what is the value of being 
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a nation, a society, which leads the world in an endeavor that excites all others, 
one in which every nation that can do so seeks to partner with us? 
'These are some of the specific benefits I see accruing to the nation which 
leads in the exploration of space. But I also believe that, in the long term, it will 
be important for the survival of homo sapiens to inhabit planets other than Earth. 
It will be in our interest to develop the technical capabilities to avoid the many 
cosmic collisions which we have now documented in the geological record. 'The 
comet Shoemaker-Levy 9 consisted of at least 21 discernable fragments with 
diameters up to 2 kilometers wide. Even one such collision with Earth would 
be devastating, and it doesn't have to be a dinosaur-killer. An impact like the 
Tunguska event of 1908 could destroy the cultural and economic fabric of a 
nation, should it land in a populated area instead of the Siberian wilderness. 
And so I believe that long-term survival, scientific discovery, economic 
benefit and recognized leadership in great endeavors provide a worthwhile 
rationale for sustaining our nation's human spaceflight efforts. 'This and our 
endeavors in robotic Earth and space science, and our work in advanced 
aeronautics, are purchased with an investment in NASA of less than 0.6 percent 
of the federal budget of the United States. (If any ofyou happen to be an average 
Americans, this figure will surprise you, as polls reveal that the 50-percentile 
American believes that NASA receives over 24 percent of the federal budget, 
comparable to that of DOD.) 
My view is that our efforts in human spaceflight are, in actuality, far 
more meaningful than the "flags and footprints" rationale with which critics of 
human spaceflight like to denigrate Apollo or future voyages to the moon and 
Mars. Survival, leadership in great enterprises and economic benefit are real and 
acceptable reasons why humans should continue to explore space beyond what 
robotic spacecraft can achieve. 
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'Throughout mankind's time on this world, we have gazed up at the night 
sky and attempted to make sense of the stars, planets, comets and asteroids, 
speculating about what they might mean. While we are lucky enough to be 
the first generation to see the universe with the clarity Hubble offers, I firmly 
believe that we also need to journey beyond "the surly bonds of Earth," in order 
to see the universe with our own eyes. In the words of poet T.S. Eliot, "Only 
those who will risk going too far can possibly find out how far one can go." 
Expanding the range and scope of human action is a goal fully as noble as that 
of scientific discovery. 
In our hearts, we know these things. We know that space is the frontier of 
tomorrow, and that the frontier can only be ours with "boots on the ground." 
We know from even the most casual reading of history that nations, which 
shrink from the frontiers of their time, shrink also in their influence on the world 
stage. We know these things, and yet we also see that Americans today do not 
feel the urgency for preeminence on the space frontier that we felt in the 1950s 
and 1960s. Sometimes I wonder if we are a bit tired or distracted from other, 
urgent crises to recognize what that preeminence means for America. 
And so I am reminded of Edgar Allan Poe's "gallant knight" in search 
of Eldorado and who, in his fatigue, asks a "pilgrim shadow" where it might 
be. "Over the Mountains of the Moon, down the Valley of the Shadow, ride, 
boldly ride," the shade replied- "If you seek for Eldorado!" 
Sometimes, there is no rest for the weary. 
'Thank you. 
Leadership in Space 113 
Bob Peters, of Kendel Welding and Fabrication, welds part of an internal access support for 
the Ares I-X upper stage simulator at NASA's Glenn Research Center in Cleveland. In 2009, 
NASA will launch Ares I-X, a test flight for the new Ares I rocket. Ares I will launch astronauts 
on missions to the space station, the moon and beyond. (21995main-image-eng) 
This artist's concept illustrates how astronomers have determined the distance to an invisible 
Milly Way object called OGLE-2005-SMC-001 using a depth-perceiving trick called parallax. 
Different views from both Spitzer and telescopes on Earth are combined to give depth 
perception. (DARK-BODIES) 
With its thermal-infared sensor pod under its left wing, NASA's lkhana unmanned aircraft cruiw 
over California during the Western Statespke Mission. (ED07-0186-13) 
The - -ended W --, ---y research airc--- ---- -...-, ,., the Block - i g h t  phase. 
(ED08-0092-03) 
Leadership in ?---e 115 
A drafting room at the NACA Airplane Engine Research Laboratory (AERI,), now known as the 
NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, Virginia. (GPN-2000-001839) 
(March 24,2008) -The STS-123 crew used part of its last hU day onboard the space 
station taking in-space crew portraits. These six astronauts launched aboard the Space Shuttle 
Edauour on March 11 and are scheduled to return aboard it on March 26. Shown are 
astronauts Dominic Gorie (top center), commander; Gregory H. Johnson (bottom center), 
pilot; along with astronauts RickLinnehan (top left), Mike Foreman (top right), Robert 
L. Behnken (bottom left) and JAXA's T&o Doi (bottom right), d mission specialists. 
(ISSO16-E-033709) 
Bob Peters, of Kendel Welding and Fabrication, welds part of an internal access support for 
the Ares I-X upper stage simulator at NASA's Glenn Research Center in Cleveland. In 2009, 
NASA will launch Ares I-X, a test flight for the new Ares I rocket. Ares I will launch astronauts 
on missions to the space station, the moon and beyond. (21 995main-image-eng) 
?his montage of images of the Saturnian system was prepared from an a3c;lLtblage of imagw 
taken by the Voyager 1 spacecraft during its Saturn encounter in November 1980. This artist's 
view shows Dione in the forefront; Saturn rising behind; Tethys and Mimas fading in the 
distance to the tight; Enceladus and Rhea off Saturn's rings to the left; and Titan in its distant 
orbit at the top. (PIA01482) 
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An Extreme Ultraviolet Imaging Telescope (EIT) image of a huge, handle-shaped prominence 
taken on September 14, 1999 in the 304 angstrom wavelength. Emission in this spectral line 
shows the upper chromosphere at a temperature of about 60,000 degrees kelvin. Every image 
feature traces magnetic field structure. The hottest areas appear almost white, while the darker red 
areas indicate cooler temperatures. (PL403149) 
m 
A montage of New Horizons images of Jupiter and its volcanic moon 10, taken in early 2007. 
The Jupiter image is an infrared color composite taken by the spacecraft's linear etalon imaging 
spectral array (LEI~A) at 1:40 UT on February 28,2007. Blue denotes high-altitude clouds 
and hazes; red indicates deeper clouds. The bluish-white oval is the Great Red Spot. The 
observation was made at,a solar phase angle of 75 degrees. ?he 10 image was taken at 00:25 U T  
on March 1,2007 by the panchromatic long-range reconnaissance imager (LOW), with color 
provided by the multispectral visible imaging camera (MVIC). (PIA10102) 
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An artist concept illustrating the nav view of the Mdky Way along with other findings 
presented at the 212th American Astronomical Society meeting in St. Louis, Missouri. The 
galaxy's two major arms (Scutum-Centaurus and Perseus) can be seen attached to the ends of a 
thick central bar, while the two minor arms (Norma and Sagittarius) are less distinct between 
the major arms. The major arms consist of the highest densities of young and old stars; the 
minor arms are primarily Med with gas and pockets of star-forming activity. (PIA10748) 
(December 12,2006) - Backdropped by New Zealand and Cook Strait in the Pacific 
Ocean, astronaut Robert L. Curbeam Jr. (left) and ESA astronaut Christer Fuglesang, both 
STS-116 mission specialists, participate in the mission's first of three planned EVA sessions 
while construction continues on the space station. (S116-E-05983) 
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(June 11,2008) - Backdropped by a blue and white part of Earth, the space station is seen from 
Space Shuttle Discove~y as the two spacecraft separate. Undocking of the two spacecraft occurred 
at 6:42 a.m. CDT on June 11,2008. (S124-E-009982) 
(February 7,2008) -The Space Shuttle Atlantis and its seven-member STS-122 crew head 
toward Earth-orbit and a schguled link-up with the space station. Liftoff from Kennedy 
Space Center's launch pad 39A occurred at 2:45 p.m. EST. The crew's prime objective is to 
attach the Columbus laboratory to the Harmony module. Onboard are astronauts Steve Frick, 
commander; Alan Poindexter, pilot; Leland Melvin, Rex Walheim, =A's Hans Schlegel, 
Stanley Love and =A's Leopold Eyharts, al l  mission specialists. (STS122-S-051) 
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Young stars want to show their independence. This Spitzer view shows a stellar version of 
the "terrible twos". The stars are beginning to move away from their formative cloud, seen 
in red and green. Jets come off the young stars as they make their way into the cosmos. 
(TerribleTwos) 
'Ihe Eagle Nebula (M16) showing a portion of a pillar of gas and dust. Light from nearby 
bright, hot and young stars sculpts the cloud into intricate forms, causing the gas to glow. 
(Top-Pillar M 1 G) 
MODIS image of Hurricane Katrina taken on August 28,2005. Hurricane Katrina 
strengthened into a powerful Category 5 hurricane overnight with sustained winds of 160 mph. 
The National Hurricane Center put out a special advisory on the hurricane's gain in strength 
just before 8 a.m. EDT. The boost came just hours after Katrina reached Category 4, with wind 
of 145 mph, as it gathered energy from the warm water of the Gulf of Mexico. (Credit: NASA/ 
Jeff Schmaltz, MODIS Land Rapid Response Team) 
Torrential rainfall from a 2003 storm in the Southeast resulted in massive accumulations of rain 
(red). Similar data from NASA's Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission (TRMM) satellite has 
revealed that more rain falls midweek. (Credit: NASA) 
This mosaic of two Cassini images shows two of Saturn's moons, Pan and Prometheus, creating 
features in nearby rings. The images were taken in visible light with the Cassini spacecraft 
narrow-angle camera on August 15,2008. 'Ihe Cassini-Huygens mission is a cooperative 
project of NASA, the European Space Agency and the Italian Space Agency. (Image Credit: 
NASAIJPLlSpace Science Institute) 
James Webb Space Telescope full-scale model on display at The International Society for 
Optical Engineering's (SPIE) week-long Astronomical Telescopes and Instrumentations 
conference, May 25-30,2006. 'Ihe model built by the prime contractor, Northrop Grumman, 
is constructed mainly of aluminum and steel, weighs 12,000 pounds, and is approximately 
80 feet long, 40 feet wide and 40 feet tall. 
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Administrator 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
'The 19th Annual Von Braun Dinner 
Huntsville, Alabama 
October 22,2007 
Space exploration is acomplexstory, a rich story, full of dramaanddespair, 
pride and pathos. It is a story we need to tell our children and !grandchildren, 
lest they forget why we explore what John F. Kennedy referred to as the "New 
Frontier" of space. There are many distractions in modern life; and I believe it 
is necessary for us to discuss openly with the public the principles that led us as 
a nation to embrace space exploration five decades ago. 
I recently read an interview with Actor Bill Pullman, who is famous among 
those of us who watch science fiction movies for being the president who beat 
the aliens in the movie Independence ' ~ q .  Pullman wrote and produced a new 
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play about the International Space Station Expedition 6 crew, Ken Bowersox, 
Don Pettit, Nikolai Budarin and their trials and tribulations aboard the station 
following the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia. When Pullman was asked the 
question about how he first learned of the Columbia's loss, he responded quite 
simply and insightfully: "It was a Saturday morning, and I think I was in the 
car driving. I had to go run to get milk and I heard the radio report. I remember 
pulling off to the side of the road and listening to it. It was stunning to me. I 
was aware that I hadn't kept up on it. I wasn't somebody who was aware that 
they had even gone up. Suddenly I became hugely interested." 
Probably everyone in this room remembers that Saturday morning of 
February 1, 2003. I know Dave King does. He spent the next several months 
in Texas and Louisiana leading the debris recovery and investigation efforts for 
Columbia. Many of us that morning were probably going about our lives in a 
manner similar to Bill Pullman when we were pulled in by the television or 
radio with the news. We called and e-mailed our family and friends in the space 
business, and most importantly, we rolled up our sleeves and went to work 
finding the cause of the accident, fixing it and continuing the journey. 
There are galvanizing moments in our lives, moments we remember 
forever, moments when we hold our breath in the realization that the events 
unfolding before us will forever change the course of our lives. These are the 
events for which we remember precisely where we were and what we were 
doing, what we saw and what we felt when we first heard. For the rest of our 
lives, we return to them in quiet introspection, thinking about how the world 
changed in those moments. Those who are older can recall many such. For the 
oldest among us, there is still Pearl Harbor and later Hiroshima. For those a 
bit younger, the assassinations of John and Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther 
King, Jr. might be the first. Younger still, there is the fall of the Berlin Wall or 
September 1 lth. Not one of us ever, ever forgets such things. And for those here 
tonight, there are many more such milestones even closer to home: Sputnik, 
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Yuri Gagarin, John Glenn, the Apollo Fire, "The Eagle has landed and "one 
small step," Challenger and Columbia. 
These are the things, too often crises, which shape the course of human 
events. Thus, tonight I will pose for you a question, which I hope will stir some 
debate: 'Why does it take a crisis to capture our attention? 
This is a simple question without a simple answer. However, I do 
believe that it is fundamental to some of the problems we face in explaining 
the importance of space exploration to the American public or to our children. 
There are many distractions in our lives, distractions that make it difficult 
to distinguish between what is urgent and what is important. It is easy to 
become complacent about or even apathetic toward the signals that, too 
often in the clarity of hindsight, show that another crisis looms, that action 
should be taken. 
Crises can take many and various forms, and always-always-in the 
investigation that occurs after an accident or a tragedy, we find that there were 
warning signs, that there were people who connected the dots but were not 
heeded. Churchill was right about Hitler years before Hitler proved him so. 
And as Admiral Gehman said of the Space Shuttle Columbia, "The machine was 
talking; but why was nobody hearing; how were the signals missed?" 
Even worse, with the passage of time we seem to forget the lessons learned 
from those crises that occurred many years ago. Time heals the wounds, the fear 
and the pain we felt when the galvanizing moment occurred. We move on. And 
slowly, our complacency grows back. The great engineering Educator and Author 
Henry Petroski writes about this facet of humans and their organizations in his 
book, Design Paradigms: Case Histories ofError and Judgment in Engineering. He 
cites a trend, two centuries old, of major bridge disasters occurring about every 
three decades. Younger engineers who did not experience the community-wide 
trauma of such an event do not fear it, do not believe it can happen to them 
126 Leadership in Space 
and do not embrace its lessons as deeply as those who were there. The cycle thus 
begins anew. 
As managers, we must understand this aspect of human nature and fight 
against it. We must inspire and reward perseverance and persistence to the task 
before us. We must check, re-check and check again to hear what our machines 
and our people are saying. All of us-from assembly-line technicians through 
young and mid-career engineers to center directors and associate administrators 
within NASA-have the responsibility to speak up if we believe that something 
is miss  with our part of the complex machine. Other people may disagree with 
any given concern or may simply see things differently; in fact, it is guaranteed 
that they will. And no decision can be made that doesn't leave at least one 
group feeling as if their concern has been set aside. But it is still everyone's 
responsibility to offer their own judgment on a controversial issue. The final 
decision cannot be made better by the lack of debate. In this way, sometimes a 
crisis can be averted. 
This takes me to last week's Flight Readiness Review for STS-120. We 
should all applaud the folks from NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) 
who brought forward their concerns with regard to the integrity of the Space 
Shuttle Discovery wing leading edge. We have a new inspection technique that, 
if nothing else, demonstrates that we don't know as much about the reinforced 
carbon-carbon (RCC) panels that comprise the wing leading edge as we thought 
we did. This realization brings with it the concern as to whether several of the 
panels had adequate margin for flight. We had a good, healthy engineering 
discussion, culminating in a majority, but not unanimous, decision that we have 
an acceptable level of risk to launch the space shuttle. The bottom line is: I don't 
think we're seeing new behavior in the RCC panels. I think we're seeing how 
the panels we've always flown look, when inspected via a new technique. But I 
will say here that I simply could not be happier with the manner in which the 
NESC folks pursued, and brought forth, this concern. 
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In the space business, we live up to a creed of excellence or die from 
the lack of it, and we make our entire society better for the acceptance of that 
challenge. We are not perfect; we do not have perfect knowledge of our machines 
or the environment in which they will be operating. Our machines are no more 
perfect than we ourselves. A quote that I love goes like this: "Excellence is the 
result of caring more than others think wise, risking more than others think 
safe, dreaming more than others think practical and expecting more than others 
think possible." My hope is that we inspire our people to work-and work 
hard-toward the goals of the missions placed before us, as our forebears did. 
That's what it takes. This is rocket science. 
NASA is a high-~erformance organization, working on large, complex 
engineering systems on their way to Mercury, Mars, Pluto, and with the Dawn 
mission, the asteroid belt between Mars and Jupiter. Weather permitting, my 
hope is that tomorrow or later this week we will launch Space Shuttle Discovery, 
commanded by Colonel Pam Melroy, to the station on the STS-120 mission. 
This shuttle mission will deliver the Italian-built Harmony Module to connect 
the European and Japanese laboratory modules that will be flown on the next 
two missions. 
But, we will only launch after checking, re-checking and checking 
again. Tonight, as I speak, hundreds of technicians and flight controllers are 
working toward that launch. Tonight, here at Marshall, payload operators 
are working on experiments onboard the station. Tonight, the Expedition 16 
crew commanded by Peggy Whitson will soon wake to begin preparing for 
Discovery's arrival. O n  November 2, we will celebrate 7 years of continuous 
manned spaceflight operations aboard the space station. Many, many people 
said that such a goal could never be reached, but as Meriwether Lewis wrote in 
his journal, "we continued on." 
In discussing the great things we have accomplished and seek yet to do, 
I need to return to my original question: why does it take a crisis to get the 
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American people's attention? It is frustrating sometimes for those of us in the 
space business to realize that many people in the American public are not aware, 
or do not care, about the things we are accomplishing, often for the first time 
in history. 
We saw this for the first time with the lunar missions that followed 
Apollo 11, except most famously the harrowing Apollo 13. Some people lost 
interest-lost interest!-in seeing a precious few of their fellow Americans 
begin the exploration of an entirely new and unknown world. Today, it can be 
frustrating when some young people actually question whether we ever really 
landed on the moon. However, it has been almost 35 years, and enough time 
has passed that many Americans forget the importance of these events in their 
time. In a way, it's a lot like Petroski's observations concerning the three-decade 
cycle in major bridge collapses. New generations sometimes need to relearn the 
lessons so painfully gathered by their fathers. 
Perhaps, that is what prompted the Columbia Accident Investigation 
Board to observe: "The U.S. civilian space effort has moved forward for more 
than 30 years without a guiding vision." That was a damning statement, citing 
(as it did) a lack of leadership in space policy, a strategic interest for the United 
States reaching to the highest levels of our nation for over a generation. 
Earlier this year, Mike Coats asked me to speak at a dinner in Houston. It 
was "budget season" in D.C., and I didn't have time to write a speech, or even 
to seek help from any of my colleagues, who might have been willing to furnish 
a draft for editing. I was simply out of time when the dinner arrived, and so I 
stood up to speak with nothing more than the benefit of a few notes I made 
on a napkin during dinner. Thus, I spoke more from the heart and less from 
my analytical side than is customary for me. I discussed the "real reasonsy'-as 
compared to the "acceptable reasons"-why those of us in the space business 
make the sacrifices we do to pursue the dream and the challenge of spaceflight. 
Some of you may have been there or perhaps have read the speech, which later 
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appeared in Air and Space magazine. I've been enormously surprised by the 
outpouring of positive feedback I've received in regard to that speech, far more 
than for any other speech I have ever given. With those thoughts, I must have 
touched a sensitive nerve that the analytical side of my brain did not know was 
there. The real reasons which drive those of us who are in this business are, I 
think, more visceral, or even spiritual, than can be expressed by means of any 
tangible rationale. 
While NASA's budget is about half a cent out of every federal budget 
dollar, spaceflight in all its forms is a strategic capability for this nation. We 
must understand the real reasons why that is so, we must explain those values 
to our children, to their children, to the public and to the nation's leadership, 
lest it just slip away. 
Thus, maybe the reasons why the American public is not aware of what 
we're doing in space, of what we're trying to accomplish, is that we're not 
explaining it well enough. Maybe the scientists and engineers in this room need 
the help of folks like Miles O'Brien, Neil Tyson, Homer Hickam, Tom Hanks, 
Bill Pullman and many, many others who are far more charismatic than I will 
ever be and who know how to weave the fabric of such a story. For those of us 
in the space business, this is our story, a complex story full of richness, daring, 
drama, comedy and pathos. While I don't pretend to know all the different 
ways to tell it, or maybe any of them, I do know it cannot be condensed down 
to a bumper sticker slogan. But it can be distilled. "This cause of exploration 
and discovery is not an option we choose," as President Bush put it in his 
eulogy to the Columbia astronauts. "It is a desire written in the human heart. 
We are that part of creation which seeks to understand all creation. We find 
the best among us, send them forth into unmapped darkness and pray they will 
return. 'They go in peace for all mankind, and all mankind is in their debt." 
A few weeks ago, many television news shows and newspapers recognized 
the 50th anniversary of the launch of the first man-made satellite, the Russian 
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Sputnik. Some commentators noted the galvanizing reaction of this event on the 
America public and our national leadership around the question of whether 
we were falling behind in recognized leadership in the world, falling behind 
the Soviet Union in technological competitiveness and how this reaction was 
primarily a media-driven frenzy. That is the power of the American media then 
as now. America at the forefront of the frontier is a concept deeply embedded 
in our national psyche. People who tell stories for a living know this better than 
I do. Space was the New Frontier, as the junior senator from Massachusetts and 
future president would say. He was the first of our national leaders to recognize 
the strategic importance of the new medium, the new arena of space. 
President John F. Kennedy also understood what it meant for nations to 
ignore the telltale signs of a looming crisis, failing to connect the dots. His thesis 
at Harvard in 1940, Why Engkznd Slept, compared the failure of the British 
government to take steps to prevent the rise of Nazism in Europe with allusions 
to how America was also ignoring its own looming crisis and could be pulled 
into another world war. Like Churchill, Kennedy spoke up about his concerns, 
just as I have asked every NASA employee to speak up if they have concerns. In 
Kennedy's case, when he spoke in his famous speech on May 25, 1961 about 
the need to "take longer strides," Congress and the American people listened. 
In my own small way, I have recently given vent to my thought that the 
pace of China's space program may be faster than our own. Later this week, 
China plans to launch its first satellite to the moon. I also believe that, if they so 
choose, the Chinese have the economic and technical wherewithal to send their 
taikonauts to the moon before the United States plans to return our own. If this 
happens, we in the United States will not like our position in the world of that 
time. I am speaking out now because I hope to avert the situation our nation 
faced 50 years ago with the launch of Sputnik. 
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Even at the age of 8, I was as attuned to events following the launch 
of Sputnik as closely as was possible by watching television and reading 
B e  Baltimore Sun. 'The newspapers were full of both soul-searching analysis 
and rampant second-guessing. We questioned our military plans, our civilian 
research programs and our educational systems and made changes in all 
those areas and more. America's readiness-or more properly our lack of 
readiness-to explore and exploit the space frontier decided a presidential 
election. Sputnik changed everything. 
I was in Russia a few weeks ago toasting the 50th anniversary of this 
accomplishment with my Russian counterpart, Anatoly Perminov. Times have 
changed. NASA is now paying the Russian Space Agency several hundred 
million dollars over the next several years for the Soyuz and Progress vehicles 
necessary to support the space station. Partly for that reason, we need the 
help of the rocket team here at Marshall and our industry partners to develop 
the next-generation Ares rockets as expeditiously as possible. I would rather 
we spent NASA's funds within the American space industry, first with U.S. 
commercial systems to support the station, and then the Orion crew vehicle 
and Ares rockets. 'This is both important and urgent, and we need to work with 
the same sense of purpose as our forbears to build these new systems. 
While we engineers like to talk about the machines that propel us into 
space, in a democracy, it is really the American people who ignite our nation's 
space program. Fortunately for those who care about space, one of the most 
charismatic men in history was the first Director of Marshall Wernher von 
Braun, whose memory we honor here tonight. Chris Scolese brought to my 
attention a wonderful book, B e  Rocket Team, about the life and times of von 
Braun and the team he built. I commend it to your attention. 
'There's no need for me to recount to this group the story of the von 
Braun team and how they built the V-2, Redstone, Jupiter and, finally, the 
Saturn V. Many of you know far more than I do about these accomplishments. 
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Von Braun's charisma, technical acumen and leadership in the field of space 
exploration are legendary. 
But do you know what Huntsville was like before von Braun settled 
here to work in the spring of 1950? The population of Huntsville was 16,000, 
and the city fathers proudly advertised it as "The Watercress Capital of the 
World." Von Braun changed Huntsville, the nation and the world in the course 
of his pioneering efforts in space exploration. Von Braun and other legendary 
engineers and managers like Glynn Lunney, George Mueller, George Low and 
Chris Kraft turned President Kennedy's vision into a reality. I've said before, 
and will do so again here, that James Webb was NASA's greatest administrator 
for the manner in which he kept those people and their programs pointed in the 
right direction during the 1960s. Today, young engineers in this audience are 
following in their footsteps, and pursuing a vision for space exploration which, 
I hope will be sustainable over the next 50 years. 
Look around the room. You are the people whose accomplishments 
future NASA administrators will toast 50 years from now. You are the ones 
who will be building the Ares I crew launch vehicle and the Ares V heavy-lift 
launch vehicle to propel our nation back to the moon. But it will only happen 
if we all work just as hard as they did. You are the new Rocket Team. But not 
only must we be able to build rockets, we must also re-ignite the passion for 
space exploration that von Braun conveyed to his team and the nation. This is 
now our story to tell. 
Only a few months before he died, von Braun wrote the following: "While 
the members of this magnificent team changed with time, the fundamental 
characteristics of the team itself never did. It always has been characterized by 
enthusiasm, professionalism, skill, imagination, a sense of perfectionism and 
dedication to rocketry and space exploration. How can the story of such people 
and of the exciting programs with which they are involved ever end?" 
So, let us resolve that it will not-not ever-end. 
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NASA's Direction 
Michael D. Griffin 
Administrator 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Remarks at the Mars Society Convention 
August 3, 2006 
This morning, I want to look at NASA's overall mission, rather than at 
the single goal of a voyage to Mars. 
Many know that I am an admirer of NASA's greatest Administrator, 
James Webb. Webb once characterized his role during the Apollo program 
in the following way: "The process of management became that of fusing at 
many levels a large number of forces, some countervailing, into a cohesive, but 
essentially unstable whole, and keeping it in the desired direction." This is it, 
exactly, and that perspective serves me well today. There are many disparate 
goals held by NASA's numerous stakeholders, and we try-very hard-to move 
the agency forward in a manner which promotes unity among, rather than 
division between, these stakeholders. It is not easy. 
If the blunt truth be told, prior to the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia 
a few years ago, NASA suffered from a long period of benign neglect by both 
the public and our government stakeholders concerning the broader purposes of 
our nation's space enterprise, especially human spaceflight. NASA's last mission 
to the moon was in 1972, and our nation, as a matter of policy at the highest 
levels, had chosen to confine itself to low Earth orbit ever since. As I have said 
on many, many previous occasions, I believe this to have been a crucial strategic 
mistake for our nation. 
We have come a long way since the dark days of the Columbia accident 
in building a consensus as to what goals are worthy of our nation's civil 
space program. After a lengthy national discourse, the bold challenge of the 
President's Vision for Space Exploration was endorsed by Congress in the NASA 
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Authorization Act of 2005. I firmly believe that the Vision is the proper lasting 
legacy for the astronauts who perished in the Columbia accident. It sets a course 
in space for our generation and, indeed, future generations. The law charges 
the NASA administrator to "establish a program to develop a sustained human 
presence on the moon, including a robust precursor program, to promote 
exploration, science, commerce and United States preeminence in space, as a 
stepping-stone to future exploration of Mars and other destinations." This is 
wonderful direction. It tells NASA to make the United States, once again, a 
spacefaring nation. Nothing more is necessary, and nothing less is appropriate. 
The law charges NASA to carryout certain specific programs with the 
following milestones: 
* Return Americans to the moon no later than 2020. 
Launch the Crew Exploration Vehicle as close to 2010 as possible, and 
not later than 2014. 
* Increase knowledge of the impacts of long duration stays in space on the 
human body using the most appropriate facilities available, including the 
International Space Station. 
* Enable humans to land on and return from Mars and other destinations 
on a timetable that is technically and fiscally possible. 
With this, NASA's stakeholders at the White House and Congress have 
provided clear direction on the policies and programs that the agency must 
carryout. And so, while some of you might wish it to be otherwise, NASA's 
strategic goals are neither solely nor initially focused upon Mars. We are 
charged with carrying out a broad portfolio of missions in space exploration, 
scientific discovery and aeronautics research. With the resources projected to 
be available to NASA over the next 5 years, properly balanced with our other 
national priorities of Earth and space science as well as aeronautics research, 
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NASA is on course to complete the space station by 2010 and to bring the CEV 
online no later than 2014. 
This is a national imperative. With the retirement of the space shuttle by 
2010, a far more urgent concern to me than a future mission to Mars is taking 
steps to ensure that we have a smooth transition from the space shuttle to the 
CEV, and to commercial cargo and crew transport services to the space station. 
Thus, we plan to award a contract for the design and development of the CEV 
next month, and in the coming weeks ahead, we hope to enter into Space 
Act agreements with commercial firms to demonstrate space station resupply 
capabilities. As I have said previously, if cost-effective commercial services are 
demonstrated to support the station, NASA will welcome and use them. 
So, let me be clear about what is at the forefront of our attention at 
NASA. The greatest management challenge we face over the next several years 
is the safe and effective transition to the new exploration systems by completing 
the remaining space shuttle missions for the assembly of space station, followed 
by retirement of the space shuttle in 2010 to allow greater focus on missions 
beyond low Earth orbit. We now have a clear goal for the future. Our current 
activities can and must be focused to advance that goal. The remaining space 
station assembly missions and space shuttle flights will allow us to advance 
knowledge and help train the next generations of space explorers. 
And, more broadly, I believe that the most important aspect of the space 
station is the tried and tested partnership that has been forged among the 
spacefaring nations of Canada, Europe, Japan, Russia and the United States. 
This partnership has endured tremendous hardships and stands by itself as a 
monumental international accomplishment. We can learn from this experience, 
and expand on its positive aspects as we move forward to the moon and Mars. 
At this stage in the development of our plans, it is important that NASA 
not prescribe roles and responsibilities for hture international partnerships. 
Instead, we have defined a minimalist exploration architecture with the CEV, 
Leadership in Space 
the crew- and heavy-lift launch vehicles and a lunar lander as the first critical 
elements, with the hope that international and commercial partners will want 
to augment these capabilities with their own. We're already collaborating with 
other nations on a series of satellite missions to map the resources of the 
moon, and I hope that we'll collaborate on even more missions to the moon 
and Mars. 
This year, we've hosted workshops in order to discuss with our international 
partners, scientific communities and commercial interests what each of us might 
do, and what we might do together, in exploring and utilizing the moon. I hope 
to issue a plan later this fall based on the feedback from those workshops. One 
of the main reasons why these discussions for future collaborations in exploiting 
the moon have been so fruitful is that, despite many trials and tribulations, the 
United States has shown itself to be a good partner on the space station. We 
need to continue that. 
Also this year, we've celebrated the 30th anniversary of the Viking 
mission and begun to lay the groundwork for the robotic missions to Mars 
in the next decade, building on the results from the Mars Rovers and Mars 
Reconnaissance Orbiter. Next year, I hope to make plans as to how to carryout 
manned missions to Mars, building on the heavy-lift launch vehicles, landers 
and other capabilities from the lunar exploration architecture. We will especially 
call for the support of our international partners for this long-term endeavor, as 
we build on the relationships forged in assembling the space station. 
This morning, onboard the station, American astronaut Jeff Williams 
and German astronaut Thomas Reiter are preparing for a 6-hour spacewalk 
to install equipment and experiments around the outside of the station. This 
spacewalk is being choreographed by Russian Commander Pave1 Vinogradev 
who will remain onboard the space station and be televised by cameras on the 
Canadarm-2. Today's spacewalk exemplifies how nations work together at their 
best. We make it look easy .. . perhaps even too easy, to those who are not 
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steeped in the risks of the space business. However, this spacewalk is not simply 
science fiction. The space station is our nation's most technically challenging 
project, and this spacewalk is one small step forward toward exploration. 
The station is a scientific and engineering test bed that we must use before 
embarking on long journeys to Mars. In fact, the NASA Authorization Act 
designates the U.S. segment of the space station as a national laboratory, and 
I am actively seeking partnerships with other federal agencies like NSF, NIH 
and DOD, and commercial entities who would use the station for their own 
experiments while NASA focuses its research directly on exploration-related 
missions. 
For example, we know that a crew on such a long journey to Mars will 
need a great deal of self-sufficiency as we break the apron-strings of Earth. A 
three-person crew onboard the space station requires approximately 5,000 
pounds of water each year. However, by developing and testing environment 
and water recycling capabilities for the station, the future logistics resupply 
required will be significantly less. This will have far-reaching implications for 
future Mars missions. Likewise, learning to use resources on the moon and 
Mars must prove far more economical than bringing those resources with us 
on the journey. 
In situ resource utilization, maintenance and logistics, international 
partnerships and the leveraging of commercial space capabilities will help 
sustain this Vision for Space Exploration, and they are all being tested onboard 
the space station. 
The priorities for NASA are clear. In the wake of the Columbia tragedy, 
our national leadership realized that human spaceflight is today one of those 
strategic capabilities that define a nation as a superpower. And I must ask each 
of you this: Is it possible to envision a future in which America is considered to 
be a leader in the world, if others can and do conduct exploration and research 
on the moon, Mars and beyond, and we cannot? International cooperation, 
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leavened by a healthy dose of competition, is what makes America the greatest 
country in the world. The ultimate goal of the Vision for Space Exploration is 
not to impress others, or even merely to explore the moon or Mars, but rather 
to advance U.S. scientific, security and economic interests through leadership 
in the grandest expression of human imagination of which we can conceive. 
We are turning science fiction into reality. We do what others dream. 
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Science and NASA 
Michael D. Griffin 
Administrator 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Goddard Space Flight Center 
September 12,2006 
I'd like to share with you my thoughts on some issues that seem to have 
disturbed quite a few members of the scientific community. Many of my friends 
have spoken to me about these issues. And there's been a lot of hyperbole flung 
about in the media during the past several weeks about NASA's "decimated 
science program," how NASA has rejected its responsibilities in the study of 
Earth science and how we're not listening to our advisory committee. 
So, let me be clear at the outset with my response to such hyperbole: 
Nothing could be farther from the truth. And frankly, as someone who's spent 
a good part of my engineering career building NASA science satellites, I think 
that this sort of unfounded rhetoric hurts the overall space program, including 
space science. But allow me an opportunity to offer a few points as I see them 
to ground the discussion in fact before opening it up to your questions. My 
intent is to change this debate into a more thoughtful, objective dialogue 
about the issues facing NASA's science and exploration programs than what 
has been presented in many circles. I'd really like to reduce some of the angst 
in the community. 
As I see it, by any objective measure science is doing well at NASA. 
Within the context of a national policy mandating a return of humans to 
deep space and adherence to our international commitment to use the space 
shuttle to complete the assembly of the International Space Station, NASA is 
maintaining many vigorous science programs, not the least of which will be 
the opportunity to reconstitute a productive program of human and robotic 
exploration of the moon. 
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The Science Mission Directorate (SMD) fiscal year 2007 (FY07) 
budget request is $5.33 billion, up from FYO6 by 1.5 percent. And we have 
an administration (not just NASA) that is committed to preservation of SMD 
funding in FY08-10, albeit at a lower gowth rate, 1 percent, than we all would 
like. In FYI 1 and beyond, SMD funding tracks agency top line growth. 
I must note here that fiscal years 2008-2010 are very, very difficult budget 
years at NASA, because we are engaged in completing the space station, while at 
the same time trying to gain ground on replacing the shuttle with the new Orion 
and Ares I systems. Even so, Orion will not be operational until FY14, the last 
year allowed by presidential policy pidance. It had been hoped by many in 
NASA, the White House and Congress that we could deploy Orion as early as 
2012. The later delivery of this key first element in the exploration architecture 
was accepted precisely because no one wanted to cut the science budget in 
order to deploy a shuttle replacement vehicle earlier. This was a serious and 
significant commitment to science at NASA, one which was made in the face of 
very tough issues in the human spaceflight program. That commitment implies 
that the United States, in the face of growing international competition, will 
not have a human spaceflight capability of its own for at least 4 years. This was 
an enormous step and raises national issues far beyond any in science. 
The above decisions are consistent with a long period of support for and 
growth in the portfolio of SMD. Science today comprises a larger piece of the 
NASA portfolio than ever before: 32 percent today as compared with 24 percent 
back in the mid-90s. 
While we will still launch a mission to Mars at every orbital opportunity, 
we have rebalanced what many viewed as an excessive increase-about 
40 percent-to robotic Mars exploration at the expense of other areas in science. 
Further, we have restored some cuts made previously in Earth science and 
sponsored a National Academy study to produce the equivalent of a "decadal 
survey" in this field for the first time. These decisions reflect a commitment 
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by NASA to long-term balance in our science portfolio and recognition of 
the key role of Earth science in that portfolio. Earth science at NASA receives 
$1.5 billion annually, more than 25 percent of our science portfolio. 
There has been a strong, visible and clear intent by NASA management 
to restore the previously cancelled Hubble servicing mission, if it is technically 
possible to do so. A final decision and an accompanying announcement should 
be made by November. 
In support of both National Academy priorities and long-standing 
international commitments, we have the reviewed the Stratospheric Observatory 
for Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA) mission, restored funds to the program and 
redirected the management strategy so as to offer the greatest possibility for 
ultimate success, despite a history of significant overruns and schedule slips. 
We've completed the Earth Observing System with the recent launches 
of Cloudsat and the Cloud-Aerosol Lidar and Infrared Satellite Observation 
(CALIPSO) mission, and will be taking part in the multi-agency National 
Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) effort 
through our development of the NPOESS Preparatory Program (NPP). And 
we've recently placed the system integration responsibility for the Landsat Data 
Continuity Mission (LDCM) here at Goddard. 
There's more, indeed much more, but my point is, I think, clear. These 
are not the actions of a science-hostile NASA, Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) or President. Quite the contrary. 
So, what's all the tumult and shouting about? A few key things come 
to mind, concerning which you probably won't be surprised: I think it comes 
down to money, respect and power. So let's take these issues on. 
First and most obviously, despite all the good things above, "Science" 
was in earlier years promised more than it is actually getting. I believe that 
142 Leadership in Space 
what SMD is getting is pretty good, but it isn't what was promised in the FY05 
budget, as that budget was unveiled in February 2004. That is a plain fact. 
'The other plain fact is that no one else at NASA is getting what they 
were promised either! NASA as a whole will receive fully $3 billion less than 
planned in the 5-year runout in the FY05 budget request. But there were several 
"disconnects" in that plan. The shuttle and space station were under-funded 
by almost $6 billion. Cross-agency support programs were significantly 
under-funded and NASA was subjected to a government-wide 1 percent 
rescission of $350 million for FY06-07. We looked for savings where we could 
find them, but in the end it was necessary to reduce SMD by $3.1 billion and 
Exploration Systems by $1.6 billion to close the FY07 budget request. 
At this point, let me add a necessary footnote to the above discussion. 
By "under-funded," I mean that during preparation of the FY05 budget it was 
assumed that, since the shuttle was retiring in FY10, the program would require 
less money for fiscal years 2008, 2009 and 2010 than would otherwise have 
been the case. While strictly speaking this is true, it is not nearly as much true 
as had been hoped! If we're going to fly the shuttle at all, it turns out that we 
actually still need most of the program to be there for the last flight. And, of 
course, we've had to take $2.7 billion in shuttle return-to-flight costs out ofwhat 
little "hide" remains in the Space Operations Mission Directorate (SOMD). 
So, the shuttlelspace station program has been reduced to 17 flights from 28. 
'There will be little actual "utilization" of the space station for the next several 
years, in contrast to the original plan; we will be doing mostly "assembly." 
Now, of course, the science community would by and large just as soon see 
the shuttlelspace station program cancelled outright. But at the highest levels 
of national government, that simply was not the decision that was made! So, 
logically, it is time to move on. But what the scientific community sees in all of 
this is a broken budgetary promise, pure and simple. 
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In this context, I have on many occasions heard the accusation that 
NASA has betrayed the scientific community because, it is said, the Vision for 
Space Exploration was "sold" as being "affordable," to be "go as you can pay." 
To many scientists, that means very explicitly that exploration is to be funded 
afier, and only afier, all prior science commitments were satisfied. The idea 
seems to be that, after we've done the James Webb Space Telescope, Europa, 
SIM, Terrestrial Planet Finder and every other mission in the pre-VSE NASA 
budget, then and only then can we embark upon renewed human exploration 
of deep space. Well, that is simply not how it works. "Affordable" does not 
mean that all of science is of higher priority than anything in exploration. 
The programs above were approved in an earlier time, with different budget 
assumptions for NASA. There have been very significant budget cuts and many 
unplanned requirements for funding since the Vision for Space Exploration 
was announced. The impact of those cuts cannot fall to any single entity in 
NASA's portfolio. "Go as you can pay" applies to all of NASA, not just to 
isolated pieces of its portfolio. 
That's the "money" part of it. I've outlined the arguments not because I 
expect to obtain agreement-far from it-but because I think it's useful to get 
the nature of the issue frankly into the open. Science did not get, and will not 
get, as much as was promised only a couple of ago, or will anyone else at 
NASA or will many other areas of discretionary government spending. 
So now lets move on to "respect." Once the Vision for Space Exploration 
was announced, the science community immediately said, as if with once voice, 
"Robotic science is exploration too" and "Besides, exploration without science 
is tourism! No more flags and footprints!" (Which is to me, by the way, a rank 
mischaracterization of Apollo, but I won't fight that battle here. I will note that 
approximately one-fourth ofApollo funding was devoted to the last six scientific 
exploration missions to the moon, missions that resulted in a profound increase 
in our understanding of the history of terrestrial planets, particularly Earth, and 
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of the environment in which it and life evolved.) I'm sure you've heard all of 
this and more. Since the science community had never previously characterized 
their work in terms of "exploration," many observers concluded that the theme 
underlying these view was, more cynically, "Don't cut our budget to pay for 
human spaceflight!" 
Now, certainly exploration includes and enables science, for it opens and 
offers new capabilities to do exciting new science in new ways from new places, 
and about those new places. What an incredible opportunity! 
But, as always, there is another view, best and most tersely captured by 
the President's Science Advisor Jack Marburger in his March 2006 speech at 
the American Astronautical Society's Goddard Symposium. Jack noted that the 
Vision for Space Exploration is fundamentally about bringing the resources of 
the solar system within the economic sphere of mankind. It is not fundamentally 
about scientific discovery. To  me, Marburger's statement is precisely right. 
So a key point must be made: Exploration without science is not 
"tourism." It is far more than that. It is about the expansion of human activity 
out beyond Earth. Exactly this point was very recently noted and endorsed by 
no less than Stephen Hawking, a pure scientist if ever there was one. Hawking 
joins those, including the chairman of the NASA Advisory Council, who have 
long pointed out this basic truth: The history of life on Earth is the history of 
extinction events, and human expansion into the solar system is, in the end, 
fundamentally about the survival of the species. So to me exploration is, in and 
of itself, equally as noble a human endeavor as is scientific discovery. 
Now, portions of the broader scientific community feel deeply 
disrespected-I can think of no other word-when I, or anyone, says or implies 
that "Exploration" is not primarily about "Science." There exists a view that the 
only reason we go into space is to pursue scientific discovery. To  me, that is a 
reason, but it is certainly not the reason. 
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Scientists frequently tell me that they want to "be a part" of the Vision 
for Space Exploration. And that is essential. But to be a part of the Vision does 
not mean to collect money that would otherwise go into manned spaceflight. 
It means rethinking planned programs of scientific activity in light of the 
opportunities to be made available through a newly vigorous program of human 
exploration. That is exactly what our NASA Advisory Council is asking the 
community to do with its planned Lunar Science Workshop next year. 
I have said on numerous occasions-many of you have probably 
heard me say it-that the Vision for Space Exploration is not about getting 
more money for manned spaceflight. It is obvious that such is not going to 
occur. Rather, the Vision is about redirecting the money that the nation has 
been spending on human spaceflight to better purposes than we have been 
spending it. That is the key. 
Similarly, participation by "Science" in space exploration cannot be 
about the transfer of money into SMD. It can only be about redirecting the 
money being spent in existing scientific arenas, along lines which the scientific 
community believes to be more productive, given the fact of human exploration 
and utilization of the moon, Mars and near-Earth asteroids in the coming 
decades. It is about refocusing our thoughts as to the merits and nature of 
future programs, given that humans will be operating in space beyond low 
Earth orbit. 
This is the attitude that must prevail if there is to be respect by 
non-scientists for the contributions "Science" can make to exploration. And it 
is the attitude that must prevail if scientists are to show appropriate respect for 
those whose primary focus is to expand the scope of the stage upon which we 
humans act. If mutual respect can be developed between these two groups, they 
can be allies rather than adversaries in the grandest endeavor I can imagine. 
Scientists and non-scientists alike must remember that "exploration science" 
is not an oxymoron. 
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Finally, there is the issue of control. Many members of the scientific 
community fully understand that the president and Congress have made 
decisions about the shuttle and space station programs that will not be undone. 
They understand that the proportion of funding at NASA that goes to SMD is 
at an historic high, and that they should pocket their gains over the last decade 
and remain quiet, lest someone notice! They understand that NASA is unlikely 
to grow in real terms, and that therefore many projects which all of us would 
like to do earlier will, in fact, be done later. They get all of that. 
The problem is that these folks do understand these real-world 
limitations, and in a world with such limitations, they want to be in charge of 
the distribution of resources. Put bluntly, they want to exercise the inherent 
authority of government to decide what is being done with the money which 
is available for science at NASA. But, they don't want to come to Washington, 
put on a NASA badge, make all the associated sacrifices and live with the 
consequences of their decisions, which mostly means that when you decide to 
do one thing, you are also deciding not to do something else that someone else 
would like to do, and you have to be publicly accountable for that fact. 
This is the world of the many advisory committees and groups that 
rendered guidance to NASA, especially to NASAISMD before I became 
administrator. Some of these external folks really seem to believe that NASA 
program selection and planning should be vetted through "the community" for 
approval. It is one thing to say that, broadly, we should be guided by the decadal 
plans of the NAS, the organization to which Congress looks for strategic advice 
in such matters. I emphatically support this view, while also being of the belief 
that sometimes circumstances change on time scales shorter than a decade, and 
also that sometimes good advice comes from other directions. But it is another 
thing entirely to suggest that "the community" has an inherent right to review 
and modify our annual budget. To me, one of the most disturbing aspects of 
this practice is that the very same people who stand to benefit from particular 
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distributions of NASA funding would be advising NASA as to what those 
distributions ought to be. 
Let us for a moment consider the situation in the abstract. The market 
for scientific goods and services, while dominated in the space sciences by the 
government, is nonetheless a market like any other. So, each year the president 
and Congress (mostly upon the advice of scientists) determine that the pursuit 
of certain goals in space and Earth science is in the best interests of the United 
States. Each year, Congress approves the purchase, through NASA, of scientific 
goods and services to that end. As with most markets, there are more parties 
desiring to provide such products than can be procured, and so a variety of closely 
supervised competitive procurement mechanisms are employed to determine 
the success~l suppliers of these products. Thus, from a legal, contractual and 
managerial perspective, members of the external scientific community are 
suppliers to NASA, not customers. 
My point is that if we were to substitute above any other noun besides 
L'science," the inherent conflict between the role of the scientific community as 
a purveyor of products to the government, and its role as the primary source 
of advice as to which products the government should purchase, would not be 
tolerated. Yet, the scientific community simply must be involved if we are to 
set intelligent priorities among the nation's various scientific goals. The whole 
process is ethically defensible if, and only if, a proper "arm's length" separation 
is maintained between advisors and implementers. 
This is a very fundamental issue, a matter of organizational governance. 
So where, exactly, do external advisors fit into the development and execution 
of the NASA science strategy? Let's review the bidding concerning NASA's 
advisory committee structure. 
Leaving aside temporary groups established for specific purposes, such 
as the committees that investigated the Challenger and Columbia accidents, 
legislation governing NASA includes three specific groups chartered by 
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Congress to advise the administrator. These are the NASA Advisory Council 
(NAC), the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) and the new International 
Space Station Independent Safety Task Force (ISS-ISTF). These groups 
examine our programs from the various perspectives suggested by their names 
and make recommendations to the administrator. Pursuant to the 2005 NASA 
Authorization Act, any recommendations from the latter two groups are also 
provided to Congress. 
I take these advisory groups, and the importance of their roles, very 
seriously indeed. Recommendations from our congressionally chartered advisory 
groups are, and must be, considered and evaluated thoughtfully, and we at 
NASA must respond to them in a timely and substantive fashion, whether we 
choose to adopt a given idea or not. In fact, I have sought to elevate the role of 
the NAC relative to that it has occupied in recent years, because of its statutory 
role as the primary external advisory group for NASA in its implementation of 
national space policy. 
But that's all there are. There are no other standing committees or 
interested parties required or permitted to review and advise NASA, no other 
group whose recommendations should be thoughtfully evaluated and to which 
the agency must respond. Now, all of you know that there are many, many 
individuals and groups whose interests are affected by NASA programs and 
decisions, and who believe that they deserve "a seat at the table" in helping to 
shape such decisions. But there is no foundation for such a belief. 
Several independent groups and committees had been chartered by 
NASA, particularly in connection with the science advisory structure for SMD, 
prior to my tenure as administrator. They are gone. Instead, a quite similar 
advisory structure now exists as a group of subcommittees under the aegis of the 
NAC. I have done this for three reasons. First, in a "strict constructionist" sense, 
I prefer to use the advisory structure provided by Congress to help manage 
NASA. Second, mutually independent committees advising particular elements 
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of NASA from a particular perspective can easily-I would say inevitably--offer 
conflicting and uncoordinated advice lacking concern for the larger perspective, 
with no need to resolve inherent conflicts with other portions of the agency's 
portfolio or direction. Third, it was my observation that NASA managers have 
sometimes used these advisory committees to assist in shaping the direction of 
our programs to a degree that I find unseemly, in view of the inherent potential 
for conflicts that I have outlined above, and in a manner tending to reduce 
responsibility and accountability on the part of NASA officials. 
Bringing the more specialized advisory groups together as subcommittees 
under the purview of the NAC, which reports to the administrator rather than 
to individual organizational elements within SMD, addresses and resolves these 
issues. This structure offers and allows frequent interchange between NASA 
SMD st& and the external scientific advisory community without diffusing the 
responsibility of NASA managers for their programs. It also allows the NAC 
to weigh the advice of its Science Committee, or any other of its committees, 
against the perspectives and responsibilities of other mission directorates and 
other managerial units of NASA before making final recommendations to 
me. I believe this to be the proper way to provide an open forum for the full 
spectrum of advice and perspective that might be of utility to NASA, while at 
the same time allowing the NAC leadership to winnow and focus such advice in 
a manner deemed appropriate by the Council. And since the Council reports to 
the administrator, formal advice to NASA follows the formal chain of command 
used to manage the agency. 
It has been said that in restructuring the scientific advisory committees 
as I have done, I have somehow "diluted" (that word from a September 2, 
2006 New York Times editorial) the voice of the scientific community, or have 
otherwise attempted to stifle debate and discussion or am trying to suppress 
advice that I do not wish to hear. 
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This is nonsense. It is simply a fact that the NAC subcommittee meetings 
are open to, and heavily attended by, NASA managers and key staff. Anyone 
who attends is instantly privy to all advice and discussion that is aired, or which 
is working its way through the system. An obviously good idea can be adopted 
by a NASA manager without waiting for a formal recommendation. The 
public-including the media-is present for final Council deliberation and 
action. There is no "dilution" of advice whatsoever. There is only the question 
of whether a committee accepts a given piece of advice, whether the Council 
as a whole agrees with the committee's recommendation or whether it suggests 
alternative wording. Generally, the Council has gone along with committee 
recommendations; the one major exception occurred when the Science 
Committee recommended that it be able to bypass the Council, the NAC Chair 
and the administrator and provide "tactical" advice directly to SMD. 
Let's consider this particular recommendation. How many of you present 
here today, and who are organizational managers at any level, would appreciate 
external advisors-or even other managers-bypassing you to provide "tactical" 
advice to those who report to you? Any takers for this approach to organizational 
governance? And if not, would it make a difference if the staff members and the 
advisors are "scientists" as opposed to other employees? 
Moving on, it has also been alleged that, in reshaping the advisory 
committee reporting structure, I am "preventing scientists from talking to 
scientists." This is also nonsense. As far as I am concerned, anyone can talk to 
anyone and probably should! I desperately hope that the staff of NASA's SMD 
converses widely and frequently within the community. The NASA scientific 
staff absolutely must be of the scientific community, and active in it, to be 
effective in the planning and execution of their work. But the rendering of 
formal advice from an advisory committee to officials of a federal agency is 
hardly "scientists talking to scientists," nor should it be. 
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In fact, with regard to scientific advisory committee input to NASA, 
the real issue is not whether "scientists can talk to scientists," but whether the 
administrator is to be included in the conversation! By requiring formal advice 
to be debated in and provided through the NAC, the scientific community's 
advice to NASA comes to the administrator and simultaneously to SMD. Under 
the prior structure, with numerous committees reporting directly to lower-level 
organizational managers, the administrator usually had no direct knowledge 
as to the advice being provided to the agency by external groups. This is not a 
responsible approach to organizational management. 
Thus, at this point, I am back to basic organizational management 
principles. Responsibility and accountability for planning and executing 
NASA's science program must rest with NASA's managers, not the external 
scientific community. Execution of these responsibilities must be appropriately 
informed, and to this end we must, and will, make intelligent use of our advisory 
committee structure. But the final responsibility and accountability for agency 
programs can lie nowhere other than with us, the NASA staff. 
I hope I have been able to clarify my thinking with respect to how science 
fits into NASA's overall strategy. I am deeply committed to having a robust 
science portfolio, and my actions have been consistent with that commitment. 
As administrator, I put the Hubble Servicing Mission back into our 
science plan. I rebalanced the science portfolio out of respect for National 
Academy priorities and out of concern for the health of important disciplines 
like Earth science and heliophysics. I did have to cut the growth rate for science, 
but other parts of the NASA portfolio, including exploration and aeronautics, 
have made similar sacrifices. 
Others with more singular and self-interested views of NASA's purpose 
would like to divide and conquer'us. They would like to cast the argument 
in the terms "Science verses Exploration." That argument is deliberate and 
deceptive. I don't accept it, and I urge you to reject it as well. The Vision 
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for Space Exploration was wise to call for the use of both robotic scientific 
missions and human scientific missions in the exploration of the universe. 
It rightly recognized the strengths of both endeavors, and it understood the 
symbiosis between robotic science and human exploration that will characterize 
our exploration campaigns. 
So, this isn't about "Science versus Exploration." We will do both. And we 
will succeed with both. Both will contribute greatly to increased understanding 
of ourselves, the environment in which we live and the solar system and universe 
around us. And because of the mutually reinforcing relationship between the 
two, we will do both better than we could do either one alone. This will be 
a productive partnership, and the sooner we recognize that, the better that 
partnership will be. 
And finally, as I have said from day one, we (NASA) are responsible 
for executing the nation's space program. Sixteen months ago, shortly after 
joining NASA, I was asked if I would approve the flight of STS-114 in the face 
of concerns by some members of the Stafford-Covey Return to Flight Task 
Group. I said then that the role of advisors is to advise; NASA decides. I will no 
more submit NASA's scientific decision making to external committees than 
I submitted NASA's shuttle flight readiness decisions to them. And I say that 
with no disrespect to NASA's important advisors. When they have something 
to say, they should say it; and we should listen and listen carefully. But in the 
end NASA (and by "NASA I mean you and I) is responsible for the decisions 
of this agency. And you should understand that in taking that position, I am 
not only committing to a certain kind of governance in which I strongly believe, 
but I am also demonstrating commitment to and respect for you. 
Thank you for choosing to spend your time with me today. 
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Science Priorities and Program Management 
Michael D. Griffin 
Administrator 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Remarks to the NASA Advisory Council 
Science Subcommittees 
July 6, 2006 
We celebrated our nation's 230th birthday, our Independence Day, this 
week. One of the great strengths of our country is the principle of freedom 
of speech, of entertaining vigorous debates on the great issues of the day. For 
NASA, the great issue before us is how we carry out our nation's civil space 
program-in space science and human spaceflight-and our aeronautics 
research programs. 
We are a nation of laws, and to that end NASA is governed by the Space Act 
of 1958 as our founding charter, just as the Declaration of Independence and the 
Constitution are the founding charters of our nation. The NASA Authorization 
Act of 2005 and presidential policy-the Vision for Space Exploration-provide 
the long-term direction for our investments of time, resources and energy in the 
nation's space and aeronautics program. Each year's budget and appropriations 
legislation provides detailed guidance in crafting an overall portfolio of missions 
in space exploration, scientific discovery and aeronautics research. Thus, all 
NASA programs are "go-as-far-as-we-can-afFord-to-pay" at the national level. 
When it comes to space science priorities, we are guided by the decadal 
surveys of the National Academy of Sciences, and I'm glad that we'll soon have 
a decadal survey for Earth science priorities. This brings us to your role. We've 
specifically asked for your collective and personal advice as to how we carry out 
NASA's science programs-astrophysics, heliophysics, planetary science and 
Earth science. In this town, advice is often freely given, but in your case, we're 
actively seeking it. You are some of the most senior representatives and emerging 
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leaders of your respective fields of endeavor. So, I offer my thanks to you all for 
agreeing to be part of the NASA Advisory Council's science subcommittees. 
One of the issues where we need your advice concerns the fact that 
human exploration of the moon, Mars, near-Earth asteroids and the rest of 
the solar system is not solely science-driven. However, given that this effort 
will be undertaken, we are seeking the counsel of the science community as to 
what science can be done in the course of the human exploration of the solar 
system. Jack Marburger framed this issue very well in his speech in March at the 
44th annual Goddard Memorial Symposium. "'The question about the Vision 
boils down to whether we want to incorporate the solar system in our economic 
sphere, or not." 
Our national policy, declared by President Bush and endorsed by 
Congress last December in the NASA Authorization Act, affirmatively answers 
that question: "The fundamental goal of this vision is to advance U.S. scientific, 
security and economic interests through a robust space exploration program." 
Scientific discovery through human exploration is one goal of the Vision for 
Space Exploration, but is not the only goal. 
We will definitely add to the scientific body of knowledge for our 
civilization about the real estate values in the vicinity of Earth, and we will 
conduct scientific experiments along the way, much in the fashion that 
Meriwether Lewis and William Clark gathered specimens, made careful 
observations in their journals, and drew detailed maps of the great American 
West 200 years ago. 
Like Lewis and Clark's maps of the newly-acquired territories that 
expanded our nation's economic sphere, NASA's Lunar Reconnaissance 
Orbiter will provide detailed terrain elevation data for future exploration and 
use of the resources of the moon, just as the Mars Global Surveyor and Mars 
Reconnaissance Orbiter are mapping details of the surface of that planet in the 
search for evidence of potential subterranean flowing water and future landing 
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sites for robotic and human exploration. But what other scientific endeavors 
should we pursue in low-Earth orbit, or on the moon, Mars and near-Earth 
asteroids during the course of human exploration of our solar system over the 
next several decades? 
We need the scientific community to help us answer that question. 
As we organize our endeavors, I'd like to call your attention to the 
recommendations from the 1990 decadal survey in astronomy and astrophysics 
of the National Academy of Science, commonly known as the Bahcall report. 
Back in 1990, this National Research Council (NRC) committee studied the 
suitability of the moon for possible astronomical facilities and found that, in 
the long term (though not even in the next decade), the chief advantage of the 
moon as a site for space astronomy was that it provided a large, solid foundation 
on which to build widely separated structures such as interferometers. 
This same report from 1990, along with the next decadal survey, 
"Astronomy and Astrophysics in the New Millennium" in 2000 and the annual 
report from the NRC's Astronomy and Astrophysics Advisory Committee have 
helped me to make some difficult decisions recently by informing me as to how 
the science community viewed certain priorities. In 1990, both SOFIA and 
Astrometric Interferometry Mission, since renamed the Space Interferometry 
Mission (or SIM), were regarded as moderately priced programs compared 
to large programs like Space Infrared Telescope Facility (SIRTF)/Spitzer. 
Obviously, this survey underestimated the complexity, cost and schedule for both 
of these projects; but the decadal survey ranked the Stratospheric Observatory 
for Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA) as a higher science priority than SIM. 
Even before I became NASA administrator in the spring of 2005, I knew 
of problems with the SOFLA program, due to gross underestimates of the 
technical complexity of integrating a 2.5-meter telescope onto a Boeing 747 
airborne platform. Costs grew to the point of making SOFIA a large program 
and the schedule kept slipping further to the right. 
Leadership in Space 
Earlier this year, I believed that the best course of action at that time was 
to withhold funding in fiscal year (FY) 2007 for SOFIA, until we conducted a 
thorough review and carefully considered the next steps for this project. 'That 
review included the option of terminating it. Having received this report, I 
now believe the best course going forward is to continue SOFIA, with some 
significant management changes. 
After a careful and independent technical and management review this past 
spring, NASA's Program Management Council concluded that the remaining 
technical challenges for SOFIA, like the stability of the telescope within the 
aircraft's cavity door drive system, were not insurmountable. However, we 
decided that we needed a team in place to manage SOFIA having a greater level 
of management experience with research aircraft. Thus, we decided that the 
Dryden Flight Research Center should lead the development and flight tests of 
SOFIA. We also need to simplify the contracts to ensure that Dryden project 
managers have direct authority over the contractors actually performing work 
on the aircraft. Dryden operates several research aircraf? and has considerable 
hands-on experience with such issues. Arnes Research Center will continue 
to retain science management responsibility for SOFIA, though we may later 
re-evaluate the science management responsibilities as the project continues. 
Following the NASA Program Management Council's (PMC) technical 
and management review, we then sought to determine whether SOFIA 
represents a better investment for space science funding than other projects 
in the universe/astrophysics portfolio. For this analysis, we were informed by 
the 1990 Bahcall report, where SOFIA was ranked as a higher priority than 
SIM, the 2000 decadal survey which reaffirmed those recommendations and 
the NRC's annual report from the Astronomy and Astrophysics Committee last 
March, which said: "With a substantial expenditure on Hubble Space Telescope 
servicing, increases in James Webb Space Telescope's construction cost and 
significant funding for SIM (despite its not earlier than 2015-16 launch date), 
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the astrophysics program is overly biased towards large missions. 'The science 
return from such missions is not in doubt, but the lack of balance will impact 
future opportunities and the diversity of scientific investigations. As discussed 
in more detail in the report, substantial delays in the shuttle availability for 
HST SM4 (Hubble Space Telescope Servicing Mission 4), any further cost 
growth in JWST and the funding profile for SIM are all issues that need to be 
considered. (SIM has a high lifecycle cost because of both current significant 
spending and early ramp-up.)" 
In addition to SOFIA, the universe/astrophysics theme has a diverse 
portfolio of projects, ranging from "Great Observatory" missions like the 
Hubble Space Telescope, James Webb Space Telescope, SOFIA and SIM 
as well as smaller-class missions such as Kepler, Wide-field Infrared Survey 
Explorer (WISE), Gamma-ray Large Area Space Telescope (GLAST), Herschel 
and Planck. Despite losing the opportunity to make some observations in 
conjunction with the Spitzer Space Telescope, SOFIA can still fulfill its science 
objectives to a degree commensurate with our investment and has the potential 
to produce "Great Observatory" science over its 20-year design life. As an 
airborne platform more readily able to incorporate and test a wide range of 
astronomical instruments than a space telescope, SOFIA has a great deal of 
flexibility and can benefit a broad range of astronomers while complementing 
the capabilities of NASA's space telescopes. As a research aircraft, SOFIA can 
also provide hands-on training and education for future astronomers. 
'Thus, in order to continue SOFIA out of the $1.5 billion spent per year 
in NASA's astronomy and astrophysics portfolio, we plan to refocus SIM as 
a technology and research effort for finding Earth-like planets in other solar 
systems, a portfolio of projects which includes the Kepler Space Telescope. 
NASA will then be informed by the priorities in astronomy and astrophysics 
from the upcoming decadal survey, to be initiated in 2 years. I have made this 
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consideration carefully, and I believe that it is the best course of action for 
SOFIA as well as the rest of the astronomy and astrophysics portfolio. 
As I have told Charles Elachi, I am sensitive to the impacts to scientists 
and engineers at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory UPL) who worked on SIM. I 
have been laid off twice in my career. He has my commitment to maintain 
JPL's overall workforce at its present level, with the assignment of other 
work as necessary to do so. However, the priorities of the decadal surveys in 
astronomy and astrophysics are clear, as is the advice of the NRC's annual 
report. Clearly, we in the broader space community have a credibility problem 
with our stakeholders in managing the technical complexity, costs and schedule 
for our programs. The science community must be careful not to underestimate 
the costs and complexity of the missions it proposes. NASA cannot afford 
everything our many constituencies would like us to do. 
However, having been a part of several Nunn-McCurdy breach reviews 
for NPOESS and reading reports concerning other major DOD programs, 
this problem is broader than NASA, and I have discussed it extensively with 
former Congressman Dave McCurdy, Tom Young, my counterparts in the 
DOD and members of Congress. Our stakeholders in Congress are concerned 
that NASA not under-estimate the costs or complexity of our programs. To  
that point, the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 requires even more stringent 
management actions than those in the Nunn-McCurdy legislation for NASA 
missions costing more than $250 million and which exceed their base-lined 
costs. I would ask everyone in the science community who proposes missions to 
NASA to become familiar with that legislative provision, which is now the law 
of the land and which I and my managers must follow. In the future, decisions 
such as whether or not to continue missions like SOFIA will not be left to the 
NASA administrator but will go to Congress. 
My number one request to Mary Cleave Associate Administrator for 
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the Science Mission Directorate and Colleen Hartman Deputy Associate 
Administrator for the Science Mission Directorate is that they bring forward 
realistic, executable programs within their budget. We will need your help in 
this. Every time we have over-promised on a program, we have lost credibility 
with our stakeholders. 
Speaking of stakeholders, it's now the time of the year when the House 
and Senate committees mark-up their bills for the following year's appropriation. 
Recently, the chairman of NASA's appropriation subcommittee, Congressman 
Frank Wolf, displayed real leadership by curtailing individual member's earmarks 
for NASA and the National Science Foundation (NSF). "One person's priority 
is another's earmark," Jack Marburger points out, and he's absolutely right. I 
believe the science community is best governed by merit-based, peer review 
~rocedures. Our hope is that the science community can form a consensus 
on its priorities, as with the decadal surveys, which would argue against funds 
being diverted for one person's earmarks. Back in FY97, specific direction for 
NASA constituted only $74 million for six specific projects. In FYO6, NASA was 
earmarked at a total of $568.5 million for 198 site-specific and programmatic 
increases, with $48.3 million in site-specific earmarks from NASA's Science 
Mission Directorate and $63.4 million from our Education programs. 
As members of the science community, we need your help in curtailing 
this level of earmarking among your colleagues. NASA simply cannot afford 
everything that everyone would like us to do. Chairman Wolf recognizes these 
difficult choices and the need to focus limited resources on programs most critical 
to our nation. We are working closely together on this. I have also discussed 
with Chairman Wolf the need for more discussions within the planetary science 
community to set priorities for missions to the outer planets and moons of 
Jupiter and Saturn. These missions will cost a minimum of several billions of 
dollars. While a mission to Europa was ranked as the highest planetary science 
priority in the decadal survey published in 2003, since then we have learned 
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that liquid water might also be found on Enceladus, one of Saturn's moons; and 
Titan also has an interesting methane-rich atmosphere with volcanic activity. 
Neither of these two moons has a harsh radiation environment like that of 
Europa, whose extreme radiation field could cripple a multi-billion spacecraft 
in its orbit before it completed its science mission. Thus, I believe that the 
best course of action moving forward is to permit the science community 
to determine the next outer planets mission through a competitive selection 
process under the New Frontiers program. 
I would also like to note for the science community that, if you advocate 
large missions exceeding the capabilities of the current Evolved Expendable 
Launch Vehicle (EELV) fleet, you should consider taking advantage of new 
heavy-lift capabilities currently under development for human exploration. 
While the planetary science community may not have liked my decision, as part 
of the FY07 budget formulation, to place the national priorities of completing 
the space station, retiring the space shuttle by 2010 and bringing the CEV on 
line no later than 2014, higher than the goals of missions to the outer planets 
like Europa, I want to assure you that our nation will carry out such missions. 
It simply will not occur as soon as some might wish that mission to be. Does 
that make me less of a fan of missions to the outer planets? Absolutely not. I'm 
trying to put forward an affordable and credible portfolio of missions within 
NASA in accordance with the law of the land and national policy and avoid 
making promises the agency cannot keep. I strongly believe this to be in the 
best interests of the overall space program. 
These are the issues at the forefront of my mind today as I look out at the 
landscape of NASA's broad portfolio of science missions. We're asking for your 
advice on the journey ahead. This has been a momentous week for NASA, with 
the second Return-To-Flight shuttle mission underway on July 4; and I'm glad 
to be spending some time with you now. After this mission is completed, I will 
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convene a group of senior NASA managers to help me decide the best course 
ahead for a servicing mission with the shuttle to the Hubble Space Telescope. 
Meriwether Lewis observed the following perspective in his journal on 
July 4,1805 which speaks across two centuries to many of us in NASA: "We all 
believe that we are now about to enter on the most perilous and difficult part of 
our voyage, yet I see no one repining; all appear ready to meet those difficulties 
which wait us with resolution and becoming fortitude." 
We have a lot of work to do. We are asking for your advice as to how we 
carryout that work. Let me now open this dialogue to your questions. 
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NASA and the Commercial Space Industry 
Michael D. Griffin 
Administrator 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Remarks at the X-Prize Cup  Summit 
October 19,2006 
An insightful, and often all too apt, observation goes: "There are three 
types of people in the world: people who make things happen, people who 
watch things happen and people who wonder what happened." The group 
assembled here clearly fits into the first category, and so for my part, I'd like 
to spend some time with you this morning wondering what happened. More 
seriously, I believe this observation needs a fourth category ahead of the three 
given above; first there must be the people who think about what ought to 
happen. These are the visionaries, and none of us would be here at this event 
today without them. So, I want to spend some time with you thinking about 
what needs to happen next. 
All of you here will be familiar with our new Commercial Orbital 
Transportation Services (COTS) demonstrations being conducted under the 
framework of NASA Space Act Agreements. These landmark agreements are, 
truly, NASA's most significant investment to date in attempting to spur the 
development of the commercial space industry. But let me say this at the outset: 
NASA can do even better in partnering with the commercial and entrepreneurial 
space sector in carrying out our nation's Vision for Space Exploration. However, 
let me be equally blunt about the other side of the coin: "partnership" with 
NASA is not a synonym for "helping NASA spend its money." Just as with our 
international partnerships, I expect commercial and venture capital partners to 
have "skin in the game," contributing resources toward a common goal that is 
greater than that which could be easily afforded by NASA alone, while figuring 
out how to make a profit from it! 
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Thus, it is important for the future that NASA's investments productively 
leverage the engine of the American economy, a Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) valued at over $13 trillion per year, to help us carry out our mission 
of space exploration. As the President's Science Advisor Jack Marburger stated 
earlier this year, "questions about the Vision boil down to whether we want 
to incorporate the solar system in our economic sphere, or not." I think that 
I can guess how most of you who are here today would answer that question. 
And, indeed, I have said in other venues that for me also, this is one of the core 
principles justifying human exploration and expansion into space. 
But the kind of things we need to do have been done before. We know 
how it should go. Many of you have in the past heard me allude briefly to 
the story of how the U.S. Post Office Department, with the help of the War 
Department, helped spur our nation's aviation industry when it started the 
airmail service routes in 1918. I very strongly believe that we can, and should, 
draw certain lessons from this event; that it can be an historical paradigm for 
how NASA might fill a similar role in spurring our emerging commercial space 
industry in concert with the goals of the Vision for Space Exploration. However, 
a review of this history shows that it was not an easy proposition then, and it is 
likely to be just as difficult to pursue in the present era. But, as President John 
Kennedy said at Rice University in 1962, we do these things, "not because they 
are easy, but because they are hard." So let us look again at what was once done, 
and then let us think about what might yet be done. 
The idea of an airmail service in the United States was initially proposed 
by the Post Office Department in 1912. However, Congress refused to grant 
them the $50,000 appropriation needed to start. Undaunted and persistent, the 
Post Office Department kept requesting funds from Congress for an airmail 
service. Finally, in 19 16, some funding was received, but when the Post Office 
Department invited bids for airmail routes in Massachusetts and Alaska, no 
company took them up on their offer, because no airplanes then in existence could 
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meet the stringent requirements. Revising its plans, the Post Office Department 
and the Army finally demonstrated the first airmail route between Long Island, 
New York and Washington, D.C. in May 1918. It was a momentous occasion, 
and President Woodrow Wilson greeted the pilot upon landing. Today, if you 
walk along the Potomac River not far from the Jefferson Memorial, you will find 
several plaques commemorating those first airmail flights. 
Using initially the then-plentifd Curtis Jenny trainers, surplus from 
the Great War, transcontinental airmail routes were quickly established. By 
the mid-1920s, the Post Office Department's fleet was flying 2.5 million 
miles annually, delivering 14 million letters. This airmail service was popular 
because delivery times were much faster than could be accomplished using 
trains. However, there were also many fatalities during this barnstorming era. 
Cross-country flights in all kinds of weather and lighting conditions presented 
new and unsolved problems. The reason why pilots wore goggles and scarves in 
those open-air cockpits was hardly to look dashing. The goggles prevented bugs 
from striking the pilot's eyes at 100 miles per hour, and the scarf was to cover 
the pilot's mouth from the bugs that might fly in and to wipe away oil sputtering 
from the plane's engine. Those of us who flew here to Las Cruces today should 
not take for granted our current level of aviation safety and comfort. Today, 
you have about the same chance of being killed by a lightning strike-about 
100 Americans per year die this way-as in an air transport accident. But back 
then, aviation accidents and deaths were all too common. 
In 1925, the Contract Air Mail Act (or Kelly Act) authorized the 
postmaster general to contract for airmail services, and in the process spawned 
our nation's nascent airline industry, as the airlines delivered both paying 
passengers and cargo. Charles Lindbergh was one of those early pilots, flying the 
route between Chicago and St. Louis in his de Havilland DH-4. His experiences 
flying the mail in these early years-including the bailouts and emergency 
landings-are recounted with both great literary grace and a pilot's sense of 
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immediacy in We, his autobiographical summary of those years. Lindbergh's 
early experiences flying the mail gave him the experience he would need for 
his famous first non-stop flight from New York to Paris in 1927, winning the 
$25,000 Orteig Prize for himself and his backers. 
But the story doesn't end there. In 1933, President Roosevelt's postmaster 
general found unethical behavior in the awarding of these airmail contracts, and 
the president summarily canceled all such contracts and ordered the Army Air 
Corps to step in and take over the airmail service for a brief time. A young man 
by the name of James Webb, who was a lawyer and also a Marine Corps aviator 
himself, and who would later become NASA's greatest administrator, was closely 
involved in bringing order out of that chaos to restart the commercial airmail 
service. This phase of Webb's life is chronicled in his biography, Powering 
Apollo, by W. Henry Lambright. 
So what are the lessons to be gleaned? First, the U.S. government acted 
through the Post Office Department as amajor purchaser ofpotential air transport 
services, as opposed to being a technology developer. The aviation industry 
used the government's investment to develop their commercial operations 
hrther, and along the way, incorporated numerous technical innovations 
that proceeded from the Ford tri-motor to the Boeing 247 and eventually to 
the Douglas DC-3, generally considered to be the first practical commercial 
transport aircraft. These investments in soliciting actual airmail service, rather 
than in technology development itself, spurred innovation in retractable 
landing gear, radio navigation aids, aluminum monocoque structural design for 
low weight, low drag airframes, air-cooled radial engines, vacuum gyroscopes 
and a slew of other technologies, while also delivering the mail which was of 
course the intended primary goal. Technology development was the byproduct 
of this investment; it occurred as a natural result of competitive entrepreneurs 
attempting to out-do each other in servicing a known government market. 
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But second, we should remember that even as the Post Office Department 
was stimulating the development of aviation by purchasing commercial service, 
another arm of the U.S. government was doing its part from a different 
perspective. Aviation technology development was extensively aided and abetted 
by the activities of the National Advisory Committee for Aviation, or NACA, 
the predecessor of today's NASA. Through its three research centers-first 
Langley, then later the Lewis and Arnes laboratories-the NACA sponsored 
much of the groundbreaking technology development and proof-of-concept 
work, providing a base of feasible technical alternatives upon which industry 
could draw with each new airplane design. In my opinion, this private-public 
synergy achieved results both far better, and much faster, than either approach 
alone could have done. 
So, what about space? We now have more than 50 years of investment, 
through both NASA and DOD, in space technology and systems development. 
But what we have not had is a stable, predictable government market for space 
services sufficient to stimulate the development of a commercial space industry 
analogous to that which was seen in the growth of aviation. My hope is that with 
the seed money we are putting into the COTS program, we can demonstrate 
the possibility of commercial cargo and crew transportation to the International 
Space Station, and that subsequently NASA will be able to meet its space station 
logistics needs by purchasing these demonstrated services. If we can do this, we 
will be able to change the paradigm for transportation services to be more in 
line with the airmail service of the 1920s, meeting the logistics needs of the 
space station, some 7,000 to 10,000 kilograms per year, after the space shuttle is 
retired in 2010. In the process, we may be able to spur innovation for low-cost 
access to space. This is a carefully-considered investment with known risks that 
we can all see and appreciate, but with a potentially huge upside that makes it 
well worth the risks. 
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I'll risk repeating myself to ensure that everyone fully understands how 
serious NASA takes the COTS demonstrations: if these commercial service 
capabilities are successfully demonstrated and cost-effective, NASA will 
welcome and use them. That is our default strategy for space station resupply. 
Most of you will probably agree that meeting or beating the government's cost 
to provide space transportation services shouldn't be too difficult for private 
industry to do. I hope you are right. I want these demonstrations to succeed; 
however, my wanting it won't make it so. If these capabilities are not successfully 
demonstrated, then NASA's fallback position is to rely on the Orion Crew 
Exploration Vehicle or international partner cargo and crew service capabilities 
for space station logistics support. 
Now, there is another lesson to be derived from the airmail experience. 
For the space transportation services we seek, certain human rating and visiting 
vehicle requirements applicable to the space station must be respected. To 
that end, we're interested in hearing from potential commercial providers, like 
SpaceX and Rocketplane Kistler, as well as Lockheed Martin's Orion team, 
concerning what requirements are necessary and value-added, and which ones 
may not be. 'The definition of human-rating is not simply how much paper and 
process we can afFord to buy. That is the wrong metric. For this reason, we are 
reviewing the visiting vehicle and human rating requirements, not only for the 
COTS demonstration but also for the Crew Exploration Vehicle, to ensure 
that we're writing our engineering specifications to achieve the goal of technical 
excellence and are not simply following a handbook. Good engineers do not 
simply quote requirements from handbooks; we understand the underlying 
technical necessity behind such requirements. 
Similarly, we must avoid relying solely on precedent, upon the mentality 
of "that's the way we did it on shuttle," or space station, or Apollo, or Skykb or 
whatever as a substitute for good judgment. If we don't periodically question 
our technical requirements, if we focus on process to the exclusion of outcome, 
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if we substitute methodology for intent, then we will replicate the experience 
of the Post Office Department in its initial request for bids on airmail service: 
commercial industry will never be able to meet NASA's stated needs. Thus, we 
must focus upon, and be experts in, systems engineering as we work through 
various technical issues for our future crew and cargo systems. We must be 
prepared to question our assumptions when necessary. 
Yet another lesson gained from the airmail service was how it helped train 
a new generation of pilots like Wiley Post and Charles Lindbergh, engineers like 
Glenn Curtiss and Donald Douglas and lawyers like future NASA Administrator 
Jim Webb. 'This barnstorming era engendered a certain sense of "air-mindedness" 
among the American people in much the same way that space tourism is 
rekindling an interest in space travel for the American public, over and above 
that which NASA accomplishes today. Of course, the physics and engineering 
are more difficult for personal space travel than for air travel, with even greater 
levels of cost and risk, but we must recognize that this change is occurring. 'There 
are now emerging certain rudimentary commercial capabilities for members of 
the public to have their own personal "space experience," with varying degrees of 
weightlessness and views of Earth and space. I fervently hope that the emergence 
of such capabilities will help make America more "space minded." 
Now, I must be clear that the development of space tourism is not a part 
of NASA's charter. NASA was founded during the Cold War, soon after the 
launch of Sputnik, when the United States was in a race with the Soviets. NASA 
and the early civil space program were instruments of American preeminence 
in the world at a time when an important component of such was seen to be 
preeminence in space. NASA achieved the goals that were set for it by the 
nation's policymakers in that era, and did so with remarkable brilliance, so 
much so that even today we remain in awe of what the Apollo generation did. 
Now, some have since posited that NASA somehow failed the American public 
by not opening up the experience of space travel to the broader population. 
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lhis  is patent nonsense; the agency could not fail at something it was never 
asked to do. Such a mandate was simply never in NASA's charter; if it were, I 
would question the wisdom of such a role for a government entity. However, 
as we go forward with the Vision for Space Exploration, it emphatically is our 
duty to encourage and leverage nascent commercial space capabilities. Not only 
is it the right thing to do in a country whose economic system is rooted in free 
market concepts, but it will also be a necessity if we are to achieve the goals set 
out for the U.S. civil space program. 
A little over a year ago, I unveiled to Congress and the public NASA's 
architecture for returning to the moon. It is a conservative plan designed to 
accomplish the stated mission with minimum cost, maximum cost confidence 
and as much use of existing systems as we could reasonably achieve. But having 
combed through the design trades, associated costs and projected budget for 
the agency, it is apparent that NASA will need to leverage commercial and 
international partners to the maximum if we are to sustain this long journey, 
with footholds first on the space station, then on the moon and from there 
onward to Mars. It is out of necessity for, not charity toward, commercial space 
endeavors that we at NASA must change our way of doing business. While I 
think that the $500 million we're investing in the COTS demonstrations is a 
sizable first step, there's more gold to be mined in other fields of commercial 
endeavor as well. 
To that end, we are taking a hard look at our government-operated 
microgravity research aircraft at Johnson Space Center and at what NASA 
requirements commercial providers can meet. We've purchased some 
commercial research flights from Zero-G Corporation in the past and, going 
forward, we are looking to meet the full set of our requirements through the 
purchase of private sector services at a lower cost. You recently saw a NASA 
Request for Information on micro-gravity flight services, and you can expect to 
see more from NASA in the coming months. 
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Commercial aircraft can make parabolic flights for 20-30 seconds 
of weightlessness at a time. I hope that future suborbital flights will soon be 
taking paying passengers to the edge of space for approximately 4 minutes of 
weightlessness, as well as a great view of Earth from the edge of space. Using 
the airmail paradigm, NASA will purchase seats for these suborbital flights 
for certain experiments, and possibly astronaut candidate proficiency, if and 
when they become available. Just as NASA pilots fly T-38s and micro-gravity 
aircraft flights to maintain proficiency, we should consider how we might 
use these future suborbital flight opportunities. I have asked NASA Associate 
Administrator Rex Geveden to look into this capability under NASA's 
Innovative Partnership Program. Rex also oversees management of NASA's 
Centennial Challenge Prize program, authorized by Congress last December. 
Several NASA prize challenges, like the lunar lander, will be featured here at 
the X-Prize Cup over the next several days. The spirit and heritage of these 
prizes harks back to Charles Lindbergh's successful bid for the Orteig Prize in 
1927; I hope these new prizes spark similar accomplishments. 
In another vein, the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 also designates 
the U.S. segment of the space station a national laboratory. NASA is actively 
seeking commercial partners who would like to use the space station for their 
own experiments. After the loss of Space Shuttle Columbia, NASA was forced to 
curtail a great deal of space station research, and with our focus on the use of the 
space shuttle system for space station assembly over the next few years, I believe 
that commercial cargo and crew services will prove invaluable for increasing 
access to space and to the space station for these commercial experiments. 
Also in connection with the space station, we need to be open to novel 
concepts, which can enhance the utility of this multibillion dollar facility. As one 
example, former astronaut and present-day entrepreneur Franklin Chang-Diaz, 
creator and proponent of the Vasimir electric propulsion concept, has opened 
discussions with NASA in connection with the possible use of the Vasimir 
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engine for space station orbit maintenance. We don't know, yet, whether this 
particular approach makes sense or not, but if it does, there might be a classic 
"win-win" strategy here; we gain experience with a potentially useful space 
propulsion concept, and we reduce the amount of propellant delivery needed for 
space station reboost, leaving room in the logistics manifest for more productive 
cargo. This is the kind of private-public synergy that can serve us well. 
While we are on the theme of innovative approaches to commercial 
space endeavors, I want to congratulate Pete Worden and his team at Ames for 
working with Bigelow Aerospace to secure a piggyback ride for their Genebox 
experiment on Bigelow's Genesis inflatable space habitat demonstration. I 
believe that this is one of many innovative, short turnaround ideas that we'll 
be seeing from Pete over the next several years. He is turning Arnes Research 
Center in Silicon Valley into a "Mecca" for space entrepreneurs, where among 
other things we are hosting the Red Planet venture capital fund, similar in some 
ways to the CIA'S In-Q-Tel operation, to leverage innovators and investors who 
have not typically done business with NASA. 
Recalling again the lessons of the airmail service in 1933, we know 
that we must avoid any real or perceived favoritism before entering into any 
joint endeavors. There must be a healthy competition of ideas and resources. 
Before making commitments, we must carefully consider and ensure that joint 
endeavors are properly aligned with NASA's mission, sufficiently high priority 
and can be done within the resources provided to NASA. Now, I specifically 
want to emphasize that the phrase "carefully considered is not a euphemism 
for hiding behind bureaucratic processes or legalistic red tape. If you see this 
happening, we want to hear about it. Having worked in industry, I appreciate 
the need to meet a payroll, and I know well how the timing of government 
decisions affects your "skin in the game." For this reason, clear dialogue is 
necessary between NASA and the parties involved when exploring possible 
joint endeavors. We must not over-promise or over-commit. It is one thing to 
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begin an endeavor, but it is an even greater accomplishment to complete it! Too 
many exciting endeavors at NASA have failed to meet this standard in recent 
years. We must re-establish NASA's reputation for finishing what we start. 
As I stated earlier, there are people who make things happen, people who 
watch things happen and people who wonder what happened. I'll share with 
you another of my favorite aphorisms: managers do things right, but leaders do 
the right things. So, we need to make things happen, but we also need to make 
sure that we're trying to make the right things happen. 'The lessons learned from 
our nation's first steps in creating a commercial airmail service are useful to us 
today. So, let me leave you with a final thought from a certain airmail pilot, 
one Charles Lindbergh: "It is the greatest shot of adrenaline to be doing what 
you have wanted to do so badly. You almost feel like you could fly without 
the plane." 'The group assembled here today knows that feeling. So, let's make 
things happen, so that we can enjoy it more often! 
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When President Bush announced the Vision for Space Exploration in 
January 2004, he made many specific points, including one which has been 
little noted but which we here all believe: the pursuit of the Vision will enhance 
America's economic, scientific and security interests. He also made it clear that 
the first step in the plan was to use the space shuttle to complete the assembly 
of the International Space Station, after which the space station would be used 
to further the goals of exploration beyond low Earth orbit. These issues are all 
closely related, and I believe it is time to discuss in more detail how the space 
station will be used to accomplish them, and how it will fit into a broader 
strategy for 21st century space exploration of the moon, Mars and beyond 
in a way that will spur commerce, advance scientific knowledge and expand 
humanity's horizons. 
We are entering the dawn of the true space age. Our nation has the 
opportunity to lead the way. It is an opportunity we are eager to pursue, and 
one which we are unwilling to postpone. But the exploration of the solar 
system cannot be what we want it to be as an enterprise borne solely by the 
American taxpayer, or even by the taxpayers of the nations willing to join with 
us in this enterprise. 
Ifwe are to make the expansion and development of the space frontier an 
integral part of what it is that human societies do, then these activities must, as 
quickly as possible, assume an economic dimension as well. Government-directed 
space activity must become a lesser rather than a greater part of what humans 
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do in space. To this end, it is up to us at NASA to use the challenge of the 
Vision for Space Exploration to foster the commercial opportunities that are 
inherent to this exciting endeavor. Our strategy to implement the Vision must, 
and we believe does, have the potential to open a genuine and sustainable era 
of space commerce. And the space station will provide the first glimpses into 
this new era. 
Before we pursue this thought further, let us summarize a few statistics 
from the space station program. On  November 2, 2005, we marked the fifth 
year of consecutive human occupancy of the station. The station has hosted 
97 visitors from 10 countries in its approximately 425 cubic meters, a volume 
roughly the size of a typical three-bedroom home. Of these, 29 have been 
crewmembers of the 12 space station expeditions that have flown to date. With 
the most recent spacewalk by Expedition 12 Commander Bill McArthur and 
Flight Engineer Valery Tokarev, 63 have been conducted in support of space 
station assembly, totaling nearly 380 hours. And through the partnership we 
have with 15 other nations, we have learned to work together on an incredibly 
complex systems engineering project. While it certainly has not always gone 
smoothly, the simple fact of its accomplishment has been an amazing feat. 
My oft-stated view is that the international partnership is, in fact, the most 
important longterm benefit to be derived from the space station program. I 
think it is a harbinger of what we can accomplish in the future as we move 
forward to even more ambitious objectives in space. 
Indeed, the value of this international collaboration was endorsed once 
again by a recent vote in Congress, which lessened certain restrictions placed 
on our ability to cooperate with Russia in the arena of manned spaceflight. 
This congressional action helps to ensure the continuous presence of American 
astronauts on the station. It continues to reflect our government's commitment 
to nonproliferation objectives, while recognizing the value of international 
cooperation in space exploration. 
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So, how can the space station that we are building today help us to move 
beyond low Earth orbit tomorrow? 
To begin, we are focusing human research on the space station on the 
highest risks to crew health and other issues we will face on long exploratory 
missions. This research will help us understand the effects of long duration 
spaceflight on the human body, such as bone and muscle loss, so that we can 
develop medical standards and protocols to manage such risks. We have already 
had some successful anecdotal experience among space station crewmembers 
with exercise countermeasures. Perhaps space station-based research will one day 
help us to evaluate the efficacy of drugs to counter osteoporosis, or long-term 
exposure to the radiation environment or to test advanced radiation detectors. 
The station will help us learn to deal with crew stress on long missions, to enable 
them to remain emotionally healthy. 
With the space station as a test bed, we can learn to develop the medical 
technologies, including small and reliable medical sensors and new telemedicine 
techniques, needed for missions far from home. A milestone in that arena was 
achieved a year ago when the journal Radiology published its first research paper 
submitted directly from the station-Space Station Science Officer Mike Fincke's 
account of the first use of ultrasound in space for a shoulder examination. 
The space station can host and test developmental versions of the new 
liquid-oxygen (1ox)lmethane engines we will need for the Crew Exploration 
Vehicle (CEV), and many other systems that we will need for Mars. These 
include the development and verification of environmental control, life support 
and monitoring technologies, air revitalization, thermal control and multiphase 
flow technologies, and research into flammability and fire safety. As I have often 
said, when we set out for Mars, it will be like sealing a crew into a submarine and 
telling them not to ask for help or return to port for several years. We can't do 
that today. We have to be able to do it before people can go to Mars. We'll learn 
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to do it on the space station and later on the moon. And so, fundamentally, the 
space station will allow us to learn to live and work in space. 
And even though this research is focused on the tasks associated with 
setting up research bases on the moon and preparing the way for Mars 
exploration, it will also benefit millions of people here on Earth. What we 
learn about bone loss mitigation and cardiovascular deconditioning, the 
development of remote monitoring and medical care, and water reclamation 
and environmental characterization technology obviously has broader benefits. 
One certainly would not build a space station to achieve these goals. But given 
that we have it, we intend to maximize the science return from the space station 
in ways that will benefit both space exploration and our society at large. 
But now let us turn to what I believe will be an even greater benefit 
of the space station, and that is its role in the development of space as an 
economic arena. 
In order that we may devote as much of NASA's budget as possible to the 
cutting edge of space exploration, we must seek to reduce the cost of all things 
routine. Here in 2005, the definition of "routine" certainly should include 
robust, reliable and cost effective access to space for at least small and medium 
class payloads. Unfortunately, it does not, and frankly, this is not an area where 
it is reasonable to expect government to excel. Within the boundaries of available 
technology, when we want an activity to be performed reliably and efficiently, 
we in our society look to the competitive pressures of the free market to achieve 
these goals. In space, these pressures have been notably lacking, in part because 
the space "market" has historically been both specialized and small. There have 
been exceptions-notably in the communications satellite market-but the key 
word here is "exceptions." Broadly speaking, the market for space services has 
never enjoyed either the breadth or the scale of competition which has led, 
for example, to today's highly efficient air transportation services. Without a 
Part 2. NASA, Science, Commerce and Engineering 
strong, identifiable market, the competitive environment necessary to achieve 
the advantages we associate with the free market simply cannot arise. 
I believe that with the advent of the space station, there will exist for 
the first time a strong, identifiable market for "routine" transportation service 
to and from low Earth orbit and that this will be only the first step in what 
will be a huge opportunity for truly commercial space enterprise, inherent to 
the Vision for Space Exploration. I believe that the space station provides a 
tremendous opportunity to promote commercial space ventures that will help 
us meet our exploration objectives and at the same time create new jobs and 
new industry. 
The clearly identifiable market provided by the space station is that for 
regular cargo delivery and return, and crew rotation, especially after we retire the 
shuttle in 2010 but earlier should the capability become available. We want to be 
able to buy these services from American industry to the fullest extent possible. 
We believe that when we engage the engine of competition, these services will be 
provided in a more cost-effective fashion than when the government has to do it. 
To that end, we have established a commercial crew and cargo project office and 
assigned to it the task of stimulating commercial enterprise in space by asking 
American entrepreneurs to provide innovative, cost effective commercial cargo 
and crew transportation services to the space station. 
This fall, NASA will post a draft announcement which seeks proposals 
from industry for flight demonstrations to the space station of any combination 
of the following: external unpressurized cargo delivery and disposal; internal 
pressurized cargo delivery and disposal; internal pressurized cargo delivery and 
recovery; and crew transport. 
As these capabilities are demonstrated in the years ahead, we will solicit 
proposals for ongoing space station transportation services from commercial 
providers. This announcement offers the opportunity for industry to develop 
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capabilities that, once proven, NASA will purchase with great regularity, just as 
we regularly purchase launch services for our robotic spacecraft today. Once the 
announcement is on the street, we will receive proposals by late January with 
the intent to execute agreements by May of next year. 
This competition will be open to emerging and established companies, 
with foreign content allowed, consistent with American law and policy. 
Proposals can include any mix of existing or new designs and hardware. NASA 
does not have a preferred solution. Our requirements will be couched to the 
maximum extent possible in terms of performance objectives, not process. 
Process requirements that remain will reflect matters of fundamental safety of 
life and property or other basic matters. It will not be government "business as 
usual." If those of you in industry find it to be otherwise, I expect to hear from 
you on the matter. 
With this plan, and providing of course that we retain the support of 
Congress necessary to carry it out, we will put about a half-billion dollars in play 
over the 5 years to promote competition that is good for the private sector and 
good for the public interest. I'm confident that this kind of financial incentive, 
on different terms than are usual with NASA or indeed with any government 
entity, will result in the emergence of substantial commercial providers. Such 
successes will, in their turn, serve as a justification for even greater use of such 
"non-traditional" acquisition methods. As I have said in other venues, my use 
of the words "non-traditional" here is somewhat tongue-in-cheek because what 
we are talking about is completely traditional in the bulk of our economy, 
which is not driven by government procurement. In this larger economy, when 
there exist customers with specific needs and the financial resources to satisfy 
these needs, suppliers compete avidly to meet them. We need more of this in 
the space enterprise. 
But as stated earlier, this is only the first step. An explicit goal of our 
exploration systems architecture was to provide an avenue for the creation of 
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a substantial space economy by suitably leveraging government investment 
to meet its stated mission requirements. ?he architecture we announced in 
September was designed so that NASA would provide but would provide only 
the essential transportation elements and infrastructure to get beyond low Earth 
orbit. The heavy lift launchers and crew vehicles necessary to journey beyond 
low Earth orbit cannot, in anything like the near future, be provided by any 
entity other than NASA on behalf of the U.S. government. The analogy I have 
used elsewhere is that NASA will build the "interstate highwayx that will allow 
us to return to the moon and to go to Mars. 
We as a nation once had the systems to build this "interstate highway" 
leading out into the solar system. We should have retained and evolved them 
but we did not. So we need to rebuild them. But the "highways" themselves 
are not and are not supposed to be the interesting part. What is interesting are 
the destinations and, particularly to the point of the present discussion, the 
service stations, hotels and other businesses and accommodations that we will 
find at the "exit ramps" of our future "interstate highways" in space. It is here 
that a robust commercial market can develop to support our exploration goals 
and eventually go beyond them. I think we are at the start of something big, 
somewhat akin to what we saw with the personal computer 25 years ago. 
To my point, NASA's exploration architecture does what it must. It 
fulfills the mission required by the president, according to the terms of a major 
speech and written policy. It does so in a fashion which some have labeled as 
"boring" or "lacking pizzazz," but which others have observed makes efficient 
use of the building blocks that we as a nation own today and in which the pieces 
"fit together like a fine Swiss watch." I believe these seemingly divergent views 
are merely two sides are the same coin, reflecting the fact that the plan delivers 
what it must without including what it need not. Nothing else is acceptable in 
these fiscally challenging times. 
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But the building blocks of our architecture could easily be used to 
accomplish much more, with the right leverage from commercial providers. 
To see how this is so, observe first that our "1.5 launch solution" separates 
the smaller crew launch from that of the heavy, high-value cargo, both on 
shuttle-derived launch vehicle variants. While this approach allows us to meet 
lunar return mission requirements with U.S. government systems-no external 
entities are in the critical path for mission accomplishment-it does not exclude 
such entities and indeed provides several "hooks" and "scars" by which their 
services can be used to facilitate or enhance the mission. 
By the time we are ready to return to the moon, the space station will 
have been completed and will be in receipt of routine commercial resupply and 
crew rotation service for, we hope, several years. So, if the plan for stimulating 
the development of space station commercial crew rotation capability is 
successful, it becomes possible to envision the crew launch phase of the lunar 
mission being carried out on commercial systems. This would be a service we 
could purchase commercially, leaving the very heavy lift requirements to the 
government system, for which it is less likely that there will be other commercial 
applications during this period. 
Whether or not this occurs, other options are also possible. Astute 
observers will note that the shuttle-derived heavy lift vehicle (SDHLV) that we 
have proposed is not, as a rocket, being optimally utilized for its lunar mission. 
This is because some of the fuel in the so-called "Earth departure stage" is 
used to lift the lunar payload into Earth orbit, but additional fuel must yet be 
retained for the translunar ignition burn of over 3 kilometers per second. From 
a purely architectural point of view, the SDHLV is an expensive vehicle most 
aptly utilized for lifting only expensive cargo such as the man-rated systems 
it carries. But in our architecture, some of its lift capacity must be utilized 
to carry fuel into low Earth orbit. This is unsatisfying, because when on the 
ground, fuel is about the cheapest material employed in any aspect of the space 
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business. Its value in orbit (at least several thousand dollars per pound) is almost 
completely a function of its location rather than intrinsic to its nature. In 
contrast, the value of, say, the Lunar Surface Access Module (LSAM) brought 
up on the heavy-lifter will be well over $100 thousand per pound, most of which 
represents its intrinsic cost. The additional value it acquires when transported to 
its new position in low Earth orbit remains a small part of the total value. 
Logically, then, we should seek to use the SDHLV only for the 
highest-value cargo, and specifically we should desire to place fuel in orbit by 
the cheapest means possible in whatever manner this can be accomplished, 
whether of high reliability or not. However, in deciding to embark on a lunar 
mission, we cannot afford the consequential damage of not having fuel available 
when needed. Recognizing that fact, our mission architecture hauls its own 
Earth-departure fuel up from the ground for each trip. But if there were a fuel 
depot available on orbit, one capable of being replenished at any time, the Earth 
departure stage could after refueling carry significantly more payload to the 
moon, maximizing the utility of the inherently expensive SDHLV for carrying 
high-value cargo. 
But NASA's architecture does not feature a fuel depot. Even if it could 
be afforded within the budget constraints (which we will likely face) and it 
cannot; it is philosophically the wrong thing for the government to be doing. It 
is not "necessary;" it is not on the critical path of things we "must do" to return 
astronauts to the moon. It is a highly valuable enhancement, but the mission is 
not hostage to its availability. It is exactly the type of enterprise which should 
be left to industry and to the marketplace. 
So let us look forward 10 or more years to a time when we are closer to 
resuming human exploration of the moon. The value of such a commercially 
operated fuel depot in low Earth orbit at that time is easy to estimate. Such a 
depot would support at least two planned missions to the moon each year. The 
architecture which we have advanced places about 150 metric tons in low Earth 
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orbit, 25 metric tons on the Crew Launch Vehicle and 125 metric tons on the 
heavylifter. Of the total, about half will be propellant in the form of liquid 
oxygen and hydrogen, required for the translunar injection to the moon. If the 
Earth departure stage could be refueled on-orbit, the crew and all high-value 
hardware could be launched using a single SDHLV; and all of this could be 
sent to the moon. 
There are several ways in which the value of this extra capability might 
be calculated; but at a conservatively low government price of $10,000 per a 
kilogram for payload in low Earth orbit, 250 megatons of fuel for two missions 
per year is worth $2.5 billion at government rates. If a commercial provider can 
supply fuel at a lower cost, both the government and the contractor will benefit. 
This is a non-trivial market, and it will only grow as we continue to fly. The 
value of fuel for a single Mars mission may be several billion dollars by itself. 
Once industry becomes fully convinced that the United States in company with 
its international partners is headed out into the solar system for good, I believe 
that the economics of such a business will attract multiple competitors, to the 
benefit of both stockholders and taxpayers. 
Best of all, such an approach enables us to leverage the value of the 
government system without putting commercial fuel deliveries in the critical 
path. If the depot is there and is full, we can use it. But with the architecture 
we have advanced, we can conduct missions to the moon without it. 
The government does not need to have oversight, or even insight, into the 
quality and reliability of the fuel delivery service. If fuel is not delivered, the 
loss belongs to the operator, not to the government. If fuel is delivered and 
maintained in storage, the contractors are paid, whether or not the government 
flies its intended missions. If long-term delivery contracts are negotiated, and 
the provider learns to effect deliveries more efficiently, the gain is his not the 
government's. Since fuel is completely fungible, it can be left to the provider to 
determine the optimum origin, size and method of a delivering it. And finally, 
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though I would rather not do it, it is even possible that we could develop such 
a market in stages, with the first fuel tank provided by the government and 
then turned over to a commercial provider to store and maintain fuel for future 
missions, and to expand the tank farm as warranted by the market. 
To maintain and operate the fuel depot, periodic human support may 
be needed. Living space in Earth orbit may be required; if so, this presents yet 
another commercial opportunity for people like Bob Bigelow, who is already 
working on developing space habitats. So the logistics needs of the fuel depot 
may provide more of the same opportunities that we will pioneer with the space 
station. 
Fuel and other consumables will not always be most needed where they 
are stored. Will orbital transfer and delivery services develop, with reusable 
"space tugs" ferrying goods from centralized stockpiles to other locations? 
The fuel depot operator will need power for refrigeration and other support 
systems. This might well be left to specialty suppliers who know nothing of the 
storage and maintenance of cryogenic tank farms, but who know a lot about 
how to generate and store power. Could these be standard power modules, 
developed and delivered for a fee to locations specified by the user? 
In the course of conducting many fuel replenishment missions and 
associated operations, commercial launch and orbital systems of known and 
presumably high reliability will be developed and evolved. Government mission 
planners will be able to take advantage of these systems, which will become 
"known quantities" by virtue of their track record rather than through the at 
best mixed blessings of government development oversight. 
There will also be a private sector role in supporting a variety of lunar 
surface systems and infrastructure, including lunar habitats, power and science 
facilities, surface rovers, logistics and resupply, communications, navigation 
and in situ resource utilization equipment. There may or may not be gold on 
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the moon-I'm not sure we care-but we may well witness a 21st century 
gold rush of sorts when entrepreneurs learn to roast oxygen from the lunar soil, 
saving a major portion of the cost of bringing fuel to the lunar surface. Will a 
time come when it is more economical to ship liquid oxygen from the lunar 
surface to low Earth orbit then to bring it up from Earth? 
This will all start to become "really real" in 10 years or so. As I see it, 
these are exactly the kinds of enterprises to which government is poorly suited, 
but which in the hands of the right entrepreneur can earn that person a cover 
on Fortune magazine. But it will take enlightened government management to 
bring it about, management as much in the form of "what not to do" as "to do." 
In the coming years and decades, NASA must focus on its core government role 
as a provider of infrastructure broadly applicable to the common good and too 
expensive for any single business entity to develop. NASA must remain on the 
frontier and must conscientiously architect its plans to favor the inclusion of 
entrepreneurs through arms-length transactions wherever possible, restricting 
the use of classic "prime contracts" to situations where they are the right tool 
and not the default tool. 
With the beginning of space station operations 5 years ago, we are now 
at a point children born at the beginning of the 21st century will live their lives 
knowing that there will always be people living and working in space. And the 
number of people who will be engaged in such activity will grow by leaps and 
bounds if we in government are faithful in executing our role in helping the 
private sector to step up to these new opportunities. I hope there are many 
entrepreneurs in this audience who have the vision to help us help them pioneer 
the commercial space frontier. You, and all those engaged in the quest that we 
are undertaking, have my sincere thanks and appreciation. 
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I'd like to start by recalling a congressional hearing with the late Physicist 
Robert Wilson, co-discoverer of the 3 degree kelvin microwave background 
radiation that is the remnant of the 14 billion year old Big Bang. When asked 
before a committee about what value a new particle accelerator would have in 
promoting the national security of our country, he responded: "Nothing at all. 
It only has to do with the respect with which we regard one another, the dignity 
of men, our love of culture. . . . It has to do with are we good painters, good 
sculptors, great poets? I mean all the things we really venerate in our country 
and are patriotic about. . . . It has nothing to do directly with defending our 
country except to make it worth defending." 
Similarly, NASA's scientific activities in climate change research, 
monitoring our ever-changing sun and studying the physics of solar flares and 
their effects on our Earth, our missions to the other planets, moons, asteroids and 
comets of our solar system as well as our astronomy and astrophysics missions, 
like the Hubble Space Telescope, make our country worth defending. Further, 
I hope that the space shuttle, International Space Station and our next missions 
to the moon (this time to stay) are something of which we are all proud. These 
are the things that make our nation worth defending 
I recently read an essay written a few years ago by Michael Crichton, 
the author of many popular science fiction books, including Jurassic Park 
and B e  Andromeda Strain. In that article, Crichton highlighted the work of 
a privately funded foundation called Space Camp, an intensive program for 
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kids and adults to teach the physics and engineering of spaceflight. Last year, 
after 25 years of operation, Space Camp graduated its 500,000th camper. In 
his essay, Crichton tells the story of a 10 year-old boy who was interviewed on 
TV after graduating from Space Camp. "Asked about the future, he spoke of 
colonies on the moon, and trips to Mars. The reporter said, 'How are you going 
to get Congress to pay for it?"' To which the young boy replied, "Maybe your 
Congress won't, but mine will." With your help, with American ingenuity and 
support, we are slowly turning this young man's dreams into reality. 
At a fundamental level, NASA is in the inspiration business. We're about 
making our country worth defending and I am extremely lucky and proud to 
be a part of this great enterprise. 
It invigorates me to visit a college campus and meet the next generation 
of physicists and engineers, to hear about the latest research they are conducting 
and to meet the young people who will go on to build our nation's new 
spacecraft and launch vehicles and discover new things about our Earth, solar 
system and universe; or build our nation's next generation air traffic control 
system; or design advanced aircraft to make air travel safer, cheaper, faster and 
more environmentally friendly. I just met with some of the future professional 
engineers and scientists of Calvin College this morning and, as always, I really 
enjoyed the Q&A. 
But the questions make me realize, increasingly, that I am two generations 
removed from the life and world of undergraduate education. And, sometimes, 
I am told that young people today are just not interested in NASA, in the 
space program, and that my generation cannot possibly understand the college 
students of today. After all, I grew up in the very different world of the 1950s 
and 60s. Today, we have satellite television with hundreds of channels and 
24-hour news coverage, inexpensive jet travel, personal computers, cell phones 
and instant messaging, et cetera; so how could I possibly understand this new 
generation? Now, I will readily admit to being clueless about a lot of popular 
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culture, but despite that, I think the best answer I can give is, "You're right. My 
generation didn't have all those things when I was young. We invented them." 
Now, some of you in this auditorium are of my generation, which grew 
up during the Apollo era of the 1960s, NASA's apotheosis. We watched science 
fiction movies and television shows that made us believe that we-all of us and 
not simply a few astronauts-could become space travelers. Arthur C. Clarke's 
and Stanley Kubrik's masterpieces of science fiction 2001: A Space Odyssey 
projected onto the screen of our collective human consciousness a future for 
us where, by now, hundreds of people would be living and working in space 
stations orbiting Earth and towns would exist on the moon. We would be 
journeying to other planets in our solar system, just as our European forebears 
came to America looking for new beginnings. This vision of our future proved 
illusory for our generation for two fundamental reasons: the limitations of our 
economic resources and of our technology. Neil Armstrong's "giant leap for 
mankind" was not a journey that could be sustained without a more concerted 
investment of time, resources and energy than the nation was willing to provide 
after July 20, 1969. 
But rather than looking back wistfully on past greatness, I would rather 
learn from such history to understand our present and predict our future in 
space exploration. NASA celebrates it 50th birthday this year, but that does not 
mean we are due for a midlife crisis; it means that we have reached a milestone 
to recognize, celebrate and then blow out the birthday candles with the wish 
that we be refreshed and renewed in our approach to the problems we face 
today and are likely to face in the future. 
We have been exploring space now for 50 years; but it has only been 
50 years. Byway ofcomparison, human beings have been conducting transoceanic 
voyages for 1,000 years or so. So, in only the first 50 years of spaceflight, it is 
actually quite remarkable to realize that NASA's robotic spacecraft have ventured 
to almost all planets in the solar system; four have actually left the solar system; 
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and 12 men have walked on the moon. We are in the midst of constructing the 
space station, which will be larger in wingspan than a football field and weigh 
about what the first Mars ship will weigh. Its development is the largest task 
ever performed by the civilian agencies of the United States or our international 
partners; only military coalitions have undertaken larger efforts. 
Yet despite the achievements of our nation's first 50 years in space, the 
history books 1,000 years from now will note that the United States ofAmerica 
was not the first country to explore space. Those books will name a nation that 
no longer exists-the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Those books will show 
that the Soviet Union launched the first man-made object into space, Sputnik, 
in October 1957; and that they launched the first astronaut, Yuri Gagarin, in 
April 1961. I was a young boy, 8 years old at the time of Sputnik, growing up 
around an Army base in Aberdeen, Maryland, and I can still remember vividly 
the fear and embarrassment our nation felt at that time. It was on the front 
page of every newspaper, in the largest possible type-font. The idea that the 
United States could be beaten to space by any other nation, not to mention 
by our supposedly-backward declared adversary, was for almost everyone a 
galvanizing event. Nikita Khrushchev's November 1956 admonition-"We 
will bury youn-reverberated in our collective consciousness. Sputnik shifted 
the arena of international technical competition to the new frontier of space 
and it mattered greatly. 
One of the national leaders who recognized the importance of Sputnik 
was a young congressman from Grand Rapids by the name of Gerald Ford 
who in 1958 volunteered to become a member of the House Select Committee 
on Astronautics and Space Exploration. 'This committee has in the course of 
50 years evolved into the House Science and Technology Committee. More 
importantly, this congressional committee and Congressman Ford in particular, 
was important in the drafting of the original Space Act legislation which 
founded NASA, bringing together laboratories and field centers from various 
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other branches of the federal government, including the Army, Navy and the 
civilian National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics. 
When Gerald Ford became president 16 years later, he saluted the 
landings of the twin Viking robotic explorers on Mars, saying on the occasion 
of the first landing, "Our achievements in space represent not only the height of 
technological skill, they also reflect the best in our country-our character, the 
capacity for creativity and sacrifice and a willingness to reach into the unknown." 
In the summer of 1975, President Ford also spoke via telephone through NASA 
ground antennas to American astronauts Tom Stafford and Deke Slayton 
and Soviet cosmonaut Valeriy Kubasov onboard the Apollo-Soyuz spacecraft 
140 miles overhead. In the span of only a few years, America went from being 
behind in the space race to putting 12 men on the surface of the moon. We 
also went from a competition to the beginning of a partnership with the Soviet 
Union; and our collaboration continues to this day. Partnership with other 
spacefaring nations has become a vital element of the United States "soft power" 
appeal. And over half of all NASA science missions, with over 50 spacecraft 
operating in space today, involve some form of international collaboration. 
Today, 200 miles overhead on the space station, NASA astronauts Peggy 
Whitson and Dan Tani are living and working in space with Russian cosmonaut 
Yuri Malechenko. With the space station, NASA and our 15 international 
partners have maintained a permanent human foothold in space since October 
2000-over 7 years, and we are still learning the hard lessons of how to live and 
work in space 24171365. We are in the midst of space station assembly with 
the space shuttle between now and the fall of 2010 and hope to launch the 
European CoLumbus module in 2 weeks with Space Shuttle AtLantis, commanded 
by Navy Commander Steve Frick. Athntis will also deliver German astronaut 
Hans Schlegel as part of the assembly team, and leave French astronaut Leopold 
Eyharts on the space station, replacing U.S. astronaut Dan Tani. 
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We are using the station as a laboratory test bed for technologies, 
techniques and lessons that will enable future colonies on the moon and trips 
to Mars; and we are also developing materials and conducting research, which 
will benefit us here on Earth. For example, Peggy and Dan recently activated a 
Microgravity Science Glovebox experiment called InSpace. The purpose of this 
investigation is to obtain fundamental data of the complex properties of a class 
of smart materials termed magnetorheological (MR) fluids. Magnetorheological 
fluids are suspensions of small (micron-sized) superparamagnetic particles in a 
nonmagnetic medium. These controllable fluids can quickly transition into a 
nearly solid-like state when exposed to a magnetic field and return to their 
original liquid state when the magnetic field is removed. The relative stiffness 
can be controlled by controlling the strength of the magnetic field. 'Thus, due to 
the rapid-response interface that they provide between mechanical components 
and electronic controls, MR fluids can be used to improve or develop new 
brake systems, seat suspensions, robotics, clutches, airplane landing gear and 
vibration damping systems. 
Last year, a convention of the American Medical Association (AMA) 
endorsed NASA's efforts in human spaceflight, in going to the moon, Mars 
and beyond because the technologies and techniques we have developed for 
doctors will "undoubtedly yield both projected and unanticipated biomedical 
breakthroughs." The AMA resolution listed several NASA contributions 
to their work, including LASIK surgery, laser angioplasty, dialysis machines 
improvements and digital cochlear implants. 
One of the success stories from NASA's work to develop such 
countermeasures is against painful kidney stones. In microgravity, the human 
body compensates for the reduced stress on the skeleton by releasing calcium 
from our bones, making astronauts more prone to developing kidney stones. 
In order to prevent the formation of such stones, astronauts have been taking 
potassium citrate and NASA is conducting experiments with a new generation 
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of pharmaceuticals with companies like Arngen to test other ways to prevent or 
reduce osteoporosis-like bone loss as well as deteriorating muscles. 
Last September, Elias Zerhouni of the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) and I signed a Memorandum of Understanding to conduct even 
more joint medical research onboard the space station. On  the next shuttle 
flight, STS-122, NASA astronauts will test a drug called midodrine with the 
help of NIH researchers to hopefully reduce dizziness caused by a drop in 
blood pressure after our astronauts first return back to Earth from the zero-g 
environment of space. 
Again, our goal is to develop and test new capabilities onboard the space 
station that cannot be tested anywhere on Earth; and that will not only enable 
future spaceflight missions to the moon, Mars and beyond but also benefit life 
here on Earth. 
NASA simply cannot carry out this ambitious goal of exploring the solar 
system alone. We will need international collaborators, commercial companies, 
venture capitalists and other agencies of the United States government. It will 
take American know-how and can-do attitude. It will literally take "the best 
of the best of the best" to turn this goal into a reality. In my usual clueless 
fashion, I had failed to notice-until receiving a question from a member of the 
media-that Peggy Whitson is the first woman to command the space station. 
Peggy has a Ph.D. in biochemistry, studying at Iowa Wesleyan University 
College and Rice University in Houston, Texas. She is a veteran astronaut, who 
previously lived and worked for 6 months onboard the station in 2002 as the 
science officer. And yes, NASA's naming convention here with "science officer" 
pays homage to Star Trek's Mr. Spock. However, pointy ears are not required 
for this job. 
Peggy is literally one of "the best of the best of the best," because less than 
1 percent of those who even apply to become astronauts are selected. Over the 
years, NASA has received approximately 41,000 applications from prospective 
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astronauts, while only 32 1 individuals have been selected. NASA is in the process 
of taking applications and screening for the next class of astronaut candidates 
even now, and we plan to announce this selection early next year. 
Times have changed from the NASA of the 1950s and 1960s; and they 
should. 'The stereotypical buzz-cut test pilot or white male engineer like me 
is no longer representative of our agency. NASA depends upon the ideas in 
our people's heads for our success, not upon the package containing them. 
And while I do indeed care about the egalitarianism of society, I am also being 
pragmatic. For America to continue to be pre-eminent in the world economy, 
to be the world's leader in innovation, science and technology and to be a leader 
on the frontier of space exploration and aeronautics research, NASA will need 
the best ideas, hard work and dedication from all those who would like to be 
involved with this most exciting enterprise of our time. 
To  explore space, we will need people, energy and resources, so let me 
address the facts and some common misconceptions about how much the 
American taxpayer provides for NASA's budget. America's annual investment 
in NASA is less than one penny out of every federal dollar spent. Let me repeat: 
If you looked into your wallet or purse and pulled out a dollar bill and a penny, 
the entire federal budget represents that dollar while NASA's budget is less than 
that penny. To be more exact, NASA's current budget is six tenths of 1 percent of 
every federal dollar spent. This is somewhere in the realm of what engineers like 
me call rounding error. However, when polled, the average American believes 
NASA's budget to be much higher than it actually is, 24 percent of the federal 
budget, comparable to that of the Pentagon. In fact, NASA's budget this year 
is $17.3 billion, the Pentagon's operating budget (not including supplemental 
appropriations for our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan) is $459 billion and 
the overall federal budget is over $2.5 trillion. 
From this small investment in NASA over many years, new engineering 
and scientific capabilities built originally for our nation's space program are 
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now pervasive in our lives, critical to a range of activities that create and provide 
value. Since the 1960s, NASA pioneered research in high bandwidth satellite 
communications which helped lead to the development of high-definition 
satellite television with 24-hour news, entertainment and sports anywhere in 
the world. 
Forty years ago, engineers like me used three pieces of wood and a piece of 
plastic-the slide rule-to make calculations. Thirty years ago, 1,000 transistors 
could fit on a silicon chip; today, it's 1.7 billion. The cost of such chips has 
dropped by a factor of 100,000. Few people know that the development of the 
first microprocessors was born of a competition between Fairchild and Intel in the 
1960s to build components small enough to fit in NASA's Apollo spacecraft. 
We built weather and climate change monitoring sensors and satellites 
that, along with the fundamental research and applications from this data, 
improve our daily lives. Working with the Air Force and Navy, NASA improved 
precision timing techniques with atomic clocks that enabled the development of 
the Global Positioning System (GPS), which created a consumer market of over 
$20 billion in sales this year. In every GPS satellite, there is a small correction 
to its atomic clock to compensate for the effects of special and general relativity 
discovered by Albert Einstein. 
In partnership with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), NASA 
is developing the concepts, algorithms and technologies to increase the airspace 
capacity in the United States in a safe, equitable and efficient manner. A key 
question here is how to best address where, when, how and the extent to which 
machine-level automation of air traffic control functions can be safely and 
effectively applied throughout U.S. airspace. NASA is also not limiting its 
research simply to the airspace; we are also looking at ways to improve the 
efficiency in the use of airport gates, taxiways and runways while balancing the 
requirements of safety and environmental concerns. Researchers from across 
the United States have used NASA's aerodynamics laboratories, wind tunnels 
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and know-how to help develop every single jet fighter aircraft used by the 
Air Force and Navy and to test new, commercial jet engines and lightweight 
composite structures. 
Again, my generation didn't have these things when I was young. We 
invented them. Sometimes our contribution is not to create new technologies 
but to integrate various existing capabilities in innovative ways. Last fall, 
NASA used its air and space capabilities to aid Californians during the terrible 
wildfires that ravaged Southern California. Our Earth-observing satellites 
helped monitor the spread of those terrible fires. We also sent an unmanned 
aerial vehicle (UAV) equipped with unique infrared (IR) sensors to fly over the 
fires. The Ikhana UAV, which is operated through a cooperative effort between 
the Ames and Dryden Research Centers in California, peered through heavy 
smoke and darkness, found hot spots and flames and transmitted the sensor 
information to a computer server at Ames where it was combined with Google 
Earth maps and then transmitted to operations centers to provide firefighters 
a much better understanding of the situation, aiding disaster managers in 
allocating firefighting resources. ?he quick turnaround made a difference too. 
Information gathered from piloted airplanes currently must wait for the aircraft 
to land before it can be transmitted, while the Ikhana UAV sent the data to fire 
incident commanders only minutes after acquisition. Eventually and in concert 
with other agencies, we at NASA hope to have an entire network of sensors that 
will provide information about natural disasters at every scale, from the ground 
up to space, aiding responders and hopefully saving lives. 
In another example, NASA is helping the poor countries of Central 
America with SERVIR (Spanish for "to serve"), a high-tech satellite visualization 
system that monitors weather and climate, helps to track and combat wildfires, 
improves land use for city planning and agricultural practices and helps local 
officials respond faster to natural disasters. Meteorologists and disaster response 
experts in Central America use SERVIR to see where rain will fall, where 
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flooding will occur, the location of forest fires, hurricanes, tornadoes and pretty 
much anything nature can dish out. Most recently, NASA research brought 
together radar imagery and other satellite data to help the Dominican Republic's 
government respond to extensive flooding in the wake of Tropical Storm Noel. 
The SERVIR project along with other acts of kindness and charity by the 
embedded NASA team has been such a success that one of our researchers, Dan 
Irwin, actually found himself being nominated to be the mayor for the small 
town of San Andres, Guatemala. Dan respectfully declined, but he was touched 
by the vote of confidence. NASA is now working with the State Department, 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and other 
agencies to help provide capabilities like SERVIR to other regions of the world, 
like Africa. 
Again, NASA is bringing space capabilities to bear to improve people's 
lives and even to save lives. But it will take far more than NASA funding to 
open up the new, exciting opportunities we hope to continue finding when we 
explore and exploit the vantage point of space. 
NASA has formed a strategic partnership with the founders of Google 
to carry out various scientific endeavors, like the Google Moon mapping 
software, the use of their Gulfstream V to carry out scientific missions such as 
the campaign to monitor the Quadrantid meteor shower earlier this month, 
and supporting Google's offer of a prize purse of up to $30 million for the first 
privately funded and developed landerlrover to touch down successfully on 
the moon and carry out various experiments. I also hope to open up the space 
station as a national laboratory to commercial ventures and create relationships 
similar to our work with Amgen and other pharmaceutical companies. 
My hope is that more people will be able to experience and benefit from 
space exploration and scientific discovery and even make a profit from it. That 
is the American way. Likewise, it is also my hope that NASA will be able to 
spur on and leverage the capabilities that the commercial sector builds and be 
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able to harness the improved intellectual capabilities coming from our nation's 
universities and high school students. 'This is important. It matters greatly to 
our nation's hture. 
I am gavely concerned when I read statistics about how, on average, 
U.S. students are lagging behind their counterparts in other countries in their 
knowledge of math and science. According to a recent report which measures 
the skills of 15-year-olds in math and science across 30 industrialized nations, 
American students are trailing many potential competitors and sometimes 
trailing badly. On  average, U.S. students placed below standards in science, well 
behind Japan and Korea, but also trailed Ireland and Iceland. American 15-year 
olds did even worse in math, trailing many nations in Asia and Europe. 
'These troubling trends were best explored by the recent report Rising 
Above the Gathering Stom by the National Academy of Engineering. One of 
the first ~ a r a ~ r a p h s  in the report captured the situation well, so I will quote it 
at length: "Having reviewed the trends in the United States and abroad, the 
committee is deeply concerned that the scientific and technical building blocks 
of our economic leadership are eroding at a time when many other nations are 
gathering strength. We strongly believe that a worldwide strengthening will 
benefit the world's economy-particularly in the creation of jobs in countries 
that are far less well off than the United States-but we are worried about the 
future prosperity of the United States. Although many people assume that the 
United States will always be a world leader in science and technology, this 
may not continue to be the case inasmuch as great minds and great ideas exist 
throughout the world. We fear the abruptness with which such a lead in science 
and technology can be lost and the difficulty of recovering a lead once lost-if 
indeed it can be regained at all." 
'This is a sobering assessment. 'This report also cites some alarming 
statistics. Fifiy years ago, almost twice as many bachelor's degrees in physics 
were awarded in the United States than in 2004. Last year, the United States 
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produced more undergraduates in sports exercise than in electrical engineering. 
About a third of U.S. students who plan to study engineering when they entered 
college switch majors before graduating; they probably are not switching to 
mathematics or theoretical physics. Today, there are more software engineers in 
Bangalore, India than in Silicon Valley. In 2000,38 percent of all U.S. science 
and technology Ph.D.s were conferred upon foreign-born graduate students, 
most of whom return to their home countries. 
I hope you agree with me that America's economic growth is driven 
by technological innovation and that societies which foster such innovation 
become leaders in the world. So, as NASA begins its next 50 years, I am deeply 
concerned about our nation's "bench strength" in carrying out our mission of 
space exploration, as well as other technical endeavors. We still need "the best 
of the best of the best" in more than just the astronaut corps. This is rocket 
science. The alarming statistics I have quoted have broad implications for the 
United States' ability to maintain economic and technological leadership in 
today's world. 
Specific to the realm of spaceflight, I am concerned that America's real 
and perceived leadership in the standing of the world's spacefaring nations is 
slipping away. As Admiral Hal Gehman noted in his report of the Space Shuttle 
Cobmbia Accident Investigation Board a few years ago, "previous attempts 
to develop a replacement vehicle for the aging shuttle represent a failure of 
national leadership." 
That is also a sobering assessment. We have only recently begun 
developing the new Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle and Ares rockets, which 
will ferry astronauts to and from the space station and, more importantly, allow 
us once again to go beyond low Earth orbit to the moon. We plan to retire the 
space shuttle in 2010, after nearly .30 years of experimental flights. However, 
with current budget projections, NASA's new human spaceflight systems will 
not come online until 2015. With an operational stand-down like this, I am 
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gavely concerned that even more highly-skilled engineers will simply exit the 
field altogether, as happened at the end of the Apollo program. Worse, between 
now and then, NASA will pay over $700 million (and possibly a good deal 
more) to the Russian Space Agency to support the space station with their 
Soyuz and Progress crew and cargo vehicles. Other countries, like Malaysia and 
South Korea, and certain wealthy individuals are already paying the Russians 
for trips to the space station. So, 50 years afier Sputnik and 35 years after the 
last American footprint on the moon, I must ask the question: who is currently 
the recognized leader in spaceflight? 
China has also emerged as a major spacefaring nation. China demonstrated 
an antisatellite weapon against one of its own aging weather satellites a year 
ago and launched its first satellite mission to the moon last October. In 2008, 
the Chinese plan to launch 17 satellites and to conduct their first spacewalk 
following the Beijing Olympics this fall. China is investing heavily in building 
its space capabilities because it understands the value of these activities as a 
driver for innovation and a source of national pride in being a member of 
the world's most exclusive club. China today not only flies its own taikonauts 
but also has plans to launch about 100 satellites over the next 5 to 8 years. It 
should be no surprise, especially to those who have read Tom Friedman's book 
?he World is Flat or John Kao's Innovation Nation, that this environment in 
China is breeding thousands of high-tech startups. 
The Chinese have adapted the design of the Russian Soyuz to create their 
Shenzhou spacecraft. However, the similarity between the two ends at the outer 
mould line; the Shenzhou spacecraft is both more spacious and more capable. 
They plan to conduct their first spacewalks and orbital rendezvous operations 
and to build their own space station (admittedly simpler than ours) in the 
coming years. While they have not stated an intention to do so, the Chinese 
could send a mission around the moon with the Shenzhou spacecraft, as the 
United States did with the inspiring Apollo 8 mission back in 1968. China 
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could easily execute such a mission with its planned Long March V rocket 
currently under development and reportedly rivaling the capabilities of any 
expendable rocket in the world today. I have no doubt that they will have it in 
use, as they plan, by around 2012. 
I am pointing out such things, matters of engineering capability, because 
I believe that it is important to understand our strategic competitors as well as 
those with whom we wish to collaborate. We must also understand ourselves 
and the framework of our real and perceived leadership in the world in a broader 
context than simply NASA's six tenths of 1 percent of the federal budget. As 
John Kao couches the issue, we are currently facing a "Silent Sputnik" where 
"many countries are racing for a new innovation high ground while our own 
advantages are showing signs of serious wear." 
If you agree with me that our nation is indeed facing a "Silent Sputnik" 
moment, then this situation begs the question: why does it take a crisis to get 
our nation's attention? I am concerned that America's potential as a great nation 
is withering away due to benign neglect, apathy, complacency and a lack of 
leadership. That is, we are ignoring the crisis because there is not a galvanizing 
moment like the launch of Sputnik. 
Now I fully appreciate there are many distractions in our modern life 
today, possibly due to the 24-hour satellite news capabilities that NASA itself 
helped to create. Last summer, just prior to a space shuttle launch, I sat down 
for an interview with CNN just as one of their producers informed me that they 
had to cut away from their coverage of the shuttle launch. There was breaking 
news of vital national interest from Los Angeles: Paris Hilton was going to 
jail. And NASA could not compete for the American people's attention against 
Paris Hilton. That was the moment when I realized how tough the NASA 
administrator's job really is. 
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While I make light of this, there is a not-so-subtle lesson here, that our 
media and nation are not focusing enough on what matters most. Thus, I believe 
it is necessary for us-all of us-to discuss openly the founding principles that 
led us as a nation to embrace space exploration five decades ago. 
A former chairman of the House Science Committee, Congressman Bob 
Walker from Pennsylvania, framed the issue very well in a speech soon after the 
Space Shuttle Columbia tragedy 5 years ago: "For every generation, choices are 
made that lead to greatness or mediocrity." And I would ask that all of us, each 
and every one of us here today, consider our choices and decisions we make in 
how we spend our time, resources and energy. 
In this thought-provoking speech, Congressman Walker quoted from 
the great British statesman, Benjamin Disraeli, who once opined that "nations 
go from bondage to faith, from faith to courage, from courage to freedom, from 
freedom to abundance, from abundance to complacency, from complacency to 
dependency and from dependency back to bondage." It's all a matter of what 
each generation, in its time here on Earth, chooses to do. 
History books hundreds of years from now will note President John F. 
Kennedy's choice for America in 1962. "We choose to go to the moon in this 
decade and do the other things not because they are easy but because they 
are hard; because that goal will serve to organize and measure the best of our 
energies and skills; because that challenge is one that we are willing to accept, 
one we are unwilling to postpone and one which we intend to win, and the 
others, too. It is for these reasons that I regard the decision last year to shift our 
efforts in space from low to high gear as among the most important decisions 
that will be made during my incumbency in the office of the presidency." 
When President Kennedy spoke those bold words and challenged our 
nation, NASA then had less than 11 hours of experience in human spaceflight 
under its belt in the Mercury program; but we had "The Right Stuff." We did 
not yet have the Apollo capsules or powerful Saturn V rockets or lunar landers; 
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we did not even have computers as advanced as the Blackberry I have on me 
today, let alone the power of the Internet. We invented them. 
"For every generation, choices are made that lead to greatness or 
mediocrity." ?hank you for choosing to spend this afternoon listening to me. 
Leadership in Space 
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A few weeks ago, I was asked to speak about the role of space exploration 
in spurring innovation and American competitiveness in the world. Today, 
I would like to address the opposite question: how can space exploration spur 
greater collaboration between our nation and others? 
It is necessary to be successful both in competition and in collaboration if 
we are to survive and prosper, whether as individuals or as a society. We cannot 
thrive if our presence offers nothing to others that they cannot do more easily 
themselves. And we cannot thrive if every other hand is turned against us. So, 
I believe that it is important to strike a thoughtful balance between competition 
and collaboration. In the most fundamental sense of these words, it is crucial to 
our national security to do so. 
"National security" is an elusive concept and its fulfillment imposes 
different requirements upon a great nation than upon a small one. Most 
obviously, it consists of having the wherewithal to act, militarily, in support 
of our nation's perceived interests. At a higher level, it consists in part of a 
measure of deterrence against potential adversaries. In George Washington's 
famous words, "if you would have peace, prepare for war." But I would submit 
to you that the highest possible form of national security, well above having 
better guns and bombs, is that which comes from being a nation which seeks 
to carry out the great deeds that cause other countries to want to join with us 
in pursuing those objectives. In this sense, it is of enormous value to our nation 
to collaborate with others in the most technically challenging endeavor of our 
time-space exploration. 
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As the present administrator of NASA, I am fortunate to bear witness 
to an enormous effort carried out daily on the frontiers of both technology 
and international cooperation. With 16 participating nations, the International 
Space Station under construction today is a testament to the perseverance of 
the United States, Russia, the countries of the European Space Agency, Japan 
and Canada working together on the largest task ever performed by the civilian 
agencies of the United States or our international partners. O n  November 2, 
we celebrated 7 years of permanent human presence in space onboard the 
space station. 'The partnership that brought it about has endured tremendous 
hardships, most especially the loss of Space Shuttle Columbia, and stands by 
itself as a monumental international accomplishment. 'The space station will 
indeed pay dividends as an engineering and research laboratory as we push 
outward in Constellation, the successor to Apollo, back to the moon and then 
on to Mars and other destinations in our solar system over the course of the next 
decades. But eventually, the space station hardware will fail or the questions we 
can pose with it will have been asked and answered. Eventually, and so that it 
does not become a danger, it will be reentered into the Pacific. 
'Thus, one day the space station will be no more. But I believe that one day 
we will conclude that most important legacy of the space station endeavor was 
the partnership itself. Together, we are learning the hard but essential lessons 
concerning how we can carry out the largest and most complex endeavors 
human beings have yet undertaken. 
I do not say this lightly. 'The station rivals the Apollo program in cost, 
and in my opinion easily surpasses it in complexity. When completed, it will 
be longer than a football field, four times larger than the Russian Mir space 
station and five times larger than the 1970s Skylab. It is truly one of the great 
engineering wonders of the world akin to such feats as the Great Wall of China, 
the pyramids of Egypt, the Panama and Suez canals or the sea walls of Venice. 
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Last month, Space Shuttle Discovery delivered the Italian-built Hamzony 
Module to the space station along with Italian astronaut Paolo Nespoli as 
part of the assembly team. It was the most challenging space station mission 
undertaken thus far and it was completed brilliantly, including for good measure 
a contingency spacewalk to effect repairs to a torn solar array. Next month, 
Space Shuttle Atlantis will launch the European Columbus Laboratory Module, 
assembled in Bremen, Germany. Space Shuttle Atlantis will also deliver German 
astronaut Hans Schlegel as part of the assembly team and leave French astronaut 
Leopold Eyharts on the space station, replacing U.S. astronaut Dan Tani. 
Independent human spaceflight has been accomplished only by the 
United States, Russia and China. India has announced its intention to develop 
such capabilities, joining this most exclusive club of spacefaring nations. Having 
visited several space facilities in China and India last year, and having met their 
aerospace engineers, I must say that I am very impressed by the methodical, 
disciplined approach that these nations have taken in developing their space 
industrial base and capabilities. 'The national economies of both countries 
exceed in scale the economy of the United States as it existed in the early 
1960s when America set out to undertake the Apollo program in accordance 
with President John F. Kennedy's vision for our nation's future on the "New 
Frontier." So if they wish to send their own astronauts into space, it is simply a 
matter of national will on their part, of choosing to do so. 
But rather than fostering a new rivalry in space I hope that China and 
other countries will join their own programs to the United States' effort in 
Constellation, returning together to the moon and exploring space to our mutual 
benefit. In this regard, China's anti-satellite weapon demonstration last January 
was a step backward. We can all hope that it will be the only such step. 
Last September, Japan launched the Selene mission to Earth's moon and 
NASA has an agreement with the Japanese Space Agency to share the data 
collected from that mission. China also launched its first lunar mission, Chang'e, 
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last month. I want to applaud China's recent announcement that it would 
provide the data collected from this mission to researchers around the world 
in accordance with common international practice. We recently established a 
new Lunar Science Institute at the Ames Research Center in the heart of Silicon 
Valley, California. Our goals with this institute are to use state-of-the-art 
information technologies, like Google's recent partnerships with NASA, to 
create new virtual and international collaborations for lunar research and to 
spark the growth of a lunar science community. 
We will use the data collected from these spacecraft, from India's 
Cbandrayaan as well as NASA's Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter and Lunar 
Crater Observation and Sensing Satellite missions, all planned for launch next 
year, to produce a detailed map of the lunar surface and its resources as well as 
to better understand its gravity field, to search for evidence of polar volatiles 
and to define radiation hazards so we can mitigate them for human missions 
beginning in the next decade. We will need such data to carry out our nation's 
plans to build our first outpost on the new frontier of the moon. 
We are actively seeking out other countries in this journey to explore 
the undiscovered country of our moon and other worlds. Today, over half 
of our 50-plus operating robotic science missions incorporate some form of 
international collaboration. These include a wide range of missions to other 
planets and moons in our solar system as well as comets and asteroids. They 
include Earth science missions enabling the study of climate change by a 
community of international researchers for which NASA is, by far, the greatest 
contributor. And they include heliophysics missions like Ulysses and the Solar 
and Heliospheric Observatory to help us to understand our own sun and 
(of course) great astrophysical observatories like the Hubble Space Telescope. 
Space exploration, whethei- human or robotic, is the grandest and most 
technically challenging expression of human imagination of which I can 
conceive. lhroughout my professional career, I've wanted nothing more than 
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to be a part of it. And I think it is in our nation's best interests to work together 
in this unique human endeavor, to learn from each other, as different countries 
and cultures, how we go about solving the unique problems presented by the 
exploration of space. My training in physics tells me that the problems and 
constraints are the same for all; the rocket equation does not change when 
expressed in another language. But my training and experience as an engineer 
has taught me that the vagaries of human ingenuity and creativity can yield 
many different solutions to problems bounded by a given set of constraints. 
Collaboration offers us the chance to reap a rich harvest of ideas and solutions 
germinated in different intellectual soil. 
As we at NASA learned during the Apollo program and are re-learning 
in Constellation, the operation of complex, integrated space systems requires 
revolutionary thinking in their development and management. Accordingly, 
we need to develop new manufacturing methods with the ability to operate to 
a higher, more precise standard of excellence. This is rocket science. But it is 
also art and the industrial capabilities we create as we learn to master this most 
difficult art ripple throughout our economy. So it is to our mutual benefit to 
understand how the other spacefaring nations of the world solve the problems 
posed in the course of mankind's efforts to master spaceflight. We all have 
much to learn, and we can learn best by doing some of these things together, 
each of us making our individual contribution, so that all may benefit in direct 
and indirect ways. 
I've lived through this experience. When we initiated the Shuttle-Mir 
program in the early '90s, many of us at NASA felt a bit put out. It was easier 
to compete with the Russians than to cooperate with them! But we learned over 
time, and through shared experiences, to trust them to a far greater extent than 
we had imagined we could. We learned that different doesn't mean bad. We 
now defer to the space station partners in regard to their design standards, 
delegated safety panels and remote mission control centers. And we and the 
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Russians have learned to trust each other enough to alternate space station 
design reviews and mission commanders with confidence. We're better than 
we were because of what we have learned that was new to us and "old hat" to 
our partners. 
For these reasons and where we can feasibly promote it, collaboration on 
the space frontier is the right thing to do, from both an altruistic and a national 
interest perspective. 
That being said, we must recognize certain realities. The United States is 
firmly committed to ensuring that certain key space and missile technologies- 
that we possess and others do not-not be used against us or our allies. That 
priority is higher for us than partnership in space endeavors, a fact that must be 
understood by all parties involved in any prospective collaboration. I recognize 
the bluntness of this statement; but I believe that each of us, as spacefaring nations, 
must respect each other's national priorities and speak openly and honestly with 
each other if there are differences that hamper our ability to collaborate. 
The other major limitation on collaborative programs is the universal 
constraint of budgetary resources. NASA simply cannot afford everything that 
our many partners, domestic and international, would like us to do. It is clear to 
me that partnerships work best when all partners have "skin in the game," each 
contributing resources toward a common goal that is greater than that which 
could be easily afforded by any single partner. I believe that such relationships 
work best when conducted on a "no exchange of funds" basis. For example, 
NASA is contributing two sensor payloads to India's Chandrayaan spacecraft. 
NASA teamed with the French Space Agency on the Cloud-Aerosol Lidar and 
Infrared Pathfinder Satellite Observation mission, an Earth science satellite for 
which we built the laser radar sensors. France integrated the spacecraft and NASA 
launched it. The reverse will be true for the James Webb Space Telescope; design 
and integration will be conducted in the United States, but the observatory will 
be launched on a European Ariane V from French Guiana. 
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I must admit that this view of partnership is not universally shared. On  
many occasions since assuming my role as administrator, and especially in 
connection with our efforts to define and implement Constellation, I have been 
asked about opportunities for "partnership" when what was really being sought 
was American investment in the aerospace industries of other nations. To me, 
partnership cannot be a synonym for "helping NASA to spend its money." We 
at NASA need partners not subcontractors. 
However, there are always exceptions. Soon after my return to NASA 
in April 2005, I was faced with the choice of continuing to pay the Russian 
Space Agency for crew and cargo transport to the space station or de-crewing 
U.S. astronauts. I regarded this (and still do) as an unseemly position for our 
nation. We are in this position because for the better part of a generation the 
nation failed to step up to its commitments to build a crew rescue system for 
the space station astronauts and a replacement for the shuttle. In the words 
of Admiral Hal Gehman, Chairman of the Columbia Accident Investigation 
Board, "previous attempts to develop a replacement vehicle for the aging shuttle 
represent a failure of national leadership." 
The Russians developed and have operated for many years their Soyuz 
and Progress spacecraft. When the shuttle fleet is retired in 20 10, there may be 
no alternative other than to use Soyuz for crew transport and rescue. While I do 
not relish the idea of paying Russia some $900 million in U.S. taxpayer funds 
through 201 1 (and possibly more in later years) the alternative-removing 
American presence from the space station-is worse. This reliance on Russia, 
paying them for their increased support of the space station partnership because 
of America's inability to meet its partnership commitments with American 
hardware, is one reason why this nation must now invest the time, resources 
and energy in developing a new U.S. system for crew and cargo transport and 
why we must bring these systems on line as soon as possible. 
If we are to partner effectively in future exploration endeavors, we must 
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establish clear principles for such partnerships. The story above illustrates one 
of those precepts; to me, it is clear that America cannot partner from the rear. 
That is not the posture of a great nation. 
But however it is done, working together in space helps all of us to realize 
our common humanity. It shows us that what binds us together is far more 
important than the issues that separate us. 
This certainly can be difficult to keep in mind. Fifty years ago, Americans 
looked into the sky with fear and trepidation at a small metal orb that was 
circling our Earth, Sputnik. Many Americans felt vulnerable to Soviet missiles, 
fearing that if the Soviets could place this small satellite in orbit then they 
could also strike anywhere in the United States. No other adversary had ever 
produced such a threat to the American homeland and, protected as we were by 
two oceans, no one in 1957 had ever imagined that anyone ever could. Nikita 
Krushchev's November 1956 admonition, "We will bury you," reverberated in 
America's collective consciousness. 
Not far from here as he lived in and walked the streets of Georgetown, 
the junior senator from Massachusetts bore witness to the Sputnik crisis 50 years 
ago. It spurred the creation of NASA and America's space race with the Soviet 
Union. John F. Kennedy was the first of our nation's leaders to fully appreciate 
the strategic importance of space exploration. He recognized that the United 
States trailed the Soviet Union in human spaceflight; and he recognized its 
significance to the world's perception of America's leadership, saying: 
"lhose who came before us made certain that this country rode the first 
waves of the industrial revolution, the first waves of modern invention and the 
first wave of nuclear power; and this generation does not intend to founder in 
the backwash of the coming age of space. We mean to be a part of it-we mean 
to lead it. For the eyes of the world now look into space, to the moon and to 
the planets beyond, and we have vowed that we shall not see it governed by 
a hostile flag of conquest but by a banner of freedom and peace. . . . In short, 
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our leadership in science and in industry, our hopes for peace and security, our 
obligations to ourselves as well as others, all require us to make this effort; to 
solve these mysteries; to solve them for the good of all men; and to become the 
world's leading spacefaring nation." 
President Kennedy's insights have stood the test of time; certainly 
others in the world understand them even as the import of that challenge to 
our nation has faded in the American collective consciousness. It has been 
35 years since Americans Gene Cernan and Harrison Schmitt walked on the 
moon in December 1972. 'Thirty-five years. Some young people today actually 
question whether we ever really set foot on the moon, whether it was all a 
hoax. 'Thirty-five years ago, who would have guessed that such a thing could 
ever have occurred? 
I have on many occasions offered the blunt opinion that America made 
a mistake of strategic importance when, in the early 1970s, we dismantled our 
nation's technical capability to build the Saturn rocket, Apollo capsules and 
lunar landers-the means by which NASA met President Kennedy's challenge 
and defined his lasting legacy. 'The space shuttle we first flew in 1981 is an 
amazing machine with unparalleled capability. It is, however, limited to low 
Earth orbit by its very design. Now our nation must rebuild the capability to 
journey once again beyond low orbit to see and explore the universe with our 
own eyes and hands, not just with robotic ones. 
I will again quote Hal Gehman in the report of the Columbia Accident 
Investigation Board: "'The U.S. civilian space effort has moved forward for 
more than 30 years without a guiding vision." 'That was a damning statement 
highlighting a lack of leadership in space policy reaching to the highest levels of 
our nation for over a generation. Based on the policy debate that ensued after 
the Columbia accident, President George W. Bush committed our nation to 
fulfilling our obligations to our international partners by finishing the space 
station and invited them and others to join the United States in our return 
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to the moon and future ventures to Mars and beyond. Congress codified this 
direction into law with the NASA Authorization Act of 2005, a copy of which 
hangs outside my office. In my opinion, this is the best direction NASA has 
received from Congress in 40 years or more and is a palpable recognition that 
"space" is a strategic interest of the United States. And last month on the floor 
of the United States Senate, a large, bipartisan group of senators expressed their 
strong support for NASA's mission and the challenges we face. 
NASA is taking the first steps in this long journey by fulfilling our 
commitments to our international partners with the space station, retiring the 
space shuttle and building the new Orion and Ares crew and launch vehicles 
to support the station and return to the moon. We are also encouraging and 
spurring a burgeoning commercial space industry in the United States with the 
space station. Combined, this is the greatest management challenge NASA has 
ever faced. 
However, we are now beginning that quadrennial political season in 
Washington and some space policy pundits and critics have begun to speculate 
that we do not have the national will to return to the moon or to venture 
astronauts beyond low orbit-this time to stay. They argue that NASA's budget, 
a mere 6110th~ of 1 cent of every federal dollar, is too much. In their minds, 
Gene Cernan would indeed be the last American to set foot on Earth's moon. 
If that future comes to pass, then I will tell you flatly that we will have 
ceded our leadership on the frontier of space exploration to other countries 
through softness, complacency and a lack of national will. If that happens then 
America's best days are indeed behind us. 
I believe that talk of retreating again to low Earth orbit merely foments 
pointless discord, setting aside for the sake of partisan politics the strategic 
foresight of what is important to our nation. Quite simply, for the United 
States to be anything other than the leader on the space frontier is a mistake 
of historic proportions. We are a wealthy nation both economically and 
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intellectually. Leadership in space cannot be taken from us; we can only let it slip 
ineluctably away by failing to recognize its importance to our national security, 
our technological superiority, our industrial base and our ability to compete 
favorably on a global scale. If that happens, we won't live to know the cost of it 
but our children and grandchildren will to their detriment. 
I would like to conclude with President Kennedy's advice on November 21, 
1963, almost 44 years ago on the day before he was assassinated: 
For more than 3 years I have spoken about the New Frontier. 
'Ihis is not a partisan term, and it is not the exclusive property 
of Republicans or Democrats. It refers, instead, to this nation's 
place in history, to the fact that we do stand on the edge of a 
great new era, filled with both crisis and opportunity, an era to be 
characterized by achievement and by challenge. It is an era which 
calls for action and for the best efforts of all those who would test 
the unknown. 
President Kennedy's challenge to NASA and our nation continues today. 
If we want to be a nation with which other nations will want to collaborate, we 
must continue to show the bold leadership and commitment to action called 
for by President Kennedy. The need to take these steps will be seen most clearly 
if we fail to take them. We can never allow that to happen. 
Thank you. 
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'The great American Author James Michener, who frequently had 
interesting observations about our society, once said. "Scientists dream about 
doing great things. Engineers do them." Although Michener was often right on 
target, I think this statement requires some modification. Obviously, scientists 
are capable of doing great things. But perhaps not as obvious is that some of 
the best engineers in the business are also dreamers, people who refuse to be 
satisfied with the status quo, who are able to determine new and better ways of 
achieving grand objectives and then implement them using the disciplines we 
have all been taught. 
We at NASA are going to need these engineers, and plenty of them, to 
achieve the goals of the Vision for Space Exploration. Two years ago, on January 
14, 2004, President Bush committed this nation to a new direction in space 
and set forth a fresh, clear mission for NASA. The president's directive gave all 
of us who are privileged to work in this business a challenge bold enough to last 
a lifetime. Indeed, it is a challenge to last several generations. 
NASA is undertaking a program of human and robotic exploration of the 
moon, Mars and beyond that will enable human beings to do things that have 
never been done before, see things that have never been seen before and discover 
things that may never have been dreamed of before. If I were graduating today, 
I would want to work in the space program for no greater reason than to be a 
part of these amazing challenges and opportunities. 
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And in fact, we will recruit the best and brightest engineers out of college 
to help us develop the next generation spacecraft, launch vehicles and systems 
that will enable these voyages of exploration to unfold. These exciting missions 
will motivate today's grade school and high school students to want to work as 
engineers and scientists in the space program. 
Nothing is more important to our future in space. Currently, the engineers 
of the Apollo era-which ended over 30 years ago--have nearly disappeared at 
NASA. Our present generation of engineers largely cut their teeth on the space 
shuttle and space station programs. And even this "baby-boomer" generation of 
engineers, of which I am one, will for the most part soon be passing from the 
scene. So we will need the talented young engineers and the promising students 
coming up through the educational pipeline because the era we are entering 
must have a steady flow of engineering talent for the next 30 years and beyond. 
With this in mind, I challenge the National Society of Professional 
Engineers to work as an advocate for and a strong partner of NASA in nurturing 
our schools and universities to establish and maintain excellence in our 
engineering curricula and motivate a new generation of engineering talent. 
While NASA is not the Department of Education, consistent with our 
charter we do spend nearly $167 million on education initiatives that are targeted 
to our future workforce needs and to developing the talent, skills and professions 
necessary to carry out the Vision for Space Exploration. We also spend a like 
amount in the context of education and public outreach efforts associated with 
individual space missions. We must ensure that these investments benefit not 
only NASA but also the aerospace industry as a whole. 
To  be certain, what we and you do in this regard has broader implications. 
As the blue ribbon panel of the National Academy of Sciences headed by Norm 
Augustine has so forcefully pointed out, there has been a steady erosion in 
investment in the kind of scientific and engineering brainpower that keeps 
a nation competitive-and a consequent decline in American inventiveness. 
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So anything that we can do to arrest these trends: to inspire young students to 
pursue technical careers and to motivate talented foreign-born graduate students 
to consider staying in the United States and work on the greatest exploration 
project of the 21st century-would be all to the good. 
I'd now like to address how we are organizing our engineering work at 
NASA to achieve the kind of technical excellence that is necessary to execute 
our long-term exploration program successfully. As a central organizing 
principle of our work, and despite the fact that 80 percent of our total funding 
goes to industry and will continue to do so, I firmly believe that it must be 
NASA and its engineering staff, not our contractors, who will assume the 
primary responsibility for making this program work. We are undertaking a 
multigenerational program of sustained exploration, and we must ask where 
our intellectual capital should reside. Should it be outside the government in 
the hands of a prime contractor whose interests may change over the years? 
Or  should it remain in-house, where we can sustain the program's momentum 
and retain an institutional memory of the system and cost trades that are made 
and a strong understanding about why the architecture is the way it is? I do 
not believe that it is wise to contract out these vital functions. Making NASA 
engineers clearly responsible and accountable for our technical products at the 
system level will drive our team toward excellence. 
Having decided this, we want to provide our engineers with an 
environment that will help them succeed, by giving them the best possible 
tools, facilities, training and processes. These will allow them to be competent 
in assessing risk and assuring mission success. 
Already under way is an effort to upgrade our computer assisted design 
tools and the infrastructure that supports our engineering workforce at the 
10 NASA centers. With respect ti, training, NASA's Academy of Program 
and Project Engineering Leadership provides a variety of training and learning 
opportunities for engineers to help develop their competencies and skills 
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throughout the lifecycle of a career in engineering and project management. 
The curriculum of the Academy employs state-of-the-art methodologies based 
on the best empirical research and the latest developments in industry. One 
of the innovations of the Academy is the Academy Sharing Knowledge or ASK 
magazine, which gives NASA managers the opportunity to swiftly tell each 
other about successes, failures and lessons learned. These "after action reports" 
were featured in a recent issue of Government Executive magazine as a model for 
what every federal manager should be able to tap into. 
But as valuable as this training is, there is no substitute for hands-on 
experience. Our associate administrator for safety and mission assurance, 
former astronaut Bryan O'Connor, recently asked a senior Southwest Airlines 
captain to explain why his airline had the best safety record in the world. The 
pilot responded by saying, "We always fly manually during the high risk parts 
of the flight." The pilot then explained that if something goes wrong during 
takeoff, climb out, approach and landing, he and his colleagues would be better 
able to react to an emergency situation if they were already flying the aircraft. 
As a much less accomplished pilot myself, I absolutely believe this observation. 
And I want NASA to have the same approach. Our engineers will be better 
able to react to problems in a development activity if they are directly involved. 
In the past, it has been possible to be an engineer working at NASA over a 
25-year career devoted to managing engineering, observing engineering and yet 
never once doing engineering. That will change. We will give our engineers the 
opportunity to learn, experiment and succeed or fail on in-house work as part 
of their normal career progression. This will make them smarter buyers on our 
contracted efforts and better leaders as they mature. 
We must also be able to develop within NASA good processes that will 
help us execute our mission objectives with careful and sober attention to the 
management of risk. First and foremost, we will continue to encourage our 
people to speak up whenever they have safety concerns. And we will listen 
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to and respond to those concerns. The Cobmbia accident and other mishaps 
have shown that we in this agency have not always listened as carefully as we 
should have. 
The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) observed that the 
agency had not been exercising its engineering curiosity sufficiently. Accordingly, 
we are benchmarking other organizations involved in complex systems 
engineering projects, such as DOD research, development and engineering 
projects, and those in the nuclear safety industry. In another response to the 
CAIB, we are taking a fresh look at some of the hazard analysis and engineering 
models that had been developed in the past and updating them to incorporate 
new experience and current thinking. 
We are upgrading our ability to provide independent assessments of our 
work, so that at key steps in a project we can check progress, make appropriate 
adjustments and catch the things that people miss when they are focused on 
crucial details but, possibly, are missing the big picture. This gets directly to the 
issue of programmatic authority versus technical authority in the management 
of large, complex programs, a topic upon which the CAIB spent considerable 
time. I'm convinced that it is necessary to have independent technical and 
programmatic lines of command at NASA because there will always be a 
healthy tension between the programmatic imperative to accomplish tasks 
within cost and schedule and the technical imperative to do things perfectly, 
regardless of cost or schedule. Without this organizational separation, one 
imperative or the other must dominate always to the detriment of either the 
project or the institution in my experience. By having this separation, the valid 
viewpoints of both are preserved to the benefit of both the program and the 
institution. I believe that this approach will restore our ability at NASA to 
provide independent technical review of programs in a way that the CAIB 
found lacking in the shuttle program prior to the loss of Columbia. 
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To provide a further independent engineering assessment capability, we 
have a group at the Langley Research Center called the NASA Engineering and 
Safety Center (NESC), comprised of some of the most talented engineers in 
the agency. This organization draws upon engineers throughout NASA to assist 
on some of our most difficult technical problems. The NESC has contributed 
greatly to the shuttle return to flight effort, in part by leading more than a 
dozen independent assessments of important technical issues. One of these 
assessments led to the design and building of an insulating wrap, utilizing 
a sacrificial retainer made of shrink wrap and aerogel, which can be used to 
preclude the buildup of ice on the space shuttle external tank liquid oxygen 
feedline bellows. Another assessment, done in conjunction with the Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory, brought to light a potentially catastrophic 
failure with composite overwrapped pressure vessels due to stress rupture not 
revealed by earlier studies but unearthed by more recent analyses. The NESC 
is now working with the shuttle program office on lifetime assessments for the 
remaining shuttle hardware. 
Through diligence like this, we are working to establish standards of 
technical excellence that will enable a program of the complexity and promise 
of deep space exploration to move forward over a period of decades. As I said 
in the beginning, all human knowledge and skill will be needed to push the 
frontier out beyond low Earth orbit. But as Michener suggested, engineers will 
have a special role in the doing of it. That's why I am devoting so much of 
my own time to working with our team to make sure that our engineering 
workforce is given the best possible opportunity to acquire and demonstrate 
technical excellence in all of its facets. 
In closing, I thank all of you for your commitment to excellence in 
engineering and for your strong interest in what we are trying to accomplish 
at NASA. 
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Boeing Lecture Purdue University 
March 28,2007 
Most of you will have heard of Baron Charles Percy (C. P.) Snow and 
will know of his observations on the breakdown in communication between 
the humanities and the sciences. Trained as a scientist, Snow served as minister 
for technology under Prime Minister Harold Wilson yet was more famous as 
an author, with 16 novels and eight works of non-fiction to his credit. He 
would be near the top of nearly any list of scientifically literate authors or of 
literarily-talented scientists. Snow developed his theme in B e  Two Cultures 
and the Scient$c Revolution in 1959 and explored it further in Ihe Two Cultures 
and a Second Look in 1963. He decried the decline in standards of higher 
education and in particular what he viewed as the almost willful ignorance 
by the modern cultural elite of scientific fundamentals. In a summary of his 
theme, Snow noted, 
A good many times I have been present at gatherings of people 
who, by the standards of the traditional culture, are thought highly 
educated and who have with considerable gusto been expressing 
their incredulity at the illiteracy of scientists. Once or twice I 
have been provoked and have asked the company how many of 
them could describe the, Second Law of Thermodynamics, the 
law of entropy. The response was cold: it was also negative. Yet I 
was asking something which is about the scientific equivalent of: 
'Have you read a work of Shakespeare's?' 
I now believe that if I had asked an even simpler question--such as, 
What do you mean by mass, or acceleration, which is the scientific 
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equivalent of saying, 'Can you read?'-not more than one in ten 
of the highly educated would have felt that I was speaking the 
same language. So the great edifice of modern physics goes up, 
and the majority of the cleverest people in the western world have 
about as much insight into it as their Neolithic ancestors would 
have had. 
While Snow's criticisms did not go unanswered-most famously by 
Literary Critic F.R. Leavis-the essential truth of his observations was, and 
is, widely acknowledged. His elucidation of the "two cultures" has become 
a societal paradigm, a bumper-sticker phrase to describe the basic cultural 
separation between the arts and the sciences that is clearly visible to most of us. 
Even those who know nothing else of Snow's work are probably familiar with 
this one phrase. 
Today, I want to discuss the two cultures that, if we think about it, 
we find embedded in the profession we call "engineering," and how we are 
linking them, and must link them, through the discipline known as "system 
engineering," a product of the American aerospace sector. 
Let us first explore the nature of the "two cultures" in engineering. 
I have always loved the view of the engineering profession captured by the 
great Theodore von Karman when he said, "Scientists study the world as it is; 
engineers create the world that has never been." Less eloquently, engineers are 
designers; they synthesize knowledge to produce new artifacts. Von Karman 
speaks to what most of us, and certainly most laymen, would consider the 
essence of engineering: engineers create things to solve problems. 
But all of us who are engineers know that the engineering profession also 
has a rich scientific side, the analysis of these artifacts and the prediction of their 
behavior under various environmental and operational conditions. Adapting 
von Karman's observations, it may be said that engineering science is the study 
of that part of the world created by man. 
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Sadly, many students have been led to believe that engineering science 
is engineering! In a curriculum of 120 or more credits leading to a bachelor's 
degree in a branch of engineering, the typical student is required to take 
one or maybe two courses in design. Everything else, aside from general 
education requirements, focuses on the analysis rather than the creation of 
engineered objects. Graduate education often has no design orientation at 
all. So, engineering as taught really deals with only a part of engineering as 
it is practiced. 
This trait is so pronounced that engineers who have spent their careers- 
even widely recognized careers-in design and development, focusing on the 
creation of objects rather than the creation of papers for publication in refereed 
journals, are essentially unemployable (hence unemployed) in academia. No 
matter how well credentialed a practicing engineer may be when the inevitable 
search committee meets to rank the applicants for a department chair or a tenured 
position, it is a rare designer who can offer even the minimum of "academic" 
qualifications expected of an applicant for the position of assistant professor. 
Some universities have recognized this inherent bias and its consequences 
for the training of their students and have sought to remedy it by creating 
titles such as "professor of practice" or similar appellations. But it is a truism 
that the longer the title, the less important the job. So this term serves only 
to emphasize the point that these particular faculty members are not "real" 
professors hired and promoted on their merits in a straight-up competition 
among all candidates. One wonders if this is the message we really want to send 
to those who will design (or not) the world of the next generation. 
But if the present excessive focus on engineering science in the engineering 
curriculum is of concern, it is nonetheless true that the fundamental difference 
between modern engineering and that practiced prior to the Enlightenment 
is the development of formal analytical methods and their application to 
manmade objects. This has allowed the prediction of performance, and the 
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limits of that performance, in the environment in which a given device must 
function. It has allowed the refinement of designs through methods more 
sophisticated than the trial-and-error techniques to which our ancestors were 
limited. It has enormously shortened the time required for a design cycle for the 
objects we create. A control system engineer might say that the formal methods 
of engineering science have produced an enormously improved feedback path 
for the engineering design loop. More simply, engineering science has taken 
engineering beyond artisanship. 
But, interestingly, the development of formal methods has not altered 
in any way the fundamental nature of design, which still depends, as it did in 
antiquity, upon the generation of a concept for a process, technique or device by 
which a given problem might be solved. The engineering sciences have provided 
better, and certainly quicker, insight for the designer into the suitability of 
the concept than can be provided solely by building it and examining its 
performance in its intended application. But a human being must still intuit 
the concept. We have no idea how we do that. And until we do, we have little 
hope of developing a formal method by which it can be accomplished. 
It must be said that some progress in this area has been through 
research into "genetic algorithms" that use the tools of engineering science 
and mathematical simulation to explore the consequences of iterative random 
changes to a given design. 'Ihe performance of the design is evaluated against 
objective criteria. If a change results in a net improvement, it is retained; 
otherwise, it is discarded. In this manner, the design evolves to a higher state of 
suitability to its intended environment through the pressures of artificial, rather 
than natural, selection. Modern engineering analysis tools offer the ability to 
conduct what is essentially a very large number of randomized design cycles in 
an acceptable period of time. 
But this process does not seem, at least to me, to be much akin to the 
intuitive synthesis of a human brain when it leaps almost instantly from a 
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perception of a problem to an idea for its solution. Creativity, used in this sense, 
remains thus far the sole province of biological computers. 
However, my colleague, NASA Associate Administrator Lisa Porter, has 
pointed out to me that precisely because genetic algorithms work differently 
and produce different results than would a human designer, they can offer new, 
unusual and potentially useful solutions for consideration by humans. So as the 
field of genetic algorithms matures, it may well be that the methods of engineering 
science will yield solid contributions to the synthetic aspect of engineering. 
But at least for now, there remains an artistic side of engineering; and 
it is fully as much an art for its practitioners as any painting, sculpture, poem, 
song, dance, movie, play, culinary masterpiece or literary work. The difference 
between the cultural and engineering arts lies not so much in the manner of 
creation of a given work but in the standards by which that work is judged. In 
the humanistic disciplines, human aesthetics sets the standard by which merit is 
assigned to a finished product. In the end, aesthetic sensibilities vary with place 
and time and are ultimately matters of opinion. The role of opinion in evaluating 
a work of engineering is, by comparison, much restricted. In engineering, more 
objective methods are employed to judge the degree to which the completed 
work meets the standards established for it or fails to do so. 
This brings us to the role of failure in engineering design. Regardless of 
the sophistication of the analytical methods brought to bear, they are applied to 
a theoretical model of a device operating in a theoretical model of the real world. 
The model is not reality, and the differences produce opportunities for the real 
device to fail to operate as intended in the real environment. An evolutionary 
biologist might say that the gap between model and reality is an environmental 
niche in which failure, like a new species, can thrive. 
Civil Engineer and Author 'Henry Petroski has, in a series of essays 
and books, explicitly noted the crucial role of failure in producing ultimately 
successful designs. In Success Ihrough Faibre: Ihe Paradox of Design and other 
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works, Petroski establishes the point that new designs or successive iterations 
and refinements of a basic design have as their essential purpose the elimination 
of failure modes known to be inherent in earlier designs. He further argues, 
by means of many examples, that designers must go beyond merely ensuring 
success; they must strive to anticipate the ways in which a design might fail. 
Great designers and successful designs incorporate, in advance, methods to 
mitigate such anticipated failures. 
But in recent decades human artifacts have become increasingly 
complex, building upon and extending former art and especially combining 
disparate elements of established art in new ways. This has been accomplished 
at an astonishing pace, a cause and a result of Moore's Law, the approximate 
2-year doubling time of computational throughput, which has held sway for 
several decades. While a large bridge cannot properly be considered a "simple" 
structure, involving as it does the interaction of thousands of component 
parts, it clearly pales in complexity relative to, say, a space shuttle, which relies 
for its success upon the interaction of millions of parts derived from a dozen 
technical disciplines. 
Failure in complex systems can arise in so many more ways than in 
simpler systems that the quantitative difference ultimately produces qualitatively 
different behavior. It becomes unreasonable to expect, other than through the 
harshest of hindsight, that a particular failure mode might have been or ought 
to have been anticipated. Indeed, results from the modern study of complexity 
theory indicate that complex systems can experience highly non-linear departures 
from normal state-space trajectories-for example, "failure"-without anything 
being wrong. 
Among the first to study complex engineeringsystems was Charles Perrow, 
in the landmark work NomzalA,ccidents. Perrow argued that adding additional 
processes, safety measures and alerts to complex systems-the traditional design 
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approach to improving system safety-were inherently flawed because for 
complex, tightly coupled systems and organizations, failure is inevitable. 
Perrow is a sociologist, not an engineer, but his points are well taken. 
Those of us who are aviators, or who are familiar with the history of aviation, 
can point to numerous high-profile accidents where the crew became occupied 
with minor anomalies and their warning systems, only to fly a perfectly good 
airplane into the ground. Most of us can also cite analogous incidents from 
other fields. 
Yet, we have evolved complex systems for good reasons, and we will clearly 
continue to do so. The modern air transport aircraft is an incredibly complex 
device, and the system within which such aircraft operate is far more so. But in 
the last five decades this system has revolutionized world society, culture and 
economics. It will not be shut down merely because it cannot be made perfectly 
reliable. Nor will we do so with any of the other complex appurtenances of 
modern society that did not exist a century ago but are now deemed essential. 
So, if we are not to eschew the use of complex systems, how do we make them 
as reliable as possible? 
I believe that the answer to the above question is "system engineering." This 
is an entirely appropriate answer for the Boeing Lecture here at Purdue University, 
for system engineering has evolved as a discipline of modern engineering from its 
roots in the American aerospace system development culture. 
System engineering and its allied discipline of systems management 
are treated from an historical perspective in the excellent text by Stephen 
Johnson, Ihe Secret ofApollo. Johnson retraces Petroski's path, showing the 
development of system-oriented disciplines to be the natural reaction to the 
failure of early, complex aerospace systems, including large aircraft, ballistic 
missiles, and spacecraft. 
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From its first introduction into the engineering lexicon, "system 
engineering" has been a question-begging term. In earlier times, it was 
considered by many in the traditional engineering disciplines to be a category 
without a subject matter. Even today I find the term to be, in my opinion, 
misused and misunderstood by many who claim to be practitioners of the art. 
So, having spent what I believe to be the most productive part of my career as a 
system engineer, let me say a few words about what I believe system engineering 
is, and what it is not. 
System engineering is the art and science of developing an operable system 
capable of meeting requirements within imposed constraints. ?he definition 
is somewhat independent of scale, and so these words are useful only if one 
understands that it is the big-picture view, which is taken here. We are talking 
here about developing an airplane, a spacecraft, a power plant and a computer 
network. We are not talking about designing a beam to carry a particular load 
across a known span. 
System engineering is a holistic, integrative discipline, wherein the 
contributions of structural engineers, electrical engineers, mechanism 
designers, power engineers and many, many more disciplines are weighted and 
considered and balanced, one against another, to produce a coherent whole 
that is not dominated by the view from the perspective of a single discipline. 
System engineering is about tradeoffs and compromises, about generalists 
rather than specialists. 
System engineering is not about the details of requirements and interfaces 
between and among subsystems. Such details are important, of course, in the 
same way that accurate accounting is important to the chief financial officer of 
an organization. But accurate accounting will not distinguish between a good 
financial plan and a bad one nor hdp to make a bad one better. Accurate control 
of interfaces and requirements is necessary to !good system engineering, but no 
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amount of care in such matters can make a poor design concept better. System 
engineering is about getting the right design. 
Complex systems usually come to grief, when they do, not because they 
fail to accomplish their nominal purpose. While exceptions certainly exist, it 
remains true that almost all systems which proceed past the preliminary design 
phase will, in fact, accomplish the tasks for which they were explicitly designed. 
Complex systems typically fail because of the unintended consequences of their 
design, the things they do that were not intended to be done. ?he Second 
Law of Thermodynamics is sufficient to guarantee that most of these things 
will be harmful! I like to think of system engineering as being fundamentally 
concerned with minimizing, in a complex artifact, unintended interactions 
between elements desired to be separate. Essentially, this addresses Perrow's 
concerns about tightly coupled systems. System engineering seeks to assure that 
elements of a complex artifact are coupled only as intended. 
C.P. Snow believed that mutual comprehension and appreciation 
between the arts and the sciences, which had existed in earlier times, had been 
erased by his time. He did not find a means to restore it. I sometimes think that 
the gap between synthesis and analysis in engineering is as wide as that between 
the arts and the sciences of Snow's "two cultures." But the fact remains that 
designers simply do not think or work in the same way as analysts and this 
does on occasion produce a certain cognitive dissonance. When it occurs in the 
context of a complex system development, catastrophe is a likely result. 
System engineering is the link, which has evolved between the art and 
science of engineering. The system engineer designs little or nothing of the 
finished product; rather, he seeks a balanced design in the face of opposing 
interests and interlocking constraints. ?he system engineer is not an analyst; 
rather, he focuses analytical resources upon those assessments deemed to be 
particularly important from among the universe of possible analyses which 
might be performed but whose completion would not necessarily best inform 
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the final design. There is an art to knowing where to probe and what to pass by, 
and every system engineer knows it. 
Like other branches of engineering, system engineering has evolved 
out of the need to obviate dramatic failures in complex systems. Such 
failures are not new. One of my favorite books is a fascinating text entitled, 
Structures: or, Why lhings Don't Fall Down, by Professor J. E. Gordon of 
the University of Reading, England, written in 1978 at the end of Professor 
Gordon's long career as a structural analyst. It is aimed at a level appropriate 
to an intelligent technical professional in any field. I recommend it highly. 
Regarding the matter of spectacular engineering failures, I quote Professor 
Gordon (pp. 352-53): 
There are, of course, a certain number of great dramatic accidents 
which, for a while, monopolize the headlines. Of such a kind 
were .. . [numerous disasters follow] . .. These are very often 
intensely human and intensely political affairs, caused basically 
by ambition and pride. ... One can at once recognize a certain 
inevitability about the whole procedure. Under the pressure of 
pride and jealousy and ambition and political rivalry, attention is 
concentrated on the day-to-day details. The broad judgements, the 
generalship of engineering, [my emphasis] end by being impossible. 
The whole thing becomes unstoppable and slides to disaster before 
one's eyes. . . . 
In 36 years of engineering practice, of many kinds and in many situations, 
I have not seen a more appropriate assessment of what is truly important in 
engineering. We must of course get the details right. However, to be a complete 
engineer, one must also master what Professor Gordon calls "the generalship of 
engineering." 
I will be frank. Educators, and I include myself for I have spent many 
years as an adjunct professor at various institutions, are far less certain how to 
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teach "generalship" than we are of how to teach the laws of thermodynamics. 
And yet it is clear that an understanding of the broad issues, the big picture, is 
so much more influential in determining the ultimate success or failure of an 
enterprise than is the mastery of any given technical detail. The understanding 
of the organizational and technical interactions in our systems, emphatically 
including the human beings who are a part of them, is the present-day frontier 
of both engineering education and practice. 
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Generalship of Engineering 
Michael D. Griffin, Administrator 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Commencement Address 
Johns Hopkins University 
Whiting School of Engineering 
Baltimore, Maryland 
May 24,2006 
Thank you for inviting me to speak here at the Whiting School of the 
Johns Hopkins University. I am twice an alumnus of this university, with my 
first Hopkins degree ganted before most of you who are here today were born. 
So it is always a pleasure to be back here at my alma mater. I hope you will be 
able to look back on your years at the university with as much affection as I do 
on mine. 
In that vein, I'd like to take a moment to applaud your success. You 
have earned a degree at one of our nation's finest academic institutions, and 
you have every right to be proud of that accomplishment. For the rest of your 
life, you will look back upon your time here, and increasingly you will come to 
understand how these years have helped to shape the course of the rest of your 
life. Graduation, at any level, is a huge milestone. 
And I believe that you should be especially proud to be graduating as 
engineers. With all due respect to other fields of endeavor, I will bring to your 
attention one of Robert Kennedy's favorite quotes: "Some men see things as 
they are, and ask 'why'? I see things that never were, and ask 'why not'?" 
Though not of a technical origin, no phrase more perfectly captures for me 
the role of the engineer in human society. As Theodore von Karman put it, 
"Scientists study what is; engineers study that which has never been." Engineers 
are artists, with the world of science, mathematics and technology as their 
easel, brush and canvas. 
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But graduation as an engineer is only one of many milestones to come, 
and with this honor comes responsibility. One of those responsibilities is to 
step up to the leadership opportunities that will come your way. So, how do we 
abstract from our experiences as students the lessons that will be most helpful 
to us 10,20 or 30 years in the future? 
In addressing this group, as always on similar occasions, I am faced with 
a key question: What can I talk about in 20 minutes or so that might be of 
some value to you, something that you might recall in 20 years? It's a difficult 
problem, if you think about it. And I don't believe the answer lies in a further 
exposition of Shannon's Theorem, Bernoulli's Principle, Hooke's Law, or some 
other detail taken from your engineering study. Rather, I think the answer 
more properly lies in the other direction, in an examination of our profession 
from the broadest, rather than the narrowest, possible viewpoint. 
If we are observant, we realize that engineering and the engineering 
profession are often in the news, and more often than not in unfortunate ways. 
For example, in my own field, the resumption of space shuttle flights with 
STS-121 next month will be big news as it was with STS-114 last July. But 
the biggest news about last year's flight was the unexpected loss, yet again, of a 
sizeable chunk of foam from the shuttle's external tank. Similarly, the successful 
return of the robotic Stardust probe, with samples of matter from interstellar 
space, made news. But the prior year's 200 mile per hour impact of the Genesis 
spacecraft in the Utah desert, when its parachute failed to open made headlines. 
The plain fact is that engineers and their creations are, in today's world, simply 
expected to be successful, to perform without fail. 
The good news is that in the vast majority of instances, we have indeed 
learned to make it so. The bad news is that, when we fail, it is often in a very 
serious and public way. And the worst news of all is that, most often, our greatest 
failures are rooted not in our technical knowledge but in our humanity. 
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The Next Generation of Engineers 
Michael D. Griffin 
Administrator 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Remarks at  National Society of Professional Engineers 
Professional Development Conference 
Washington, District of Columbia 
January 19,2006 
The great American Author James Michener, who frequently had 
interesting observations about our society, once said. "Scientists dream about 
doing great things. Engineers do them." Although Michener was often right on 
target, I think this statement requires some modification. Obviously, scientists 
are capable of doing great things. But perhaps not as obvious is that some of 
the best engineers in the business are also dreamers, people who refuse to be 
satisfied with the status quo, who are able to determine new and better ways of 
achieving gand  objectives and then implement them using the disciplines we 
have all been taught. 
We at NASA are going to need these engineers, and plenty of them, to 
achieve the goals of the Vision for Space Exploration. Two years ago, on January 
14, 2004, President Bush committed this nation to a new direction in space 
and set forth a fresh, clear mission for NASA. The president's directive gave all 
of us who are privileged to work in this business a challenge bold enough to last 
a lifetime. Indeed, it is a challenge to last several generations. 
NASA is undertaking a program of human and robotic exploration of the 
moon, Mars and beyond that will enable human beings to do things that have 
never been dbne before, see things that have never been seen before and discover 
things that may never have been dreamed of before. If I were graduating today, 
I would want to work in the space program for no greater reason than to be a 
part of these amazing challenges and opportunities. 
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And in fact, we will recruit the best and brightest engineers out of college 
to help us develop the next generation spacecraft, launch vehicles and systems 
that will enable these voyages of exploration to unfold. These exciting missions 
will motivate today's grade school and high school students to want to work as 
engineers and scientists in the space program. 
Nothing is more important to our future in space. Currently, the engineers 
of the Apollo era-which ended over 30 years ago-have nearly disappeared at 
NASA. Our present generation of engineers largely cut their teeth on the space 
shuttle and space station programs. And even this "baby-boomer" generation of 
engineers, of which I am one, will for the most part soon be passing from the 
scene. So we will need the talented young engineers and the promising students 
coming up through the educational pipeline because the era we are entering 
must have a steady flow of engineering talent for the next 30 years and beyond. 
With this in mind, I challenge the National Society of Professional 
Engineers to work as an advocate for and a strong partner of NASA in nurturing 
our schools and universities to establish and maintain excellence in our 
engineering curricula and motivate a new generation of engineering talent. 
While NASA is not the Department of Education, consistent with our 
charter we do spend nearly $167 million on education initiatives that are targeted 
to our future workforce needs and to developing the talent, skills and professions 
necessary to carry out the Vision for Space Exploration. We also spend a like 
amount in the context of education and public outreach efforts associated with 
individual space missions. We must ensure that these investments benefit not 
only NASA but also the aerospace industry as a whole. 
To be certain, what we and you do in this regard has broader implications. 
As the blue ribbon panel of the National Academy of Sciences headed by Norm 
Augustine has so forcefully pointed out, there has been a steady erosion in 
investment in the kind of scientific and engineering brainpower that keeps 
a nation competitive-and a consequent decline in American inventiveness. 
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So anything that we can do to arrest these trends: to inspire young students to 
pursue technical careers and to motivate talented foreign-born graduate students 
to consider staying in the United States and work on the greatest exploration 
project of the 2lst century-would be all to the good. 
I'd now like to address how we are organizing our engineering work at 
NASA to achieve the kind of technical excellence that is necessary to execute 
our long-term exploration program successfully. As a central organizing 
principle of our work, and despite the fact that 80 percent of our total funding 
goes to industry and will continue to do so, I firmly believe that it must be 
NASA and its engineering staff, not our contractors, who will assume the 
primary responsibility for making this program work. We are undertaking a 
m~lti~enerational program of sustained exploration, and we must ask where 
our intellectual capital should reside. Should it be outside the government in 
the hands of a prime contractor whose interests may change over the years? 
Or  should it remain in-house, where we can sustain the program's momentum 
and retain an institutional memory of the system and cost trades that are made 
and a strong understanding about why the architecture is the way it is? I do 
not believe that it is wise to contract out these vital functions. Making NASA 
engineers clearly responsible and accountable for our technical products at the 
system level will drive our team toward excellence. 
Having decided this, we want to provide our engineers with an 
environment that will help them succeed, by giving them the best possible 
tools, facilities, training and processes. These will allow them to be competent 
in assessing risk and assuring mission success. 
Already under way is an effort to upgrade our computer assisted design 
tools and the infrastructure that supports our engineering workforce at the 
10 NASA centers. With respect to training, NASA's Academy of Program 
and Project Engineering Leadership provides a variety of training and learning 
opportunities for engineers to help develop their competencies and skills 
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throughout the lifecycle of a career in engineering and project management. 
The curriculum of the Academy employs state-of-the-art methodologies based 
on the best empirical research and the latest developments in industry. One 
of the innovations of the Academy is the Academy Sharing Knowledge or ASK 
magazine, which gives NASA managers the opportunity to swiftly tell each 
other about successes, failures and lessons learned. These "after action reports" 
were featured in a recent issue of Government Executive magazine as a model for 
what every federal manager should be able to tap into. 
But as valuable as this training is, there is no substitute for hands-on 
experience. Our associate administrator for safety and mission assurance, 
former astronaut Bryan O'Connor, recently asked a senior Southwest Airlines 
captain to explain why his airline had the best safety record in the world. The 
pilot responded by saying, "We always fly manually during the high risk parts 
of the flight." The pilot then explained that if something goes wrong during 
takeoff, climb out, approach and landing, he and his colleagues would be better 
able to react to an emergency situation if they were already flying the aircraft. 
As a much less accomplished pilot myself, I absolutely believe this observation. 
And I want NASA to have the same approach. Our engineers will be better 
able to react to problems in a development activity if they are directly involved. 
In the past, it has been possible to be an engineer working at NASA over a 
25-year career devoted to managing engineering, observing engineering and yet 
never once doing engineering. That will change. We will give our engineers the 
opportunity to learn, experiment and succeed or fail on in-house work as part 
of their normal career progression. This will make them smarter buyers on our 
contracted efforts and better leaders as they mature. 
We must also be able to develop within NASA good processes that will 
help us execute our mission objectives with careful and sober attention to the 
management of risk. First and foremost, we will continue to encourage our 
people to speak up whenever they have safety concerns. And we will listen 
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to and respond to those concerns. 'The Columbia accident and other mishaps 
have shown that we in this agency have not always listened as carefully as we 
should have. 
The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) observed that the 
agency had not been exercising its engineering curiosity sufficiently. Accordingly, 
we are benchmarking other organizations involved in complex systems 
engineering projects, such as DOD research, development and engineering 
projects, and those in the nuclear safety industry. In another response to the 
CAIB, we are taking a fresh look at some of the hazard analysis and engineering 
models that had been developed in the past and updating them to incorporate 
new experience and current thinking. 
We are upgrading our ability to provide independent assessments of our 
work, so that at key steps in a project we can check progress, make appropriate 
adjustments and catch the things that people miss when they are focused on 
crucial details but, possibly, are missing the big picture. 'This gets directly to the 
issue of programmatic authority versus technical authority in the management 
of large, complex programs, a topic upon which the CAIB spent considerable 
time. I'm convinced that it is necessary to have independent technical and 
programmatic lines of command at NASA because there will always be a 
healthy tension between the programmatic imperative to accomplish tasks 
within cost and schedule and the technical imperative to do things perfectly, 
regardless of cost or schedule. Without this organizational separation, one 
imperative or the other must dominate always to the detriment of either the 
project or the institution in my experience. By having this separation, the valid 
viewpoints of both are preserved to the benefit of both the program and the 
institution. I believe that this approach will restore our ability at NASA to 
provide independent technical review of programs in a way that the CAIB 
found lacking in the shuttle program prior to the loss of Columbia. 
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To  provide a further independent engineering assessment capability, we 
have a group at the Langley Research Center called the NASA Engineering and 
Safety Center (NESC), comprised of some of the most talented engineers in 
the agency. This organization draws upon engineers throughout NASA to assist 
on some of our most difficult technical problems. The NESC has contributed 
greatly to the shuttle return to flight effort, in part by leading more than a 
dozen independent assessments of important technical issues. One of these 
assessments led to the design and building of an insulating wrap, utilizing 
a sacrificial retainer made of shrink wrap and aerogel, which can be used to 
preclude the buildup of ice on the space shuttle external tank liquid oxygen 
feedline bellows. Another assessment, done in conjunction with the Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory, brought to light a potentially catastrophic 
failure with composite overwrapped pressure vessels due to stress rupture not 
revealed by earlier studies but unearthed by more recent analyses. The NESC 
is now working with the shuttle program office on lifetime assessments for the 
remaining shuttle hardware. 
Through diligence like this, we are working to establish standards of 
technical excellence that will enable a program of the complexity and promise 
of deep space exploration to move forward over a period of decades. As I said 
in the beginning, all human knowledge and skill will be needed to push the 
frontier out beyond low Earth orbit. But as Michener suggested, engineers will 
have a special role in the doing of it. That's why I am devoting so much of 
my own time to working with our team to make sure that our engineering 
workforce is given the best possible opportunity to acquire and demonstrate 
technical excellence in all of its facets. 
In closing, I thank all of you for your commitment to excellence in 
engineering and for your strong interest in what we are trying to accomplish 
at NASA. 
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System Engineering and the "Two Cultures" of Engineering 
Michael D. Griffin 
Administrator 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Boeing Lecture Purdue University 
March 28,2007 
Most of you will have heard of Baron Charles Percy (C. P.) Snow and 
will know of his observations on the breakdown in communication between 
the humanities and the sciences. Trained as a scientist, Snow served as minister 
for technology under Prime Minister Harold Wilson yet was more famous as 
an author, with 16 novels and eight works of non-fiction to his credit. He 
would be near the top of nearly any list of scientifically literate authors or of 
literarily-talented scientists. Snow developed his theme in ?he Two Cultures 
andthe ScientiJc Revolution in 1959 and explored it further in Ihe Two Cultures 
and a Second Look in 1963. He decried the decline in standards of higher 
education and in particular what he viewed as the almost willful ignorance 
by the modern cultural elite of scientific fundamentals. In a summary of his 
theme, Snow noted, 
A good many times I have been present at gatherings of people 
who, by the standards of the traditional culture, are thought highly 
educated and who have with considerable gusto been expressing 
their incredulity at the illiteracy of scientists. Once or twice I 
have been provoked and have asked the company how many of 
them could describe the, Second Law of 'Thermodynamics, the 
law of entropy. The response was cold: it was also negative. Yet I 
was asking something which is about the scientific equivalent of: 
'Have you read a work of Shakespeare's?' 
I now believe that if I had asked an even simpler question-such as, 
What do you mean by mass, or acceleration, which is the scientific 
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equivalent of saying, 'Can you read?'-not more than one in ten 
of the highly educated would have felt that I was speaking the 
same language. So the great edifice of modern physics goes up, 
and the majority of the cleverest people in the western world have 
about as much insight into it as their Neolithic ancestors would 
have had. 
While Snow's criticisms did not go unanswered-most famously by 
Literary Critic F.R. Leavis-the essential truth of his observations was, and 
is, widely acknowledged. His elucidation of the "two cultures" has become 
a societal paradigm, a bumper-sticker phrase to describe the basic cultural 
separation between the arts and the sciences that is clearly visible to most of us. 
Even those who know nothing else of Snow's work are probably familiar with 
this one phrase. 
Today, I want to discuss the two cultures that, if we think about it, 
we find embedded in the profession we call "engineering," and how we are 
linking them, and must link them, through the discipline known as "system 
engineering," a product of the American aerospace sector. 
Let us first explore the nature of the "two cultures" in engineering. 
I have always loved the view of the engineering profession captured by the 
great Theodore von Karman when he said, "Scientists study the world as it is; 
engineers create the world that has never been." Less eloquently, engineers are 
designers; they synthesize knowledge to produce new artifacts. Von Karman 
speaks to what most of us, and certainly most laymen, would consider the 
essence of engineering: engineers create things to solve problems. 
But all of us who are engineers know that the engineering profession also 
has a rich scientific side, the analysis of these artifacts and the prediction of their 
behavior under various environmental and operational conditions. Adapting 
von Karman's observations, it may be said that engineering science is the study 
of that part of the world created by man. 
Part 2. NASA, Science, Commerce and Engineering 
Sadly, many students have been led to believe that engineering science 
is engineering! In a curriculum of 120 or more credits leading to a bachelor's 
degree in a branch of engineering, the typical student is required to take 
one or maybe two courses in design. Everything else, aside from general 
education requirements, focuses on the analysis rather than the creation of 
engineered objects. Graduate education often has no design orientation at 
all. So, engineering as taught really deals with only a part of engineering as 
it is practiced. 
This trait is so pronounced that engineers who have spent their careers- 
even widely recognized careers-in design and development, focusing on the 
creation of objects rather than the creation of papers for publication in refereed 
journals, are essentially unemployable (hence unemployed) in academia. No 
matter how well credentialed a practicing engineer may be when the inevitable 
search committee meets to rank the applicants for a department chair or a tenured 
position, it is a rare designer who can offer even the minimum of "academic" 
qualifications expected of an applicant for the position of assistant professor. 
Some universities have recognized this inherent bias and its consequences 
for the training of their students and have sought to remedy it by creating 
titles such as "professor of practice" or similar appellations. But it is a truism 
that the longer the title, the less important the job. So this term serves only 
to emphasize the point that these particular faculty members are not "real" 
professors hired and promoted on their merits in a straight-up competition 
among all candidates. One wonders if this is the message we really want to send 
to those who will design (or not) the world of the next generation. 
But if the present excessive focus on engineering science in the engineering 
curriculum is of concern, it is nonetheless true that the fundamental difference 
between modern engineering and that practiced prior to the Enlightenment 
is the development of formal analytical methods and their application to 
manmade objects. This has allowed the prediction of performance, and the 
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limits of that performance, in the environment in which a given device must 
function. It has allowed the refinement of designs through methods more 
sophisticated than the trial-and-error techniques to which our ancestors were 
limited. It has enormously shortened the time required for a design cycle for the 
objects we create. A control system engineer might say that the formal methods 
of engineering science have produced an enormously improved feedback path 
for the engineering design loop. More simply, engineering science has taken 
engineering beyond artisanship. 
But, interestingly, the development of formal methods has not altered 
in any way the fundamental nature of design, which still depends, as it did in 
antiquity, upon the generation of a concept for a process, technique or device by 
which a given problem might be solved. The engineering sciences have provided 
better, and certainly quicker, insight for the designer into the suitability of 
the concept than can be provided solely by building it and examining its 
performance in its intended application. But a human being must still intuit 
the concept. We have no idea how we do that. And until we do, we have little 
hope of developing a formal method by which it can be accomplished. 
It must be said that some progress in this area has been through 
research into "genetic algorithms" that use the tools of engineering science 
and mathematical simulation to explore the consequences of iterative random 
changes to a given design. The performance of the design is evaluated against 
objective criteria. If a change results in a net improvement, it is retained; 
otherwise, it is discarded. In this manner, the design evolves to a higher state of 
suitability to its intended environment through the pressures of artificial, rather 
than naqural, selection. Modern engineering analysis tools offer the ability to 
conduct what is essentially a very large number of randomized design cycles in 
an acceptable period of time. 
But this process does not seem, at least to me, to be much akin to the 
intuitive synthesis of a human brain when it leaps almost instantly from a 
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perception of a problem to an idea for its solution. Creativity, used in this sense, 
remains thus far the sole province of biological computers. 
However, my colleague, NASA Associate Administrator Lisa Porter, has 
pointed out to me that precisely because genetic algorithms work differently 
and produce different results than would a human designer, they can offer new, 
unusual and potentially useful solutions for consideration by humans. So as the 
field of genetic algorithms matures, it may well be that the methods of engineering 
science will yield solid contributions to the synthetic aspect of engineering. 
But at least for now, there remains an artistic side of engineering; and 
it is fully as much an art for its practitioners as any painting, sculpture, poem, 
song, dance, movie, play, culinary masterpiece or literary work. The difference 
between the cultural and engineering arts lies not so much in the manner of 
creation of a given work but in the standards by which that work is judged. In 
the humanistic disciplines, human aesthetics sets the standard by which merit is 
assigned to a finished product. In the end, aesthetic sensibilities vary with place 
and time and are ultimately matters of opinion. The role of opinion in evaluating 
a work of engineering is, by comparison, much restricted. In engineering, more 
objective methods are employed to judge the degree to which the completed 
work meets the standards established for it or fails to do so. 
This brings us to the role of failure in engineering design. Regardless of 
the sophistication of the analytical methods brought to bear, they are applied to 
a theoretical model of a device operating in a theoretical model of the real world. 
The model is not reality, and the differences produce opportunities for the real 
device to fail to operate as intended in the real environment. An  evolutionary 
biologist might say that the gap between model and reality is an environmental 
niche in which failure, like a new species, can thrive. 
Civil Engineer and Author Henry Petroski has, in a series of essays 
and books, explicitly noted the crucial role of failure in producing ultimately 
successful designs. In Success lhrough Failure: B e  Paradox of Design and other 
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works, Petroski establishes the point that new designs or successive iterations 
and refinements of a basic design have as their essential purpose the elimination 
of failure modes known to be inherent in earlier designs. He further argues, 
by means of many examples, that designers must go beyond merely ensuring 
success; they must strive to anticipate the ways in which a design might fail. 
Great designers and successful designs incorporate, in advance, methods to 
mitigate such anticipated failures. 
But in recent decades human artifacts have become increasingly 
complex, building upon and extending former art and especially combining 
disparate elements of established art in new ways. This has been accomplished 
at an astonishing pace, a cause and a result of Moore's Law, the approximate 
2-year doubling time of computational throughput, which has held sway for 
several decades. While a large bridge cannot properly be considered a "simple" 
structure, involving as it does the interaction of thousands of component 
parts, it clearly pales in complexity relative to, say, a space shuttle, which relies 
for its success upon the interaction of millions of parts derived from a dozen 
technical disciplines. 
Failure in complex systems can arise in so many more ways than in 
simpler systems that the quantitative difference ultimately produces qualitatively 
different behavior. It becomes unreasonable to expect, other than through the 
harshest of hindsight, that a particular failure mode might have been or ought 
to have been anticipated. Indeed, results from the modern study of complexity 
theory indicate that complex systems can experience highly non-linear departures 
from normal state-space trajectories-for example, "failurey'-without anything 
being wrQng. 
Among the first to study complex engineering systems was Charles Perrow, 
in the landmark work NormalAccidents. Perrow argued that adding additional 
processes, safety measures and alerts to complex systems-the traditional design 
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approach to improving system safety-were inherently flawed because for 
complex, tightly coupled systems and organizations, failure is inevitable. 
Perrow is a sociologist, not an engineer, but his points are well taken. 
'Those of us who are aviators, or who are familiar with the history of aviation, 
can point to numerous high-profile accidents where the crew became occupied 
with minor anomalies and their warning systems, only to fly a perfectly good 
airplane into the ground. Most of us can also cite analogous incidents from 
other fields. 
Yet, we have evolved complex systems for good reasons, and we will clearly 
continue to do so. 'The modern air transport aircraft is an incredibly complex 
device, and the system within which such aircraft operate is far more so. But in 
the last five decades this system has revolutionized world society, culture and 
economics. It will not be shut down merely because it cannot be made perfectly 
reliable. Nor will we do so with any of the other complex appurtenances of 
modern society that did not exist a century ago but are now deemed essential. 
So, if we are not to eschew the use of complex systems, how do we make them 
as reliable as possible? 
I believe that the answer to the above question is "system engineering." 'This 
is an entirely appropriate answer for the Boeing Lecture here at Purdue University, 
for system engineering has evolved as a discipline of modern engineering from its 
roots in the American aerospace system development culture. 
System engineering and its allied discipline of systems management 
are treated from an historical perspective in the excellent text by Stephen 
Johnson, Ihe Secret ofApollo. Johnson retraces Petroski's path, showing the 
developmekt of system-oriented disciplines to be the natural reaction to the 
failure of early, complex aerospace systems, including large aircraft, ballistic 
missiles, and spacecraft. 
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From its first introduction into the engineering lexicon, "system 
engineering has been a question-begging term. In earlier times, it was 
considered by many in the traditional engineering disciplines to be a category 
without a subject matter. Even today I find the term to be, in my opinion, 
misused and misunderstood by many who claim to be practitioners of the art. 
So, having spent what I believe to be the most productive part of my career as a 
system engineer, let me say a few words about what I believe system engineering 
is, and what it is not. 
System engineering is the art and science of developing an operable system 
capable of meeting requirements within imposed constraints. The definition 
is somewhat independent of scale, and so these words are useful only if one 
understands that it is the big-picture view, which is taken here. We are talking 
here about developing an airplane, a spacecraft, a power plant and a computer 
network. We are not talking about designing a beam to carry a particular load 
across a known span. 
System engineering is a holistic, integrative discipline, wherein the 
contributions of structural engineers, electrical engineers, mechanism 
designers, power engineers and many, many more disciplines are weighted and 
considered and balanced, one against another, to produce a coherent whole 
that is not dominated by the view from the perspective of a single discipline. 
System engineering is about tradeoffs and compromises, about !generalists 
rather than specialists. 
System engineering is not about the details of requirements and interfaces 
between and among subsystems. Such details are important, of course, in the 
same way that accurate accounting is important to the chief financial officer of 
an organization. But accurate accounting will not distinguish between a good 
financial plan and a bad one nor help to make a bad one better. Accurate control 
of interfaces and requirements is necessary to good system engineering, but no 
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amount of care in such matters can make a poor design concept better. System 
engineering is about getting the right design. 
Complex systems usually come to grief, when they do, not because they 
fail to accomplish their nominal purpose. While exceptions certainly exist, it 
remains true that almost all systems which proceed past the preliminary design 
phase will, in fact, accomplish the tasks for which they were explicitly designed. 
Complex systems typically fail because of the unintended consequences of their 
design, the things they do that were not intended to be done. The Second 
Law of Thermodynamics is sufficient to guarantee that most of these things 
will be harmful! I like to think of system engineering as being fundamentally 
concerned with minimizing, in a complex artifact, unintended interactions 
between elements desired to be separate. Essentially, this addresses Perrow's 
concerns about tightly coupled systems. System engineering seeks to assure that 
elements of a complex artifact are coupled only as intended. 
C.P. Snow believed that mutual comprehension and appreciation 
between the arts and the sciences, which had existed in earlier times, had been 
erased by his time. He did not find a means to restore it. I sometimes think that 
the gap between synthesis and analysis in engineering is as wide as that between 
the arts and the sciences of Snow's "two cultures." But the fact remains that 
designers simply do not think or work in the same way as analysts and this 
does on occasion produce a certain cognitive dissonance. When it occurs in the 
context of a complex system development, catastrophe is a likely result. 
System engineering is the link, which has evolved between the art and 
science of engineering. The system engineer designs little or nothing of the 
finished product; rather, he seeks a balanced design in the face of opposing 
interests and interlocking constraints. The system engineer is not an analyst; 
rather, he focuses analytical resources upon those assessments deemed to be 
particularly important from among the universe of possible analyses which 
might be performed but whose completion would not necessarily best inform 
Leadership in Space 
the final design. There is an art to knowing where to probe and what to pass by, 
and every system engineer knows it. 
Like other branches of engineering, system engineering has evolved 
out of the need to obviate dramatic failures in complex systems. Such 
failures are not new. One of my favorite books is a fascinating text entitled, 
Smtctures: or, Why 7hings Don't Fall Down, by Professor J. E. Gordon of 
the University of Reading, England, written in 1978 at the end of Professor 
Gordon's long career as a structural analyst. It is aimed at a level appropriate 
to an intelligent technical professional in any field. I recommend it highly. 
Regarding the matter of spectacular engineering failures, I quote Professor 
Gordon (pp. 352-53): 
There are, of course, a certain number of great dramatic accidents 
which, for a while, monopolize the headlines. Of such a kind 
were . . . [numerous disasters follow] . . . These are very often 
intensely human and intensely political affairs, caused basically 
by ambition and pride. ... One can at once recognize a certain 
inevitability about the whole procedure. Under the pressure of 
pride and jealousy and ambition and political rivalry, attention is 
concentrated on the day-to-day details. The broad judgements, the 
generalship of engineering, [my emphasis] end by being impossible. 
The whole thing becomes unstoppable and slides to disaster before 
one's eyes. . . . 
In 36 years of engineering practice, of many kinds and in many situations, 
I have not seen a more appropriate assessment of what is truly important in 
engineering. We must of course get the details right. However, to be a complete 
engineer, one must also master what Professor Gordon calls "the generalship of 
engineering." 
I will be frank. Educators, and I include myself for I have spent many 
years as an adjunct professor at various institutions, are far less certain how to 
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teach "generalship" than we are of how to teach the laws of thermodynamics. 
And yet it is clear that an understanding of the broad issues, the big picture, is 
so much more influential in determining the ultimate success or failure of an 
enterprise than is the mastery of any given technical detail. The understanding 
of the organizational and technical interactions in our systems, emphatically 
including the human beings who are a part of them, is the present-day frontier 
of both engineering education and practice. 
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Generalship of Engineering 
Michael D. Griffin, Administrator 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Commencement Address 
Johns Hopkins University 
Whiting School of Engineering 
Baltimore, Maryland 
May 24,2006 
'Thank you for inviting me to speak here at the Whiting School of the 
Johns Hopkins University. I am twice an alumnus of this university, with my 
first Hopkins degree granted before most of you who are here today were born. 
So it is always a pleasure to be back here at my alma mater. I hope you will be 
able to look back on your years at the university with as much affection as I do 
on mine. 
In that vein, I'd like to take a moment to applaud your success. You 
have earned a degree at one of our nation's finest academic institutions, and 
you have every right to be proud of that accomplishment. For the rest of your 
life, you will look back upon your time here, and increasingly you will come to 
understand how these years have helped to shape the course of the rest of your 
life. Graduation, at any level, is a huge milestone. 
And I believe that you should be especially proud to be graduating as 
engineers. With all due respect to other fields of endeavor, I will bring to your 
attention one of Robert Kennedy's favorite quotes: "Some men see things as 
they are, and ask 'why'? I see things that never were, and ask 'why not'?" 
'Though not,of a technical origin, no phrase more perfectly captures for me 
the role of the engineer in human society. As 'Theodore von Karman put it, 
"Scientists study what is; engineers study that which has never been." Engineers 
are artists, with the world of science, mathematics and technology as their 
easel, brush and canvas. 
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But graduation as an engineer is only one of many milestones to come, 
and with this honor comes responsibility. One of those responsibilities is to 
step up to the leadership opportunities that will come your way. So, how do we 
abstract from our experiences as students the lessons that will be most helpful 
to us 10,20 or 30 years in the future? 
In addressing this group, as always on similar occasions, I am faced with 
a key question: What can I talk about in 20 minutes or so that might be of 
some value to you, something that you might recall in 20 years? It's a difficult 
problem, if you think about it. And I don't believe the answer lies in a further 
exposition of Shannon's Theorem, Bernoulli's Principle, Hooke's Law, or some 
other detail taken from your engineering study. Rather, I think the answer 
more properly lies in the other direction, in an examination of our profession 
from the broadest, rather than the narrowest, possible viewpoint. 
If we are observant, we realize that engineering and the engineering 
profession are often in the news, and more often than not in unfortunate ways. 
For example, in my own field, the resumption of space shuttle flights with 
STS-121 next month will be big news as it was with STS-114 last July. But 
the biggest news about last year's flight was the unexpected loss, yet again, of a 
sizeable chunk of foam from the shuttle's external tank. Similarly, the successful 
return of the robotic Stardust probe, with samples of matter from interstellar 
space, made news. But the prior year's 200 mile per hour impact of the Genesis 
spacecraft in the Utah desert, when its parachute failed to open made headlines. 
The plain fact is that engineers and their creations are, in today's world, simply 
expected to be successful, to perform without fail. 
Thh good news is that in the vast majority of instances, we have indeed 
learned to make it so. The bad news is that, when we fail, it is often in a very 
serious and public way. And the worst news of all is that, most often, our greatest 
failures are rooted not in our technical knowledge but in our humanity. 
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So often, we fail greatly for the most humiliating reasons. The Hubble 
Space Telescope was placed in orbit in 1989 at enormous expense, the product 
of a career for many of its creators. And it arrived with its vision brilliantly 
flawed, its optics perfectly formed to exactly the wrong specifications. 
More personally, I will note that we in the space community lost seven 
friends and colleagues on Space Shuttle Columbia, just over 3 years ago. This 
loss was made all the more difficult to bear by the knowledge, so starkly outlined 
in the report of the Cobmbia Accident Investigation Board, that Columbia 
was brought down by many of the same human flaws as was her sister ship, 
Challenger, in 1986, in one of the classic failures of engineering management. 
There are many-too many-other such examples. As our technical 
capabilities increase seemingly without bound, it becomes ever more obvious 
that the next great barrier we engineers must overcome is of our own, rather 
than nature's, making. As the bard said, "The fault, dear Brutus, lies not in our 
stars, but in ourselves, that we are men. . . ." 
What causes these things? Are they failures of engineering or of 
management? And does it matter? 
Dramatic engineering failures are of course not new. One of the best 
books I have read is a fascinating text entitled Structures: or, Why lhings 
Don't Fall Down, by Professor J. E. Gordon of the University of Reading, 
England, and written in 1978, at the end of Professor Gordon's long career as 
a structural analyst. It is aimed at a level appropriate to an intelligent technical 
professional in any field. I could not recommend it more highly. Regarding the 
matter of spectacular engineering failures, I will now quote Professor Gordon 
1 
(pp. 352-53): 
There are, of course, a certain number of great dramatic accidents 
which, for a while, monopolize the headlines. Of such a kind were 
the Tay Bridge collapse in 1879 . . . [other disasters follow]. . . . 
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These are very often intensely human and intensely political 
affairs, caused basically by ambition and pride. . . . One can at once 
recognize a certain . . . inevitability about the whole procedure. 
Under the pressure of pride and jealousy and ambition and political 
rivalry, attention is concentrated on the day-to-day details. The 
broad judgements, the generalrhip of engineering, [my emphasis] 
end by being impossible. The whole thing becomes unstoppable 
and slides to disaster before one's eyes. ... People do not become 
immune from the classical or theological human weaknesses merely 
because they are operating in a technical situation. . . . 
In 35 years of engineering practice, of many kinds and in many situations, 
I have not seen a more appropriate assessment of what is truly important for 
each of you to bear firmly in mind throughout your engineering career. I do 
not say that you should not work, and work hard, to get the details right. 
You should. But these matters you have been taught. You know how to care 
for them. However, to be a complete engineer, you must also master what 
Professor Gordon calls "the generalship of engineering." 
I will be frank. We as educators, and I include myself for I have spent 
many years as an adjunct professor at various institutions including this one, 
are far less certain how to teach you this "generalship" than we are of how to 
teach you, for example, the laws of thermodynamics. And yet it is clear that an 
understanding of the broad issues, the big picture, is so much more influential 
in determining the ultimate success or failure of an enterprise than is the 
mastery of any given technical detail. The understanding of the organizational 
and technical interactions in our systems, emphatically including the human 
beings who are a part of them, is the unconquered frontier of both engineering 
education and practice. 
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I will leave you with another of my favorite sayings: "Managers do things 
right. Leaders do the right things." Here at the university, you have learned to 
do things right. Now you must go forth and apply this knowledge; and while 
you are about it, you must learn also to do the right things. I wish you all good 
fortune in this quest. 
Leadership in Space 
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NASA and Engineering Integrity 
Michael D. Griffin 
Administrator 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Wernher von Braun Memorial Symposium 
American Astronautical Society 
October 21, 2008 
While some people like to think that Washington, D.C is the center of the 
universe, any aerospace engineer knows that it's more fun, more immediately 
rewarding, to be where the action is, to be part of a great team where great 
things are being built, contributing to a great cause that you can see in front 
of you. Yes, Washington has a crucial role to play in the management of any 
federal agency, certainly including NASA, but it is not where the action is, 
especially when it comes to building, or in this case rebuilding, the capability 
for our nation to propel Americans beyond low Earth orbit back out to the New 
Frontier of which President John F. Kennedy spoke. 
No collection ofbooks contains all the knowledge one must have to succeed 
in spaceflight. The unwritten lore of space system design and engineering fills 
volumes, all stored in irreplaceable human minds. And that is just the technical 
stuff. Engineering texts do not touch the most important of all elements in the 
success or failure of any space mission, the human system. 
It is people who power our spacecraft, who build the machines to carry 
out every complex space mission. It is people that matter-how we organize 
and utilize their energy, how we bring their skills to bear, how we listen to and 
work with ,each other and how we inculcate an ethos where the best ideas take 
flight. It is people who have created the art and science of space vehicle design, 
the most challenging engineering problem of our age. 
Now, while I know how important the management of the human 
system is to the success of any endeavor, I will not pretend to understand it very 
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well, even in the relatively narrow context of aerospace program management. 
If I did, I could not possibly cover the topic in a single speech. Tomes have 
been written on effective management, most of which omit entirely the more 
crucial, yet even more nebulous, quality we call "leadership." These terms are 
not synonymous. To  me, management is "doing things right" while leadership 
is "doing the right things." But they share a common element that I believe to 
be the foundation of effective human organizations: integrity. And that is what 
I would like to talk about today. 
I am, of course, speaking about ethical decision making in our professional 
lives, about creating a culture within which all can act and speak with openness 
and honesty, about embracing the responsibility for our statements and actions. 
Integrity matters enormously. I personally believe that without it, there is 
nothing else which does matter. 
Long stated as one of the core values of our agency, it is nonetheless hard 
to define integrity in the abstract. It is much easier to recognize it when we see 
it. It is a quality not well suited to self-assessment, a quality for which we are 
more easily judged by others than by ourselves. I'm sure that each of you has 
observed acts of notable integrity as well as cases where people fell well short of 
expectations. We should examine the differences, make note of what integrity 
"looks like" in practice and strive for it. 
In engineering practice, integrity is speaking up in a meeting when you 
do not believe the facts match the conclusions being reached or that certain facts 
are being ignored. Integrity is following the data. Integrity is refusing to fall in 
love with your own analysis, admitting that you are wrong when presented 
with new ldata that should alter your earlier view. Integrity is keeping a promise 
or commitment or, when circumstances change, explaining why an agreement 
cannot be kept. Integrity is walking into your boss's office, closing the door and 
speaking with frankness, openness and honesty-and listening the same way. 
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Integrity is being willing to put your badge on the boss's desk when you believe 
that an ethical breach warrants such drastic action. 
Integrity is the foundation upon which other human virtues are built- 
trust, credibility, leadership-and that foundation can be damaged for a 
very long time, even irreparably, with the slightest crack in a person's or an 
organization's integrity. As a case in point, my long-time friend Arnie Aldrich, 
manager of the Space Shuttle Program at the time of the Challenger accident, 
has recently written about some of the long-term consequences of that event: 
In addition to the tragic and unforgettable loss of life, the 
Challenger accident had, and continues to have, momentous 
effects on United States and international space programs. In the 
near term, it led directly to an unprecedented restructuring of the 
Space Station Freedom program resulting in extensive redirection, 
massive delays and huge cost overruns. ?his was half a dozen years 
prior to the second massive restructuring of the space station under 
NASA Administrator Daniel Goldin, which likely never would 
have occurred. A strong case can be made that if the Challenger 
accident had not occurred the space station would have flown and 
become operational a decade earlier than what has transpired, with 
attendant cost savings and opportunities to expeditiously move 
forward with future plans and programs. Also, the shuttle was 
reined in from its full potential with decisions to move away from 
the Department of Defense (DOD) and commercial customers, a 
large, flexible onboard upper stage and west coast launch capability. 
In ~e longer term, the play out of these events continues today 
as NASA struggles to plan for effective space station operations 
without the space shuttle while attempting to move forward with 
a vast new program of human space exploration beyond Earth 
orbit. ?he Challenger accident changed the course of history and 
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the nature of both national and international space programs even 
as these programs continue to evolve in the 21st century. The Ml 
impact of the Challenger launch decision is still unfolding. 
And, again, in late August 2003, when the Columbia Accident Investigation 
Board's report discussed NASA's organizational flaws, they noted that: 
The organizational causes of this accident are rooted in the Space 
Shuttle Program's history and culture, including the original 
compromises that were required to gain approval for the shuttle 
program, subsequent years of resource constraints, fluctuating 
priorities, schedule pressures, mischaracterizations of the shuttle as 
operational rather than developmental and lackofan agreed national 
vision. Cultural traits and organizational practices detrimental to 
safety and reliability were allowed to develop, including: reliance 
on past success as a substitute for sound engineering practices 
(such as testing to understand why systems were not performing 
in accordance with requirements/specifications); organizational 
barriers which prevented effective communication of critical 
safety information and stifled professional differences of opinion; 
lack of integrated management across program elements; and the 
evolution of an informal chain of command and decision-making 
processes that operated outside the organization's rules. 
Sadly, this damning indictment of NASA's engineering management 
culture was supported by the facts of the accident. It was in part for this reason 
that we implemented a new governance model within NASA. The approach 
that we chose is modeled on that used in the Office of Space Flight by former 
NASA Associate Administrator George Mueller during the Apollo era. It places 
our mission directors and center directors on par with one another and allows 
for the elevation of concerns and dissent by means of at least two pathways 
through equally-empowered programmatic and institutional lines of authority. 
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This was a necessary but not sufficient condition to obtain the "independent 
technical authority" demanded by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. 
Remembering that it is the people who count, I then worked-and continue 
to work-to select individuals of high integrity and established technical 
acumen in spaceflight to fill senior leadership positions. Too often in the past, 
senior managers at NASA have been allowed to begin their careers in the space 
business at the top. It doesn't work. An effective organization must be led by 
people who offer both unquestioned integrity and relevant domain expertise. 
If I were to be granted only one "legacy" for my tenure as NASA administrator, 
I would want it to be this. 
That brings me to certain accusations, both overt and subtle, that I have 
seen recently in various media, questioning our approach in developing the 
Constellation launch vehicle architecture with its shuttle-derived Ares I and 
Ares V. The Orlando Sentinel, in an article on June 22, accused NASA of 
"trying to stifle dissent about alternatives" to the Ares design. That's certainly 
"overt." More subtly, my friend and colleague Lon Rains, Editor of Space News, 
published on July 21 an editorial entitled "No More Studies," a premise with 
which I certainly agree. But buried within Lon's editorial are a few words that 
are actually more troubling to me than those offered by the Sentinel precisely 
because I know that Lon was, on this occasion, actually attempting to speak on 
our behalf. Lon wrote: 
Teamvision ChiefExecutive Stephen Metschan naturally questions 
the objectivity of NASA's analysis and is calling for an independent 
review of Direct 2.0 versus the Ares architecture, with the aim of 
convbcing the next Congress and presidential administration to 
set NASA on a new course as early as next year. 
It is perfectly understandable that Mr. Metschan would be suspicious 
that NASA's analysis was unfairly skewed in favor of Ares. . . . 
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Oh, really? Why is that, exactly? Why is it "natural" to question NASA's 
objectivity? Why is it "perfectly understandable" for someone to be "suspicious" 
that analysis by NASA was "unfairly skewed?" This is the same as saying that it 
is to be presumed that NASA does not act with integrity-and I know that Lon 
did not intend to imply such. But is that what some people really believe? 
Since my thesis in this speech is that nothing matters more than personal 
and organizational integrity, let's take a moment to review the bidding 
from the top down. NASA is a federal agency, an arm of the United States 
government. NASA employees don't get stock options; they don't get bonuses 
for concluding mergers and acquisitions; and they do not have financial interests 
in the industrial concerns that actually implement about 85 percent of the work 
managed by the agency. We go to tremendous lengths to ensure that NASA 
employees do not have real or perceived conflicts of interest in connection with 
their work assignments, to the point that employees must fully disclose their 
financial investments, regularly attend ethics training and sign legally binding 
oaths attesting to the absence of conflicts of interest. 
What NASA employees do have, to varying degrees, is executive 
power delegated by Article 2 of the Constitution and specified in great detail 
through many laws. NASA is the entity charged with the implementation and 
management of government civil space development activities. Public funds 
allocated to meeting U.S. civil space policy objectives are spent largely according 
to the technical and programmatic judgment of NASA civil servants as to how 
it can best be done. NASA employees have the power to decide such issues. 
That, of course, is what some critics, many of whom who do have financial 
interests in'the outcome of the decisions we make, find to be objectionable. 
But the management of appropriated funds to accomplish national policy 
objectives is the very purpose of executive branch agencies. Making decisions 
in connection with such matters is a core function of government; and for 
civil space programs, that function is performed by NASA. If we didn't have a 
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NASA, we'd have to invent one or assign the required functions to some other 
government entity. The key feature to which some apparently object-that 
decisions about the allocation of public funds to some alternatives in preference 
to others are made by government employees-would remain. Only the names 
would change. 
Now, I am not so naYve as to believe that NASA managers are exempt 
from Lord Acton's observation that, "Power tends to corrupt and absolute 
power corrupts absolutely." It is absolutely necessary to have interlocking checks 
and balances between the executive and legislative branches of government as 
specifically provided by the framers of the Constitution. Our Constitution 
provides that NASA as an executive branch agency should be overseen by the 
people's elected representatives. It is. Quite thoroughly, I might add. 
But with that said, it is trivial to observe that there can never be enough 
oversight, never enough checks and balances, never enough watchers, to restrain 
a large group of people who are determined to behave badly. The effectiveness 
of institutions generally (and certainly of government institutions) is heavily 
predicated on a fundamental tenet: most ofthe people, most ofthe time, are trying 
to do their jobs well and fairly. The assumption ofwell-intentioned competence 
in government must be the norm, not the exception, in the functioning of a 
democratic society. 
We at NASA cannot possibly make everyone happy with our decisions. 
Most decisions will produce an unhappy outcome for someone. However, that 
unhappiness is not by itself a symptom of incompetence, bad intentions or 
a lack of integrity on our part. Allocation of public funds to any particular 
alternative inevitably leaves aggrieved parties who believe, with their own logic 
and passion, that their proposed alternative was the superior choice. It is not 
reasonable to expect that responsible managers can make decisions pleasing to 
all interested parties. What the taxpaying public and its elected representatives 
Leadership in Space 
(our overseers) can and do expect from NASA can be summarized in two words: 
objective expertise. 
NASA cannot be effective as an organization if the decisions of its managers 
are judged by the space community to be generally lacking in either competence 
or fairness and that is why such criticisms in Space News, The Orhndo Sentinel 
and elsewhere, especially the blogosphere, are deeply disconcerting. If it is not 
obvious that objective expertise underlies NASA decisions and actions, then the 
civil space program will grind to a halt in response to one searching examination 
after another by various other governmental entities that claim the right of agency 
oversight and can make it stick. Thus, it is incumbent upon us to be able to 
explain how a decision was reached, why a particular technical approach was 
chosen or why a contract was awarded to one bidder instead of another. 
We have all lived through times, some of them recent, when technical 
competence at NASA was called into question. But today I believe that is not 
an issue. The management team in place at the agency today is, I believe, second 
to none in our history. And I think that most of those with even more gray hair 
than I, who have worked with NASA over the decades, share this belief. 
That then leaves the question of objectivity, which of course is exactly 
the point of comments about "stifling dissent" or "unfairly skewed analysis. 
Such accusations are deeply troubling because, in the end, they are accusations 
that we lack integrity. They chip away at the foundation of the high-integrity 
organization we strive to build at NASA. The efficacy of our team is predicated 
upon our ability to "follow the data," to communicate constructively the 
differences of technical opinion throughout the organization. Accusations to 
the contrary such as those in the mainstream media or as found on many Web 
postings reverberate as echoes of lessons not learned from the Challenger and 
Columbia tragedies. 
Because these tragedies are still fresh in our collectiveconsciousness, nothing 
better serves to cause attention to be focused on NASA's choices-a fact not 
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lost upon those who object to our choices. Such accusations are strong claims 
indeed. They require strong justification by the accuser and a clear response 
from the accused. As a manager, I need facts when such charges are levied. 
Otherwise, it is impossible for me to address them, to prove or disprove their 
validity or to provide a cure for the cause if there is one. 
What must be understood is that differences of technical opinion based on 
a given set of facts are common among engineers. Such differences of opinion do 
not mean that the data is "unfairly skewed." A decision by a manager to follow 
one path rather than another is not evidence of "stifling dissent." To do our 
jobs, to make forward progress, we must make decisions every day on matters 
that, unlike the problems in most textbooks, do not have clear, simple, right or 
wrong answers found in the back of the book. Judgment calls are required; we 
then often wait years to find out whether they were correct. Not everyone has a 
taste for the kind of pressure that this brings to bear on senior institutional and 
program managers but it is inherent to the nature of our business. 
Allow me to offer a specific example of how false accusations can be made 
by taking selective snippets of information out of context. Managers of large, 
complex projects such as the Ares rocket development use simple "stoplight 
charts" with red, yellow and green as useful indicators as to where management 
attention might best be focused. That's all we use them for. They do not begin to 
convey the subtleties and complexities of managing technical and programmatic 
risks. But such charts taken out of engineering and management context from 
internal NASA briefings are regularly featured on various blogs generally 
accompanied by uninformed and typically anonymous judgments that the Ares 
rocket will never work and by accusations of lying and malfeasance by NASA 
managers. Of course, no supporting evidence is ever offered. 
So, differences of engineering opinion are cited as evidence of lying, of 
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malfeasance? 'This is not how any of us were taught to conduct an engineering 
discussion. Quite frankly, it is demeaning to the profession. 
I wonder what Webb or Searnans, von Braun or Gilruth, Mueller or 
Low or Krafi would have thought if they had had to deal with such vitriol 
during Apollo? Viewed in hindsight, the success of Apollo can appear to be 
an unbroken record of progress from President Kennedy's speech to Neil 
Armstrong's first footstep. But it was hardly so. It took those folks-heroes 
in our business-18 full months afier Kennedy's declaration of the lunar 
goal merely to determine that lunar orbit rendezvous would be the best flight 
mode. 'The original Apollo spacecrafi design, with its embedded assumption 
that Earth orbit rendezvous would be used, had to be substantially modified. 
An unanticipated procurement of a completely new vehicle, the lunar module, 
had to be conducted some 2 years afier the Apollo program was supposedly 
well underway. Combustion instability plagued the F-1 engine well into its 
development and pogo oscillations nearly destroyed the Saturn V on its second 
mission-an event, by the way, that resourceful flight controllers managed to 
turn into a success anyway by making great decisions literally "on the fly." 
But the managers and engineers of that era pressed on, solved the Saturn V's 
technical problems, and sent three men around the moon on its very nextjight. 
If there had been blogs in the 1960s, they would have had so much grist for 
their mills that they wouldn't have known where to start. 
And by the way-just in case anyone has forgotten-Apollo actually 
turned out pretty well. 
So let's fast-forward to the present. Our choices for the shuttle-derived 
Constellation launch architecture have been especially subject to external 
criticism by those who would have preferred a different outcome. I strive to be 
objective in considering the data before me so let's look at the data we used to 
make the decisions we made. 
'The probabilistic risk assessment for the shuttle-derived Ares I Crew 
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Launch Vehicle showed it to be twice as safe as an Evolved Expendable Launch 
Vehicle (EELV)-derived system for missions to the International Space Station 
and the moon. The analysis for the shuttle-derived Ares V Heavy-Lift Launch 
Vehicle showed it to be approximately 1.4 times more reliable than any 
EELV-derived concept we saw. 
If we were to try to undertake a lunar mission using existing EELV 
systems, at least seven launches would be required to conduct one lunar mission 
and more than 30 would be required to mount a future Mars expedition. That 
is not a realistic concept of operations. 
If we were to extend existing EELVs to meet our requirements, the 
development cost would be higher than with the shuttle-derived approach. 
While a new upper stage would be needed in either case, the Atlas V was 
preferred over the Delta IV due to its more straightforward development path 
but at a cost 25 percent higher than the shuttle-derived approach. We would 
need changes such as pad modifications for crew access, booster structural 
modifications, improved flight termination and integrated health management 
systems and a new flight dynamics database to deal with the new outer mold line 
and abort scenarios. We would need to invest in facilities for U.S. co-production 
of the Russian RD-180 engine or accept longterm dependence upon Russia 
for a critical capability by continuing to purchase it directly. The latter course 
further implies the receipt of a perpetual waiver of Iran, North Korea, Syria 
Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) legislation from Congress for such purchases. 
If we were to make the necessary changes to the EELV, the new vehicle would 
differ significantly from today's EELV, thus obviating the supposed advantage 
of commonality with DOD systems for our nation's launch vehicle industrial 
base. Finally, the transition from the shuttle to the Ares launch vehicle family 
is less disruptive for our workforce and makes more efficient use of existing 
facilities and ground support equipment than an EELV-derived system. 
These are not trivial issues. These facts matter. And while I appreciate 
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that many proponents of EELV systems were upset with our decision and some 
still are, I stand by it. We are following the data not opinion, emotion or a 
course of action based upon any personal benefit. 
Turning now from the launch vehicle architecture to the overall 
Exploration architecture, NASA's Constellation systems are designed for the 
moon but must support the space station as well. Thus, we are sizing the Orion 
crew capsule and Ares rockets appropriately for both missions. Now, from 
numerous conversations with people who are genuinely friends and colleagues, 
I completely understand that some would prefer to replace the shuttle with a 
new system to support the space station and nothing more. They are either 
uninterested in venturing beyond Earth orbit or regard it as a problem for 
another generation. In my view, such a narrow focus would (again) leave NASA 
and our nation stuck in low Earth orbit. This is not the direction provided to 
NASA by President Bush and Congress in two successive authorization bills. 
While some pundits have opined that we will receive new direction from 
a future president or Congress, we will continue to follow the law of the land 
as it exists today unless and until such new guidance is provided. I, for one, 
devoutly hope that we do not reverse course. Let me be very blunt: We have 
spent the last 35 years conducting the experiment of confining our ambitions 
for human spaceflight to low Earth orbit. It did not turn out in a manner 
befitting a great nation. Let's not continue it. 
Finally, I would like to speak openly and honestly about the criticism 
that NASA did not study space access carefully enough in our 2005 Exploration 
Systems Architecture Study (ESAS). So I'll put it on the public record again: 
We conducted a thorough study by engineers who have considered this technical 
challenge for many years. The ESAS was the culmination, not the beginning, 
of these studies. Further, when and as we learned more after the ESAS we 
continued to incorporate new ideas, resulting in beneficial changes. For example, 
we eliminated over $5 billion in life cycle costs by adopting the RS-68 core 
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engine and going directly to a common five-segment solid rocket booster and 
J-2X upper stage engine for both crew and heavy-lift launch vehicles. 
'The key corn and safety advantages of the shuttle-derived launch architecture 
remain as clear today as in 2005. If someone has better data or specific examples 
where the data I reviewed either in 2005 or since has been "skewed or is 
incomplete, please come forward. I receive a lot of e-mails on this subject but 
none offering new or better data-only conjecture and opinion. To date, on 
the rare occasions when data is offered to support contrarian opinions, I have 
found it to ignore engineering reality, funding constraints or the law of the land. 
Finally, I would add that if we are stifling dissent then we are doing an extremely 
poor job of it, given the amount of ink provided to so many dissenters. 
I am not putting my thumb on the scales. I believe our leadership team 
upholds the philosophy that we strive always to be receptive to constructive 
criticism in solving a problem. However, we are now well past the time when we 
can simply "stop work to conduct more architecture studies. In my opinion, the 
propensity to conduct too many studies with too little action has in recent years 
been a profoundly detrimental characteristic of this nation's broader aerospace 
enterprise. It is long past time to do something. We are deeply engaged in 
the design, development and testing of the Orion and Ares I and we will be 
ramping up our work on the Ares V and Altair in the months ahead. We're 
making good progress. Let's keep it up. 
We have-I have-explained quite carefully over the past several years 
why our new spaceflight architecture looks the way it does with our eyes wide 
open to the fact that this transition to a new system for human spaceflight 
transport will be the greatest challenge NASA has faced in decades. Now with all 
that said, if you have a better idea that doesn't conveniently ignore one or more 
of our many constraints, we'll listen..But bring data and be prepared to have the 
technical discussion. Simply saying that an idea is better does not make it so. 
Now, please do not infer from my comments that I believe we have a 
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perfect answer to the problems facing our nation's human spaceflight program. 
We don't. Our solution is simply the best we can construct with the funding 
provided to meet our long-standing commitment to complete the assembly of 
the space station while building new ships to embark on new ventures beyond 
low-Earth orbit. 
It has only been 5 years since the report of the Columbia Accident 
Investigation Board and we have made tremendous strides as an organization 
in that time. It is my sincere hope that we have learned the lessons of past 
mistakes, taken them to heart and emerged stronger from that adversity. We 
did so after the Apollo 1 fire; we did it when Challenger was lost; and we can 
do it again now. NASA celebrates its 50th anniversary this year. We should 
celebrate our achievements but we must also remember those days when we 
failed to meet our own expectations. If we are to act with integrity, we must 
remember these failures by learning from them. 
Dealing with failure is the essence of engineering. In his book, To Engineer 
is Human: Ihe Role of Failure in Success$l Design, Professor Henry Petroski 
notes, "No one wants to learn by mistakes, but we cannot learn enough from 
successes to go beyond the state of the art." Petroski expands greatly upon that 
theme in other works, including Success Ihrough Failure: Ihe Paradox ofDesign. 
If you have not read these works, I highly recommend them to you. You will 
come away from them with the understanding that, as unfortunate as it may be, 
most of the great advances in engineering have been the result of learning from 
failures. 'That willingness to learn is a sign of integrity. 
I too am eager to learn of better ways by which NASA can accomplish its 
missions. However, I cannot learn from proposals that in the end come down 
to saying what NASA should or could do if we had more money. While I too 
personally wish that NASA had more money, it would be irresponsible for me 
not to be honest with our stakeholders at the White House and Congress about 
the careful balance we have reached with the resources provided. When the law 
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and policy directives cannot be carried out within known funding limitations or 
d e ~  our best engineering and management judgment, it is our duty to say so. We 
cannot simply do more with less. We should not over-promise and under-deliver. 
Saying "no" when that is the honest answer is also a sign of integrity. 
In his book, Good to G m t ,  Jim Collins evaluated how "good companies 
become "great" companies. The primary task in becoming "great" is "to create 
a culture wherein people have a tremendous opportunity to be heard and, 
ultimately, for the truth to be heard." Collins further recommends that such 
"great" companies "face just as much adversity as [others], but respond to that 
adversity differently. They hit the realities of their situation head-on. As a result, 
they emerge from adversity even stronger." 
The same holds true for high-performance government organizations like 
NASA. We need the best ideas to come forth, to learn from our experiences and 
for there to be civil dialogue and debate, not vituperation, before setting forth 
on the best course to follow. 
The men and women of NASA are writing a new chapter in the history 
of space exploration. It's a complex story, a rich story, full of drama and despair, 
pride and pathos. It is a story we need to tell our children and grandchildren lest 
they forget why it is we explore what John F. Kennedy referred to as the New 
Frontier of space. I believe it is necessary for us to discuss openly and honestly 
the principles that led us as a nation to embrace space exploration five decades 
ago and the need to continue that journey. But first and foremost, we must tell 
our story with integrity. 
Thank you. 
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Shown is a concept illustration of the Ares I crew launch vehicle (left) and Ares V cargo launch 
vehicle. Ares I will carry the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle to space. Ares V will serve as 
NASA's primary large-scale hardware delivery vehicle. (Ares-Collage3) 
At 9:32 a.m. EDT, the swing arms move away and a plume of flame signals the liftoff of the 
Apollo 1 1 Saturn V space vehicle and astronauts Neil A. Armstrong, Michael Collins and 
Edwin E. Aldrin, Jr. from Kennedy Space Center Launch Complex 39A. (GPN-2000-000629) 
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Astronaut John Glenn, Jr. as he enters into the spacecraft Friendship 7 prior to M - 6  launch 
operations at Launch Complex 14. Astronaut Glenn is entering his spacecraft to begin the first 
American manned Earth orbital mission. (GPN-2000-000652) 
Atlas Agena target vehicle l i o f f  for Gemini 1 1 from Pad 14. Once the Agena was in orbit, 
Gemini 11 rendezvoused and docked with it. (GPN-2000-001019) 
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I 
The Original Mercury Seven astronauts with a US. Air Force F-106B jet air& From left to 
right: M. Scott Carpenter, Leroy Gordon Cooper, John H. Glenn, Jr., Virgil I. Gus Grissom, 
Jr.% Walter M. Wally Schirra, Jr., Alan B. Shepard, Jr., Donald IS. Deke Slayton. (GPN-2000- 
001286) 
NASA's Constellation Program is getting to work on the new spacecraft that will return 
humans to the moon and be capable of delivering crews and cargo to the space station. The 
new spacecraft will be similar in shape to the Apollo spacecraft but significantly larger. The 
tried-and-true conical form is the safest and most reliable for re-entering Earth's atmosphere. 
?his artist's rendering represents a concept of the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle in orbit with 
the moon and Earth in the background. (jsc2008e097002) 
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The LCROSS is gently maneuvered into the thermal vacuum chamber at the Northrop 
Grumman facility, Redondo Beach, California. The spacecraft was subjected to heating and 
cooling cycles to simulate the harsh conditions in outer space. Thermal vacuum is one of the 
final milestones before the LCROSS is certified for spaceflight. (LCROSS) 
This image shows NASA's Phoenix Mars Lander's solar panel and the lander's robotic arm with 
a sample in the scoop. ?he image was taken by the lander's surface stereo imager looking west 
during Phoenix's Sol 16 ('June 10,2008) or the 16th Martian day after landing. The image 
was taken just before the sample was delivered to the optical microscope. This view is a part of 
the "mission success" panorama that will show the whole landing site in color. (PHOENIX- 
PANELARM) 
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Astronarit Edward H. White 11, pilot for the Gemini-Titan 4 spce&&t> during Amerids 
first spacewalk. The EVA was p k m e d  during the Gemini 4 mission on June 3, 1965. White 
spent 23 minutes maneuvering while attached to the: spacecraft by a 25-foot umbilical Line and a 
23-foot tether line, both wrapped in gold tape to form one cord. White carria a hand-held self 
maneuvering unit (HHSMW to help move him in the weightless space environment. His helmet 
visor is gold plared to protect him fiom unfiltered sun rays. (355-34635) 
(1992) - Laser power stations, perhaps drawing energy from the local environment, might 
one day propel spacecraft. NASA studies of advanced planetary missions have rang;ed from 
- 
small robotic probes to multiple-spacecraft human exploration missions. Credit: Pat Rawlings 
(SAIC), titled "Via Luminae." (S99-04188) 
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(1 997) - A few kilometers from the Apollo 17 Taurus Littrow landing site, a lunar mining 
facility harvests oxygen from the resource-rich volcanic soil of the eastern Mare Serenitatis. 
Credit: Pat Rawlings (SAIC), titled "The Deal." (S99-04195) 
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The Constellation Architecture 
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Administrator 
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Remarks to the Space Transportation Association 
January 22,2008 
I've received multiple inquiries lately, in one forum or another, concerning 
various aspects of NASA's post-shuttle spaceflight architecture. None of the 
questions is new, and all of them were elucidated during our Exploration 
Systems Architecture Study (ESAS). The architecture is essentially as it was 
coming out of ESAS back in September 2005, and the architectural trades 
we made then when considering mission requirements, operations concepts, 
performance, risk, reliability and cost hold true today. 
But more than 2 years have gone by, and the logic behind the choices we 
made has receded into the background. People come and go; new questioners 
lacking subject matter background appear; and the old questions must 
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be answered again if there is to be general accord that NASA managers are 
allocating public funds in a responsible fashion. And so it seemed to me that 
the time was right to review again why we are developing the post-shuttle space 
architecture in the way that we are. 
As many of you know, I used to teach space system engineering at 'The 
George Washington University and the University of Maryland and am more 
comfortable discussing engineering design than just about any other topic. But 
as NASA administrator, I must first frame the Constellation architecture and 
design in the context of policy and law that dictate NASA's missions. 
Any system architecture must be evaluated first against the tasks that 
it is supposed to accomplish. Only afterward can we consider whether it 
accomplishes them efficiently or presents other advantages that distinguish 
it from competing choices. So to start, we need to review the requirements 
expressed in presidential policy and, subsequently, congressional direction that 
were conveyed to NASA in 2004 and 2005. 
'The principal documents pertinent to our architecture are President 
Bush's January 14,2004 speech outlining the Vision for Space Exploration and 
the NASA Authorization Act of 2005. Both documents are a direct result of the 
policy debate that followed in the wake of the Columbia tragedy 5 years ago and 
the observation of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB). "'The 
U.S. civilian space effort has moved forward for more than 30 years without a 
guiding vision." 
Several items of specific direction are captured in the president's speech: 
"Our first goal is to complete the International Space Station by 2010. 
We will finish what we have started; we will meet our obligations to our 
15 international partners on this project." 
"Research onboard the station and here on Earth will help us better 
understand and overcome the obstacles that limit exploration. 'Through 
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these efforts we will develop the skills and techniques necessary to sustain 
further space exploration." 
"Our second goal is to develop and test a new spacecraft, the crew 
exploration vehicle ... and to conduct the first manned mission no 
later than 2014. The crew exploration vehicle will be capable of ferrying 
astronauts and scientists to the space station after the shuttle is retired. 
But the main purpose of this spacecraft will be to carry astronauts beyond 
our orbit to other worlds." 
"Our third goal is to return to the moon by 2020. . . ." 
"With the experience and knowledge gained on the moon, we will then be 
ready to take the next steps of space exploration: human missions to Mars 
and to worlds beyond." 
After extensive debate, Congress offered strong bipartisan approval of 
these goals, while adding considerable specificity. From the 2005 Authorization 
Act for NASA: 
'The administrator shall establish a program to develop a sustained 
human presence on the moon, including a robust precursor 
program, to promote exploration, science, commerce and United 
States preeminence in space and as a stepping-stone to future 
exploration of Mars and other destinations. 
The administrator shall manage human spaceflight programs to 
strive to achieve the following milestones: 
(A) Returning Americans to the moon no later than 2020. 
(B) Launching the crew exploration vehicle as close to 2010 as possible. 
(C) Increasing knowledge of the impacts of long duration stays in space on 
the human body using the most appropriate facilities available, including 
the space station. 
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(D) Enabling humans to land on and return from Mars and other destinations 
on a timetable that is technically and fiscally possible." 
'The bill establishes specific requirements for the space station, noting that 
it must "have an ability to support a crew size of at least six persons," codifying 
a long-promised design feature in law. It also details statutory requirements 
for shuttle transition, including maximizing the use of shuttle assets and 
infrastructure: 
'The administrator shall, to the fullest extent possible consistent 
with a successful development program, use the personnel, 
capabilities, assets and infrastructure of the space shuttle program 
in developing the crew exploration vehicle, crew launch vehicle 
and a heavy-lift launch vehicle. 
Collectively, these requirements outline the broad policy framework for 
the post-shuttle U.S. human spaceflight architecture: 
1. We will manage the U.S. space program so as to complete the space 
station by 2010, utilizing the space shuttle for that purpose after which it 
will be retired. 
2. After completion, the space station will be used to "better understand and 
overcome the obstacles that limit exploration." 
3. The shuttle will be replaced as soon as possible, but not later than 2014, 
by a crew exploration vehicle designed to take humans to the moon and 
beyond, but which must also be capable of servicing the space station and 
its crew of six. 
4. The architecture must support human lunar return not later than 2020 
and, after that, development of a sustained human lunar presence, both 
for its intrinsic benefits and as a "stepping stone" to Mars and beyond. 
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5. Finally, the new architecture must take advantage of existing space shuttle 
program assets "to the fullest extent possible." 
Not that anyone asked, but I consider this to be the best civil space policy 
to be enunciated by a president and the best authorization act to be approved 
by Congress since the 1960s. But no policy is perfect and none will please 
everyone. In particular, many in the exploration community as well as many of 
those who pursue space science were disappointed by the reaffirmation of our 
nation's commitment to the space station. 
But a plain reading of policy and law requires us to understand that, 
throughout four presidential administrations and 20-plus congressional votes 
authorizing tens of billions of dollars for its development, the space station 
has remained an established feature of U.S. space policy. Its support and 
sustenance cannot be left to chance; the crew exploration vehicle must and will 
be capable of fulfilling this requirement; and the exploration architecture must 
and will take that into account. This is nothing more than common sense. 'The 
U.S. government will not abandon its commitment to the development and 
utilization of low Earth orbit. 
'There continues to be many questions about NASA's long-term 
commitment to the space station, so let me clarify. The Bush administration 
has made no decision on the end date for space station operations. We are, of 
course, concerned that station operating costs after 2016 will detract from our 
next major milestone: returning to the moon by 2020. But while the budget 
does not presently allocate funds for operating the space station beyond 2016, 
we are taking no action to preclude it. Decisions regarding U.S. participation in 
space station operations after 2016 can only be made by a future administration 
and a future Congress. I am sure these will be based on discussions with our 
international partners, progress toward our exploration goals, utility of this 
national laboratory and the affordability of projected space station operations. 
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Again, we plan to keep our commitments to our partners, utilizing the space 
station if it makes sense. 
Now, returning to our space architecture, note the order of primacy in 
requirements. We are not primarily building a system to replace the shuttle for 
access to low Earth orbit and upgrading it later for lunar return. Instead, we 
are directed to build a system to "carry astronauts beyond our orbit to other 
worlds," but which can be put to the service of the space station if needed. 
In brief, we are designing for the moon and beyond. 
That too is only common sense. Once before, an earlier generation of U.S. 
policymakers approved a spaceflight architecture intended to optimize access 
to low Earth orbit. It was expected-or maybe "hoped is the better word- 
that with this capability in hand, the tools to resume deep space exploration 
would follow. It didn't happen. And with the funding which has been allocated 
to the U.S. civil space program since the late 1960s, it cannot happen. Even 
though from an engineering perspective it would be highly desirable to have 
transportation systems separately optimized for low Earth orbit and deep space, 
NASA's budget will not support it. We get one system; it must be capable of 
serving in multiple roles and it must be designed for the more difficult of those 
roles from the outset. 
There are other common-sense requirements that have not been 
written down. 
The most obvious of these, to me, is that the new system will and should 
be in use for many decades. Aerospace systems are expensive and difficult to 
develop; when such developments are judged successful, they tend to remain in 
use far longer than one might at first imagine. Those who doubt this should look 
around. The DC-3 and the B-52, to name only two landmark aircraft, remain 
in service today. The Boeing 747 has been around for 30 years and who doubts 
that it will be going strong for another 30? In space, derivatives of Atlas, Delta 
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and Soyuz are flying a half-century and more after their initial development. 
Ariane and its derivatives have been around for three decades with no end in 
sight. Even the space shuttle will have been in service for 30 years by the time 
it retires. Apart from Saturn and Apollo, I am hard put to think of a successful 
aerospace system which was retired with less than several decades of use and 
often more. 
'The implications of this are profound. We are designing today the systems 
that our grandchildren will use as building blocks, not just for lunar return but 
for missions to Mars, to the near-Earth asteroids, to service great observatories 
at sun-Earth L1 and for other purposes we have not yet even considered. We 
need a system with inherent capability for growth. 
Elsewhere, I have written that a careful analysis of what we can do at 
NASA on constant-dollar budgets leads me to believe that we can realistically be 
on Mars by the mid-2030s. It is not credible to believe that we will return to the 
moon and then start with a "clean sheet of paper" to design a system for Mars. 
'That's just not fiscally, technically or politically realistic. We'll be on Mars in 
30 years; and when we go, we'll be using hardware that we're building today. 
So we need to keep Mars in mind as we work (even now). And that 
means we need to look at both ends of the requirements spectrum. Our new 
system needs to be designed for the moon but allow the U.S. government access 
to low Earth orbit. Yet, in designing for the moon, we need also to provide the 
maximum possible "leave behind" for Mars. Ifwe don't, then a generation from 
now there will be a group in this room listening to the administrator of that 
time ask about those of us here today: "What were they thinking?" 
Now, in mentioning "Mars" I must state for the record that I do realize that 
the $550 billion Consolidated Appropriations Act signed into law last month 
stipulated that no funds appropriated in 2008 "shall be used for any research, 
development or demonstration activities related exclusively to the human 
exploration of Mars." While I personally consider this to be shortsighted, and 
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while NASA was in any case spending only a few million dollars on long-term 
research and study efforts, we will of course follow this legislative direction. And 
while this provision does not affect work on Ares V, it does call into question 
the fundamental rationale for our use of space station in long-duration human 
spaceflight research. I hope that this funding restriction can be abandoned in 
future years. 
Further application of common sense also requires us to acknowledge that 
now is the time; this is the juncture; and we are the people to make provisions 
for the contributions of the commercial space sector to our nation's overall 
space enterprise. The development and exploitation of space has, so far, been 
accomplished in a fashion that can be described as "all government, all the 
time." That's not the way the American frontier was developed; it's not the way 
this nation developed aviation; it's not the way the rest of our economy works; 
and it ought not to be good enough for space, either. So, proactively and as a 
matter of deliberate policy, we need to make provisions for the first step on the 
stairway to space to be occupied by commercial entrepreneurs whether they 
reside in big companies or small ones. 
The policy decision that the crew exploration vehicle will be designed for 
the moon, while not precluding its ability to provide access to low Earth orbit, 
strongly reinforces this common sense objective. If designed for the moon, the 
use of the crew exploration vehicle in low Earth orbit will inevitably be more 
expensive than a system designed for the much easier requirement of low Earth 
orbit access and no more. This lesser requirement is one that, in my judgment, 
can be met today by a bold commercial developer operating without the close 
oversight of the U.S. government with the goal of offering transportation for 
cargo and crew to low Earth orbit on a fee-for-service basis. 
This is a policy goal-enabling the development of commercial space 
transportation to low Earth orbit-that can be met if we in government are 
willing to create a protected niche for it. To provide that niche, we must set 
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the requirements for the next-generation government spaceflight system at the 
lunar-transportation level well above the low Earth orbit threshold. 
Now again, common sense dictates that we cannot hold the space station 
hostage to fortune; we cannot gamble the fate of a multi-tens-of-billions-of- 
dollars facility on the success of a commercial operation; so the crew exploration 
vehicle must be able to operate efficiently in low Earth orbit if necessary. But 
we can create a clear financial incentive for commercial success based on the 
financial disincentive of using government transportation to low Earth orbit at 
what will be an inherently higher price. 
To this end (as I have noted many times) we must be willing to defer the 
use of government systems in favor of commercial services as and when they 
reach maturity. When commercial capability comes on line, we will reduce 
the level of our own low Earth orbit operations with Ares and Orion to that 
which is minimally necessary to preserve capability and to qualify the systems 
for lunar flight. 
So how is all of this-law, policy and common sense-realized in the 
architecture that came out of ESAS? 
As I have outlined above, policy and legislation are in some ways quite 
specific about the requirements for post-shuttle U.S. spaceflight systems. They 
are less so where it concerns our lunar goals, beyond the clearly stated requirement 
to develop the capability to support a sustained human lunar presence both 
for its intrinsic value and as a step toward Mars. This leaves considerably more 
discretion to NASA as the executive agency to set requirements and with that 
considerably more responsibility to get it right. Again, I think common sense 
comes to our rescue. 
There is general agreement that our next steps to the moon, toward a 
goal of sustained lunar presence, must offer something more than Apollo-class 
capability; for example, sorties by two people for 3 days to the equatorial region. 
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To return after 50 years with nothing more than the capability we once threw 
away seems to me to fail whatever test of common sense might be applied to 
ourselves and our successors. 
Accordingly, then, in developing requirements for ESAS we specified 
that the lunar architecture should be capable of the following: 
Initial lunar sortie missions should be capable of sustaining a crew of four 
on the lunar surface for a week. 
The architecture will allow missions to any location on the moon at any 
time and will permit return to Earth at any time. 
The architecture will be designed to support the early development of an 
"outpost" capability at a location yet to be specified, with crew rotations 
planned for 6-month intervals. 
One could fill pages debating and justifying these requirements; 
mercifully, I will not do that. Perhaps another time. In any case, I think it 
is clear that these goals offer capability significantly beyond Apollo. Yet they 
can be achieved with the building blocks-ground facilities as well as space 
transportation elements-that we have or can reasonably envision given the 
budgetary resources we might expect. 
It is worth noting that the decision to focus on early development of an 
outpost-while retaining the capability to conduct a dedicated sortie mission 
to any point on the lunar surface that might prove to be of interest for scientific 
or other reasons-supports additional key goals. The most obvious of these is 
that it provides a more direct "stepping stone" to Mars, where even on the very 
first mission we will need to live for an extended period on another planetary 
surface. But further, even a basic human-tended outpost requires a variety 
of infrastructure that is neither necessary nor possible to include in a sortie 
mission. Such infrastructure development presents obvious possibilities for 
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commercial and international partner involvement, both of which constitute 
important policy objectives. 
But if the capability we are striving for is greater than that of Apollo, so 
too is the difficulty. To achieve the basic four-person lunar sortie capability 
anytime, anywhere requires a trans-lunar injection mass of 70-75 metric tons, 
including appropriate reserve. Saturn V trans-lunar injection mass capability 
on Apollo 17 was 47 metric tons without the launch adaptor used to protect 
the lunar module. Thus, more than Saturn V capability is required if we are to 
go beyond Apollo. I think we should not be surprised to find that the Apollo 
engineers got just about as much out of a single launch of the Saturn V as it was 
possible to do. 
Ifwe need more trans-lunar injection mass capability than can be provided 
by a single launch of a Saturn-class vehicle, we can reduce our objectives, build 
a bigger rocket or attain the desired capability by launching more than one 
rocket. Setting a lesser objective seems inconsistent with our goal of developing 
the capability for a sustained lunar presence and, as noted earlier, merely 
replicating Apollo-era capability is politically untenable. 
Building a larger rocket is certainly an attractive option, at least to me; 
but to reach the capability needed for a single launch brings with it the need 
for significant modifications to fabrication and launch infrastructure. The 
Michoud Assembly Facility and the Vertical Assembly Building were designed 
for the Saturn V and have some growth margin above that. But they will not 
accommodate a vehicle that can support our goals for lunar return with a single 
launch; and the projected NASA budget does not allow the development of 
extensive new ground infrastructure. Further, and crucially, a single-launch 
architecture fails to address the requirement for space station logistics support. 
Thus, after detailed consideration of the single-launch option, we settled 
on a dual-launch Earth-orbit rendezvous scheme as the means by which a 
trans-lunar injection mass payload of the necessary size would be assembled. 
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However, the decision to employ Earth-orbit rendezvous in the lunar 
transportation architecture implies nothing about how the payload should be 
split. Indeed, the most obvious split involves launching two identical vehicles 
with approximately equal payloads, mating them in orbit and proceeding to the 
moon. When Earth-orbit rendezvous as considered for Apollo, it was this method 
that was to be employed; and it offers several advantages. Non-recurring costs 
are lower because only one launch vehicle development is required; recurring 
costs are amortized over a larger number of flights of a single vehicle; and the 
knowledge of system reliability is enhanced by the more rapid accumulation of 
flight experience. 
However, this architectural approach carries significant liabilities when 
we consider the broader requirements of the policy framework discussed earlier. 
As with the single-launch architecture, dual-launch Earth-orbit rendezvous 
of identical vehicles is vastly overdesigned for space station logistics. It is 
one thing to design a lunar transportation system and, if necessary, use it to 
service the space station while accepting some reduction in cost-effectiveness 
relative to a system optimized for low Earth orbit access. As noted earlier, such 
a plan backstops the requirement to sustain the space station without offering 
government competition in what we hope will prove to be a commercial market 
niche. But it is quite another thing to render government logistics support to 
the space station so expensive that the station is immediately judged not to be 
worth the cost of its support. Dual-launch Earth-orbit rendezvous with vehicles 
of similar payload class does not meet the requirement to support the space 
station in any sort of cost-effective manner. 
On  the other end of the scale, we must judge any proposed architecture 
against the requirements for Mars. We aren't going there now, but one day we 
will and it will be within the expected operating lifetime of the system we are 
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designing today. We know already that, when we go, we are going to need a 
Mars ship with a low Earth orbit mass equivalent of about 1 million pounds, 
give or take a bit. I'm trying for one-significant-digit accuracy here but think 
"space station" in terms of mass. 
I hope we're smart enough that we never again try to place such a large 
system in orbit by doing it in 20-ton chunks. I think we all understand that 
fewer launches of larger payloads requiring less on-orbit integration are to 
be preferred. Thus, a vehicle in the Saturn V class-some 300,000 pounds 
in low Earth orbit-allows us to envision a Mars mission assembly sequence 
requiring some four to six launches depending on the packaging efficiency we 
can attain. 
This is something we did once and can do again over the course of a 
few months, rather than many years, with the two heavy-lift pads available at 
Kennedy Space Center Complex 39. But if we split the Earth-orbit rendezvous 
lunar architecture into two equal but smaller vehicles, we will need 10 or 
more launches to obtain the same Mars-bound payload in low Earth orbit, 
and that is without assuming any loss of packaging efficiency for the launch of 
smaller payloads. When we consider that maybe half the Mars mission mass 
in low Earth orbit is liquid hydrogen, and if we understand that the control of 
hydrogen boiloff in space is one of the key limiting technologies for deep space 
exploration, the need to conduct fewer rather than more launches to low Earth 
orbit for early Mars missions becomes glaringly apparent. 
So if we want a lunar transportation architecture that looks back to the 
space station low Earth orbit logistics requirement and forward to the first 
Mars missions, it becomes apparent that the best approach is a dual-launch 
Earth-orbit rendezvous mission with the total payload split unequally. The 
smaller launch vehicle puts a crew in low Earth orbit every time it flies, whether 
they are going to the space station or the moon. The larger launch vehicle puts 
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the lunar (or later Mars) cargo in orbit. After rendezvous and docking, they are 
off to their final destination. 
Once the rationale for this particular dual-launch Earth-orbit rendezvous 
scenario is understood, the next question is logically, "why don't we use the 
existing Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) fleet for the smaller 
launch?" I'm sure you will understand when I tell you that I get this question all 
the time. And frankly, it's a logical question. I started with that premise myself 
some years back. To cut to the chase, it will work as long as you are willing to 
define "Orion" as that vehicle which can fit on top of an EELV. Unfortunately, 
we can't do that. 
The adoption of the shuttle-derived approach of Ares I, with a new 
loxlhydrogen upper stage on a reusable solid rocket booster (RSRB) first 
stage, has been one of our more controversial decisions. The Ares V heavy-lift 
design, with its external-tank-derived core stage augmented by two RSRBs and 
a new Earth departure stage has been less controversial but still not without 
its detractors. So let me go into a bit of detail concerning our rationale for the 
shuttle-derived approach. 
The principal factors we considered were the desired lift capacity, the 
comparative reliability and the development and lifecycle costs of competing 
approaches. Performance, risk and cost-I'm sure you are shocked. 
The Ares I lift requirement is 20.3 metric tons for the space station 
mission and 23.3 metric tons for the lunar mission. Evolved Expendable Launch 
Vehicle lift capacity for both the Delta IV and Atlas V are insufficient, so a new 
RL-10 powered upper stage would be required, similar to the J-2X based upper 
stage for Ares I. We considered using additional strap-on solid rocket boosters 
to increase EELV performance, but such clustering lowers overall reliability. 
It is also important to consider the growth path to heavy lift capability, 
which results from the choice of a particular launch vehicle family. Again, we 
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are designing an architecture, not a point solution for access to low Earth orbit. 
To grow significantly beyond today's EELV family for lunar missions requires 
essentially a "clean sheet of paper" design, whereas the Ares V design makes 
extensive use of existing elements or straightforward modifications of existing 
elements, which are also common to Ares I. 
Next up for consideration are mission reliability and crew risk. EELVs 
were not originally designed to carry astronauts, and various human-rating 
improvements are required to do so. Significant upgrades to the Atlas V core 
stage are necessary and abort from the Delta IV exceeds allowable g-loads. In 
the end, the probabilistic risk assessment derived during ESAS indicated that the 
shuttle-derived Ares I was almost twice as safe as that of a human-rated EELV. 
Finally, we considered both development and full lifecycle costs. I cannot 
go into the details of this analysis in a speech; and in any case, much of it involves 
proprietary data. We have shared the complete analysis with the Department 
of Defense (DOD), various White House st& offices, the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO), the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and our 
congressional oversight committees. Our analysis showed that for the combined 
crew and heavy-lift launch vehicles, the development cost of an EELV-derived 
architecture is almost 25 percent higher than that of the shuttle-derived 
approach. The recurring cost of the heavy-lift Ares V is substantially less than 
competing approaches, and the recurring cost of an EELV upgraded to meet 
CEV requirements is, at best, comparable to that for Ares I. All independent 
cost analyses have been in agreement with these conclusions. 
So, while we might wish that "off the shelf' EELVs could be easily and 
cheaply modified to meet NASA's human spaceflight requirements, the data 
say otherwise. Careful analysis showed EELV-derived solutions meeting our 
performance requirements to be less safe, less reliable and more costly than the 
shuttle-derived Ares I and Ares V. 
Leadership in Space 
Now is a good time to recall that all of the trades discussed above assumed 
the use of a production version of the space shuttle main engine (SSME). But, 
returning to a point I made earlier, we continued our system analysis following 
the architecture definition of ESAS, looking for refinements to enhance 
performance and reduce risk and cost. We decided for Ares I to make an early 
transition to the five-segment reusable solid rocket booster and to eliminate the 
SSME in favor of the J-2X on the upper stage. Similarly, elimination of the 
SSME in favor of an upgraded version of the Air Force-developed RS-68 engine 
for the Ares V core stage with the Earth departure stage powered by the J-2X 
offered numerous benefits. 'These changes yielded several billions of dollars in 
lifecycle cost savings over our earlier estimates and foster the use of a common 
RS-68 core engine line for DOD, civil and commercial users. 
Praise is tough to come by in Washington, so I was particularly pleased 
with the comment about our decision on the five-segment RSRB and J-2X 
engine in the recent GAO review: "NASA has taken steps toward making 
sound investment decisions for Ares I." Just for balance, of course, the GAO 
also provided some other comments. So, for the record, let me acknowledge on 
behalf of the entire Constellation team that, yes, we do realize that there remain 
"challenging knowledge gaps," as the GAO so quaintly phrased it, between 
system concepts today and hardware on the pad tomorrow. Really. We do. 
It's time now for a little perspective. We are developing a new system to 
bring new capabilities to the U.S. space program, capabilities lost to us since 
the early 1970s. It isn't going to be easy. Let me pause for a moment and repeat 
that: It isn't going to be easy. 
So no, we don't yet have all the answers to the engineering questions we 
will face. And in some cases we don't even know what those questions will be. 
That is the nature of engineering development. But we are going to continue 
to follow the data in our decision-making, continue to test our theories and 
continue to make changes if necessary. 
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We have been, I think, extraordinarily open about all of this. Following 
the practice I enunciated in my first all-hands on my first day as administrator, in 
connection with the then-pressing concerns about shuttle return-to-flight, we are 
resolved to listen carefully and respectfully to any technical concern or suggestion 
which is respectfully expressed and to evaluate on their merits any new ideas 
brought to us. We are doing that every day. We will continue to do it. 
So, in conclusion, this is the architecture which I think best meets all of 
the requirements of law, policy, budget and common sense that constrain us 
in the post-shuttle era. It certainly does not satisfy everyone; not that I believe 
that goal to be achievable. To  that point, one of the more common criticisms I 
receive is that it "looks too much like Apollo." I'm still struggling to figure out 
why it is bad (if indeed that is so). 
My considered assessment of the Constellation architecture is that 
while we will encounter a number of engineering design problems as we move 
forward, we are not facing any showstoppers. Constellation is primarily a systems 
engineering and integration effort based on the use of as many flight-proven 
concepts and hardware as possible, including the capsule design of Orion, the 
shuttle RSRBs and external tank, the Apollo-era J-2X upper stage engine and 
the RS-68 core engine. We're capitalizing on the nation's prior investments in 
space technology wherever possible. I am really quite proud of the progress this 
multi-disciplinary, geographically dispersed, NASAIindustry engineering team 
has made thus far. 
But even so, the development of new systems remains hard work. It is 
not for the faint of heart, or those who are easily distracted. We can do it 
if-but only if-we retain our sense of purpose. 
In this regard, I'm reminded of two sobering quotes from the CAIB 
report. First, "the previous attempts to develop a replacement vehicle for the 
aging shuttle represent a failure of national leadership." Also, the CAIB noted 
that such leadership can only be successful "if it is sustained over the decade; if 
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by the time a decision to develop a new vehicle is made there is a clearer idea of 
how the new transportation system fits into the nation's overall plans for space; 
and if the U.S. government is willing at the time a development decision is 
made to commit the substantial resources required to implement it." 
'That sort of commitment is what the mantle of leadership in space 
exploration means, and the engineers working to build Constellation know it 
every day. B u s ,  I can only hope to inspire them, and you, with the immortal 
words of that great engineer, Montgomery Scott, of the USS Enterprise: 
"I'm givin' 'er all she's got, Captain." 
'Thank you. 
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The American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) has 
always been and will always be my primary professional society, so I believe I 
should start by paying respect to the wishes of our executive director and my 
longtime colleague, Bob Dickrnan. Bob has asked a number of us to recount the 
story of "when we knew;" that is, when it was that we knew that the aerospace 
profession would become our future. I think that too many of you have heard 
my own story already and I am a bit reluctant to bore you with it again, but 
maybe there is some value in getting it firmly into the record. Bob certainly 
thinks so; and so I'll recount it again. 
Many of you have known me for a long time, and so you will not 
be surprised to hear that I was an unusual child, quite different from my 
parents, siblings and others of our acquaintance. There are pictures of me as 
a pre-kindergarten child trying to use my father's tools; and one of my very 
earliest recollections is of begging, each year, for my parents to get me an Erector 
Set for Christmas. This finally arrived, if I recall correctly, when I was in the 
second grade. I thought I had gone to heaven. If ever anyone was born to be an 
engineer, I was that person. 
In 1954 or 1955, when I was 5 or 6 years old, my mother gave me 
as a birthday or Christmas present the first book that I can specifically recall 
receiving. It was entitled A Child) Book of Stars. Today, we know that most of 
what is in that book is wrong; but across more than five decades, with the vivid 
clarity of some childhood memories that each of us has, I can recall how utterly 
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fascinated I was with it. I read and re-read it until I had virtually memorized it. 
I marveled that Halley's Comet would return in 1986 when I would be a whole 
37 years old-I couldn't imagine such a thing. I began seeking out other books 
and magazine articles having anything to do with space and spaceflight. Many 
people have noted how reading science fiction as a child got them interested 
in space and other technical careers. For me it was the reverse; I began reading 
science fiction because I was interested in space! 
As a small child, I had no clear understanding of the difference between 
mathematics, science and engineering; and I didn't care. I'm not sure that I 
really care all that much today. I did know that, whatever I did, it was going to 
have something to do with space. As time went by, I fell more broadly in love 
with the beauty of mathematics and its ability to describe the system of the 
world, with science and its quest to understand that world and most of all with 
engineering and its fusion of mathematics, science and human artistry to create 
a world which had never been. But I remained in love with space and later with 
flight in all its forms; and so that is where I chose to try to create that world. 
That one book and that one decision shaped my life, sometimes in ways 
not so obvious. For example, I turned 21 in 1970, and I was fortunate-or 
maybe not-to be able to attain acceptable grades in college without expending 
much effort on schoolwork. So, you might not be surprised when I tell you 
that, shall we say, I experienced the 1960s to their fullest. It was a turbulent 
time and some of my cohort did not make it through; that era produced a lot 
of shattered lives. But for me, there was always a final governor on my behavior. 
No matter what, I would not indulge in anything that would prevent me from 
graduating and taking my place in the aerospace profession. 
As a footnote to this story, I still have the book, thanks to the wisdom 
of mothers in preserving things that their careless children would discard. In as 
big a surprise as I have ever had, Eileen Collins and her crew presented it to me 
after having flown it, without my knowledge, on STS-114. Today it is mounted 
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on my wall, together with photographs and a certificate of authenticity from 
the crew attesting to the event of its flight aboard Discovery. I suppose that is as 
close as I will get to spaceflight. 
This reverie reminds me that  our society loves to celebrate 
milestones-birthdays, anniversaries or holidays that celebrate our heroes and 
heritage, that honor the great struggles our ancestors undertook and the sacrifices 
that they made in the service of our country or that recall landmark historical 
and cultural achievements. This year, we in the space business are celebrating 
50 years of spaceflight dating from the launch of Sputnik on October 4, 1957. 
In the process, we honor its legacy and look back thoughtfully on its influence 
on the course of human events. I go to Russia next month to join them in 
celebration of that achievement. 
Now, there are appropriate times and occasions for retrospection and this 
is one of them. But to me it is always more important to look forward; and I 
like to use such historical milestones to measure our progress and as a guide to 
setting challenging goals for the future. It is my hope that our greatest days lie 
always ahead of us. But with that said, another of my beliefs is that it is vitally 
important to learn from history, and the lessons available to Americans from 
our side of the Sputnik experience are no exception. 
As anyone my age or thereabouts will recall personally, the Soviet 
Union's success with Sputnik was an almost unimaginable embarrassment 
for the United States. The reality of this event diverged impossibly from our 
image of ourselves and our place in the world. Notwithstanding the efforts 
and sacrifices of other nations, it was U.S. technical, industrial and logistical 
superiority which had been decisive in the then-recent global war. Other 
nations, victors and vanquished, were prostrate for a generation after that war. 
Japan and Germany were flattened. China and most of Europe were little better 
off. Fifty-five million people around the world were lost; the Soviet Union 
alone lost 20 million. The United States lost a few hundred thousand and our 
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industrial infrastructure was untouched. Our nation stood like a colossus above 
the postwar world. 
We had our own satellite development effort underway in support of 
the International Geophysical Year; putting an instrumented payload, the 
Vanguard satellite, into orbit was a publicly announced goal. 'The idea that 
we could be beaten to it by any other nation, not to mention by our declared 
adversary, was for almost everyone a paradigm-shifting event. 
First and most directly, Americans felt vulnerable to Soviet missiles that, 
if they could place a payload in orbit, could also strike anywhere in the United 
States. In the generations since the founding of our nation, no other adversary 
had ever produced such a threat, and we had never imagined that anyone ever 
could. Nikita Krushchev's November, 1956 admonition-"We will bury you1'- 
reverberated in our collective consciousness. 
But there was more. In being beaten so publicly by what we then regarded 
as a peasant nation, a nation whose totalitarian government embraced a set of 
values abhorrent to nearly all Americans, we felt that we were falling behind 
in our much-vaunted technical know-how and industrial capability. 'The small 
metal orb beeping overhead, visible in the clear fall sky to anyone who looked- 
and nearly everyone did-reminded us of this. We felt that we were in second 
place in a new arena, that we lagged in exploring what President Kennedy later 
named so perfectly as "this new Ocean." And we felt that it mattered. 
Given the story I related earlier, you will not be surprised to know 
that even at the age of 8 I followed these events avidly, scanning papers from 
Weekly Reader to 7he Baltimore Sun for news of space. I remember watching 
Sputnik from my home in Aberdeen, Maryland. I was hardly the only one 
doing so; as a nation, we looked up and contemplated the meaning of the 
Soviet accomplishment. 'The newspapers were full of both soul-searching 
analysis and opportunistic second-guessing. We questioned our military 
plans, our civilian research programs and our educational systems; we made 
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changes in all those areas and more. America's readiness-or more properly 
our lack of readiness-to explore and exploit the space frontier decided a 
presidential election. 
So began the Space Race. Sputnik changed everything. When the first 
Vanguard launch failed in December 1957, it spurred President Eisenhower 
to assign Army General John B. Medaris and his team, Wernher von Braun at 
Redstone Arsenal and William H. Pickering at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
(JPL) to build the Jupiter-C rocket and Explorer-1 satellite, matching the Soviet 
feat (4 months after the fact). It spurred the creation of NASA in October 
1958 as well as the then-classified National Reconnaissance Office and its early 
CORONA satellites. It spurred Air Force General Bernard Schriever's team 
to develop the Atlas, Titan and Minuteman Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 
(ICBMs). It spurred Admiral Red Raborn and his team to develop the Polaris 
missile and the Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine to carry it. It spurred more 
national spending on science, math and engineering education to boost our 
nation's technical literacy, ultimately allowing us to win the Space Race and, 
eventually, the Cold War. 
Millions of Americans, myself included, benefited from this investment 
of our nation's time, energy and resources; and this investment helped me 
personally and many others, even years later, to cut their teeth in the space 
business. We committed ourselves to the ideal that, as a nation, America must 
lead in space exploration. In President Kennedy's immortal words, prose but 
almost poetry, "For while we cannot guarantee that we shall one day be first, 
we can guarantee that any failure to make this effort will make us last." And, 
"We go into space because whatever mankind must undertake, free men must 
fully share." 
Spaceflight is a strategic capability for our nation. We are fully 50 years 
into it now, measured from the launch of Sputnik. But equally, we are only 
50 years into it. If you joined the space program after college graduation in 
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1958 or 1959, like my friends and mentors Glynn Lunney and Arnie Alrich, 
it all fits within a single long, full, tumultuous career. So we need to maintain 
a sense of perspective. Fifty years into the development of aviation, we didn't 
have even the first of the passenger-carrying jets that brought most of us to 
this conference. And 50 years into the development of open ocean seafaring, 
Carnival Cruise Lines was not one of the foreseeable outcomes. We have only 
just begun to sail the new ocean of space. We have a very long way yet to go. 
So let's spend a bit of time today to look back at where we have been, where we 
are and where we are going. 
Fifty years ago, we in the United States were not yet aware that we were 
about to be surprised by Sputnik. We did not know that, little more than 
1 year later, a new agency would be formed from elements of Navy, Army and 
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) laboratories. We did 
not know that seven test pilots would, in the spring of 1959, be named as the 
nation's first astronauts and would begin preparing for brief, single-seat trips 
into space. First and foremost, the goal was to beat the Russians to that prize. 
We all know how that turned out. 
But times have changed. People change. Fifty years ago I looked up in 
the sky to watch Sputnik pass. I remember still the annoyance I felt, even at 
the age of 8, that we were not up there also. Today, two Russians and American 
astronaut Clayton Anderson are living and working in orbit aboard the 
International Space Station, the greatest engineering project in the brief history 
of the Space Age. Next month, NASA's Expedition 16 Commander Peggy 
Whitson, Russian Flight Engineer Yuri Malenchenko and spaceflight participant 
Sheikh Muszaphar Shukor, a Malaysian physician, will lift off from Baikonur 
to join them on the space station. Later in October, Space Shuttle Discovery 
and the STS-120 crew will launch from Kennedy Space Center carrying the 
Node 2 Hamzony Module, built in Italy, which will be used to connect the 
European and Japanese laboratory modules. With the space station, NASA and 
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our international partners have maintained a permanent human foothold in 
space since October 2000. We are learning to live and work in space 2417, 
365 days a year. We are engaged in a partnership with our former rival and even 
pay for some of their crew and cargo service to the space station. Naturally, 
I would rather be providing hnding to U.S. commercial crew and cargo 
transportation providers, especially after we retire the space shuttle in 2010, 
but that is the position in which we find ourselves. 
The space station is an engineering test bed and scientific laboratory 
to study and mitigate the hazards of long-duration spaceflight, just as sailors 
hundreds of years ago learned how to stave off the debilitating effects of scuny 
and other hazards during long sea voyages. In the process, we will also develop 
new technologies that will improve life here on Earth. For example, the exacting 
techniques used for preserving food for our space missions have found their way 
into the Food and Drug Administration's safety standards. On our last shuttle 
mission, we flew a muscle atrophy experiment for the pharmaceutical company 
Amgen. Recently, a convention of the American Medical Association endorsed 
NASA's efforts in human spaceflight and the technologies and techniques 
we have developed for doctors. And last week, I signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding between NASA and the National Institutes of Health to conduct 
joint medical research onboard the space station. 
Now, while I yield to no one in my belief that the advancement of the 
arts and sciences of human spaceflight is crucial to this nation, it is not the only 
measure of our progress over the last 50 years. Even our earliest robotic satellites 
produced truly lasting scientific results. Just over 50 years ago, Explorer 1 
allowed James van Allen to infer the existence of the radiation belts circling 
Earth that now bear his name. And Vanguard 1, launched a few months later, 
showed that Earth was not actually round but in fact was a bit pear-shaped. 
NASA's work in space physics and' Earth science continues today, albeit on a 
much grander scale, and we have added many new disciplines to our scientific 
repertoire in the meantime. 
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Forty-plus years ago as a teenager, I waited anxiously to see the first 
close-up photographs of the moon by Ranger 7 and a bit later went through 
the same nail-biting exercise as Mariner 4 executed the first Mars flyby. And 
I will simply never forget, as a young JPL engineer in the late 1970s, taking 
meals in the cafeteria while watching fresh new views of the moons of Jupiter 
from Voyager 1 and later Voyager 2 come up on the television screens. Today's 
planetary scientists can look forward to such new views of Mars every day, right 
from the surface, as Spirit and Opportunity continue to break new trails. And 
our presence extends out to Saturn where Cassini similarly rewards us with new 
views of Saturn and its moons every day. By 201 1 we'll add Mercury-a very 
tough place to reach-to the list with the Mercury Surface, Space Environment, 
Geochemistry and Ranging (MESSENGER) spacecraft; and in 20 15 we'll 
finally reach Pluto with New Horizons. 
As a young flight controller at the Goddard Space Flight Center in the 
early 1970s, I had my virtual hands on the controls for the early radio astronomy 
explorers. Today, engineers and astrophysicists like NASA's John Mather are 
designing, building and controlling spacecraft that deal with issues that having 
metaphysical and religious overtones-the birth, life and death of stars, galaxies 
and our very universe. 
Edwin Hubble discovered in the 1920s that the universe was expanding; 
in the late 1990s, astronomers using the Hubble Space Telescope discovered that 
the expansion of the universe was actually speeding up. Astrophysicists today 
explain such phenomena in terms of "dark matter" and "dark energy." This just 
means they can't see it and don't understand it. Recent observations by Hubble, 
combined with the European Very Large Telescope in Chile, Japan's Subaru 
telescope in Hawaii, the VLA radio telescope in New Mexico and the joint 
NASA-European Space Agency XMM-Newton satellite have revealed a loose 
network of filaments where normal matter in the form of galaxies accumulates 
along the densest concentrations of dark matter. That is the only way, so far, 
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in which we know it's there. This unseen dark matter comprises approximately 
20 percent of the mass-energy density of the observed universe while dark energy 
makes up maybe 75 percent of the universe. Everything we see, everything we 
know anything at all about, makes up the remaining 5 percent. 
These are the deepest mysteries that there are, and it is heady stuff for 
someone like me, a simple aerospace engineer from a small town. 
But the National Academy recognizes the significance of these issues 
and has set the Joint Dark Energy Mission UDEM) as its highest priority for 
NASA's Beyond Einstein program. We support that priority and I look forward 
to working with Sam Bodman and Ray Orbach at the Department of Energy 
to turn this mission into reality. As with most space science missions NASA 
conducts, it is my hope that we will also have a great partnership on JDEM with 
the Centre National $Etudes Spatiales (CNES), the French Space Agency. 
I discussed this with Yannick D'Escatha a few days ago during his recent visit 
to Washington, and I look forward to working together with him on other 
projects and programs as well. 
International cooperation is the sine qaa non for so many of NASA's 
science missions-astronomy and astrophysics, planetary science, heliophysics 
and Earth sciences-just as it is in our human spaceflight endeavors. It is 
through such work that we find our common humanity, discovering that what 
connects us is far more important than what divides us. 
I believe that the art, science and business of engineering for space 
exploration is the hardest thing we do as a people. It is also the grandest 
expression of human imagination of which I can conceive. Members of the 
AIAA know this to be true. Just ask SpaceX, whom I will be visiting later for 
a progress update. Or  ask the Northrop Grumman folks in Redondo Beach, 
who are building the James Webb Space Telescope; or those up the road at 
JPL in Pasadena where they are building the Mars Science Lab; or those at the 
Kennedy Space Center preparing to launch the Dawn mission to the asteroid 
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belt next week. My hope is that when we contemplate the majesty of our 
universe resulting from complex instruments operating at a Lagrange point or 
landing on the surface of Mars, we appreciate the effort that went into making 
such technological miracles happen. They truly are miracles by the standards we 
used only 50 years ago. 
But it is not only the miracles that matter. Less than 1 year from now, 
NASA will launch the final servicing mission to Hubble on Space Shuttle 
Atlantis. My hope is that members of the astronomy and astrophysics community 
will not only thank the astronauts who risk their lives in making this mission 
happen, but also that we all pause to recall the Hurricane Katrina ride-out 
crew who risked their lives to save the Michoud Assembly Facility near New 
Orleans where the space shuttle external tanks are manufactured. They were 
just as instrumental in making the Hubble servicing mission happen. 
In a few years, this Michoud workforce will turn its attention to building 
the Ares 1 and Ares 5 rockets. While ESA's Ariane 5, which will launch the 
Webb Space Telescope, can loft approximately 21,000 kilograms to low-Earth 
orbit, the Ares V will be able to launch more than six times that amount. The 
Ares launch vehicles are being built primarily for human spaceflight, but my 
hope is that the engineers designing robotic spacecraft to be launched over 
the coming decades will take advantage of this new capability. Our nation has 
not seen such a capability since the Saturn 5 last flew in 1973; so it behooves 
us-not simply NASA but all of us in the space business-to begin now to 
think of innovative ways to use these launch systems for greater scientific and 
other benefits over the next 50 years. 
We will soon be ready to discuss how we in NASA are organizing the 
workforce at our 10 field centers to lead and support development for our next 
major exploration programs, including those beyond Orion and Ares 1: the 
Ares V, the lunar surface access module and other lunar surface systems. This is 
the exploration work to be done over the next 10-1 5 years, and I hope to entice 
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international and commercial partners to be part of turning these ideas into 
reality. We have a lot of work ahead of us. 
While most of these projects and programs will not begin in earnest until 
after the shuttle is retired, we need to plan now for the work ahead. I want the 
young people in NASA and at our contractors who are working today on the 
space shuttle, space station and exploration programs to know that they will 
have more to do beyond the 5-year government budget horizon; and I want 
even younger people in colleges and universities to know what the future holds 
for them if they join us in this journey. I also want to make it perfectly clear 
to our current workforce that, if funding for NASA remains as we anticipate, I 
do not foresee any need for reductions in force at NASA. I realize that this has 
been the subject of considerable unpleasant speculation over the past several 
years, primarily due to the lack of stability in our programs as we struggled to 
pay for space shuttle return-to-flight costs and numerous other reductions and 
redirections in NASA's budget. My hope is that those days of instability are 
behind us. 
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NASA's most important resource-even beyond the budget Congress 
provides-is its people, scientists, engineers and technicians who make our 
nation's space program possible, whether they work directly for NASA or not. 
And our biggest threat today, our biggest management challenge, concerns those 
people. Space shuttle retirement and transition to a new system is an upheaval 
that occurs not even as often as once in a generation. We are trying to manage 
this challenge as best we can with the resources we have been given. We are all 
concerned that we not repeat the mistakes of the 1970s in the transition from 
the Apollo to shuttle programs. What was planned as a 2-year gap in human 
spaceflight turned into 6. Because we did not sustain the commitment (which 
had been made in the 1960s) because real-dollar funding in the post-Apollo 
years was so severely reduced, there was an exodus of talent from the program, 
squandering national capability and weakening the industrial base. We must 
not allow that to happen again. We must commit ourselves, as a nation, to the 
space enterprise. We must commit to leadership, not followership, in space 
exploration. It matters. 
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I've touched on some of the rational and acceptable reasons for which 
we explore space, but I hope you will allow me a moment to share with you a 
recent lesson that reflects the real reasons why I think most of you in this room 
decided to go into the space business. Last July, Space Shuttle Atlantis was being 
ferried across the United States after landing at Edwards Air Force Base. Due 
to weather conditions, the B-747 ferry crew needed to make an unscheduled 
stop in Amarillo, Texas. Within a few hours, the word had spread on radio and 
television that the space shuttle had landed in Amarillo. What began with a few 
passers-by near the airport turned quickly into an impromptu pilgrimage by 
several hundred and then several thousand people, parents and children to see 
our nation's space shuttle on display. 
Especially poignant in this story is the fact that this airport was named 
after Rick Husband, Commander of Space Shuttle Columbia on February 1, 
2003. Those of us in the space business will never, must never, forget the lessons 
of that day, just as we remember those we learned on January 27, 1967 and 
January 28, 1986. 
I want to conclude on that note of remembrance. We must remember 
how we felt in October 1957; we must remember how we felt in February 
2003; and we must understand how such events change our lives and the 
course of human affairs, especially as we consider what we choose to do in the 
future. And for those in the space policy arena who wonder sometimes what the 
meaning and value of the space program is to the American people, remember 
the story of that stopover in Amarillo. 
We are only 50 years into the development of space, with milestones of 
both joy and tragedy behind us. Preparing for and having a part in it has filled 
my life. I have been very lucky. 
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The first Goddard Symposium was organized in 1961; and the theme 
for that year's meeting was "The Interaction of Space Vehicles with an Ionized 
Atmosphere." This year's theme, "Exploration to Commercialization: Going to 
Work in Space," deals with some of the many aspects of spaceflight that are not 
simply about scientific discovery or about the unique engineering problems of 
operating in this still-new medium. And if you look at the changing themes of 
this symposium over time, you will notice that this is not an isolated example. 
The themes of this conference have gradually evolved from strictly technical 
subjects to the broader implications of spaceflight for human society. 
This is good, and it should continue. The state of the art in engineering 
is a transitory thing at best. Those, like me, who once studied vacuum tube 
design and programmed in assembly language on "advanced computers with 
16 kilobytes of 16-bit core memory, know this all too well. And the burning 
scientific questions of one generation are the received wisdom of the ones after 
that. It seems quaint, and more, to realize today that Einstein received the 
1921 Nobel Prize for his elucidation of the photoelectric effect in part because 
relativity theory was then still too controversial. Our scientific and technical 
frontiers are transitory, but the deeper questions that devolve, in one form or 
another, to "What does it all mean?" will always be relevant. 
The poster advertising this year's conference shows at first glance the range 
of space endeavors today. Near ~ i r t h ,  we have burgeoning commercial space 
tourism highlighting the role of prizes in spurring technological innovation, 
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as with Burt Rutan's SpaceSbipOne. Moving outward, we will place NASA's 
Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle in orbit around the moon in the next decade, 
breaking out of low Earth orbit for the first time in 45 years. And there is a 
stunning picture of a spiral galaxy bringing to mind the vastness of space with 
all its possibilities. Of course, this poster is hardly drawn to scale. ... But it is 
always easier to be an art critic than an artist, so I better not stray too far out 
of my lane. 
However, I do have one serious point to make about how we in the space 
community try to talk about these larger issues in an understandable way. My 
hope, as an engineer, is that we do not downplay the technical difficulties of 
spaceflight to the general public or to our stakeholders in the White House and 
Congress who don't do what we do for a living. I mean, this is rocket science. 
As just one example, the energy which was harnessed to launch 
SpaceSbipOne on its suborbital flights is about 2 percent of what is needed to get 
into low Earth orbit, never mind carry out missions to the moon, Mars and other 
planets. As I have noted on several occasions, I admire Burt Rutan enormously, 
and even more so the achievement of him and his team with SpaceShipOne. 
But their achievement was one of breaking (thank heavens) organizational and 
institutional paradigms not of pioneering new technical frontiers. We in the 
space community need to communicate these differences clearly. 
While I am speaking of commercial suborbital spaceflight, I will note that 
I also very much hope that NASA researchers and astronauts will be proactive 
in taking advantage of such capabilities as they are developed by the nation's 
entrepreneurs. Last week, NASA's Science Mission Directorate issued a request 
for information on potential human-tended, government-sponsored flight 
experiments which could be flown on such commercial suborbital vehicles. I 
hope this request generates a lot of good ideas because all of us at NASA want 
to figure out how to engage the emerging commercial space sector to advance 
NASA's goals. 
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We would not be where we are today if it weren't for doers with big 
dreams, people like Robert Goddard and Burt Rutan. Burt continues to be an 
inspiration and mentor for many aerospace engineers, with his offices at Scaled 
Composites lined with Aviation Week & Space Technology magazine covers 
depicting his varied handiwork along with a Collier Trophy or two on the 
bookshelf. In many respects, Burt is carrying on the tradition of great engineers 
whose work was initially dismissed but recognized later. 
Robert Goddard, the practical physicist whom we honor with this 
symposium, was another pioneer whose ideas were initially panned. One of 
the oft-told tales in the space business is of how, in 1920, Ihe New York Times 
editorial board questioned Goddard's technical acumen, noting that rockets 
could not operate in the vacuum of space and saying of Goddard: "He only 
seems to lack the knowledge ladled out daily in high schools." Goddard's simple 
yet profound response: "Every vision is a joke until the first man accomplishes 
it; once realized, it becomes commonplace." 
Of course, the truth eventually surfaced. Forty-nine years later (as Apollo 
11 was on its way to the moon) and buried on Page 43 of its July 17, 1969 
edition, Ihe New York Times grudgingly admitted: "It is now definitely 
established that a rocket can function in a vacuum as well as in the atmosphere. 
The Times regrets the error." 
But the quote from Goddard that I like the most is this one: "It is difficult 
to say what is impossible, for the dream of yesterday is the hope of today and 
the reality of tomorrow," because it is my own hopes for the reality of tomorrow 
that I would like to discuss with you this morning. Unfortunately, it is in my 
nature to be a realist. Some in the space community wish that I were more a 
cheerleader or a font of inspiration, but those of you who have known me for 
decades know that such irrational exuberance is not in my character. Thus, I 
sometimes point out the harsh realities with pernicious facts about our nation's 
space and aeronautics enterprise. Just the facts. 
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For example, it is a fact that as a matter of national policy spanning 
multiple administrations and congresses, NASA simply is not allocated the 
budget resources to accomplish all of the many and varied space and aeronautics 
missions that our many constituencies would like us to do. The president's 
request for NASA in fiscal year (FY) 2009 is $17.6 billion out of $3.1 trillion 
for all U.S. government spending, less than 0.6 percent of the entire federal 
budget. During the development peak of the Apollo program, NASA received 
4.4 percent of the federal budget and employed over 400,000 civil servants 
and contractors across the country; today, we employ maybe 90,000 people. 
Adjusted for inflation, NASA's budget is $3 billion less per year than it was the 
last time I was at NASA in the early 1990s. That is about 20 percent less buying 
power today than when I was associate administrator for exploration. These are 
just facts. 
T o  the Bush Administration's strong credit, NASA's budget has kept pace 
with inflation at a time when most other non-defense domestic discretionary 
budgets have not, showing the priority given to the agency's mission after the 
prior years of decline. In keeping with my sardonic side: when you care enough 
to send the very best, send money. This administration has. But the reductions 
made in prior years have not been reversed. Just a fact. 
During this period of declining NASA budgets since I left the agency in 
1994, no viable replacement for the space shuttle was developed; aeronautics 
research funding declined significantly; funding for new space technology dried 
up; and science funding rose to an all-time high percentage of the agency's 
budget. Just facts. 
Thus, a major focus during my tenure as administrator has been to 
find some semblance of budgetary balance among the competing priorities of 
NASA's overall budget within the resources provided, while also returning the 
space shuttle to flight after the Columbia accident, completing the assembly of 
the International Space Station, and building new crew launch systems. 
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As Admiral Hal Gehman noted in the report of the Space Shuttle 
Columbia Accident Investigation Board 5 years ago, "previous attempts to 
develop a replacement vehicle for the aging shuttle represent a failure of national 
leadership." Because of that, we now face a gap in U.S. human spaceflight 
capabilities after shuttle retirement and are reliant upon the Russian Soyuz 
system for transport to and from the space station that we have built. 
Thus, I must admit that our post-Apollo budget history and our posture 
today color my view of the reality of tomorrow. While this is hardly inspirational 
rhetoric, my hope for today to become the reality of tomorrow is that NASA's 
budget will continue to grow at least in accord with the Office of Management 
and Budget's (OMB) inflation index for the next 50 years. This kind of budget, 
and this kind of stability, will produce a pretty good outcome if we manage it 
with a proper sense of purpose. 
About 1 year ago I wrote a lengthy article for Aviation Week & Space 
Technology concerning what we can realistically afford to do under such a 
budget scenario. If we make the necessary strategic investments and maintain 
the sense of purpose that I find around the agency today, then we can indeed be 
back on the moon by 2020, have a lunar base by mid-decade and be on Mars 
by the mid-2030s. 
After I wrote the article, I was criticized for painting a rosy pictu?e by 
using the prescribed OMB inflationary index when some believe that, through 
no fault of our own, the real costs of aerospace goods is much higher. Others 
believe that if aerospace costs are rising disproportionately in compkson to 
other high-tech sectors, the fault lies within our community and our culture 
and should be addressed there. This is not an esoteric argument but one that has 
profound implications for NASA's real purchasing power and ability to plan for 
multiyear projects and programs in an era when the costs of raw materials and 
high-tech labor are increasing higher than inflation. As Albert Einstein observed, 
"The most powerful force in the universe is compound interest." Thus, all I can 
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say is that until someone else demonstrates a better model for inflation than 
OMB's prescribed index, while I might not be full of irrational exuberance, 
I am cautiously optimistic in my hopes for the reality of tomorrow. 
So, given what we know of NASA's budget over the past several decades 
and what we might reasonably project for the future, we can either bemoan the 
underfunding of our nation's efforts in space and aeronautics research, wallow 
in pity about the lack of progress being made or find some more productive and 
constructive approach to our problems. I choose the latter. So let me talk now 
about my second hope for the reality of tomorrow. 
Let us speak openly and honestly about the problems we face in carrying 
out our nation's space program. Over the course of my career in this business, 
I have often been disheartened by the large number of diverse "entrepreneurs" 
in search of NASA funding who place their self interests over the greater good of 
the aerospace community. 'They do not respect the priorities set out for NASA 
by our duly-elected stakeholders in the White House and Congress or even 
the priorities of their own respective science communities in decadal surveys 
by the National Academy of Sciences. Even worse, the rift and harsh rhetoric 
between proponents of robotic science and human spaceflight does not help 
our nation's overall space effort one iota, but it does cause division that weakens 
us. If we wish a better reality for tomorrow, we as a community must police this 
behavior; those who engage in it must be made to feel, and be, unwelcome in 
the community at large. My hope for today is that there will in the future be 
more respect for each others' work. 
I must also point out that there have been many instances where 
proponents of individual missions have downplayed the technical difficulty 
and risk of their individual mission or grossly underestimated the cost and 
effort involved to solve the problems in order to gain "new start" funds for 
a particular project. Everyone knows that, once started, any given mission 
is nearly impossible to cancel; so the goal becomes that of getting started no 
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matter what has to be said or done to accomplish it. I am speaking here not 
only to industry and scientific investigators but also to organizations within 
NASA. This is a matter of integrity for our community. NASA managers, the 
White House and Congress have seen this behavior too many times, and the 
agency has lost a great deal of credibility over the decades as a result. There was a 
time-I remember it, and many of you will also-when what NASA said could 
be taken to the bank. Anyone here think it's like that today? Show of hands? 
I didn't think so. 
I have spent a good portion of my time as administrator trying to 
rebuild that credibility with more rigorous technical review and independent 
cost estimating processes. But folks, we are in this together. We will not be 
trusted with more funding to carry out great, new and exciting space missions 
in the future, human or robotic, if we oversell and under-deliver on our 
commitments today. Across the board, we must be realistic in our assessments 
of cost and technical risk if we are to be trusted with funds provided to us by 
the American taxpayer. 
We must also change some of the ways in which NASA conducts its 
business. No one who has worked both in government and in the private 
sector can fail to note the efficiency of commercial operations as compared to 
those of government. Just as we are conceiving plans for commercial suborbital 
missions, we also recently awarded a contract to the Zero-G Corporation to 
use their aircraft for NASA's microgravity experiments and astronaut training. 
We will be taking a hard look over the coming months to determine whether 
NASA should continue to own and operate its current C-9 aircraft for parabolic 
flights. A couple ofweeks ago, NASA signed a new, funded Commercial Orbital 
Transportation Services (COTS) Space Act Agreement with Orbital Sciences 
and another agreement with SpaceX to spur private industry investment to 
develop and demonstrate cost-effective cargo and crew transport to the space 
station. Our goal is for NASA to be able to purchase commercial delivery of 
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goods to the space station after the shuttle is retired in 2010. With the space 
station as a national laboratory, we are opening it up to commercial use as well 
as to other agencies of government like the National Institutes of Health. We 
are going to work in space. 
Just down the road from here, the men and women of the Goddard Space 
Flight Center are going to work in space. The reality of tomorrow is that over 
the next few years, Goddard is playing a major role in launching nearly a dozen 
science missions-one of the busiest periods in the center's illustrious history. 
First up this year is the Gamma-ray Large Area Space Telescope (GUST),  
a marriage of astronomy and particle physics to study black holes and the physics 
of extreme energies and what composes dark matter. This project, set to launch 
in late May, is also a marriage between NASA, the Department of Energy and 
research institutions in France, Germany, Japan, Italy and Sweden. Indeed, 
over half of NASA's missions involve some form of international cooperation. 
One month ago, we asked the science community and the public to offer 
recommendations on renaming the GLAST mission. Let's hear from you. 
Perhaps the most inspirational mission NASA hopes to carry out later 
this summer is the final servicing mission to the Hubble Space Telescope by 
the crew of STS-125 on Space Shuttle Atlantis. ?he Hubble servicing mission 
turns the unhealthy schism between human and robotic spaceflight into a 
meaningless argument. With four previous service calls, our astronauts risked 
their lives to correct the Hubble's flawed optics, install new gyros, batteries, solar 
arrays as needed and install a series of powerful new instruments, dramatically 
boosting its capabilities and performance. It is a marriage of human ingenuity 
and state-of-the-art scientific know-how and perseverance. I saw that Frank 
Cepollina is speaking here at the Goddard Symposium tomorrow and I would 
rather you hear directly from him what we have accomplished with the Hubble, 
our progress in carrying out this mission and what's next. 
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The scientists and engineers of Goddard are also completing the 
development work for the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO), NASA's first 
mission to our closest celestial neighbor in a long time. The LRO, to launch 
late this year with the Lunar Crater Observation Sensing Satellite (LCROSS) 
lunar impactor, will create the most accurate and comprehensive topographic 
maps of the lunar surface to date, vital for pinpointing landing sites for hture 
manned missions. As Doug Cooke observed last week when unveiling the recent 
Goldstone radar maps of the moon's south pole around the Aitken Basin, an 
area of great potential interest as a landing site, "We now know that the south 
pole has peaks as high as Mt. McKinley and crater floors four times deeper than 
the Grand Canyon. There are challenges that come with such rugged terrain." 
But American explorers, people like Daniel Boone, Meriwether Lewis 
and William Clark, Zebulon Pike and many others who followed are used to 
rugged terrain. Thus, when our astronauts return to the moon for the first time 
in nearly 50 years, they will be blazing new trails and carrying on a rich tradition 
of exploration on the "New Frontier" as President John F. Kennedy framed our 
nation's first forays into space. 
The LRO mission is one of many demonstrating the marriage between 
human and robotic space exploration. The LRO, Mars Reconnaissance 
Orbiter, the Mars Exploration Rovers, the Phoenix Scout and Mars Science 
Laboratory missions are examples of some of the robotic missions that will 
enable future manned exploration as we take the first rudimentary steps out 
into our solar system. 
Another mission which will also enable hture manned exploration is 
slated for liftoff at the end of this year. NASA's Solar Dynamics Observatory 
(SDO), also built here at Goddard, is another mission where the men and 
women of Goddard are turning into the reality of tomorrow. The SDO will be 
an unblinking eye on our sun using the technique of helioseismic imaging to 
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look inside our sun and deliver images with 10 times better resolution than even 
high-definition television. This mission will revolutionize our ability to forecast 
solar storms that disable satellites, scintillate Global Positioning System (GPS) 
signals, cause interference to satellite communications and cell phone calls and 
endanger our astronauts from solar radiation. 'The importance of space weather 
data is evident in that more than 250,000 customers from 150 countries around 
the world receive almost 200 data products monthly, approaching 30 million 
file transfers a month. 
Very recently, the Solar Terrestrial Relations Observatory (STEREO) 
mission, built by my nearby alma mater the Johns Hopkins University Applied 
Physics Laboratory, witnessed the tail of a comet being completely blasted away 
by a coronal mass ejection from the sun. It's an amazing thing to watch; and it's 
posted on the STEREO Web site if you haven't seen it already. 
'The Goddard Space Flight Center is also our nation's premier center 
for global warming research and developing climate change monitoring 
satellites. NASA satellites, many built by Goddard, supply more global climate 
change data than those of any other organization in the world. NASA is also 
the largest contributor to the inter-agency Climate Change Science Program 
(CCSP), providing the more grant-based funding for such research than any 
other organization. We can take great pride in the recognition on the part of 
policymakers and the public of the value of the research coming from NASA's 
Earth scientists. NASA's work in developing so-called green technologies, like 
fuel cells in cars and clean water treatment systems for rural villages in Africa 
and Iraq, is featured in an article "Space is the Place" in this month's issue of 
Sustainable Industries. 'This is one part of turning the hope of today into the 
reality of tomorrow. 
Today, we are living in exciting and tumultuous times; and now is 
the time; this is the juncture; and we are the people to turn our Vision for 
Space Exploration into reality. In order to do so, we must cast aside many old 
chestnuts-like the divisiveness between those of us who work on robotic space 
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and those who work on human missions-to appreciate that many things we 
do in space are conducted for entirely other reasons than science. 
So in conclusion, I would like to repeat a story I told 2 months ago in 
Houston, the heart of our nation's human spaceflight endeavors. We lived 
in similarly tumultuous times 40 years ago in 1968 when I was a college 
sophomore. Former NBC News Anchor Tom Brokaw recently wrote a 
book titled Boom! Voices of the Sixties about that year. With the Vietnam 
War, the assassinations of Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy, the 
struggle for civil rights and women's rights, protests on college campuses and 
the presidential campaigns and election that year, 1968 was a time of great 
upheaval for our nation. 
Tom Brokaw points out a number of parallels between 1968 and today. 
He ends his analysis of that year with a reminder of what the inspirational 
Apollo 8 mission in December 1968 meant to our nation and the world. O n  
Christmas Eve, the crew of Apollo 8-Frank Borman, Jim Lovell and Bill 
Anders-read from the book of Genesis as they cruised in orbit around our 
moon; they saw our fragile Earth rise over the barren horizon of the moon; they 
took the first photograph of our Earth in full with blue oceans, white clouds, 
green and brown land without any artificial national borders. Jim Lovell looked 
back at Earth, held up his thumb and blocked Earth out from his view. He has 
since said that he realized in that moment how small the world he once knew 
was when compared to the vast frontier of space. With all the turmoil of 1968, 
the Apollo 8 mission and this transcendent moment helped all of us to realize 
that we must overcome our common struggles ifwe are to achieve better things 
for ourselves and future generations. 
With both human and robotic eyes, we see our planet, our solar system 
and our universe in ways we never imagined. Space exploration has brought 
many nations together in ways unimagined when NASA was first founded 
50 years ago. "It is difficult to say what is impossible, for the dream of yesterday 
is the hope of today and the reality of tomorrow." Robert Goddard speaks to 
us even today. 
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Human Space Exploration: The Next 50 Years 
Michael D. Griffin 
Administrator 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(This article first appeared in the March 14,2007, 
issue of Aviation Week & Space Technology.) 
"Prediction is difficult, especially the future," said Quantum Physicist 
Niels Bohr, and no one has since captured the underlying concept quite so 
cleverly. But having been foolish enough to accept the challenge of speculating 
upon where the next 50 years will take us in human space exploration, the first 
question to be answered is: where to begin? What is the global view that can 
best shape our thinking? It is so very easy to be completely wrong since a variety 
of radically different futures in spaceflight can be presumed with equal apparent 
credibility today. 
For example, it might be that after completing the construction of the 
International Space Station and retiring the shuttle, the excitement inherent in 
a new reach outward from low Earth orbit will appeal to the next generation, 
leading to a vigorous, technology-driven program; a plan to reach the surface 
of Mars by the late 2020s; and the will to sustain and build upon that early 
presence. Or, interest in human space exploration could once again be 
motivated by competition among spacefaring nations, leading to a modern 
version of the Space Race of the 1960s, producing substantial progress but 
for reasons unsustainable in the longer term. It could be that the unchecked 
growth of entitlements, the generational commitment of resources necessary 
to combat terrorism and a continued downward trend of interest by American 
students in mathematics, science and engineering education will combine to 
make the civil space program as we have known it irrelevant to the lives of 
our grandchildren's generation. Or the truth could lie in some other direction 
entirely; maybe human spaceflight in the next 50 years will be dominated 
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by tourism, first suborbital then orbital, with relatively little in the way of 
independent government activity. 
The one thing of which we can be certain is that in trying to envision 
the world of 2057, two generations in the future, we will be wrong. We will 
be wrong in our assumptions about the larger context of world culture and 
civilization in which space exploration exists; and we will be wrong even in 
the narrower context that is the subject of our attention here. Even the most 
cursory review of some of the key events in the development of spaceflight 
shows the need for great humility by anyone writing an essay on the likely state 
of space exploration in 2057. 
For example, who would have supposed in early 1957 that the Soviet 
Union, and not the United States, would loft the first artificial satellite into 
Earth orbit, the first robotic lunar probe and the first man into space? And 
who would ever have predicted that the United States, stung by losses in a 
competition in which it had not even known it was engaged, would or even 
could respond by carrying out the first lunar landing 8 years and 2 months after 
declaring the goal? Most then-knowledgeable observers believed that such a feat 
was unlikely to be achieved much before the end of the 20th century, if then. 
Not even the most visionary of hard science fiction authors-Asimov, Clarke, 
Heinlein-imagined that it could occur as early as 1969. And then having spent 
$2 1 billion (in mid-1960s dollars) to develop the transportation system to make 
such a thing possible, was it even conceivable that such hard-won capability 
would be utterly discarded within a few years? Who would have imagined it? 
And yet it happened. 
With those thoughts in mind to encourage an appropriate humility, it is 
nonetheless natural to wonder how we might develop a vision of the future that 
is the least likely to be terribly wrong. How can we extrapolate today's world in 
such a way as to avoid the most outrageously wrong predictions? 
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Most of the present discussion will focus on the U.S. government civil 
space program. I will have some comments on the international scene and on 
the possible role of commercial space; but for much of the next five decades, 
the U.S. government will be the dominant entity in determining the course 
of human space exploration. We will, I hope, develop robust international 
partnerships that will enormously enhance the value of space exploration. 
And we must do everything possible to provide an accepting environment for 
commercial space entities, standing down government capability in favor of 
commercial suppliers whenever it becomes possible to do so. But with that said, 
the U.S. today is spending more than twice as much on civil space per capita, as 
any other nation, and I believe this situation is unlikely to change significantly 
for some time. Commercial space firms offer great promise but, so far, limited 
performance. For a while yet, it is the U.S. government, through NASA, that 
determines the main course of human spaceflight. 
Of course, manned spaceflight is broader than exploration, and over the 
next decades it is to be expected that other entities besides the U.S. government, 
both commercial and international, will be conducting human spaceflight 
activities. A spacefaring civilization cannot be the realm only of government 
employees and government sponsored engineers and scientists, though a bias 
toward such groups is clearly one attribute of a frontier activity. But if we 
understand that broader participation is desirable, U.S. human space exploration 
programs can be conducted so as to encourage, rather than minimize, such. 
Doing so will, in my opinion, be a key to its survival and prosperity-a point 
that I will make again in what follows. 
But let us now focus our attention on more specific matters. The most 
straightforward extrapolation is to assume that the future will, on average, be 
much like the past in regard to key,assumptions. Since no aspect of government 
civil spaceflight is more crucial than the funding allocated to it, let's consider 
NASA's funding history for the last 50 years and try to make a reasonable yet 
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conservative projection as to what we might receive in the next 50. And then 
let's consider what that funding might allow us to do, setting aside unforeseeable 
political upheavals. T o  understand where we might go, we must understand 
where we have been. And I think we need a better understanding of our history 
than is commonly the case. 
Any assessment of historical or projected budgets necessarily must be 
done in constant, inflation-adjusted dollars. This fact leads inevitably to the 
question of what inflation index should be used because long-term assessments 
are sensitive to that choice. Many choices are possible. The Bureau of Labor 
Statistics maintains the familiar Consumer Price Index (CPI), applicable to the 
U.S. economy at large, that is, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). However, 
the CPI is not the best measure of inflation for government spending primarily 
because the "market basket" of goods and services applicable to the private and 
public sectors of the economy are very different. The best use of the CPI in 
connection with government programs is in the estimation of the constant-dollar 
"opportunity cost" of government activities to citizens. Government services are 
purchased by taxpayers with CPI-adjusted tax dollars; money paid in taxes is 
money not available to consumers to purchase other goods and services. 
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) publishes several 
inflation indices applicable to different portions of the government sector. For 
government R&D activities, including those at NASA, the OMB prescribes 
the use of the so-called "GDP (chained) Price Index" (www.whitehouse.gov/ 
omb/budget~2008/sheets/bist10zl.x~s). Without delving into the merits and 
shortcomings of various indices, our discussion of inflation-adjusted NASA 
fbnding will employ this index. While fiscal analysis across several decades 
is sensitive to the choice of inflation index, the present discussion is not 
significantly influenced by the choice of the GDP chained index versus other 
OMB indices. Unless specifically stated otherwise, all fiscal discussions in this 
essay are couched in terms of fiscal 2000 dollars with inflation adjustments 
according to the OMB GDP (chained) Price Index. 
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Figure 1 shows the constant-dollar budget for NASA's first 50 years, 
1959-2008, in fiscal 2000 dollars and includes the assumption that the agency 
will be funded in fiscal 2008 at the level of the president's request. Data for 
other fiscal years is historical. The anomalous funding bump in fiscal 1977 is 
due to the inclusion of a fifth "transition quarter" in that year since in 1976 
the fiscal year boundary was shifted from July 1 to October 1 where it remains 
today. Major events in NASA's history-the "Apollo Peak," the post-Apollo 
aerospace depression and the supplemental funding provided by Congress in 
response to the Challenger disaster are all clearly visible in figure 1. 
As seen, NASA today is funded at a constant-dollar level slightly higher 
than the agency's historical average. With proposed growth in the president's 
budget for fiscal 2008-12 roughly matching the anticipated rate of inflation 
over the next several years, agency funding is expected to remain slightly above 
the 50-year average. 
In an attempt to offer a reasonable but conservative vision for government 
civil space activities, let us assume that NASA continues in fiscal 2013 and 
beyond to be funded in constant dollars at the average level of the president's 
request for fiscal 2008-12. This is illustrated in figure 2 with the average out-year 
budget assumed to be $14.2 billion in fiscal 2000 dollars. We in the space 
community will certainly hope for more but we should not expect less. More 
properly, we should expect to perform in such a manner-actually delivering 
a bold, exciting, efficient and effective space program, instead of PowerPoint 
charts with hopes and dreams-that policymakers do not want to provide less! 
The year-to-year budget profile will show some variability, of course, 
but we should expect considerably more strategic and fiscal stability than was 
evidenced in the agency's first few decades. Minor annual variations should 
not affect the larger picture; on the 5- to 15-year cycle of developmental 
space programs and projects, it is the average level of funding which is the 
most significant parameter. The total funding received by the agency over a 
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significant period, a decade or more, together with stability of strategic goals, 
largely determines what can be accomplished. 
Figure 3 offers a different view of historical and projected NASA 
funding for the past and future 50 years. Funding is aggregated by decade and 
incorporates the assumption of a stable constant-dollar budget embodied in 
figure 2. Figure 4 provides a similar view with funding aggregated in 15-year 
intervals and constant inflation-adjusted funding assumed through 2063. 
This 15-year assessment period is particularly convenient since essentially all 
Mercury, Gemini, Apollo and Skylab development and operations are captured 
within the first 15 years of NASA's history. 
Figures 3 and 4 offer what might be a new perspective for many. From a 
decadal viewpoint, the "Apollo peak" in NASA funding, regarded by so many 
as the agency's halcyon period, is a myth. In truth, NASA received funding 
well above its historical average level for only 5 years, 1964-68, followed by a 
lengthy and debilitating reduction. But when averaged over decadal or 15-year 
time scales, the nation's civil space program has experienced no particularly 
noteworthy funding peaks. The highest historical funding period was actually 
in the decade (or 15-year interval) centered on the early 1990s and not during 
Apollo. Further, if we assume funding stability in constant dollars (shown in 
figure 2), the total in every subsequent decade will match that of the Apollo 
development decade of 1959-68. Expressed in a slightly different way, NASA 
could carry out a complete Apollo-scale effort every 15 years between the present 
day and the 100th anniversary of Sputnik. 
Let us now address another time-honored belief about the Apollo era. 
When we talk about an "Apollo-scale effort," it is important to understand that, 
contrary to conventional wisdom, we are not talking about an agency devoted 
exclusively to human exploration. The funding record clearly shows that the 
"Apollo era" was actually quite a lot more than just that. 
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In the Apollo development decade of 1959-68, human spaceflight received 
63 percent of the budget. Funding specifically for Apollo from its inception in 
fiscal 196 1 to its completion in fiscal 1973 was about $105 billion in fiscal 2000 
dollars. If Mercury ($1.9 billion), Gemini ($5.1 billion) and Skylab ($12 billion) 
are included, the entire human spaceflight program from 1959-73 received 
about $125 billion, or 6 1 percent of the $206 billion allocated to NASA during 
this period. Little has changed in this regard; today, the president's fiscal 2008 
budget request assigns 62 percent of NASA's funding to human spaceflight. 
'The list of achievements in both aeronautics and space science from 
1959-73 is long and impressive. Aeronautical accomplishments of this era 
include 199 research flights of the three X-15 rocket planes; the development 
and flight testing of a half-dozen lifting-body designs; groundbreaking work 
in computational fluid dynamics; development of the supercritical wing and 
the digital fly-by-wire flight control system; and (in conjunction with the Air 
Force) major roles in the XB-70 and YF12A programs. 'The "Apollo era" was a 
true golden age for aeronautics research, which was allocated 6 percent of the 
NASA budget from 1959-68. 
In space science the list of accomplishments is, if anything, even more 
impressive. 'The "Apollo era" saw dozens of Explorer missions including the 
Radio Astronomy Explorer and Atmospheric Explorer series; a dozen Pioneer 
missions including Pioneers 10 and 11 to Jupiter and Saturn; Rangers 1-9; 
Surveyors 1-7; Mariners 1-10; the Orbiting Solar Observatory, Orbiting 
Geophysical Observatory and Orbiting Astronomical Observatory series; 
as well as most of the money for two Viking missions to Mars launched in 
1975. The Television Infrared Observation Satellite (TIROS), Nimbus and 
Environmental Science Service Administration (ESSA) series pioneered the 
development of weather satellites. 'The "Apollo era" was also a golden age for 
space science, which received 17 percent of the NASA budget from 1959-68. 
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About 10 percent of the 1959-68 budget was devoted to space technology 
development, including space communications technology, and 4 percent was 
devoted to "Other", that is, university support and cross-agency activities. 
The summary below shows a "then and now" comparison. In contrast to 
oft-repeated claims, human spaceflight is not growing relative to other portions 
of the NASA portfolio and is not "eating everyone's lunch." 
Category 1959-68 FY08 Request 
Human Space Flight 
Science 
Aeronautics 
Comm. & Space Tech. 
Cross-Agency Support 
The historical record provides clear evidence that it is possible to have 
robust, co-existing programs of human exploration, space science, aeronautics 
and technology development in a single agency funded at a level essentially the 
same as we presently receive. So what might the future offer? 
Let us assume for the present discussion that, over the long term, 
manned spaceflight will continue to receive 62 percent of the NASA budget. 
Again assuming inflation-adjusted funding at $14.2 billion per year on average, 
it follows that human spaceflight will be allocated $8.8 billion annually or 
$132 billion in each 15-year period in fiscal 2000 dollars. 
Next, we must recognize that "the future" really does not and cannot 
start until after 2010. Until then, we are engaged in completing a long-standing 
commitment to the space station with no other option besides the space shuttle 
to do it. At present funding levels, we cannot afford to develop new human 
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spaceflight systems without the money that becomes available following 
shuttle retirement. 
Despite the concerns of those-emphatically including myself-who 
worry about the gap in human spaceflight between the retirement of the space 
shuttle and the availability of the new Constellation systems, Orion and Ares, 
we must stay on our present course and retire the shuttle in 2010 if there is to 
be a future for human spaceflight. 'The shuttle offers truly stunning capability 
greater than anything we will see for a long time, but the expense of owning 
and operating it or any similar system is simply too great. Any new system, 
to be successful, must offer a much, much lower fixed cost of ownership. 'The 
space shuttle was designed to be cost effective at a weekly flight rate, a goal that 
was never credible if for no reason other than the fact that the funding for so 
many payloads to fly on it was never remotely available. And if there were a 
predictable requirement for 50-60 government-sponsored payloads to be flown 
annually, that fact should be treated as a market opportunity for a private, not 
government, space transportation enterprise. A government human spaceflight 
system must be designed to be cost effective at the half-dozen or so flights per 
year that we can expect to fly. 
But if the bad news is that "the future" doesn't start until after 2010, 
the good news is that it is only 4 years away. And in the 45 years thereafter by 
the centennial anniversary of Sputnik, we can expect to receive at least as much 
money as was necessary for Apollo three times over. And despite the limited 
funding for exploration in today's NASA budget, we will have a bit of a head 
start because we're making considerable progress toward the deployment of 
Orion and Ares even while flying out the shuttlelspace station manifest. So 
what will we do with this money? 
Most of the next 15 years will be spent recreating capabilities we once 
had, and discarded. 'The next lunar transportation system will offer somewhat 
more capability than Apollo. It will carry four people to the lunar surface instead 
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of two for a minimum duration of 1 week rather than a maximum duration of 
3 days. But in all fairness, the capabilities inherent in Orion, Ares I and Ares V 
are not qualitatively different than those ofApollo and certainly are not beyond 
the evolutionary capability of Apollo-era systems had we taken that course. But 
we did not and the path back out into the solar systems begins, inevitably, with 
a lengthy effort to develop systems comparable to those we once owned. It will 
cost us about $85 billion in fiscal 2000 currency to get to the seventh lunar 
landing by 2020. 
The above assessment is, for many, a bitter pill to swallow. Not only is 
it depressing for advocates of human exploration to face the fact that so many 
years will be spent plowing old gound but there is also the question of why 
it will take so long. Again, the answer is captured in the funding profile. We 
are indeed receiving today in any given 15-year period, the same real-dollar 
funding as in the 15 years of the Apollo era, but we are not receiving it on the 
same schedule. The brief, enormous funding peak of the mid-1960s allowed 
the Apollo systems to be developed and procured in parallel. Today's systems 
must be developed serially. And that is why the job will not be done, this time, 
in 8 years. But that is also why we will not incur the disastrous divestiture of 
talent and technology that occurred in the 15 years after Apollo between the 
early 1970s and the late 1980s. 
In the long run, to return to the moon or go to Mars and beyond, stability 
is to be valued more than going in the shortest possible time. As we move forward 
into our next 50 years, this must be fully understood by both policymakers and 
the public or we will forever be answering the question as to why we work so 
slowly compared to the Apollo generation. Civil space exploration beyond low 
Earth orbit must have the stability in strategy and funding that was lacking the 
first time around. This will only be provided by policymakers if a clear link is 
established between predictable results and predictable purpose, strategy and 
funding. I believe we will succeed in forging this new paradigm-the opposite of 
Part 3: Getting There from Here 317 
the Apollo "man, moon, decade" paradigm-but we must devote considerable 
attention to doing so. 
What will be done with the lunar transportation capability that is being 
developed? By 2020 we will have this capability and with it choices to make. 
We can choose between a lunar program devoted to sortie missions or one 
devoted to building up a lunar outpost. And we can choose between the level 
of effort we intend to focus on lunar activities versus initiating development for 
Mars missions. In company with other space agencies around the world, we at 
NASA have focused on an outpost-centered lunar exploration strategy. I believe 
this will be preferred over a sortie-only strategy for the reasons that it provides 
a much more effective avenue for international partnership and because it 
provides the greatest opportunity to learn on the moon what we need to know 
to go to Mars. But of course nothing prevents a sortie mission to any location 
on the moon that is of sufficient interest to justify the expenditure of funds. So 
again, let us look at what is fiscally possible. 
It is to be hoped and, I believe, expected that the next era of space 
exploration will be international in scope in much the same fashion as the 
development of the space station today. Whatever might be said of the space 
station program-and there cannot be much that has been left unsaid-it has 
pioneered a path to the development of a major international space facility. 
There are lessons learned in so doing that we will take with us out into the solar 
system. These lessons will be the most enduring and ultimately most valuable 
contributions the space station can make. We will be applying them on Mars 
50 years from now. 
The United States is developing the transportation system which will 
allow access to the lunar surface for the first time in a half-century. This is the 
highest "barrier to entry" for exploration beyond low Earth orbit, one which 
essentially exhausts the contribution that we can make to a lunar outpost in 
the next 15 years. If there is to be a lunar presence significantly beyond merely 
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getting there and getting back, if there is to be a human tended outpost, 
much of the early capability must be developed by international partners. 
But outpost sustainability, at least in the early years, will largely depend upon 
Orion and Ares. 
I believe that by 2021-22 we will have regained enough experience in 
lunar spaceflight operations that we will be able to undertake a modest but 
sustained and sustainable program of lunar outpost development and utilization. 
I will also venture to say that by 2022 the space station will be definitely behind 
us. We will have learned from it what we can, but there will come a time when 
the value of the work being done onboard the facility will be judged not to 
be worth the cost of sustaining its aging systems and it will be brought down. 
I don't know when this will occur and I am not sure it is predictable other 
than in a statistical sense, but I believe that by 2022 or thereabouts it will have 
happened. And when it does, the resources that have been used for space station 
support can be applied to the support of a lunar outpost. 
For the sake of argument and nothing more, let us say that in 2022 we 
will begin a sustained lunar program of exploration and development consisting 
of three manned missions (two outpost crew rotations and one sortie) and one 
unmanned cargo mission per year utilizing three Orion and Ares I vehicles 
and four Ares V launches. Present projections assume a cargo capacity of 
6 metric tons on a lander carrying four crewmembers and 20 metric tons on a 
cargo lander at a marginal cost of about $750 million for a human mission and 
$525 million for a cargo mission. The marginal cost in fiscal 2000 dollars for 
this nominal lunar program will thus be about $3 billion. 
These marginal costs do not include an allocation of the fixed costs of 
production and operations which will be assigned to each flight. Let us assume 
a fixed-cost support base of $1 billion annually with about a third of that for 
the shuttle today, equivalent to roughly 6,000 full-time employees at average 
fiscal 2000 labor rates. We should all work to make it much less; but this is an 
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appropriately conservative estimate for the present. 'This ~ields a sustained lunar 
program costing no more than $4 billion per year, leaving $4.8 billion annually 
in the human spaceflight account to be applied to new development priorities. 
By the 2020s, we will be well positioned to begin the Mars effort in 
earnest. The lunar campaign will have stabilized; a human-tended outpost 
will be well established; we will have extensive long-duration space experience 
in both zero- and low-gravity conditions, and it will be time to bundle these 
lessons and move on to Mars, which does not imply that we will bring lunar 
activities to an end. Quite the contrary. My prediction is that the moon will 
prove to be far more interesting, and far more relevant to human affairs, than 
many today are prepared to believe. But by the early 2020s, it will be time to 
assign a stable level of support for lunar activities and set out for Mars. 
'The development of the Orion, Ares I and Ares V transportation system 
is being done in a way that provides a substantial capability for subsequent 
Mars expeditions. In particular, we expect the Orion crew vehicle (or a modest 
upgrade of it) to provide the primary transportation from Earth to whatever 
transportation node is used for the assembly of the Mars ship and to be the 
reentry vehicle in which the crew returns home at the end of the voyage. The 
Ares V cargo vehicle will provide, with no more than a half-dozen launches, the 
500 metric tons or so which is thought to be necessary for a Mars mission based 
on present-day studies. As a perspective on scale, this mass is about 25 percent 
greater than that of the completed space station. 
It is difficult to estimate the non-recurring cost of developing a Mars 
mission that is initiated some 20 or more years in the future and especially so 
when a specific mission architecture has not yet been formulated. But reasoned 
estimates can be made. A small group co-chaired by Skykb and shuttle astronaut 
Owen Garriott and me made an attempt to do so in a study conducted for 
The Planetary Society in 2004. While necessarily omitting many important 
details, a reasonable approach based on mission mass, consistent with modern 
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cost estimation algorithms, was outlined. It was concluded that, following a 
decadal hardware development cycle, nine Mars missions could be conducted 
over a 20-year period for a total cost of approximately $120 billion in fiscal 
2000 dollars or $6 billion per year, significantly less than we are spending on 
the shuttle an space station today. (If this seems low, it should be noted that 
the development cost of the heavy-lift transportation system is allocated to the 
earlier lunar program. 'The Mars program would pay only the marginal cost 
of transportation.) 
Allocating an across-the-board 30 percent reserve at this stage puts the 
cost of a 30-year Mars exploration program at $156 billion in fiscal 2000 dollars. 
Of this, approximately $70 billion consists of development cost with reserve. 
If $4.8 billion per year is available in the human spaceflight account, then the 
Mars mission development cycle will require about 15 years. 'Thus, if we begin 
development work in 2021, we will be able to touch down on the Martian 
surface in about 2037 with follow-on missions every 26 months thereafter for 
the next two decades. 
So there we have it, at least for the U.S. civil space program. At present 
levels of real-dollar funding, by 2057 we can celebrate the 35th anniversary of a 
lunar base, which will be growing in capability at the rate of 30 metric tons per 
year, even without assuming any international partner contribution to logistics 
(which I believe is overly conservative). 
We can celebrate the 100th Sputnik anniversary in conjunction with the 
20th anniversary of the first human Mars landing. And we can do all of these 
things even with what I would consider the pessimistic assumption that we 
receive no more money in constant dollars than we do today. Indeed, there 
should be money available for missions to interesting near-Earth objects, a 
separate challenge which we will come to understand offers huge opportunities 
for those seeking to develop a spacefaring civilization. 
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That's what I see ahead for the American space program. What about 
the rest of the world? Both Russia and China have domestic human spaceflight 
capability today; indeed, the space station program would be in very difficult 
straits without Russian crew and cargo services. Other nations or alliances- 
Europe, Japan, India, Brazil and others-could develop similar capabilities 
within a few years of a decision to do so. For advanced nations today, possessing 
the capability for human spaceflight to low Earth orbit is a political and not a 
technical decision. But going beyond low Earth orbit to the moon is a problem 
of a different order. And yet the moon is a necessary first step outward for any 
nation seeking a spacefaring future. So let us look at the resources required to 
pursue such a future. 
The development phase ofApollo required about $80-85 billion in fiscal 
2000 currency, about the same as we predict will be required to redevelop similar 
capabilities. Constellation systems will, as stated earlier, offer substantially more 
performance than Apollo; but it does seem as if an effort of approximately this 
magnitude is necessary no matter what. There is an inherent "knee" of the cost 
versus performance curve; it takes a lot of effort to get to the moon, after which 
additional capability can be added at somewhat less marginal cost. 
So let's assume a minimum required effort of about $80 billion is required 
to develop a basic lunar capability. In the U.S., at approximate average aerospace 
labor rates for fiscal 2000 this is equivalent to an effort of roughly 600,000 
man-years or 40,000 people for 15 years. Other nations will likely operate in a 
somewhat "leaner" fashion than is characteristic of the U.S. aerospace culture. 
I will always remember Max Faget's comment to me that "we could have done 
Apollo with a lot fewer people, but we couldn't have done it with any more." 
But it remains likely that an effort similar to Apollo will be required for any 
nation or society attempting to reach the moon for the first time, provided it 
has access to the necessary industrial base and an adequate workforce. 
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Many nations or alliances can as a matter of political choice decide to 
mount such an effort. Europe has a population 50 percent greater than that of 
the U.S. yet spends on a per-capita basis only about a fifth of what we spend 
on space. A future European generation could choose to do otherwise. India 
has a middle class population equal in size to the entire U.S. population and 
produces engineering graduates equal to the best anywhere. Chinese space 
agency representatives have remarked publicly that, today, some 200,000 
engineers and technicians are engaged in space-related work. And of course 
Russia could begin the development of a lunar transportation system today, 
essentially at its discretion given its existing spaceflight capability and the recent 
and continuing flow of energy money into that country. 
By the mid-to-late 2020s at the latest, several nations will have the 
independent capability to reach the moon and will be doing so. My hope is that 
the various programs can be bent more toward a cooperative than a competitive 
agenda. I believe that nations will find it to be in their interests to cooperate 
in lunar exploration and development, as they do in Antarctica today. But it 
will also be true that each nation develop key elements of space infrastructure, 
especially transportation but also navigation and communications assets, and be 
unlikely to set them aside in favor of reliance on others. For the next generation, 
maybe as much as two decades, the U.S. may well be the only nation capable of 
reaching the moon on its own. But much beyond that, I suspect that we'll be 
there with others. 'The moon will be within the grasp of a significant number 
of advanced nations. It will be the next big leap, a voyage to Mars, where 
international cooperation is a requirement, rather than an option. 
What will be the role of commercial space entities in human exploration? 
By "commercial space," I mean space business enterprises which develop a 
marketable capability while dealing at "arms length" with the government, 
that is, largely without the financial backing and close government supervision 
which has historically characterized the space industry. 'The government will, 
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at least initially, still be the major customer for such enterprises. Whether or not 
an enterprise is part of the commercial space arena depends not on the identity 
of its customers but on the nature of its interactions with that customer. 
I expect that the role of commercial space in human space exploration 
will be significant and possibly transforming over the next five decades and 
beyond. We at NASA are presently engaged in an effort to determine whether 
it is possible for a commercial firm to develop orbital space transportation 
capabilities without the close supervision of the government. 'The latter approach 
through what are commonly known as "prime contracts" with industry has been 
the traditional approach over the last five decades for state-of-the-art projects 
in the defense and aerospace industry. It produces successful outcomes with 
reasonable certainty and at great expense. 
I believe it is obvious to most that if a desired product lies within the 
state of the art, it can be provided with substantially greater efficiency by the 
commercial sector than by the government. 'There is little comparative data 
obtained under controlled conditions to support this claim or to estimate the 
efficiency factor involved. But to me, the limited data and my own experience 
points to an efficiency factor of three to seven in favor of the commercial sector. 
Whatever the factor, the likely cost benefit to the government of commercial 
procurement of space goods and services, once it is possible, cannot and will 
not be ignored. But, again, the crucial assumption is that the intended product 
lies well within the state-of-the-art. When this assumption cannot be met, 
close government involvement will continue to be required. Commercial firms 
simply cannot be successful if engaged in a research upon whose success their 
revenue depends. 
Some have opined that the scale and difficulty of spaceflight is such 
that it will remain an inherently governmental enterprise for the foreseeable 
future. I do not share this view. For me, the question is more properly "when" 
not "if' the state-of-the-art in astronautics will permit a private enterprise 
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to develop a successful orbital transportation capability without the direct 
support-and the accompanying onerous and expensive oversight-of a 
government prime contract. 
We at NASA are attempting to determine whether this date has in fact 
arrived. By providing "seed money" in the form of Space Act Agreements for 
two Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) entities, we hope to 
stimulate the attainment of entrepreneurial commercial space transportation. If 
such capability is successfully demonstrated, we can then procure such services in 
a manner more characteristic of the economy at large than is the usual case in the 
government-driven aerospace sector. We at NASA are prepared to stand down 
government systems as and when commercial capability becomes available. 
Whether or not the specific COTS initiative is successful, the commercial 
space business model will eventually become so. A long-term government 
sponsored space exploration program carries with it the implicit demand for 
many tons of cargo logistics and crew transport, offering a stable and tempting 
market niche for industry. Some enterprises will be surely successful in their 
attempts to service this market and from there commercial space activity will 
bloom. In addition to transportation, space exploration implies the need for 
communications, navigation, power systems and other support infrastructure. 
These requirements will be targeted by specific firms as services to be provided 
commercially rather than by government. 
I believe that the future for U.S. civil space exploration that I have 
outlined here can be attained with the resources that will be available to NASA 
by means of conventional government appropriations and acquisition strategies. 
But I also believe that this is just about as much as we can achieve with those 
resources unless we can effect real changes in our methods of doing business. 
If we want to do more, if we want a richer future, if we are unsatisfied by the 
relatively modest program of inner solar system exploration I have envisioned 
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here, there must be a change in how we go about it. Embracing the possibilities 
inherent in commercial space transactions is one such method. 
What else do we have to do to bring about this future? Most of what we 
need to accomplish the set forth here has already been discussed, implicitly 
or explicitly, in connection with budgetary issues; but it may be helpful to 
concentrate some attention on the matter. 
The most important factor for future success is stability in purpose, 
strategy, requirements and funding. Apollo funding was unstable in both 
directions. The huge rate of early growth allowed the Apollo goal to be met; 
the abrupt cessation of funding as the goal drew within sight produced strategic 
damage that remains unto the present day. 
To be successful, program managers (whether in government or industry) 
need stability. Additionally, they need the knowledge that there will be such 
stability; defensive planning is inherently wasteful. 
Stability of purpose, a result of agreement upon priorities, is as important 
as funding stability. Managers must have reasonable and effective control over 
what is done with the resources-people, money and time-entrusted to them. 
If funding is in fact stable, then additional money will not be available to solve 
problems that are inevitably encountered in any state-of-the-art development 
program. Managers must have the latitude to sacrifice or defer lower priority efforts 
in order to protect more important ones. This in turn requires, at a minimum, 
broad agreement on what those priorities are. When this cannot be obtained, 
every programmatic overrun and every minor budget variation produces divisive 
political infighting over what will be sacrificed and what will not. A common 
result is that nothing is sacrificed and all programmatic content is preserved but 
at a slower pace. %is produces an inherent inefficiency in the execution of all 
programs, resulting in more overruns, etc., in a degenerating spiral. It is difficult 
and hugely wasteful to carry out a program in such an environment. 
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There is another aspect of stability that is equally crucial to bring about 
in the future outlined here. It involves, once again, a lesson to be gained from 
the past. ?his is the absolute necessity of fully utilizing the systems we develop, 
at huge expense, rather than discarding them in favor of something appealing 
because it is new. This aspect of stability has had a direct impact on NASA's 
ability to maintain stability of both purpose and funding for decades. 
We must treat our space systems as we have always treated our 
airplanes. Successful aircraft designs, from general aviation airplanes to the 
highest-performance military fighters, are evolved, upgraded and used for 
decades. Just as with DC-3s, B-52s and many other aircraft, we need to 
understand that Orion and Ares will be flown by the grandkids of the first 
astronauts who take them into space. We simply cannot again afford the 
strategic distraction, the wasted money, the squandered talent, and the lost 
time of building a new human spaceflight system and then using it for only 
16 missions. 
Once again, a look at the budgetary history provides a sobering lesson for 
the future, a sobering view of "what might have been." Let's recycle to the early 
1970s, a time of budgetary starvation for NASA, a time when we did not yet 
have the space shuttle but did still have the Apollo systems-the Saturn I-B and 
Saturn V, the Apollo commandlservice modules (CSM), the lunar lander and 
the Skylab system. All of these things were in existence in 1973, having been 
created in that seminal first 15 years of our agency's history. 
Make no mistake; these systems were far from perfect. They were 
expensive to develop and expensive to operate. Our parents and grandparents, 
metaphorically speaking, did not really know quite what they were doing when 
they set out to accept President Kennedy's challenge to go to the moon. They 
learned as they went along. But what they eventually built worked and worked 
well. And it could have kept working at a price we could afford. 
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Let's look at some recurring costs in dollars then and now. All costs include 
both hardware and mission operations and are at the high end of the range of 
possibilities because they take no advantage of stable rates of production. Fiscal 
2000 costs are approximate, obtained by inflating programs in the aggregate 
rather than tracking and inflating separate expenditures of reaLyear dollars. 
Element Real-Year $ M Fiscal 2000 $ M 
Apollo CSM 50 160 
Apollo Lunar Module 120 400 
Apollo Lunar Mission 720 2400 
Saturn I-B 35 120 
Saturn V 325 1100 
Skylab Cluster 275 925 
Let's assume that we had kept flying with the systems we had at the time, 
that we had continued to execute two manned Apollo lunar missions every year 
as was done in 1971-72. This would have cost about $4.8 billion annually in 
fiscal 2000 dollars. 
Further, let us assume that we had established a continuing program of 
space station activities in Earth orbit built on the Apollo CSM, Saturn I-B and 
Skylab systems. Four crew rotation launches per year plus a new Skylab cluster 
every 5 years to augment or replace existing modules would have cost about 
$1.5 billion per year. This entire program of six manned flights per year, two 
of them to the moon, would have cost about $6.3 billion annually in fiscal 
2000 dollars. The average annual NASA budget in the 15 difficult years from 
1974-88 was $10.5 billion; with 60 percent of it allocated to human spaceflight, 
there would have been sufficient funding to continue a stable program of 
lunar exploration as well as the development of Earth orbital infrastructure. 
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I suggest that this would have been a better strategic alternative than the choices 
that were in fact made almost 40 years ago. 
After a time, as NASA budgets once again improved, we would have 
begun to concentrate our lunar activity around an outpost and we would have 
used cargo missions to emplace the outpost equipment. A modified Apollo 
lunar module descent stage with extra fuel and cargo replacing the ascent stage 
could have been used for the purpose. The Saturn V could deliver two such 
vehicles with a single launch. So over time, we could have built up an early 
lunar outpost, or smaller ones at different places of interest. By the present 
day, using what we had with minimal modifications-and I will remind us all 
that the Soyuz systems of that era are still flying-we would have a vast store 
of experience and a significant amount of lunar infrastructure. When the civil 
space budget eventually improved, as it did, we would have been well positioned 
to begin development of a Mars mission. And in the meantime without doubt, 
we would have continued to modify, refine and incrementally improve the old 
Apollo designs to the point where they would have provided greatly enhanced 
effectiveness by the present day. 
If we had done all this, we would be on Mars today and not writing about 
it as a subject for "the next 50 years." We would have decades of experience 
operating long-duration space systems in Earth orbit and similar decades of 
experience in exploring and learning to utilize the moon. This essay on "the 
next 50 years" would be quite different than the one I am offering here. I think 
most of us will agree that it would have been a better one. 
Now, nothing is as easy as planning in hindsight or as permanent as a 
lost opportunity. I offer the "alternative history" above not to throw stones at 
policymakers long departed from the scene but to inform future decisions. If we 
ignore these lessons, we will surely repeat them. 
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The vision of the next 50 years in space that I have outlined here is 
not a flight of fancy. It does not require a course change from present 
understandings or extensive development of costly new technology. It is a 
logical, incremental, stable and sustainable plan that can be executed with 
realistically attainable budgets. For these reasons, I believe that it will be done 
and done as envisioned here. We really can celebrate the 100th anniversary of 
Sputnik with the 20th anniversary of the first human landing on Mars. It is up 
to us to make it so. 
